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U. S. Grant
Lt. Gen. U.S.A.

GRANT

AND

HIS CAMPAIGNS:

A MILITARY BIOGRAPHY.

BY

HENRY COPPÉE, A. M.,

EDITOR OF THE UNITED STATES SERVICE MAGAZINE.



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P R E F A C E.

THE following Military Biography of Lieutenant-General Grant is intended to offer but an outline of the great events in which he has borne the most distinguished part. As he held an independent command of troops in the field, from the beginning of the war—the movement upon Corinth only excepted—I have endeavored to present his plans, their execution, and the results, without entering into the minute details of the battle tactics; giving only so much of these as is necessary to enable the reader to understand the general's purposes and achievements.

In writing the life of a subordinate commander, we should gain in detail, but lose in comprehension,—dwelling more upon what he did, than upon the relations sustained to other men and movements on the field; but it is different here. Grant's life requires a glance at every part of the field of Pittsburg Landing; the great outline of the Vicksburg campaign; a summary of the splendid military successes at Chattanooga. After his appointment as commander-in-chief, all parts of the vast theatre of operations must be considered; while, as he made his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac, and personally directed it, more stress must be laid upon the movements of that army than upon others.

I have said thus much by way of self-vindication, should any reader—especially some gallant soldier—fail to find as many battle pictures, and as much of the movements of the lesser organizations, as he had expected. I could not neglect the philosophy of Grant's history, and there was not space for both.

In describing his earlier campaigns, I have had recourse to much fuller material than in the latter portions. The reports of many subordinate commanders, Union and Confederate, have been pub-

lished, and there are even critical commentaries upon these, which guard the historian against error. But in the latter parts, there is yet great dearth of detail. I have been obliged to depend, for the connected outline, upon the masterly—I may say, model—report of General Grant; and for details to such materials as had been received, not even including extended reports of the corps-commanders.

It is not improbable, therefore, that, for want of such corrective matter in the details, I may have made occasional mistakes, in spite of my best efforts to avoid doing so.

When such errors are pointed out, they shall be corrected.

I must express my hearty thanks to General Grant for his kindness in sanctioning my attempt to portray his military career, and to Major-General Rawlins for his invaluable assistance in furnishing materials without which the work could not have been written. Most of this material could not have been otherwise obtained. For its use, and the form in which it is presented, I alone am responsible.

To my friend, Captain Thomas Mitchell, of Philadelphia, late a staff-officer in the Army of the Potomac, I am indebted for valuable assistance in collecting notes, and in transcribing some of the earlier portions of the work.

I shall be amply paid for my labors, which have been arduous, if my simple narrative shall prove to the world the truth of the opinion, already very widely entertained, that Grant is the first soldier of the age, and the most distinguished American of the Regenerated Republic.

H. C.

PHILADELPHIA, December 1, 1865.

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FROM profound peace to civil war! In an instant, with no premonitions that we could regard,—so often had the threat been made, and the promise not made good,—the poetical tocsin sounded historically for America in the first gun, fired with great joy and gratitude by the venerable Edmund Ruffin,* of Virginia, against the devoted band of seventy patriot soldiers, whom, by a providential policy, and in spite of an effete administration, Major Robert Anderson had placed in Fort Sumter. This was a strong work of the United States, built with government money on government property, in Charleston harbor, for the occupation of which South Carolina, even after her unlawful secession, had not even the shadow of a State-rights' claim. Foul as was the deed, it was needed to awake the nation to its self-respect and self-preservation. The

* "The first shot at Fort Sumter, from Stevens' Battery, was fired by the venerable Edmund Ruffin, of Virginia."—*New York Herald*, April 13, 1861. On the 20th of June, 1865, this venerable gentleman, disgusted at the downfall of the cause of which he had fired the signal-gun, blew out his brains: he certainly made two remarkable shots.

loyal masses rose at the sound. Men of all social grades, all occupations, almost all shades of politics, felt that the crisis, long prophesied, but never fully expected, had indeed come; and that the nation must now and at once awake, arise, or be forever fallen. Supine before, only anxious to avert the horrid scourge of a desolating civil war, many true patriots would have been held back by sentiments of humanity from proceeding to extremities with the rebellious States; and had not the Sumter cowardice been perpetrated, we might still have been ruled by a Southern oligarchy, representing neither the best men nor the masses of the South, and we would have been subjected to the vaporings and hectorings with which South Carolina regaled the country for so many years, until the subversion of our Government, undertaken in some other more prudent and politic manner, should have occurred.

The gage of battle thus thrown down was the best thing for the United States Government. It placed the seceding States, by their own action, out of the pale of the constitution. They had said: "We ask no rights from you; we declare the Union dissolved; the constitution, for us, annulled; we will maintain our own rights." It put us, too, in our true position, as men contending no longer for a dogma or a whim, but for the salvation of the country. Every true patriot, even though he had been a pro-slavery democrat, found now no longer Southern friends to aid in what they considered the maintenance of their legal rights; but Southern traitors and armed rebels to conquer, and either bring back to their allegiance, or destroy, root and branch, with all the causes and all the institutions whence the treason and the rebellion had sprung. Their armies were to be beaten, their territory retaken, their property confiscated, and finally, if necessary, their slaves emancipated. This was, from the first, the true and simple logic of the war; and to this, as the alternative of victory, the rebels set their seal and subscription when the venerable Edmund Ruffin fired the first gun at Fort Sumter. Of course they expected to succeed; but failing of this, they had a right to expect nothing less than what has happened.

The reverberation of Ruffin's cannon went rolling over the land. It leaped the Blue Ridge, screamed through its wild passes, traversed the valleys of tributary streams, and poured in unabated thunder-tones upon the banks of the Mississippi. Everywhere it roused the patriots to action. The country sprang to its feet. The whole nation, but yesterday a people of compromisers and deprecators of civil war, now flew to arms. Volunteering was the order of the day: the enthusiasm was unbounded. Old men, with spectacles, and in unsightly jackets, nearly killed themselves at nightly home-guard drills in academies of music, concert-rooms, and town-halls; small boys formed light-infantry companies; women made haversacks and havelocks—the latter of no earthly use except to awaken, or rather keep alive, a spirit of patriotic labor; and men, in the bloom of youth and prime of manhood, flocked to the rendezvous to take the field.

It is true we did not know how to fight: we had no generals to lead us, except some old relics of our former wars. That fine old veteran, General Scott, had passed his seventieth year, and, from the effects of old wounds, was in no condition to take the field. Our army was but "the skeleton of the Forty-eighth," an army only in name; our volunteers were willing, but entirely ignorant; our regulars had not been drilled at brigade manœuvres, and the officers knew little about them. In most cases, before the war, there were not sufficient troops at the garrison posts to drill at battalion manœuvres. No one knew how extensive the theatre of war was to be: on what a scale the rebels had been preparing to carry it on: what we should need in the way of an army, of supplies and munitions of war. We were certain of one thing; and that was, that we were deficient in every thing. Even the strategic features of the country—unlike those of Europe, where every little rivulet and mountain-spur has been fought over, and has its military place in history—had never been studied. Perhaps it was incident to this state of things that statesmen spoke oracularly of "no war," or "one effective blow," or "sixty days," for which to discount the struggle. But in spite of their predic-

tions the storm grew apace, and, in the midst of obscurity, we blundered on in ignorant and absurd experiments. Speak but of a man who could aid us, suggest a hero, and the people turned to him with the blind worship of helpless fear. Not what he had done, but what he was going to do, made him illustrious: he was already a new incarnation of the god of war; a second Napoleon come to battle. It is both needless and useless now to demonstrate how unjust this was to those thus bepraised, and what sore humiliation it was to bring upon the worshippers. But there was no calm judgment then; the danger was imminent, the need urgent, the fear great. At last the lightning fell, and Bull Run was followed by a horror of great darkness over the land,—the darkest hour before the dawn.

The truth is, there was no man at that time in America who could grasp the colossal problem; no man on either side. We were babes in military practice; our armies and our generals needed education from the very elementary principles, and especially that education of disasters which Marmont declares to be the very best of all. The Grant of Belmont could not have fought the battle of Pittsburg Landing; and it needed the practice of Vicksburg and Chattanooga to fit him for the terrible struggles of the campaign from the Rapidan.

Months and years passed, and we became gradually enlightened; our troops became veterans, and our leaders, when the lists were carefully sifted, became generals. None are now invested with honors who have not fully earned them; and we stand to-day at the open portals of that glorious peace which our defenders have achieved, ready to accord to them intelligent praise in proportion to their real merits. And thus we reach the life of Lieutenant-General Grant, one of the many who rushed to the field when Ruffin's cannon sounded the alarm—a graduate of West Point, educated, indeed, as a subordinate officer, but not as a general; to be educated as a general in and by the war. His career, beginning with the Sumter gun, is in itself an epitome of the war, and marks its grandest epoch, when armed rebellion threw down its weapons,

and the country, more by his power than by that of any other individual man, stood new-born, with a giant's strength, and, in the often quoted words of Curran, never elsewhere so applicable, "redeemed, regenerated, and disenthralled, by the irresistible genius of universal emancipation."

CHAPTER II.

CHILDHOOD AND CADET LIFE.

GRANT'S LINEAGE.—THE NEW SCHOOL OF BIOGRAPHY.—HIS PARENTAGE AND BIRTH-PLACE.—HIS NAME.—STORIES OF HIS YOUTH.—LIMITED EDUCATION.—APPOINTMENT TO THE MILITARY ACADEMY.—HIS SCHOLARSHIP.—CLASSMATES.—RECOLLECTIONS OF HIM WHILE A CADET.—THE GERMS OF CHARACTER.—HE GRADUATES.

GRANT was a true autochthon, a son of the soil, heir to no splendid heritage, but to the nobility of labor. His early history needs but little comment. Born of respectable parents to the honorable sturdy life of the West, he needs no exhibition of long descent to inaugurate his history. If Napoleon could rebuke the genealogist who was creating for him a pedigree, with the words, "Friend, my patent dates from Monte Notte," Grant may claim his American nobility from Fort Donelson.

On the one hand, all efforts to establish an aristocratic descent and a remarkable childhood for such a man are dishonest and absurd; and, on the other hand, all attempts to make his antecedents very humble and his childhood very hard, in order to exalt his after-life, are disgusting. The one is absurdly European, and the other belongs to the "new American school of biography," the tendency of which is to make boys despise their fathers, that they may the more thoroughly respect themselves.*

We may, however, place on record what is truthfully known of his family and childhood, being sure that there is noth-

* See an excellent article, by *Gail Hamilton*, in "Skirmishes and Sketches," in which, with the vindictiveness of Herod, she slaughters the "Bobbin Boys," "Ferry Boys," "Errand Boys," "Tanner Boys," etc., etc. Let us hope she has killed all the "innocents."

ing in Grant's past upon which he does not look with honest pride.

His father was Jesse R. Grant, the descendant of a Scottish family, first represented in this country by two brothers, who emigrated to what were then the American colonies early in the eighteenth century, of whom one settled in Canada, and the other in New Jersey. Jesse Grant, who comes from the New Jersey branch, was born in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, in 1794. In 1805, his father died, and Jesse, then an orphan of eleven years, was apprenticed to a tanner. We need not trace the wanderings of Jesse Grant, with his mother and family, from Pennsylvania to Maysville, in Kentucky, then to Ravenna, thence to Ohio. The country was in a disordered state by reason of British intrigue with Indian barbarity; in many parts the climate was unhealthy, and so we find him, after many changes to better his lot, residing at Point Pleasant, Clermont County, Ohio.

Grant's mother was Hannah Simpson, the daughter of John Simpson. She was born in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania; but removed with her father and family to Clermont County, Ohio, in 1818, where, in June, 1821, she married Jesse R. Grant. Ten months after, on the twenty-seventh of April, 1822, their first child, known to the world as ULYSSES SIMPSON GRANT,* was born in a small one-story cottage, still standing on the banks of the Ohio, commanding a view of the river and of the Kentucky shore.

From what we know of Grant's parents—the probity, energy, and hard labor of his father; the consistent Christian character, kind heart, and devotion to her family displayed by his excellent mother—we have another beautiful illustration of the moral heritage of children, and another proof that God shows mercy and gives great reward to them that love Him, to many generations.

* His father tells us that his name was *Hiram Ulysses*, but that his cadet warrant was made out for *Ulysses Sidney*; that he accepted the name while at West Point, only changing it to *Ulysses Simpson*, in honor of his mother, when he graduated.

Many stories are told, of course, exhibiting the sturdy character of young Grant, and his resources under difficulties, but none betokening, in a remarkable degree, the character of his future career. It is said that, upon proper occasion, he could be pugnacious; that he was not outwitted in a bargain; and that he contrived means of overcoming difficulties which would have checked other boys. In the same way, the biographers of Napoleon have found the types of his after-life in his lording it over his elder brother Joseph, and in his bravery in attacking snow forts.

Grant was sturdy, strong, and cool, as many other boys are, but up to the time of his first entering into service, no events or actions of his life were the heralds of his present greatness. The qualities undoubtedly were there, but latent; and of what has evoked them in most men, ambition, he seems to have none.

The education of the boy was quite limited, like that of most Western boys in moderate circumstances. There was hard work to do, in which the son must help the father, and so it was only in the midwinter months that he could attend the village school. What he learned, however, he learned well; and he acquired with the elements of knowledge, not only a basis, but, what is of far more importance, an ardent desire for a full education.

By the time Grant was seventeen, West Point had acquired great fame throughout the country; it was known by its fruits; its *élèves* were gentlemen of high education and noble bearing. In civic life they were eagerly sought after to take the lead in railway engineering and industrial pursuits. They were the chief men in all militia organizations; indeed, the military knowledge of the country was almost as much confined to them as the esoteric meaning of the Egyptian mysteries had formerly been to the priests. It was also known that there a boy, without the necessary means, could obtain the best education which the country could afford, not gratuitously, but more than that—he would be paid for learning, trained and maintained as a gentleman, and would receive at the last a high,

self-sustaining position—a commission in the army. To such a youth as Grant, it offered a splendid chance; and so application was made to the Honorable Thomas L. Hamer, of Grant's congressional district, who gave him the appointment. Thus, with a good basis of hard, self-reliant, and eager boyhood, he was admitted to the preliminary examination, and entered the Military Academy on the first of July, 1839.* Such are the details, which would have had no importance whatever had it not been for subsequent events.

Even a step further we may follow him without any temptation to worship the incipient hero. His scholarship at West Point was respectable, and no more. He went through the entire course, like his classmates, no cadet being allowed any option.† From September to June, the cadets are in barracks, studying, riding, and fencing in the riding-hall, and, in fine weather, drilling in the afternoons at infantry: from June to September, they encamp upon the plain, and their time is entirely employed in drills of every kind, guard duty, pyrotechny, and practical engineering.

In his cadet studies, Grant had something to contend with, in the fact of his own lack of early preparation, and the superior preparation of most of his competitors, who had been over a part of the course before they entered. Among these were William B. Franklin, who stood at the head of the class; Roswell S. Ripley, not famous for his "History of the Mexican War" (written in the interest of General Pillow, and to injure General Scott), but quite infamous for firing with great rapidity upon the burning Sumter, which the devoted garrison were trying to extinguish; Rufus Ingalls, the excellent quartermaster-general of the Army of the Potomac; Joseph J. Reynolds, late commander in Arkansas; Christopher C. Augur, long in command at Washington; the rebel General Franklin Gardner, who surrendered Port Hudson to Banks when Grant

* The preliminary examination is extremely simple—reading, spelling, writing, and arithmetic through decimal fractions.

† In our day, it was only the *first* section of each class who learned something more than was required of the rest.

had taken Vicksburg ; and others, to whom we design no discredit by not mentioning them. Thirty-nine of the one hundred and more who had been appointed in 1839, graduated in 1843. Grant was the independent middle-man, twenty-first on the list.

The honor of being his comrade for two years at the Academy enables me to speak more intelligently, perhaps, than those of "the new school," who have invented the most absurd stories to illustrate his cadet-life. I remember him as a plain, common-sense, straight-forward youth ; quiet, rather of the old head on young shoulders order ; shunning notoriety ; quite contented, while others were grumbling ; taking to his military duties in a very business-like manner ; not a prominent man in the corps, but respected by all, and very popular with his friends. His sobriquet of *Uncle Sam* was given to him there, where every good-fellow has a nickname, from these very qualities ; indeed, he was a very uncle-like sort of a youth. He was then and always an excellent horseman, and his picture rises before me as I write, in the old torn coat,* obsolescent leather gig-top, loose riding pantaloons, with spurs buckled over them, going with his clanking sabre to the drill-hall. He exhibited but little enthusiasm in any thing : his best standing was in the mathematical branches, and their application to tactics and military engineering.

If we again dwell upon the fact that no one, even of his most intimate friends, dreamed of a great future for him, it is to add that, looking back now, we must confess that the possession of many excellent qualities, and the entire absence of all low and mean ones, establish a logical sequence from first to last, and illustrate, in a novel manner, the poet's fancy about—

"The baby figures of the giant mass
Of things to come at large,"

* Riding-jackets, if we remember rightly, had not then been issued, and the cadets always wore their seediest rig into the sweat and dust of the riding drill.

the germs of those qualities which are found in beautiful combination in Wordsworth's "Happy Warrior :"

"The generous spirit who, when brought
Among the tasks of real life, hath wrought
Upon the plan that pleased his infant thought."

And at this point of view, as we find the Western boy, after the compacting, instructing, developing processes of West Point, coming forth a man, ready for the stern realities of American life, we may pause to point him out to our American youth as an example henceforth to be followed ; then, as now, a character which, in the words of a friend, "betrayed no trust, falsified no word, violated no rights, manifested no tyranny, sought no personal aggrandizement, complained of no hardship, displayed no jealousy, oppressed no subordinate ; but, in whatever sphere, protected every interest, upheld his flag, and was ever known by his humanity, sagacity, courage, and honor." What more can be claimed for any young man ? What for the greatest of captains ?

He left West Point as brevet second-lieutenant in the Fourth Infantry ; and with his army life we begin another chapter in his history.

CHAPTER III.

ARMY LIFE AND RETIREMENT FROM SERVICE.

BREVET SECOND-LIEUTENANT FOURTH INFANTRY.—GOES TO CORPUS CHRISTI.—AT PALO ALTO AND RESACA DE LA PALMA.—AT MONTEREY.—AT VERA CRUZ.—REGIMENTAL QUARTERMASTER.—FIGHTS AT MOLINO AND CHAPULTEPEC.—MENTIONED IN REPORTS AND BREVETTED CAPTAIN.—AT CLOSE OF WAR SENT TO THE NORTHERN FRONTIER.—MARRIES.—OFF TO OREGON.—HARD WORK.—LEATHER-DEALER.

On the 1st of July, 1843, Grant began his army service as brevet second-lieutenant in the Fourth Infantry. The explanation of this is, that there being no vacancy in the infantry arm, all graduated cadets are thus attached, in the order of merit, to regiments, as supernumerary officers, each to await a vacancy in his turn. The regiment was then at Jefferson Barracks, near St. Louis, Missouri; but, in the summer of 1844, it was removed to Natchitoches, Louisiana, and as the Mexican plot thickened, in 1845, it was sent to Corpus Christi, to watch the Mexican army then concentrating upon the frontier. Grant was made a full second-lieutenant in the Seventh Regiment, on the 30th of September, 1845. But he had formed an attachment for the Fourth, and applied to remain in it: this was granted by the War Department. He was fortunate enough to be at Palo Alto and Resaca, May 6 and 7, 1846—the trial fights of the American army against a civilized enemy, after thirty years of peace; and he participated in the bloody battle of Monterey, September 23, 1846. His regiment was soon after called away from General Taylor's command, to join General Scott in his splendid campaign from Vera Cruz to Mexico, two hundred and seventy-two miles in the heart of the enemy's country. He was at the siege and capture of Vera Cruz, March 29, 1847; and on April 1, preparatory to the advance, he was appointed regimental quarter-

master, a post which he held during the remainder of the war. It is a position requiring system and patience, and drawing a small additional pay; it is usually conferred upon some solid, energetic, painstaking officer, not necessarily one remarkable for dash and valor. Being in charge of the regimental equipage and trains, the quartermaster may, without impropriety, remain with these during actual battle, as we have known many to do. It is therefore recorded, as greatly to the praise of Grant, that he always joined his regiment in battle, and shared their fighting. At Molino del Rey, September 8, 1847, he was distinguished, and was brevetted first-lieutenant for his services. This brevet, however, owing to the fact of his becoming a full first-lieutenant by the casualties of that battle, he declined. At Chapultepec, September 13, 1847, Grant joined, with a few of his men, some detachments of the Second Artillery, under Captain Horace Brooks, in an attack on the enemy's breastworks, served a mountain howitzer and hastened the enemy's retreat, and "acquitted himself most nobly under the observation" of his regimental, brigade, and division commanders.*

For this action Grant received the brevet of captain for "gallant and meritorious conduct," awarded in 1849, but not confirmed until 1850.

His first-lieutenancy dated from September 16, 1847. It must not be supposed that these services during the Mexican war are now dressed up to assimilate with his after-career. He was really distinguished in that war above most of those of his own rank.†

* See General Worth's, Lieutenant-Colonel Garland's, and Major Francis Lee's reports of that battle.

† During our residence at the capital I heard a "horse-story" about Grant, which has not appeared in the books, but which is, at least, true. He was an admirable horseman, and had a very spirited horse. A Mexican gentleman, with whom he was upon friendly terms, asked the loan of his horse. Grant said afterwards, "I was afraid he could not ride him, and yet I knew if I said a word to that effect, the suspicious Spanish nature would think I did not wish to lend him." The result was, that the Mexican mounted him, was thrown before he had gone two blocks, and killed on the spot.

Upon the close of the war by the treaty promulgated in April, 1848, the Fourth Infantry was sent first to New York, and then to the Northern frontier, and for some time Grant served in the command of his company, first at Detroit, and then at Sackett's Harbor.

In August, 1848, he married Miss Dent, sister of his class-mate, Frederick J. Dent, who resided in St. Louis.

Incident to the acquisition of California and the wonderful discoveries of gold, troops were more necessary on our Western coast than elsewhere, to protect the emigrants and the new Pacific settlements from the depredations of the Indians. The Fourth Infantry was therefore ordered to Oregon, in the autumn of 1851, and one battalion, with which brevet Captain Grant was serving, was ordered to Fort Dallas, where he saw some service against the Indians.

After a two years' absence from his family, and with but little prospect of promotion in those "dull and piping times of peace," Grant having been promoted to a full captaincy in August, 1853, resigned his commission in July 31, 1854, and set forth to commence life anew as a citizen. That he tried many shifts does not betoken a fickle or volatile nature, but simply the invention which is born of necessity. As a small farmer, near St. Louis, and a dealer in wood, he made a precarious living :* as a money collector he did no more, having neither the nature to bully nor the meanness to wheedle the debtors. He could not

"Crook the pregnant hinges of the knee,
That thrift may follow fawning."

* I visited St. Louis at this time, and remember with pleasure, that Grant, in his farmer rig, whip in hand, came to see me at the hotel, where were Joseph J. Reynolds, then professor, now major-general, General (then Major) D. C. Buell, and Major Chapman of the cavalry. If Grant had ever used spirits, as is not unlikely, I distinctly remember that, upon the proposal being made to drink, Grant said, "I will go in and look at you, for I never drink any thing;" and the other officers who saw him frequently, afterwards told me that he drank nothing but water.

He is said also to have played the auctioneer ; but in this branch, unless he made longer speeches than he has since done, he could achieve no success.

In 1859 he entered into partnership with his father, who had been prosperous in the tanning business, in a new leather and saddlery store in Galena, Illinois. Here, in a place which had a growing trade with Wisconsin, Iowa, and Minnesota, the industry, good sense, and honesty of Grant did at length achieve a certain and honorable success, and, had the rebellion not broken out, he would have had a local reputation in the firm of Jesse R. Grant, as an admirable judge of leather, perhaps mayor of Galena, with a thoroughly well-mended sidewalk, visited always with pleasure by his old army friends travelling westward, but never heard of by the public. His greatest success had been achieved in the army ; his Mexican experience gave glimpses of a future in that line ; he needed only opportunity, and he was to have it abundantly. Here, then, we mark a new epoch in his life—a sudden plunge, unexpected and unheralded—

“The torrent’s smoothness ere it dash below.”

CHAPTER IV.

BELMONT.

EFFECT OF THE NEWS ON GRANT.—A DEMOCRAT BEFORE THE WAR.—AN UNQUALIFIED WAR-MAN NOW.—RAISES A COMPANY.—DOES GOOD SERVICE AS MUSTERING OFFICER.—COLONEL OF THE TWENTY-FIRST ILLINOIS.—MARCHES.—ACTING BRIGADIER AT CAIRO.—THE VALUE OF CAIRO.—THE REBEL STRATEGY.—EXPEDITION TO BELMONT.—FREMONT'S ORDERS.—POLK AT COLUMBUS.—THE BATTLE.—SUCCESS.—ENEMY RE-INFORCED.—GRANT WITHDRAWS.—COMMENTS.

It may be easily conceived how the treachery of Southern leaders, the secession of South Carolina, and the bombardment of Fort Sumter affected Grant. A decided Democrat before the war, he had, in his limited sphere, been in favor of conceding to the South all its rights, perhaps more; but when the struggle actually began, his patriotism and military ardor were aroused together. As a patriot, he was determined to support his Government and uphold his flag; and as a soldier, he saw opening before him a career of distinction for which he had been educated, and in which he had already, in some degree distinguished himself. In April he helped to raise a company in his own neighborhood, and, in May, repaired to Springfield, and tendered his services to Governor Yates, to whom he had been recommended by a member of Congress from his State. It was not long before the governor made use of Grant's experience in organizing the State troops. He was appointed a mustering-officer of the State, and proceeded to the difficult task of mustering the three-months' men, which, amidst much confusion, he accomplished by his indefatigable energy. While on a brief visit to his father, at Covington, Kentucky, Grant received a commission from the governor as colonel of the Twenty-first Illinois Volunteers, three-months' men. They subsequently enlisted, owing to

their confidence in him, one thousand strong, for three years' service. Grant's first concern was to drill and discipline his regiment, which soon became marked for its excellent order. He took command of the regiment at Springfield, Illinois, and superintended their drill; and, not long after, he marched them, in default of railroad transportation, one hundred and twenty miles, to Quincy, on the Mississippi, which was supposed to be in danger. Thence he moved, under orders, to defend the line of the Hannibal and Hudson Railroad, from Hannibal and Quincy, on the Mississippi, to St. Joseph; and here coming into contact with other regiments, his military knowledge and experience pointed to him, although the youngest colonel, as the commander of the combined forces. As acting brigadier-general of this force, his headquarters, on the 31st of July, 1861, were at Mexico, Missouri. We need not detail the marches of Grant's regiments in the "District of Northern Missouri"—as General Pope's command was called—to Pilot Knob, and Ironton, and Jefferson City, to defend the river against the projected attacks of Jeff. Thompson. In August he received his commission as brigadier-general of volunteers, to date from May 17. He was seventeenth in a list of thirty-four original appointments of that date. He was ordered to proceed to Cairo, and there, with two brigades, he took command of the important strategic territory entitled "The District of Southeast Missouri," including both banks of the Mississippi River, from Cape Girardeau to New Madrid, and on the Ohio it included the whole of Western Kentucky. A glance at the map discloses the strategic importance of Cairo, as a base of operations for a southern advance, and of vital importance in the line of defence for the extensive and rich country lying between the Ohio and the Mississippi. It is especially valuable for river expeditions, the transportation of supplies, and the equipment of a gunboat fleet. The parallel flow of the Tennessee and Cumberland northward into the Ohio also includes a most important portion of West Kentucky, which Grant saw at a glance was to become the scene of immediate hostilities.

Grant was now in his element; he not only accomplished with alacrity what he was ordered to do, but he made work for his troops. He at once displayed that energy which he has never abated for an instant during the war.

The attempted and absurd neutrality of Kentucky was one-sided; it was to keep Union troops away and let rebels attack.* The latter were not slow in availing themselves of this privilege. Seizing, first Hickman, and then Columbus and Bowling Green, and fortifying the Tennessee at Fort Henry, and the Cumberland at Fort Donelson, they established a first strong line from the Mississippi to Virginia in the "neutral" State of Kentucky.† Grant followed their lead, and, on the 6th of September, with a strong force, occupied Paducah, where the Tennessee empties into the Ohio, much to the chagrin of the secessionists there, who were anxiously awaiting the arrival of a large rebel force. In the same manner he occupied Smithland, near the mouth of the Cumberland, and thus made two vital moves in the game in which he was to cry checkmate at Fort Donelson. These points were also valuable to the rebels as gateways of supplies. From the places now occupied, Grant at once busied himself in making numerous reconnoissances in every direction, until at length he was ready to try his "prentice hand" upon the rebels. When all was ready, he moved down the river to Belmont, opposite Columbus, and there the first battle took place. The origin of that movement may be thus briefly stated.

General Fremont, under date November 1, 1861, directed Grant to make demonstrations "along both sides of the river

* And yet this neutrality was reproached by the rebels. See Pollard's "First Year of the War," p. 183.

† On the 5th of September, Grant informed Fremont by telegram that the rebels had invaded the State, and that he was "nearly ready for Paducah, should not a telegram arrive preventing the movement." Receiving no word from Fremont, he left Cairo on the night of the 5th, and occupied Paducah on the morning of the 6th. On the same day he published a clear, patriotic, and humane proclamation to the citizens.

towards Charleston, Norfolk, and Blandville." On the 2d, he was thus informed by Fremont: "Jeff. Thompson is at Indian's Ford of the St. François River, twenty-five miles below Greenville, with about three thousand men. Colonel Carlin has started with a force from Pilot Knob. Send a force from Cape Girardeau and Bird's Point to assist Carlin in driving Thompson into Arkansas." Incident to these instructions, Grant sent Colonel Oglesby, with the Eighth Illinois, four companies of the Eleventh Illinois, the whole of the Eighteenth and Twenty-ninth, and three companies of cavalry, to go to Commerce, Missouri, thence to Sikeston, and pursue Jeff. Thompson (in conjunction with a force from Ironton). On the 5th he was informed that Polk was re-enforcing Price's army from Columbus. In this complication of circumstances he determined to threaten Columbus and attack Belmont. Oglesby was deflected to New Madrid, and Colonel W. H. L. Wallace sent to re-enforce him. The object of the attack then was to cut off the rebel line in Kentucky from Price's forces in Missouri, and also to keep Polk from interfering with the detachments Grant had sent out in pursuit of Jeff. Thompson.

Grant directed General C. F. Smith to make a demonstration upon Columbus from Paducah, and then himself sent down a small force on the Kentucky side to Ellicott's Mills, about twelve miles from Columbus. Having taken these precautions to deceive the enemy, he embarked his expeditionary force at Cairo on the 6th of November—three thousand one hundred and fourteen men,* chiefly Illinois volunteers, with the Seventh Iowa, upon four boats, convoyed by the gunboats Lexington, Captain Stembel, and Tyler, Captain Walker, the gunboats in advance. Moving with due caution, they reached Island No. 1, eleven miles above Columbus, that night, and lay against the Kentucky shore. It was then he heard that Polk was crossing troops to Belmont to cut off Oglesby. The

* McClernand's brigade (Twenty-seventh, Thirtieth, Thirty-first Illinois) with cavalry. Dougherty's brigade (Twenty-second Illinois, Seventh Iowa).—*Grant's Revised Report, June 26, 1865.*

next morning he moved to Hunter's Point, three miles above Belmont, on the Missouri shore, where his troops were landed and formed into column of attack.

The rebel forces at Columbus were commanded by Major-General Leonidas Polk, a bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church, the purity of whose lawn is forever stained with blood drawn by carnal weapons; a weak but brave man, but one whose West Point education was at least worth something to the rebel cause. Polk had posted a small force on the right bank, to keep open his communications; and, as soon as he had wind of Grant's movement, and Smith's demonstration to Maysfield, he expected an attack on Columbus, or at least in Kentucky. Indeed, until the close of the engagement, he apprehended an attack in his rear.

Grant's movement took him somewhat by surprise. From the point of debarkation, one battalion having been left as a reserve near the transports, the troops were marched by flank towards Belmont, and drawn up in line of battle two miles from Belmont. Skirmishers were then thrown forward, who soon encountered Colonel Tappan's rebel force, consisting of three regiments, re-enforced by Pillow with three more, and the general engagement took place. Deploying his entire force as skirmishers, Grant drove the enemy back, fighting from tree to tree, for about two miles, until he reached the intrenched camp protected by slashed timber as an abatis. In rear of this, opposing our left, were the Thirteenth Arkansas and the Ninth Tennessee; and on the right was Beltzhoover's battery of seven guns and Colonel Wright's regiment. This did not check our impetuous advance. Charging over the obstacle with great ardor, our men drove the enemy to the river-bank, and many of them into their transports, and we were in possession of every thing.* But as Belmont is on low ground, en-

* The rebel excuse is, that they were out of ammunition; good, but not new. Pollard says: "In this movement Pillow's line was more or less broken, and his corps mingled together, so that when they reached the river-bank they had the appearance of a mass of men, rather than an organized corps."—*First Year*, p. 201.

tirely commanded by the guns from Columbus, it was manifest that the ground thus gained could not be held, and therefore Grant fired the encampment, burning tents, blankets, and stores, and began his return movement with captured artillery, prisoners, and horses. But the end of our success on the field had been attained. Major-General Polk, who was now quite alive to the situation, directed his heaviest guns from Columbus upon our troops. He had already sent over three* regiments in one body, under General Pillow; these were supported by three others, under General Cheatham, which landed some distance above, between our soldiers and the boats. Further to crush Grant's small force, the bishop, although sadly afraid of an attack on his rear at Columbus, took over two additional regiments in person to aid Pillow's panic-stricken force. But by this time Grant was in retreat to his boats, and only faced to the right and rear to punish Cheatham's flankers, and a portion of Pillow's under Colonel Marks, who had marched up the river-bank, and endeavored to prevent his return to the boats. In that retreat we suffered very severely, our troops being hard pressed by overpowering numbers. At five in the afternoon Grant's force had re-embarked, and were on their way to Cairo, while the rebels, checked by the fire of our gunboats, glared like baffled tigers, and went back to their smoking camp. We had left two caissons, but had brought off two guns of Beltzhoover's battery. We had eighty-five killed, three hundred and one (many slightly) wounded, and about ninety-nine missing. The gunboats, whose duty was primarily to cover the landing and protect the transports, and also, as far as possible, to engage the Columbus batteries, performed their service to General Grant's entire satisfaction. The Confederate loss was six hundred and thirty-two.† Both parties claimed a victory, but on the recovery of the field and the pursuit of our retiring columns the rebels base their claims to a success,

* Pollard says *four* regiments, but we give the rebels the benefit of clergy, as the bishop says *three*.

† Pollard, "First Year of the War."

which we need not dispute. Although, in comparison with subsequent engagements, Belmont seems a small affair, it has an importance peculiarly its own.

I. It was a *coup d'essai* of our new general. While others of his rank were playing quite subordinate parts in large armies, Grant was making an independent expedition in command, outwitting the enemy, burning his camp, retreating successfully when overpowered, and effecting his purpose in a most soldierly manner.

II. Again, it was a trial of our new troops in the West, and they acquitted themselves so as to elicit the hearty praise of their commander and the country. They fought well in the attack, from colonels to privates,* in the retreat, and in cutting their way through Cheatham's force, and were never for a moment discouraged.

III. The objects of the expedition,—to prevent the enemy from sending a force to Missouri to cut off our detachments which were pressing Thompson, and to prevent his re-enforcing Price,—were fully accomplished. Grant had given him a blow which kept him concentrated, lest another might soon follow.

IV. It demonstrated the weakness of the enemy. It led to the victories of Forts Henry and Donelson, and the piercing of the rebels' line, which threw it back almost upon the Gulf.

Of the personal prowess of General Grant, as evinced in this battle, it is now needless to speak; it was of the highest order. He, as well as General McClelland, had a horse shot under him, and amid the crashing projectiles of heavy guns from Columbus and Belmont, and the fatal storm of musketry, "the gallant conduct of his troops was stimulated by his presence and inspired by his example."†

* In a letter to his father (November 8th) Grant says, "I can say with gratification, that every colonel, without a single exception, set an example to their commands," etc.

† General McClelland's "Official Report." McClelland had three horses shot under him.

NOTE.—June 26, 1865, General Grant submitted to the Secretary of War a fresh report, to take the place of the old one.

CHAPTER V.

FORT HENRY.

HALLECK'S DEPARTMENT OF MISSOURI.—GRANT'S RECONNOISSANCE INTO KENTUCKY.—ITS VALUE.—MAP OF FIELD OF OPERATIONS.—COLUMBUS, THE GIBRALTAR OF AMERICA.—REBEL LINE.—FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON.—FOOTE'S FLOTILLA.—C. F. SMITH AND PHELPS RECONNOITRE FORT HENRY.—GRANT RECEIVES PERMISSION TO ATTACK.—THE FORT DESCRIBED.—LLOYD TILGHMAN IN COMMAND.—GRANT'S ORDERS OF MARCH AND BATTLE.—THE NAVAL ATTACK.—THE SURRENDER.—COMMENTS ON REBEL DEFEAT.—ON TO DONELSON.—TRIBUTE TO COMMODORE FOOTE.

THE "District of Cairo," to the command of which General Grant had been assigned, began now to assume more importance, as the immediate field of war in the West blazed from new points almost daily, and the thunder-bursts were answered by echoing guns all over the country. On the 12th of November, 1861, General Henry Wager Halleck, of the regular army, and second on the list of major-generals, was sent to take command of the "Department of Missouri." He had formerly been an officer of engineers in our army, but had been for some time out of service, as a successful lawyer in San Francisco. He was well known as a diligent military student, and as a writer upon the military art. His department included the States of Missouri, Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Arkansas, and that portion of Kentucky west of the Cumberland River. This territory he at once divided into districts. Of this department, the District of Cairo was the most important part; and it was on the 20th of December enlarged, so as to include all the southern part of Illinois, all that part of Kentucky west of the Cumberland River, and the southern counties of Missouri south of Cape Girardeau. Confirmed in this large command, General Grant at once began to organize,

under the direction of General Halleck, for a new movement. Cairo was the point of departure, rather than a *point d'appui*. Grant posted his troops at numerous prominent points for defence, for convenience of supplies, and for facilities of reconnoissance, and also to deceive the enemy temporarily, with reference to his strength. On the 10th of January he sent General McClelland, with an expeditionary force of five thousand Illinois Volunteers, to penetrate into the interior of Kentucky, in the neighborhood of Columbus, and towards Mayfield and Camp Beauregard.

This reconnoissance into Kentucky was made by order of Major-General Halleck, and, as it is believed, at the request of General Buell, with a view to prevent the enemy, who had established his line, from detaching forces from Columbus and the adjacent country to re-enforce the garrisons of Bowling Green, against which General Buell was then preparing to move.


To aid McClelland, General Grant sent down detached regiments from time to time to join him; and, on the 14th, he sent the entire divisions of Generals Payne and C. F. Smith to act in concert with him.

General Payne moved from Bird's Point, with the column from Cairo, and then, holding Fort Jefferson with a portion of his command, supported McClelland in the reconnoissance. General Smith moved from Smithland: Grant himself accompanied the column from Cairo.

The weather was cold, the roads slippery and muddy, and the river filled with floating ice. McClelland occupied Fort Jefferson, marched through Blandville, and to within the distance of a mile from the defences of Columbus. He was recalled on the 20th, having discovered new roads and obtained much valuable information for a future advance in force. Indeed, the results of this rapid and vigorous movement, especially so far as the column from Cairo was concerned, was a minute acquaintance with the roads, streams, and general topography of the country, which would have been of incalculable value had we been compelled to operate directly against Columbus. Two of our gunboats had gone down the river at the same

time, and driven three rebel armed vessels back under the shelter of the guns of Columbus.

Before attempting to present the succeeding movements, based upon the information obtained from this and other reconnoissances, let us glance for a moment at the rebel position.



OPERATIONS IN WESTERN KENTUCKY.

Columbus, twenty miles below the mouth of the Ohio, with its bluffs two hundred feet high, was strongly fortified by heavy batteries which swept the Mississippi above and below. The landward defences, at first weak, were being daily strengthened; and the rebel press, calling it the *Gibraltar of America*, declared that it would seal the great river, until all nations should acknowledge the independence of the Southern Confederacy.

To extend their line eastward, covering Nashville in that direction, they had, beginning in August, 1861, fortified Bowling Green, a small place on the Big Barren River, but naturally well adapted to defence, and of strategic importance as being on the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. The Big Barren River is at certain seasons navigable for small vessels, by the Ohio and Green rivers, from Louisville. The river is very winding in its vicinity, and in all the bends are steep hills

which were crowned with lunettes, redans, and even bastioned works.

Important lines in the strategic problem were the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, flowing in a northerly direction, with nearly parallel currents through Kentucky, into the Ohio. The Tennessee is navigable at high-water for steamboats to Florence, at the foot of Muscle Shoals; and the Cumberland, on the right bank of which Nashville is situated, is navigable during high-water for large steamboats to Nashville, about two hundred miles from its mouth, and for small steamers nearly three hundred miles further.

To bar the navigation of these streams against the passage of Union troops, supplies, and gunboats, into the very vitals of the rebellion, thus cutting it in two places, the rebels had erected two strong works, which they boasted to be quite sufficient for this purpose. The one on the eastern bank of the Tennessee was called Fort Henry: it mounted seventeen guns, and had barracks and tents for fifteen thousand men; and the other, named Fort Donelson, was erected on the western bank of the Cumberland, and mounted about forty guns. These forts also served immediately to guard the railroads from Memphis to Nashville and Bowling Green, and the small branch railroad to Dover. The distance between Forts Henry and Donelson was twelve miles: a good road and telegraph line connected the two.

Thus an apparently strong, and a certainly well-chosen line, was formed, extending from the Mississippi at Belmont and Columbus, through Southern Kentucky and Northern Tennessee to Cumberland Gap, and thence onward by East Tennessee and Southwestern Virginia to the rebel positions around and beyond Richmond; and to strengthen this line, all troops that could be spared from Virginia had been sent by the Confederate government.

But the old axiom, that "nothing is stronger than its weakest point," was here verified. To break this vaunted line; to make stronghold after stronghold crumble or dissolve, and to lay down the grand equations for the solution of


future problems of a higher degree—the clearing of the Mississippi and the advance from Chattanooga—these were the plans of our Government; and among the intelligent any energetic agents in carrying them out, none was more so than General Grant. We cannot read his history from first to last without being struck with the manifest foresight he has displayed. He goes on from action to action—*vires acquirit eundo*—as though each was only a means to an end, the end becoming a new means, until the final goal should be reached.

During the autumn and early winter, numerous gunboats had been built, and many river-boats altered into gunboats, at Cairo, St. Louis, and numerous river-towns, by citizens and quartermasters, under the general superintendence of Commodore A. H. Foote, of the navy; and a number of these were now in readiness to co-operate with the army in its advance by the rivers into Southern territory. To man them, volunteers were called for among the river-hands and sea-faring men who had entered the army, and they responded readily: it was, for a time at least, a popular service, and one that the sequel proved to be full of the most romantic adventures.

Let us now return for a moment to consider the movements of the reconnoitring column of General Grant's army which moved from Paducah. These were also of the greatest importance. Upon his return, in accordance with Grant's orders, General C. F. Smith struck the Tennessee River about twenty miles below Fort Henry. There he met Commander Phelps, of the navy, with a gunboat, patrolling the river. After a brief conference with that energetic officer, General Smith decided to get upon the gunboat, and run up for a look at Fort Henry.

The boat steamed up sufficiently near to draw the enemy's fire, and present a just idea of the armament of the work. Smith returned at once, and reported to General Grant his conviction that, with three or four of "the turtle iron-clads" and a strong co-operating land force, Fort Henry might be easily captured, if the attack should be made within a short time. It was about the 15th of January that Grant for-

warded this report to Halleck. No action having been at once taken, General Grant and Flag-Officer Foote sent dispatches, on the 28th of January, asking for permission to storm Fort Henry, and hold it as a strong point from which to operate in any direction. Time was valuable. General Grant wrote an urgent letter to Halleck (dated Cairo, January 29th), still further explaining his dispatches, and setting forth the feasibility and the great importance of this movement. At length the desired order came. On the 30th, in the afternoon, Grant received a dispatch from Halleck directing him to make preparations without delay to take and hold Fort Henry, and promising that full instructions should be sent by messenger.



FORT HENRY.

Without for an instant proposing to say that Halleck had not blocked out these movements in his own mind, we do say that the plans of General Grant, based upon the energetic action of his subordinates, and especially of C. F. Smith, were formed and suggested to Halleck in entire ignorance of the plans of General Halleck. From the concentration of troops in Grant's command it was evident that Halleck intended a vigorous move in some direction, but Grant's title to the actual plan of movement is at least as good as that of either General Halleck or General Buell.

All preparations having been made, the first point of attack designated was Fort Henry. It was an irregular field-work,

with five bastions, on the eastern bank of the Tennessee. The embrasures were revetted with sand-bags; and its armament, a large portion of which swept the river below, comprised one sixty-two pounder, one ten-inch columbiad, twelve thirty-twos, two forty-twos, and one twelve-pounder. Twelve of the guns bore upon the river.

Both above and below the fort were creeks, defended by rifle-pits and abatis of slashed timber, and around it was swampy land with a sheet of back-water in the rear. The land approaches are difficult, and across the river, which is here about half a mile wide, was an unfinished work, begun too late, and therefore abandoned, but originally designed to aid Fort Henry in stopping the passage of the river. Panther Creek, a short distance below the fort, falls into the Tennessee just abreast of Panther Island.

The command of this important work, a link in the great chain, although, as events proved, a very weak one, was confided to Brigadier-General Lloyd Tilghman, of the Confederate service, with a force of more than three thousand men, and with a clear exposition—manifest without words—of the importance of his command. Tilghman was of the Maryland family of revolutionary repute, a graduate of West Point, and a gallant volunteer in our army during the Mexican war. On the 6th of May, 1861, as colonel commanding the Western Division of "Neutral Kentucky," in an interview with Colonel Prentiss at Cairo, he had declared that he had no hostile purpose against the Government; but in less than a year he was captured at Fort Henry as a Confederate brigadier, and was afterwards killed in the ranks of treason at Baker's Creek, near Vicksburg.

On the morning of Monday, February 2, and after a quiet Sunday at Cairo, Commodore Foote having devotedly invoked God's blessing on the expedition, with all the fervor, but without the superstition, of a Spanish conquistador, moved up the Ohio to Paducah, and thence up the Tennessee. His fleet consisted of the iron-clad gunboats *Cincinnati*, *Essex*, *Carondelet*, and *St. Louis*, and the wooden boats *Lexington*, *Tyler*, and

Conestoga : the *Cincinnati* was his flag-ship. By nightfall they were in the Tennessee ; and by easy steaming they were three or four miles below Fort Henry at daylight on Tuesday, February 3. Caution was necessary, on account of the information obtained from people on the river-banks that the stream was mined with torpedoes. Foote had the river channel dragged with grappling-irons, and succeeded in fishing up several, which, however, being imperfectly prepared, would have proved harmless.

Steaming up to within a mile of the fort, the commodore fired the first gun from the *Cincinnati* as she passed the head of Panther Island, at half-past twelve o'clock, and from that time the bombardment was careful and slow, mostly with curved fire, until the fort surrendered.

And where was Grant's army at this time ? He had moved to the combined attack, with the divisions of McClernand and C. F. Smith, thus disposed : McClernand, with the First Division, landing at Marbury's, three miles below, was to move in rear of the fort, to occupy the road leading to Dover and Fort Donelson,—thus to cut off the retreat of the garrison and prevent re-enforcements from coming in, and also to be “in readiness to charge and take Fort Henry by storm promptly on receipt of orders.” We quote the words of Grant's order of march and battle.

Two brigades of Smith's (Second) division, landing on the west bank, were to reconnoitre and occupy the unfinished work, Fort Heiman, and the surrounding eminences, and bring their artillery to bear on Fort Henry. The third brigade of Smith was to march up the east bank in the track of McClernand, and either to support him or form a special column of attack on the fort, as circumstances might prompt. The orders of General Grant were clear, practicable, and well timed. It was supposed that if the attack by the fleet in front began at twelve o'clock of the 6th, the army would be in position to co-operate ; and had the fort made any thing like the defence which was anticipated, this would have been the case. But the roads were very bad, and Grant moved with

proper caution over ground entirely untried, and in partial ignorance of the disposition of the enemy's forces between Forts Henry and Donelson.

But to return to the gunboats. Constantly steaming slowly up towards the fort, and passing Panther Island by the western channel, they came into position just below the fort, and in a line diagonally across the river. The order of the iron-clads, from left to right, was as follows: the Essex, Carondelet, Cincinnati, and St. Louis. In second line, just above Panther Island, were the wooden boats Lexington, Conestoga, and Tyler.

The firing from the boats was at once warmly responded to by the fort, and a terrific cannonade was kept up; the naval guns, with both direct and curvated fire, raining in upon the terreplein, knocking the sandbag embrasures to pieces, and dismounting several of the guns in the fort. The rifled gun in the fort soon bursts, killing three men and disabling many others; the flagstaff is shattered and falls; seven of the guns are dismantled or useless. The garrison becomes discouraged, and at last panic-stricken. The three thousand men who were encamped outside scarcely wait for Tilghman's orders to save themselves. Some, fearing McClelland's approach, make a rapid flight by the upper Dover road, while others, seizing a small steamer lying at the mouth of the creek above the fort, steam hastily up the river. And thus Tilghman is left, with eighty or ninety artillerymen, to surrender the work. Meanwhile the metal of the gunboats has been fairly put to the test. The Cincinnati, flag-ship, has received thirty-one shots; the Essex, sixteen; the St. Louis, seven; the Carondelet, six. The iron sides of the boats shed most of the balls, but the Essex receives one of the shots in her boiler, which results in the wounding and scalding of twenty-nine, officers and men, among whom is the intrepid commander, W. D. Porter.

At length, when he had only four guns bearing on the river still fit for service; when his frightened garrison had deserted him, leaving only "fifty privates and twenty sick;" and when



he had done a private soldier's service at the middle battery, "covered with smoke, and personally pointing the guns," Tilghman hauled down his rebel flag, and ran up a white one, at five minutes before two, the action having lasted for only one hour and a quarter.

Grant came up about an hour afterwards, pleased of course with the result, but doubtless feeling a soldier's natural disappointment that the rapidity of the fight had settled the matter before the arrival of his command. Commodore Foote turned over to him the captured work, munitions, and prisoners; the transports and troops which were coming up the Tennessee were turned back or stopped at the fort; and the next step in the grand game was immediately considered.*

* In Grant's brief report to Halleck's staff-officer, written the same day from Fort Henry, he says:

"CAPTAIN—Inclosed I send you my order for the attack upon Fort Henry. Owing to dispatches received from Major-General Halleck, and corroborating information here, to the effect that the enemy were rapidly re-enforcing, I thought it imperatively necessary that the fort should be carried to-day. My forces were not up at ten o'clock last night, when my order was written, therefore I did not deem it practicable to set an earlier hour than eleven o'clock to-day, to commence the investment. The gunboats started up at the same hour to commence the attack, and engaged the enemy at not over six hundred yards. In little over one hour all the batteries were silenced, and the fort surrendered at discretion to Flag-Officer Foote, giving us all their guns, camp and garrison equipage, etc. The prisoners taken are General Tilghman and staff, Captain Taylor and company, and the sick. The garrison, I think, must have commenced their retreat last night, or at an early hour this morning.

"Had I not felt it an imperative necessity to attack Fort Henry to-day, I should have made the investment complete, and delayed until to-morrow, so as to secure the garrison. I do not now believe, however, the result would have been any more satisfactory.

"The gunboats have proven themselves well able to resist a severe cannonading. All the iron-clad boats received more or less shots—the flag-ship some twenty-eight—without any serious damage to any, except the Essex. This vessel received one shot in her boiler that disabled her, killing and wounding some thirty-two men, Captain Porter among the wounded.

"I remain your obedient servant,

"U. S. GRANT, Brigadier-General."

General Tilghman acknowledged, in the dispatch which he was permitted to send to General Johnston at Bowling Green, "the courtesies and consideration shown by General Grant and Commodore Foote, and the officers under their command;" but in his report he was particularly severe upon the Confederate authorities for thus leaving him to be the victim of a bad military judgment in selecting the post, and a want of proper preparations to hold the work.

Before giving to this victory its co-ordinate place in the vast strategy of the war, let us indulge in a word of comment upon the rebel defeat. The Confederate reports are unanimous in declaring that the site of Fort Henry was badly chosen; that it was low, easily surrounded, and commanded by the ground on the opposite side of the river; and that it was not calculated by its construction to sustain an attack by the fleet. We grant all this, but whose fault was it? Can there be a graver fault in war than this? It is far worse than losing a pitched battle to lose a stronghold, and that stronghold a link of the most vital value in a grand chain. Besides, it shows the rapidity and vigor of Grant's and Foote's movements, that Fort Heiman, on the opposite side of the river, was incomplete and useless. What they thus advance as a bar in judgment, or rather to explain away their defeat and depreciate the military character of our success, really enhances the credit of Grant and Foote.

But worse than all that can be said about a faulty location of the fort, is the inglorious flight of three thousand and odd men, without striking a single blow. They should have made reconnoissances from the moment they divined our purpose, ambushed the road, contested the landing of the troops, prepared torpedoes that would explode, and, at the least, held the fort long enough to give a respectable appearance to the defence. Certainly, Fort Henry was not built to surrender in an hour and a quarter. It was the briefest action, to precede an honest surrender, of which we have any record in the war.

The rules of military strategy are simple, few, and immuta-

ble ; their applications indefinitely and infinitely varied. By a rapid application of the simplest rule, the first charmed line was cut, and its tension entirely gone. Buckner, who, by command of Albert Sydney Johnston, had occupied Bowling Green as early as September, 1861, with ten thousand men, and who had vaunted its impregnable strength, felt the fall of Fort Henry like an electric shock, paralyzing his grasp. Bowling Green was no longer tenable ; there was but one point which was so, and that only for the time, and that was Fort Donelson ; and so, moving the chief part of his forces thither, he left only a rear-guard, which evacuated Bowling Green on the 15th of February. Bowling Green, that paragon of complex fortifications, was entered by General Mitchell, of Buell's column, who made a forced march from Bacon's Creek, and, arriving before he was expected, captured a large amount of stores there. Actions are not to be measured by the numbers engaged, or by their duration or carnage, but by their results. By this strategy Fort Donelson was flanked, and the safety of Nashville imminently endangered.

But yet Fort Donelson was exceedingly strong ; its garrison and armament were large, and entirely adapted to its proportions ; and it was manifest that the rebels would not abandon it without a severe struggle. To this struggle General Grant invited them without a moment's delay.

In the mean time, immediately after the surrender of Fort Henry, Flag-Officer Foote dispatched Lieutenant Commanding Phelps, with the gunboats Conestoga, Tyler, and Lexington, up the Tennessee into Northern Alabama. He destroyed the railroad-bridge twenty-five miles above Fort Henry, and proceeded up to Florence, at the foot of Muscle Shoals, destroying several steamers and river-craft, and captured a large quantity of lumber and stores, and developed the loyal sentiments of many of the people.

NOTE.—There can be no place more fitting than the close of the record of Fort Henry's surrender, in which to pay our tribute to the brilliant fighting, personal gallantry, and rare piety of Commodore, afterwards Rear-Admiral

Foote, and since, greatly to his country's loss, dead, and gone to a good man's rest. A son of Senator Samuel A. Foote, whose resolution on the public lands occasioned the famous passage at arms between Webster and Hayne, in January, 1830, young Foote entered the navy at the age of sixteen, and was known in all grades as an excellent and energetic officer. As first-lieutenant of the sloop-of-war John Adams, he took a prominent part in the attack on the Sumatra pirates in 1838; and was noted for the aid and sympathy he extended to the American missionaries at Honolulu, when few of our naval officers felt any interest in them. He was a strong advocate of total abstinence in the navy. In 1852, after a cruise on the coast of Africa, he published a volume entitled "Africa, and the Africans," in which he exposed the horrors of the slave-trade, by illustrations of the manner in which the negroes were packed in slave-ships. In 1856, in protecting the property of American citizens at Canton, which suffered during the English war, he breached a fort with his ship, and then, landing, stormed it, with a loss of forty men out of two hundred and eighty. His record during the war for the Union is brilliant in the extreme. He superintended the fitting out of the flotilla on the Mississippi and Ohio in 1861-2; took Fort Henry; was further distinguished at Fort Donelson, where he was wounded; and in the successful operations at Island No. 10, which he aided in reducing. His life was devoted to the service of his country. In July, 1862, he was created one of the new rear-admirals, on the active list; and in June, 1863, while preparing to relieve Admiral Dupont in command of the South Atlantic blockading squadron, he died suddenly, and was buried in New Haven. Although remarkable for his intelligence and tenacity of purpose, he is perhaps more fully characterized as a man of great and consistent piety. It was with him a vital principle, constantly displayed. He let his light shine, praying, exhorting, preaching; urging all with whom he came in contact, with precept upon precept, and, what is far better, alluring them by his shining example. His loss was severely felt; but his record was so glorious, and his fitness for departure so manifest, that we can "talk of his fate without a sigh," and thank God for so beautiful an exemplar of the gentleman, soldier, sailor, commander, and Christian.

CHAPTER VI.

FORT DONELSON.

REORGANIZATION.—ORDER OF MARCH.—MCCLEARNAND AND SMITH MOVE.—A GLANCE AT THE FORT.—RIVER-FRONT.—LAND APPROACHES.—GARRISON AND COMMANDERS.—ASSAULT UPON THE TRENCHES.—UNSUCCESSFUL.—STORM AND COLD.—RE-ENFORCEMENTS UNDER L. WALLACE.—THE ATTACK OF THE GUNBOATS.—TERRIBLE CANNONADE.—FOOTE WITHDRAWS.—VALUE OF HIS ATTACK.—REBEL COUNTER-PLANS.—OUR RIGHT ATTACKED AND ROLLED BACK.—GRANT'S CONSUMMATE PLAN.—L. WALLACE MOVES.

As Fort Henry was designed to obstruct the navigation of the Tennessee, so Fort Donelson was the work upon which the rebels depended to seal the Cumberland and to protect Nashville. No sooner had the former fallen, than Grant made his dispositions to assault the latter. He saw the importance of taking time by the forelock, and confusing the already dismayed Confederates by the rapidity of his assault. He reorganized his forces, and sent for all available re-enforcements that had been collecting at Cairo. His army was formed for this new service into two divisions: the first, under Brigadier-General J. A. McClernand, containing three brigades, under Colonels Oglesby, W. H. L. Wallace, and Morrison; the second, under Brigadier-General Charles F. Smith, of three brigades, under Colonels Cook, Lauman, and McArthur: a third will appear in our narrative, under Brigadier-General Lewis Wallace, to be composed of his brigade of Smith's division, and of forces that were being sent forward by General Halleck. With McClernand's division were the field-batteries of Schwartz, Taylor, Dresser, and McAllister; and with Smith were the heavy batteries of Richardson, Stone, and Walker; all Smith's artillery

being under Major Cavender, as chief of artillery. Grant's cavalry consisted of the Fourth Illinois cavalry, with several independent companies. The composition of Wallace's provisional division will be given hereafter.*

By Grant's general field-orders No. 12, of February 11, 1862, we find the order of march arranged as follows: One brigade of McClelland's division was to move by the Telegraph road from Fort Henry directly upon Fort Donelson, and to halt within two miles of the fort; the other three brigades to march by the Dover Ridge road to within the same distance, and then to unite with the first in forming the right wing in the complete investment of the fort.

Two brigades of Smith's (second) division were to follow by the Dover road, and these were to be followed by the troops who had occupied the unfinished Fort Heiman, as soon as they could be sent forward. As the force of the enemy was variously reported, details of the attack could not be given until the ground was reached; but Smith was directed to occupy Dover, if practicable, and thus to cut off all retreat by the river.

In accordance with these general directions, which were to be much modified when they reached the ground, McClelland and Smith marched across the country from the Tennessee River to the Cumberland, on the morning of February 12, to attack the works on the land side; while six regiments, which were to constitute a portion of Wallace's (third) division, were moved by transports, accompanied by the gunboats, from Smithland up the Cumberland, to join in the movement by an attack on the river-front, or to be disposed of as circumstances should afterwards require. In order to gain time, the movement was made after very rapid and unsatisfactory preparation. The gunboats had been overhauled in a very hasty manner, to repair the damages received in the

* General Lewis Wallace belonged to the division of General C. F. Smith, and when Grant moved against Fort Donelson he was left in command of Forts Henry and Heiman, garrisoned from General Smith's command.

attack on Fort Henry; but, impatient of delay, and perhaps determined that they should not again get the start of him, and still more cogently, because Grant knew the immense value of every minute of time just at this juncture, he pushed forward with the two divisions mentioned, to the siege and assault. One of Smith's brigades had been left at Fort Henry, as a garrison, under Lewis Wallace. All boats were deflected from the Tennessee to the Cumberland; many others had joined the great convoy, and the Union army was converging in all its strength upon Fort Donelson.

Let us look for a moment at the work to be attacked. This stronghold was placed upon a high hill on the left bank of the river, where it makes an abrupt turn from north to west, flowing in the latter direction for about a quarter of a mile, and then turning northward again. By this location a large number of guns could be trained directly down the stream, and pour a terrible storm of fire upon the advancing gunboats. At the foot of the hill, riverward, were two strong water-batteries, with massive epaulments; the embrasures revetted with coffee-sacks filled with sand. The armament of the lower, or main battery, consisted of eight thirty-twos, and one ten-inch columbiad; that of the other was one heavy rifled gun, carrying a one hundred and twenty-eight pound bolt, and two thirty-two pound carronades. These batteries were sunken or excavated in the hill-side. The fort itself was of irregular form, its trace following the inequalities of the hill, and inclosing nearly one hundred acres. It was flanked by a creek or back-water below, which is not generally fordable; and just above, a small creek separates it from the town of Dover, which is one mile above the fort, on the river-bank. It needs but one glance at the map to show that the works were exceedingly strong on the river-front.

We turn to the land approaches. Taking advantage of the topography of the field, which presents a conglomerate of hills and valleys, knolls and ravines, the rebels had cleared away all the timber, which could mask an enemy's advance, and erected field-works defended by artillery and infantry, from

the extreme western angle of the fort, following the southern direction of a ridge, and thus presenting a natural flanking arrangement of all the parts. Still in front of this extended line, encircling the fort and the intrenchment, and the town of Dover, was a line of detached rifle-trenches, constructed of logs, forming a slight parapet; and in front of the whole was slashed timber, as an abatis. It seemed quite as strong on the landward side as on the river-front, and the work before Grant appeared still more difficult, when we consider the strength of the rebel garrison.

It consisted of thirteen regiments of Tennessee troops, two of Kentucky, six of Mississippi, one of Texas, two of Alabama, four of Virginia, two independent battalions of Tennessee infantry, and Forrest's brigade of cavalry; and, besides the armament of the fort and water-batteries, six batteries of light artillery and seventeen heavy guns. The force, numbering at least twenty-three thousand men, was skilfully disposed; but the Confederate authorities had erred, fatally in their choice of commanders. General Floyd, whom the rebels should have been more sagacious than to have preferred to any office of responsibility and trust, however proper he might have been as an aspirant for a post of profit, had been ordered by General A. S. Johnston to the command of Fort Donelson, and had assumed it, without delay, on the 13th, the day after Grant's movement had begun. Here at once were fatal elements; he was not only a traitor, but he was believed to be a dishonest man, and circumstances were to prove him a coward. Notwithstanding his preferment to the United States secretaryship of war, under Buchanan, it was patent that he knew little of military matters; and it was certain that he knew nothing whatever of the fort, its topography, or its garrison. The next in rank was General Gideon J. Pillow, whom Floyd had assigned to the official command of the rebel left wing, in and around Dover. He too had only arrived there on the 10th, and being by nature as obtuse, and, in spite of some Mexican practice, or rather mal-practice, as ignorant as Floyd, he was of small value as a leader in the defence. The other

prominent commanders were Buckner and B. R. Johnson, both graduates of West Point, and highly esteemed for intelligence and bravery, when subordinates in our army. Buckner had command of the fort, and the ground in its immediate vicinity, while Johnson had a command on the left under Pillow. Such briefly was the work, and such the force, moral and physical, which General Grant rushed to attack with two divisions, not more in all than fifteen thousand men, and with a greater proportional weakness in artillery. This was sublime hardihood; but it was something more; it was at once the impulsion and the intuition of military genius. He knew little of the difficult topography, which maps never can adequately tell; but he meant to fight, and to continue fighting, and to force the rebels to fight. Time was of priceless value, and "confusion magnifying the foe," the rebels were deceived, as he meant them to be, by his boldness and temerity.

And now let us return to McClelland and Smith, who, preceded by the cavalry to clear the front, began their march on the morning of the 12th, from the neighborhood of Fort Henry. They came within view of the fort by early afternoon, without having encountered the enemy, who was stupidly caging himself in the intrenchment, instead of coming out like a man to beat, or at least retard, Grant's advancing columns. Our generals took up, that night, the positions assigned. On the morning of Thursday, the 13th, the fighting began with the dawn, the rebels opening their batteries upon our troops, whose positions were disclosed by the advance of Birge's sharpshooters upon the enemy's picket line.

Under this as yet desultory fire, Grant rapidly posted his divisions thus: General C. F. Smith on the left, opposite the northwest of the fort; and McClelland on the right, Oglesby's brigade holding the extreme right. The light artillery was placed with proper supports upon the various roads, while most of the heavy guns, under Major Cavender, were directed against the armament of the fort. General Grant's headquarters were at a farm-house, on the Dover road.

THE ASSAULT UPON THE TRENCHES.

The first grand act was a furious cannonade on both sides, in which the rebel practice was excellent, and our own not inferior. This was the herald of our infantry assault. To make a lodgment upon their intrenchment, and particularly upon an epaulment covering a strong battery in his front, General McClernand formed the Forty-eighth Illinois, of Wallace's brigade, and Morrison's brigade (consisting of the Seventeenth and Forty-ninth Illinois), into a storming column, under the command of Colonel Hayne of the Forty-eighth, with McAllister's Battery to cover the assault. The movement was under the superintendence of Col. W. H. Wallace, of the Second brigade. They formed at the foot of the hill, where they were in some measure protected from the direct fire; and at the word, moved forward, firing as they advanced.

The attack was not successful; and although they were re-enforced by the Forty-fifth Illinois, of Wallace's brigade, and other troops, the enemy's fire was so vigorous, and the abatis and palisading presented so strong an obstacle, that they were compelled to retire. The position assaulted was defended by Colonel Heiman's rebel brigade, and two other regiments, with one or more batteries of field artillery.*

In this, and several other desultory engagements, our losses were severe. We were at least in contact with the enemy, and had felt his strength; but there was some danger that he might also learn ours. The gunboats and re-enforcements by the river were anxiously expected. Without them, we were weaker than the enemy; and our very proximity, while it gave prestige, increased our danger.

We were also in want of rations, and, to cap the climax of untoward circumstances, the elements conspired. The unusual and deceitful mildness of the morning, like many a false harbinger of spring, had suddenly changed to biting cold; a

* Pillow's report.

rain-storm from the northeast set in, which turned, first to hail, and then to sleet. The cold became more intense, the thermometer rapidly falling to only ten degrees above zero. The like, it is said, had never been known there. Our troops had no shelter whatever, and were without rations; few had blankets and overcoats; some, with the characteristic improvidence of new troops, beguiled by the mild weather, and thoughtless of future need, had thrown them away. At length hail and sleet were followed by a driving snow; and, but that the rebels, who were in the trenches, suffered equally, it would have seemed that Boreas had become a rebel sympathizer, and was emulating the celestial anger of Juno, against our heroes of the new American Iliad.

It would be difficult for a warm, sheltered, and well-fed pen, or rather the hand that holds and the brain that impels such, to depict the sufferings of that night; the wounded freezing to death, and the weary soldiers benumbed by the cold, which even vigorous vitality could not dispel. They were seeing war for the first time, and they had bitter experience of its heat and cold at the same moment.

The morning of Friday dawned sadly upon these war-worn, hungry, freezing men, and brought with it only a new summons to battle. Still anxiously expecting the gunboats and the bulk of Lewis Wallace's new division by the Cumberland, and alive to the immediate hazard of his position, General Grant dispatched a courier to General Lewis Wallace himself, at Fort Henry, with orders to bring across the garrison which had been left there. But no sooner had the messenger been sent, than a scout, who had been posted to watch the river below, came galloping up to headquarters with the welcome intelligence that a boat was just arriving, and a thick cloud of smoke announced that the rest of the fleet was below. The first boat, the Carondelet, was the herald of the fleet; and as soon as she came within long-range, on that terrible stretch of the river swept by the concentrated rebel fire, she opened upon the water-batteries; and thus began that desperate and unequal battle, in which Commodore Foote was to

engage with only partial success, but with increase of honor to himself and the navy.

Three miles below the fort the troops and the artillery of the Third Division were soon landed, with provisions and supplies for the whole army; they had come in the very nick of time. Rapidly clearing a road through the woods, they were soon placed in line with the First and Second divisions. Wallace, being the only general officer without the command of a division, was put in command of this Third Division, organized after the arrival of the re-enforcements.

These troops, just arrived, together with the garrison left at Fort Henry, constituted the Third Division; it was composed of the brigades of Cruft and Thayer,—the former of four, and the latter—two brigades united—of seven regiments. Wallace was at once posted in the centre, between Smith and McClelland, and McArthur, with two regiments of Smith's division, was posted on the extreme right under McClelland, and thus the line was completed. Not much time was spent in issuing rations—which gladdened the hearts of our men—and ammunition, of which they were in great need, and in making proper arrangements for the wounded, who had suffered horrible tortures, when the second act in the drama was begun. This was the

ATTACK OF THE GUNBOATS ON THE RIVER-FRONT.

The Carondelet opened the unequal fight: she was not long unaided. As at Fort Henry, the commodore steamed up with his iron-clads—the Pittsburg, St. Louis, Louisville, and Carondelet in the first line, followed by the wooden boats Conestoga, Tyler, and Lexington. The water-batteries first engaged his attention: if he could silence and pass them, he could take a position in the bend, and would be able to enfilade the faces of the fort with broadsides. Until he could do this, however, his vessels were exposed to the concentrated fire of both batteries, and of the fort, the latter having a most destructive plunging, as well as raking, fire upon his decks and armor. Under a *feu d'enfer*, such as few naval armaments have

ever experienced, Foote moved nearer and nearer in a deadly struggle. But his guns did excellent service; the upper battery of four guns was already silenced; the shot and shell from the heavy guns on the boats had rained upon them for two hours, and the boats were lying within four hundred yards, perhaps even nearer. Notwithstanding that they had not been put in a proper condition for the fight, owing to the pressure of time, and that they had suffered very greatly from the guns of the work, a few minutes more would have enabled them to run by into a position from which they could have paralyzed the water-front, when suddenly Foote was forced to fall back. The rebel cross and plunging fire had at length done its work effectually: the Louisville was rendered unmanageable by a shot which cut away her rudder-chains, and she drifted down the narrow and rapid stream, helpless and useless.

The flag-ship, the St. Louis, had her wheel shot away; the pilot, by whose side the Commodore was standing, was killed, and Foote himself wounded in the foot by falling timber. Rushing to an additional steering apparatus, upon which he had depended in such an emergency to keep her up, he found that too shot away, and the St. Louis was thus compelled to drift down in an equally helpless condition. Fifty-nine shots had struck the flag-ship, some of them raking her from stem to stern. The Louisville had received thirty-five; the Carondelet, twenty-six; and her rifled gun had burst during the action. The Pittsburg had been struck twenty-one times. The fire of at least twenty guns had been concentrated upon the boats, and could only be returned by twelve boat-guns.

To sum up, two of the iron-clads were unmanageable, the other two greatly damaged between wind and water; and thus, when on the very verge of victory, the gallant commodore, himself drifting powerless, was obliged to make signal for all to withdraw, having lost fifty-four killed and wounded.

After consultation with Grant, Foote returned to Cairo to repair the iron-clads, which were seriously damaged, and to bring down a competent naval force for a new attack, if

the seige should last long enough to require it: but it did not; the end was already at hand.


We need hardly enforce upon our readers the fact that the withdrawal of Commodore Foote was an absolute necessity; he could not continue the action. But the services of the navy on that day must not be by any means undervalued. They were of the greatest utility: they relieved General Grant from all danger of attack, while yet too weak to complete the investment; they made a grand diversion in his favor, while he was posting his new troops and maturing his plans; and they gave a brighter lustre to the gallantry, skill, and endurance of the American sailor, of whom the country has always been proud. The withdrawal of the fleet after the action on Friday checked for a moment, however, the prosecution of the original plans of the general. The proper course now seemed to be to wait for large re-enforcements, which he knew might be had from St. Louis, Cincinnati, and Cairo; to strengthen and perfect the investment; and, perhaps, by marching up the river, to isolate the work, and starve it into surrender. In the meanwhile, the gunboats could be thoroughly repaired, and return to try another attack. Had the rebels now strengthened their intrenchments and awaited Grant's attack, such might have been the *modus operandi*.

But the rebel counter-plans, formed in a council of war, held on Friday night at Floyd's headquarters, in Dover, determined Grant's battle tactics in a different manner, and hurried their own ruin. The council was composed of the division and brigade commanders, and they unanimously assented to the plan proposed by General Floyd, which was to throw an overwhelming force—half his army, with Forrest's cavalry, all under Pillow and Johnson—upon our right wing, under McClernand; to drive it from the heights overlooking the Cumberland, from which there was danger that our batteries would soon sweep and close the river above; to throw it back upon Wallace, while Buckner with the remaining force, less the necessary garrison of the fort, should march directly upon our encampment in the centre, on the Wynn's Ferry

road, and attack Wallace in front. If these flank and centre attacks should be successful, Grant's army would thus be thrown back around Smith as a pivot, and then it might be easily routed and destroyed. It was a good plan, and partially successful, and yet it was the prelude to their immediate and overwhelming defeat. In case, however, they could only partially succeed, the least Floyd expected was to open a pathway by which he might evacuate the fort—now very like a trap—withdraw his army, and save his precious person; which, in any event, he meant to do, whatever should happen to his troops. Such were Floyd's plans; they were to be tried with the early morning of Saturday, the 15th. Accordingly, at five A. M., the rebel column, under Pillow and Johnson, moved out from Dover, the advance being taken by Colonel Baldwin's brigade, composed of the First and Fourteenth Mississippi and the Twenty-sixth Tennessee. These were followed by Wharton's brigade, of two regiments; McCousland's, of two; Davidson's, of three; Drake's, of five; and other troops, amounting in all to ten thousand men, with thirty guns, which were to crush McClermand, and clear a pathway through our right.

McClermand's troops were thus disposed of: McArthur on the right; and then, in order, Oglesby and W. H. L. Wallace. McClermand's left was near the Fort Henry road, on the left of which was Cruft's brigade, of Lewis Wallace's division. Our lines corresponded to the contour of the rebel intrenchment, and with each brigade was a field-battery. It was well posted, and, if on the alert, could certainly repel any rebel attack. But, unfortunately, the first attack of the rebels was of the nature of a surprise. Reveille was just sounding, the troops were not under arms, and seemed to be in utter ignorance of the rebel designs; but it at once became evident that our right flank was seriously menaced. The brigade and regimental commanders soon got their men into line, and, guided by the crack of the rebel rifles and the flashes of their guns, executed a partial change of front to meet them. It was not a moment too soon, for Pillow had sent his cavalry

to try and strike McArthur's rear, while he was pounding away at his exposed right flank.



INVESTMENT OF FORT DONELSON.

Oglesby and McArthur, with too scant a supply of ammunition for this unexpected battle, stood firm for a while; but fresh rebel troops constantly arrived, and had it not been for the coolness of the brigade commanders and the inspiring valor of Colonel John A. Logan, who commanded the Thirty-first Illinois, of Oglesby's brigade, the attack might have resulted in a panic to our troops. As it was, McArthur and Oglesby were obliged to fall back rapidly to avoid being taken in rear, and to form a new line facing south. But the rebels did not advance with impunity. Our light batteries, admirably handled by McAllister, Taylor, and Dresser, shifting their position from time to time, pour in a withering fire of grape and canister, and cause the enemy's front line to recoil again and again, until pushed forward, or replaced by the overwhelming masses in rear. Two regiments of W. H. L. Wallace's brigade fly to the rescue, while he arranges the others *en potence* on his left, to check Pillow, and yet defend the road.

Again the rebels move towards the right flank of our new

line, and again the battle rages. Cruft's brigade, of Lewis Wallace's division, is ordered down upon this flanking column at a run. Thus checked, the enemy might have been driven back and pursued, had it not been for a new and unexpected foe, or rather the fear of one, swarming from their intrenchments, and passing the rifle-pits like a surge of the sea. Buckner's force came out to attack the left flank and crotchet of our new line. As soon as they were discovered, Wallace strengthened the flank thus threatened, and two of Taylor's guns, coming rapidly into action, dealt grape and canister on his advance. Buckner was easily repulsed, for his attack was very feebly delivered, and his troops behaved in the most cowardly manner. When at eleven o'clock Pillow rode over to Buckner's position, he found them huddled under cover,* from which it was only after a good deal of artillery firing that their general could persuade them to emerge. In speaking of the repulse, Buckner says his attacking regiments "withdrew without panic, but in some confusion, to the trenches."

But the moral effect of Buckner's attack was not without its value. Beset on all sides, Pillow thundering upon our new front, the cavalry threatening our rear, Johnson well extended upon our right, checked but not driven off by Cruft, our men were somewhat demoralized by Buckner's demonstration: many became disheartened; the fugitives from the front became a crowd. A mounted officer galloped down the road, shouting, "We are cut to pieces."† The ammunition had given out. Our line, including Cruft, who had borne the brunt of the battle for some time, was again forced back. Logan, Lawler, and Ransom were wounded; many field-officers and large numbers of subalterns killed. The crisis of the battle had, indeed, arrived, when General Wallace posted Colonel Thayer's (Third) brigade across the road, formed a reserve of three regiments, placed Wood's Battery in position, and awaited the attack. The retiring regiments formed again in rear, and were supplied with ammunition. The rebel

* Colonel Gilmer's Report.

† General L. Wallace's Report.

attack upon this new line was extremely vigorous; they had delayed for awhile to plunder the dead, and pick up what they could find in McClernand's camp; and Pillow had sent back an aid to telegraph to Nashville that, "on the honor of a soldier," the day was theirs. The new attack which he was about to make was only the finishing stroke. Again he moved upon Thayer's brigade; but, by their unflinching stand and deliberate fire, and especially by the firmness of the First Nebraska and the excellent handling of the artillery, he was now repulsed.

Whatever the apparent success of the rebels thus far, in driving our right wing, Grant, thoughtful and imperturbable, had not been for a moment dismayed. He saw from the very desperate nature of the rebel attack that when it culminated, they would give way, if he showed a bold front, and advanced at all points. Riding to the front at three o'clock, he ordered Lewis Wallace, who had first checked the enemy, to advance upon Pillow, and recover the ground lost in the morning, while General C. F. Smith should storm the works on the enemy's right. His new plans were rapidly formed, and will bear the test of military criticism.

The column of attack, for the desperate work now undertaken by General Wallace, was formed of Colonel M. L. Smith's and Colonel Cruft's brigades, supported by two Ohio regiments. Over the rough, rolling, and in parts thickly wooded ground, these troops moved, driving the unwilling enemy before them, and only halting when within one hundred and fifty yards of the rebel intrenchments. This was at five o'clock! We remained in the position thus gained during the intensely cold night, ministering to the wounded of the morning's battle, with whom the field was thickly strewn, and anxious for the morning. At daylight the next morning, Thayer's brigade was brought up, and preparations were made to storm the intrenchments, when the display of a white flag from the fort, followed by others from different parts of the works, made them pause. Before going to another part of the field, where great deeds were done, we

pause for a moment to say, this movement of Wallace must be regarded as having a decided bearing upon the result.

And now let us return to the left wing. Smith had received orders to attack the intrenchments directly in front of the fort. His plan was to carry their outer works at the point of the bayonet, then to bring up his batteries, and sweep the interior crest, and then to assault and carry the fort. This was the grand stroke of the battle ; it would relieve our right, and, if successful, would insure the capture.

We cannot forbear pausing for a moment to express our unqualified admiration of General Grant's orders, just at this juncture. It was the sublimity of that *boldness* which Napoleon, and, perhaps, some one before him, had declared to be the *æs triplex* of a commanding general;* to snatch victory out of apparent disaster, by assuming the boldest offensive. It amazed and paralyzed the rebels, and it inspired our troops, most of them new and ignorant, with courage and enthusiasm.

* L'audace, l'audace, et encore l'audace.

CHAPTER VII.

GENERAL SMITH'S ATTACK AND THE SURRENDER.

SMITH'S COLUMNS ORGANIZED.—LAUMAN THE FORLORN HOPE.—SMITH LEADS.—ADDRESSES HIS MEN.—THE LINES MOVE.—SMITH'S SPLENDID VALOR DECISIVE.—FLOYD'S NEW COUNCIL.—HE TURNS OVER THE COMMAND.—PILLOW LOOKS AT THE CARDS, AND "PASSES."—THE PUSILLANIMOUS FLIGHT.—BUCKNER SURRENDERS.—THE CORRESPONDENCE.—GRAND RESULTS.—COMMENTS.—EULOGY OF GENERAL C. F. SMITH.

WALLACE was already on his war-path, as we have just described, when General Smith organized his column of attack. Cook's brigade is posted on his left, and is designed to make a feint upon the work. Cavender's heavy guns are posted in rear to the right and left, having a cross-fire upon the intrenchments, and also playing upon the fort; but the attacking force—the forlorn hope—is Lauman's brigade, formed in close column of regiments, and composed of the Second Iowa, the Fifty-second Indiana (temporarily attached), the Twenty-fifth Indiana, Seventh Iowa, and Fourteenth Iowa.

Cook's feigned attack is already begun; Cavender's guns are thundering away. It is nearly sunset, when Smith, hearing Wallace's guns far to the right, puts himself at the head of Lauman's brigade, and climbing the steep hill-side, bursts upon the ridge on which the enemy has constructed his outer works. Before advancing, and when the force was just in readiness to move, Smith had ridden along the line, and in few but emphatic words had told them the duty they were to perform. He said that he would lead them, and that the pits must be taken by the bayonet alone. Perhaps during the whole war, full as it is of brilliant actions, there is none more striking than this charge.

At the given signal, the lines are put in motion, Smith rid-

ing in advance, with the color-bearer alongside of him; his commanding figure, gray hair, and haughty contempt of danger, acting upon his men like the white plume of Navarre at Ivry. Not far has he moved before his front line is swept by the enemy's artillery with murderous effect. His men waver for a moment, but their general, sublime in his valor, reminds them, in caustic words, that while he, as an old *regular*, is in the line of his professional duty, this is what they have *volunteered* to do. With oaths and urgency, his hat waving upon the point of his sword, by the splendor of his example he leads them on through this valley of death, up the slope, through the abatis, up to the intrenchment—and over. With a thousand shouts, they plant their standards on the captured works, and pour in volley after volley, before which the rebels fly in precipitate terror. Battery after battery is brought forward, Stone's arriving first, and then a direct and enfilading fire is poured upon the flanks and faces of the work. Four hundred of Smith's gallant column have fallen, but the charge is decisive. Grant's tactics and Smith's splendid valor have won the day.

For thus the matter stands: Wallace has held his advanced ground, and is now informed of Smith's success. At all points the rebels are driven back, and at two, their advanced intrenchments are occupied or commanded. How different from the aspect of things in the morning, when Pillow had telegraphed to Nashville that he had won the day! And yet there was a logical connection between the morning and the evening. They formed but parts of a concerted whole, of a plan not intelligible to the division commanders, who had not been able, like General Grant, to appreciate the whole field, and to sum the varied issues of the battle. To most of the subordinate commanders, and certainly to the greater number of the men, up to the decisive moment, the enemy seemed to have a great and growing advantage; but to Grant it was not so. The very vigor of the enemy's attack was a surge which he was sure would soon find its reflux; and, by their massing of troops on our right and centre, Grant's

counter movement, conducted by Smith, was rendered feasible, and the result sure. Thus when night fell, on the 15th, the victory was certain. Holding the advanced points thus secured, and re-enforcing them strongly, Grant only awaited the morning to storm the work.

During that cold night, for the most part without food, and entirely without fire, our devoted men awaited the dawn with unabated ardor. Success had inspired enthusiasm; and the promise of complete victory in the morning compensated for their physical sufferings. They would have fought the next day with irresistible ardor.

But if our men were now exultant, the tables were completely turned; the rebels were completely disheartened; the officers more so than the men, and the generals more so than their subordinates. It is a sorry chapter in the history of war. They no longer thought of fighting, but of escape or surrender. Again a council of war was called that night at General Floyd's headquarters, and in it was displayed a scene which no soldier likes to portray, even if his enemy be the *dramatis personæ*—a scene in which imbecility, ignorance, and cowardice played the prominent parts. Amid much crimination and recrimination, one opinion seemed to have a large majority in its favor: the army must escape, or the place and its garrison be surrendered. Floyd, in great terror, lest after his treason and embezzlements while United States secretary of war, he should come into our hands and meet with summary retribution, in the clutches of a furious soldiery, declared that he would not fall into our power; that he would sooner die than surrender. He seems to have had little concern for the army, but partly perhaps from qualms of conscience, and partly that he wanted a large escort, he proposed to cut his way out with his own brigade of Virginia troops—a nice illustration of the State-rights' principle, which even the Confederates did not appreciate.

Pillow, *par nobile fratrum*, second in command, emulated the virtues of his chief. Vain, foolish, ignorant, during the Mexican War, this was his Confederate *coup d'essai*, and he did not

disappoint his old acquaintances. He displayed a similar want of moral and physical courage.

It is true, as might be expected, that there is some casuistry in his report, to show that he wanted to fight longer; and it is equally true, that after he had written his report, lest the world should not believe him, he did a thing unheard of before, he got the affidavits of his aids, and other officers, that what he had said was true—sharp practice, which he brought with him from his lawyer's desk.

It is also true, that when the noble pair had completed their arrangements for flight, Pillow told Floyd, not without some chuckling, that there were no two men in the Confederacy the Federals would rather get into their hands; whereas, in reality, *he* was too much despised to be great game for us.

All this is very sickening; it savors of low comedy of the lowest type. We now turn to Buckner, the third in rank, and the only one of the three having any pretensions to soldier-ship. He at least was a soldier; and because of this, he was to be made the scapegoat, and to suffer, in part at least, a vicarious confinement at Fort Warren. His West Point antecedents compelled him to remain and surrender the now thoroughly demoralized forces; and if he could not avert, at least to share their fate. In the entire record of the war there is no meaner page than this. Floyd made over the command to Pillow; who, like a player at cards, "promptly passed it" to Buckner; and then these two men, who had before disgraced the name of American, now disgraced the name of soldier, by deserting their post and their soldiers, and sneaking away under cover of night. In order to join and aid Floyd, as Buckner thought, Colonel Forrest was ordered to cut his way out with the cavalry; but Floyd, embarking such portion of the Virginia brigade as he could hastily collect, upon two small steamers, at the Dover landing, under cover of a guard, to check the frantic attempts of others to get on board, and amid the execrations and hisses of thousands collected on the wharf, pushed off and fled to Nashville! No wonder they were suspended from command, and called to account by Jefferson

Davis; but we do wonder greatly that a man of the soldierly character of Albert Sidney Johnston should have stooped to whitewash them, by declaring that, although "the command was irregularly transferred," it was "not apparently to avoid any just responsibility, or from any personal or moral intrepidity." That *not* must have given him some trouble to write.

Buckner's course was soon taken; indeed his troops were in such confusion that no other was left him. At the earliest dawn he sent a bugler to sound a parley, and with him an officer bearing a white flag. Dimly discerned in the twilight, and challenged by the picket, the officer announced himself as the bearer of a letter from Buckner to General Grant. The letter was at once taken to the headquarters. A white flag displayed upon the fort at the same time, informed the army that a capitulation was proposed. Buckner's letter* asked for the appointment of commissioners to settle upon terms of capitulation, to which end he requested an armistice till noon. Grant read the letter, and without a moment's hesitation penned a reply which has become historic.† "No terms," he wrote, "other than an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works."

* HEADQUARTERS, FORT DONELSON, February 16, 1862.

SIR—In consideration of all the circumstances governing the present situation of affairs at this station, I propose to the commanding officer of the Federal forces the appointment of commissioners to agree upon terms of capitulation of the forces and fort under my command, and in that view suggest an armistice until twelve o'clock to-day.

I am sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. B. BUCKNER, Brigadier-General C. S. A.

† HEADQUARTERS ARMY IN THE FIELD,
Camp near Donelson, Feb. 16, 1862.

TO GENERAL S. B. BUCKNER, *Confederate Army*:

Yours of this date, proposing an armistice and appointment of commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received. *No terms other than an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works.*

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, Brigadier-General U. S. A., commanding.

If we do make some allowance for Buckner's chagrin, it would be hard to palliate the unmilitary character of his reply to Grant's note.* Why should "the brilliant success of the Confederate arms yesterday" affect Grant, except to make him the more strenuous to give them no further chance? In what respect were his terms "ungenerous and unchivalrous?" They were rebels in arms; he had come there to destroy them, and to occupy their works; and, besides, Buckner's immediate acceptance of the terms proposed was strangely inconsistent with the charge against Grant. The surrender was immediate and unconditional. The work was given up, with thirteen thousand five hundred men as prisoners of war, three thousand horses, forty-eight field-pieces, seventeen heavy guns, twenty thousand muskets, and an immense quantity of stores.† Two regiments of Tennessee troops, numbering fourteen hundred and seventy-five, came up to re-enforce Donelson on the day after the capitulation, and were taken prisoners, greatly to their surprise. This is in itself a comment upon the disgraceful character of the capitulation. It took the Confederacy by surprise.

Thus the rupture of the rebel strategic line was completed, and the Cumberland and Tennessee opened to our armies. Thus, moreover, in the midst of our disasters, delays, uncertainty, and imbecility, we had at length a bright prospect of a

* FEBRUARY, 16, 1862.

TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, *U. S. A.*:

SIR—The distribution of the forces under my command, incident to an unexpected change of commanders, and the overwhelming force under your command, compel me, notwithstanding the brilliant success of the Confederate arms yesterday, to accept the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms which you propose.

I am, sir, your very obedient servant,

S. B. BUCKNER, Brigadier-General C. S. A.

† We quote the number from Pollard, who seems, however, to have forgotten that he had said before in his narrative that they had only thirteen thousand troops in all. What account does he make of the losses in battle, and of those who fled with Floyd and Forrest?

commander, only as yet a subordinate, indeed, but one who could both plan and fight; and who, when others should fail, might be relied on, as he has since proved himself, the hope of the army, and the prop of the country. It was proved, also, that our troops were possessed of valor, dash, and fortitude. "For four successive nights, without shelter, during the most inclement weather known in that latitude, they had faced an enemy in large force, in a position chosen by himself," and had "secured the greatest number of prisoners of war (up to that time) ever taken in battle on this continent." These are the words of General Grant's order announcing the victory. The confession of the rebels is no less strong. "The display of courage," says Pollard, "on the part of the Federal troops was unquestionable, . . . and many of our officers did not hesitate to express the opinion that the Western troops, particularly from Southern Illinois, Minnesota, and Iowa, were as good fighting material as there was to be found on the continent."* We are content, although he vents his spleen in the same paragraph against the Eastern troops.

We regret, even in an abstract military point of view, not to be able to return his compliment. The comments of military criticism must be entirely unfavorable to the Confederate army in this series of actions. When Grant first accosted the work, he was in weaker force than they absolutely, and eminently so when we consider the proportion established by military science between an army holding strong works and a force of besiegers.

It is no after-thought, based upon later knowledge, which leads us to say that they should have gone forth to meet his advancing column from Fort Henry, and delivered a fierce battle, so as, at least, to cripple him, and keep him for a time from coming to the siege. Secondly: when he had come up, with Smith and McClelland alone, they should have sallied from the entire line of their intrenchments, and driven him

* Pollard, First Year, 246.

back ; not waiting for Wallace to come up and re-enforce him. And finally, even after the defection of Floyd and Pillow, Buckner should have fought to the last. His thirteen thousand men, with the re-enforcements that were coming, should surely have held that army at bay, or, at least, have made a more valiant fight before surrender. But the *morale* in war, like the imagination of man, scorns all rules ; and Buckner's conduct, which he defends on the score of humanity,—declaring that three-fourths of his army would be cut to pieces if he should attempt to evacuate,—is only really explicable if we believe that his men, deserted by their commanders, would not fight, and that numbers, had they been doubled, were utterly valueless in such a case. We have a better opinion of Buckner than to be content with his own excuse ; if his men would have fought, Buckner would have led them : there was no more fight in them.

The news of the Fort Donelson victory—anxiously hoped for, though but tremblingly expected—flashed in telegraphic lightnings over the land,* and intoxicated the loyal but almost despairing people with joy. The great cities were illuminated, in public buildings and private residences alike ; and waving flags from every house attested the almost universal sentiment. National salutes echoed to each other from cities, and forts, and armies ; Grant's name was on every lip ; and the least the Government could do it did, by making him a Major-General of Volunteers, to date from the day of the surrender.

* CAIRO, February 17, 1862.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN :

The Union flag floats over Fort Donelson. The Carondelet, Captain Walke, brings the glorious intelligence.

The fort surrendered at nine o'clock yesterday (Sunday) morning. General Buckner and about fifteen thousand prisoners, and a large amount of material of war, are the trophies of the victory. Loss heavy on both sides.

Floyd, the thief, stole away during the night previous with five thousand men, and is denounced by the rebels as a traitor. I am happy to inform you that Flag-officer Foote, though suffering with his foot, with the noble characteristic of our navy, notwithstanding his disability, will take up immediately two gunboats, and with the eight mortar-boats, which he will overtake, will

His order tells the story remarkably well.* He was to move forward without delay to still greater triumphs.

Without the slightest disparagement to any of the brave commanders in that siege, it is our duty and our pleasure to make especial mention of him who, next to General Grant, was the hero of Fort Donelson—General Charles Ferguson Smith, the leader of the assault on the rebel right, which decided the fortune of the day.

It is the more his due, because this gallant, veteran soldier died soon after, at the opening of a new and what promised to be a most brilliant chapter in his life ; and, in watching the progress of our living heroes, it is the tendency of human nature to forget the honor due the dead. The more perfect

make an immediate attack on Clarksville, if the state of the weather will permit. We are now firing a national salute from Fort Cairo, General Grant's late post, in honor of the glorious achievement.

[Signed] GEO. W. CULLUM,
Brig.-Gen. Vols. and U. S. A., and Chief of Staff and Engineers.

* GENERAL ORDERS, No. 2.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF WEST TENNESSEE,
FORT DONELSON, February 17, 1862.

The general commanding takes great pleasure in congratulating the troops of this command for the triumph over rebellion, gained by their valor, on the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth instant.

For four successive nights, without shelter, during the most inclement weather known in this latitude, they faced an enemy in large force, in a position chosen by himself. Though strongly fortified by nature, all the additional safeguards suggested by science were added. Without a murmur this was borne, prepared at all times to receive an attack, and, with continuous skirmishing by day, resulting ultimately in forcing the enemy to surrender without conditions.

The victory achieved is not only great in the effect it will have in breaking down rebellion, but has secured the greatest number of prisoners of war ever taken in any battle on this continent.

Fort Donelson will hereafter be marked in capitals on the map of our united country, and the men who fought the battle will live in the memory of a grateful people.

By order,

U. S. GRANT, Brig.-Gen. commanding.

beau ideal of a soldier never existed in any army than was General Smith. We do not design to give a record of his life, nor to pen an adequate eulogium.

The son of a surgeon in the army, he was early imbued with the military spirit. He graduated at the Military Academy in 1825; and from 1829 to 1842 he was on duty there as assistant instructor of tactics, adjutant, and finally as commandant of cadets. The author's recollection of him as commandant is of a model soldier—a daily example to the cadets of splendid dignity, great manliness, and magnificent personal appearance. We all feared him, but thoroughly respected him; and we believe no commandant ever accomplished as much for the discipline of the corps as he did. He was one of the marked men in the army. No one was astonished at his splendid conduct in Mexico. In the battles of the valley, he commanded a light battalion of picked men; and he was so distinguished that he received three brevets—as major, lieutenant-colonel, and colonel.

At the outbreak of the rebellion he fell, for a short time, under the displeasure of the Government, for reasons never divulged, and was not made a brigadier-general until August, 1861; but, opportunity once offered him, the beauty and valor of his charge at Donelson, under the discriminating eye of Grant, who had formerly been his pupil, won for him immediately an appointment as major-general.

Pending the battle of Pittsburg Landing, he was lying sick at Savannah, Tennessee, where he died on the 25th of April. An accomplished general; a superb soldier; a dignified and punctiliously honorable gentleman; a splendid specimen of a man;—such is an epitome of his record, made with melancholy but grateful pleasure by one of his admiring pupils, who owes to his instruction far more than such a slight acknowledgment can repay.

NOTE.—Notwithstanding the bitter rebel spirit which pervades Pollard's work, I desire to say that it is, in many cases, very fair and just. He certainly is not afraid to criticise his own people; and in his "Chronology of the War,"

he always calls a Confederate defeat by its right name—seldom *inadvertently* naming it a victory.

I have waded with patience and weariness through the shallow and turbid waters of the official Confederate reports, finding little that is worth reproducing in the narrative. Those of Floyd and Pillow are examples of special pleading to cover their base desertion. That of Buckner is a succinct account of his straits; not without sneers, both designed and unconscious, at his superiors, who, when they had surrendered the command, asked to be permitted to withdraw their troops. The most useful is that of Lieutenant-Colonel Gilmer, late an officer of our engineers, and chief-engineer of Johnston's rebel army,—from which I have taken some details as authentic. The report of Major William Brown, of the Twentieth Mississippi, is the boldest in the denunciation of "seniors, who endeavor to escape by throwing the responsibility upon juniors."

CHAPTER VIII.

PREPARATIONS FOR A NEW ADVANCE.

GRANT'S ENLARGED COMMAND.—GENERAL BUELL CO-OPERATES WITH HALLECK.—ADMINISTRATION.—DISCIPLINE, JUSTICE, HUMANITY.—NASHVILLE FALLS.—SURPRISE OF THE PEOPLE.—A. S. JOHNSTON RETIRES TO MURFREESBORO'.—THE ASCENT OF THE TENNESSEE.—CORINTH THREATENED.—ISLAND NO. 10—SEALS THE RIVER.—THE POSITION DESCRIBED.—POPE TAKES NEW MADRID.—GENERAL MACKALL AND THE AMERICAN THERMOPYLÆ.—SCHUYLER HAMILTON'S CANAL.—THE CAPTURE AND ROUT.

GRANT'S sphere of action was at once enlarged. By an order of General Halleck, bearing date of February 14, 1862, he had been assigned to the new district of West Tennessee, embracing the territory from Cairo, between the Mississippi and Cumberland rivers, to the Mississippi border, with his headquarters in the field. Moving his army by the west bank of the Cumberland, he co-operated with the gunboats in their ascent of the river, under Commodore Foote.

When General Halleck had been assigned, in the November preceding, to the Department of the Missouri, the Department of the Ohio had been confided to Brigadier-General Don Carlos Buell. His command comprised the States of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, that portion of Kentucky east of the Cumberland, and the State of Tennessee. Portions of these two armies, thus divided by the Cumberland, were soon to come together, and form a combination against the enemy. In the mean time, however, Clarksville, on the east bank of the Cumberland, was evacuated by the enemy, and occupied by our forces on the 20th of February,—large quantities of stores being found there. The gunboats were then pushed on towards Nashville. The rebels were, in great haste, seeking a

new line ; and it was of vast importance so to hurry them, that they should find this a difficult or troublesome task.

Grant's administration of his new district was energetic, and his preparations for a new advance were rapidly made. He established martial law over West Tennessee ; and ordered that "Tennessee, by her rebellion, having ignored all laws of the United States, no courts will be allowed to act under State authority ; but all cases coming within reach of the military arm will be adjudicated by the authorities the Government has established within the State." To guard against all license in the conduct of his troops, he republished General Halleck's order, that they should "let no excesses on their part tarnish the glory of their army." The course of justice was tempered with humanity ; and when it was necessary to take supplies and subsistence for his troops from citizens, he ordered that the demands should be as light as possible,—so distributed as to produce no distress, and in every case receipted for. Justice and consideration to citizens not in arms, and succor to the poor, when oppressed by Union men or rebels, have always been his rule,—a course of action prompted by principle, and never intermitted on account of public opinion or political pressure.

Nashville, where Johnston had only remained to await the issue of the fighting at Donelson, was abandoned as soon as that fortress fell, and was occupied on Sunday evening, February 23d, by Colonel Kennet, of the Fourth Ohio cavalry, of General O. M. Mitchell's division.* On the 3d of March, Columbus, the second Gibraltar of the West (Bowling Green was the first, and Vicksburg was to be the third), fell before the strategy of Halleck and Buell, and the splendid battle tactics of Grant. Fort Henry was the first act in the process of destruction : Fort Donelson dealt an additional blow to the tottering ruin.

The fall of Nashville was a terrible blow. The rebel his-

* The surrender is publicly believed to have been made to General Nelson, but that officer did not arrive with his division until three days after.

torian compares the effect to the shock of an earthquake, when the congregations in the churches heard that the Federals were coming.* The people had been entirely deceived, or lulled into security. No one anticipated such a fate.

Johnston moved with his main body to Murfreesboro', leaving to Floyd and Forrest (who had just "retreated" from Donelson) the duty of removing or destroying the supplies; while a mob, ravenous for spoils, "secured and secreted government stores enough to open respectable groceries." The evacuation of Columbus, also, was a great blow to them, and a great acquisition to us; but it was a military necessity—a sequence in the inexorable logic of the war. The works were of immense strength, consisting of tier on tier of batteries on the river-front, and a strong parapet and ditch, crossed by a thick abatis, on the land side,† and a vast chain, to stop the passage of the Mississippi.

The fleet was now withdrawn down the Cumberland, and a portion of it sent up the Tennessee, over the ground already so adventurously reconnoitred by the expedition of Lieutenant-Commander Phelps. That river General Halleck designed to be a most important line of operations for Grant's army; and Grant was putting out his antennæ to feel his way to the terrible battle-field of Pittsburg Landing. Making his temporary headquarters at Fort Henry,—where, indeed, he was detained by department orders, for causes not publicly divulged,‡—he began a new organization of his forces, for this still more difficult campaign. The troops, as they came up from every direction, were pushed forward as rapidly as possible, under General C. F. Smith, to Savannah, about twenty miles from the Mississippi line, and to other adjacent points; and as they moved forward, it was evident to the Confederates that their great route of communication from east to west, by the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, was threatened. This road crosses the Mobile and Ohio Railroad at the little village of Corinth; and the junction there was seen at a glance, by the

* Pollard, *First Year of the War*, p. 246.

† General Cullum's dispatch.

‡ See note at end of the chapter.

generals of both armies, to be a point of great strategic importance. Grant was marching down to attack or flank it, and cut the railroad; and the rebels, with wise foresight, and praiseworthy valor,—a different spirit from that displayed at Fort Henry and Fort Donelson,—determined to hazard a battle, and strike a stunning blow in its defence, at some distance north of it, on the Tennessee. For once they had good generals—"foemen worthy the steel" of Grant—men who, in a just cause, would have gained immortal renown.

ISLAND NO. 10.

Before, however, attempting a delineation of the great battle of Pittsburg Landing, we must return for a brief space to the Mississippi River, which, having been for a time effectually barred by the fortifications of Columbus, needed a new seal and barrier, when, on the 3d of March, those works were dismantled and abandoned by General Polk. That fiery prelate had been directed to "select a defensive position below;" and, moving his forces to the river, had, by the aid of his engineers, arranged strong defences at Island No. 10, the main land in Madrid bend, and at the town of New Madrid.*

This was part of a concerted plan; Johnston was moving southward by the left bank of the Tennessee to defend Memphis, where strong works were erected. Vicksburg, with its river-knot in front, was strong by nature, and also fortified by the engineer's art. New Orleans was, to all seeming, in rebel possession until "the crack of doom," and the forts below it seemed to preclude approach from the Gulf.

Among the most loyal men there were many who doubted the practicability of clearing the Mississippi; and until that should be done, all doubted the downfall of the rebellion. The Father of Waters had submitted to the rebel chain, and there was no patriot sword or battle-axe which could strike off

* The principal islands in the Mississippi, beginning just below the mouth of the Ohio, are numbered down the river. Island No. 1 lies just below Cairo.

the accursed links. It was a gigantic task, for which neither workman nor implements seemed to have been yet found.

Island No. 10 is about forty-five miles below Columbus. It lies nearly in mid-channel, and is about a mile long and a half mile in breadth at its widest part. Its armament consisted principally of four heavy batteries on the island, sweeping the main channel, and seven on the Kentucky and Tennessee shores, most of the guns having been brought from Columbus. To define its situation a little more clearly, the river, which above it flows westward, makes a bend to the south; then to the west and north, in which is the island; and again, eight miles below, a turn to the south, on which, upon the right bank, is New Madrid. Point Pleasant is a village on the right bank, about ten miles below New Madrid; while Tip-tonville is on the opposite bank, a short distance below Point Pleasant. The double bend, in the form of an irregular and inverted S, with the island and the town at the extreme points, with peninsulas thus formed, cutting off in the one case nine miles, and in the other twenty, seems exactly formed to take the eye of the strategist and engineer.

The works on the island, and the supporting batteries on the left bank, having been completed, the old Pelican dock of New Orleans was brought up, armored, and converted into a floating battery; the rebel gunboats nestled under the batteries; forts were erected at New Madrid, and the entire defences of Island No. 10 were declared to be very strong—at least, a sort of semi-Gibraltar.

It mattered little to the Confederacy that General John Pope was dispatched against them; and, even when he had captured Point Pleasant, they felt little concern. They were still more exultant when the nine hours' bombardment by Flag-Officer Foote failed of results. He had, in order to test the strength of the works, moved down with a fleet, consisting of five gunboats and four mortar-boats, from Hickman, twenty miles above, and his bombardment had seemed to produce no effect.

Pope's first essay was to take New Madrid; and this he suc-

ceeded in doing, notwithstanding the efforts of Commodore Hollins with the rebel gunboats to prevent him. Thus, while Foote was coming down to try the defences above, he received information from Pope that, under fire of his siege-guns, the enemy had evacuated the town, that the river was closed below, and that there was no escape for the garrison by water. The first act was done, and well done.

But, although shut up by water, the garrison was strong, the works numerous and powerful, and the island would seal the river for us, until they should be reduced.

The rebel force consisted of about eight thousand men, commanded by Brigadier-General W. W. Mackall, who had assumed command on the 5th of March,—so much a stranger to his own troops, that he deemed it necessary to rest his merits in their eyes upon the fact that he was “a general made by Bragg and Beauregard.” He was a graduate of West Point, and, as an assistant adjutant-general in our service, had been esteemed a good officer; but he promised too much at the island, and failed. His promises and his energy, however, had given new hope to the Confederacy. They considered us checkmated in the river game: at the least, it was to be “an American Thermopylæ.” The rebel generals were fond of Grecian and Roman precedents, but the comparison was never complete.

Although thus hemmed in by Pope’s army on the south, and the gunboats on the north, they would, however, have kept the river sealed against us for some time, had it not been for a plan conceived by General Schuyler Hamilton, who commanded a division in Pope’s army.

The overflow in the river-bottom rendered it impossible for Pope to march his troops from New Madrid to the vicinity of the Union gunboats, and he had no transports to carry them across to any point south of the island. Could that passage be made, the strong works would be taken in rear by a land force, and must fall.

Hamilton’s suggestion was this: to cut a navigable passage across the peninsula above New Madrid, by which to float the

transports across. This herculean task was at once executed, and with perfect success.

In nineteen days our army had completed a canal twelve miles long, and fifty feet wide, a portion of it through heavy timber, which had to be sawed off four and a half feet under water by the hand. The work was done under the superintendence of Colonel J. W. Bissell, with his engineer regiment. The passage was pronounced ready, Foote again engaged the enemy, and while one gunboat was attracting, or rather distracting, the attention of Rucker's Battery, the Carondelet slipped past them all, and ran down to New Madrid. This was on the night of the 4th of April. On the 6th, at nightfall, the Pittsburg likewise ran the batteries, not without some damage; and, on the same night, a fleet of steamboats and transport barges came through the canal, took on our troops at New Madrid, carried them over to the Tennessee shore, and the impregnable works fell like the walls of Jericho. Where now was their boasted strength? Would they immortalize their American Thermopylæ? Alas, for their vain-glorying! There was no intrepidity, no dignity; the scene was pitiable in the extreme. They had shown great skill in putting themselves into traps: the attempt to escape was panic, confusion, utter imbecility. One hundred and twenty-four guns were taken, most of them uninjured. The attempt at spiking, by the hands of those eager to fly, was an entire failure. Their boats, not effectually scuttled, were most of them recovered by our men. The floating-battery was true to her name; although scuttled, she would not sink, but was found high and dry near Point Pleasant, and was immediately put in commission, as chief of the United States nondescripts. The number of prisoners actually accounted for at the surrender was not more than three thousand, but hundreds upon hundreds of starving wretches wandered among the swamps in their efforts to escape, most of whom fell into our hands, and were glad at the last to escape starvation on the terms of imprisonment or parole.

Again had the soldiers of the Confederacy been duped by their leaders; again had the people been beguiled into false security. A glance at the map will show to any military eye, that Island No. 10 was only a temporary expedient. Strong as an isolated point, it could be flanked, surrounded, perfectly invested, and then its very isolation made it a cage. Its fall was certain; and the value of their boasted strategy is indicated, when we remember that Polk evacuated Columbus on the 3d of March; Mackall took command of the island defences on the 5th; and just one day over a month—that is, on the 6th of April—our transports were going down to New Madrid. The formal surrender was made on the 8th.

Although General Grant had no immediate connection with these operations, we have dwelt upon them as forming a part of the great problem, a knowledge of which is needed to enable us to take in the entire scope of action. And now, after this glance at the collateral and contemporaneous movements by Pope, let us return to Grant.

NOTE.—After the battle of Fort Donelson, Grant had gone (Feb. 26) to Nashville to confer with Buell. Some malignant persons had reported this to Halleck and to Washington, and it was made a cause of complaint against him. Add to this, that the state of his command, on account of constant marchings, battles, sickness, detachments, and re-enforcements, made it difficult for him to report its exact condition; for this, fault was found with him. He was also blamed for letting C. F. Smith go to Nashville with his division. And to his utter astonishment, he was, on March 4th, ordered to turn over the command of his forces moving up the Tennessee to C. F. Smith, while he was to remain at Fort Henry. A correspondence took place between himself and Halleck, in which he asked to be relieved entirely from duty—taking especial umbrage at an anonymous letter which had been sent vilifying him. But he was restored to duty and full command, and General Halleck wrote a letter to the headquarters of the army removing all misconceptions. He assumes general command March 14th.

CHAPTER IX.


GRANT'S NEW CAMPAIGN.

PITTSBURG LANDING.—THE LANDING.—GRANT'S DISPOSITIONS.—THE REBEL ADVANCE.—JOHNSTON'S PROCLAMATION.—THE ATTACK ON PRENTISS.—ON SHERMAN, HURLBUT, McCLEARNAND, AND WALLACE.—THE SITUATION AT TEN O'CLOCK.—REBEL LOSSES.—THE GUNBOATS.—WEBSTER'S ARTILLERY.—SURGEON COENYN.—THE FINAL ATTACK ON SUNDAY.—LEWIS WALLACE ARRIVES.—HIS DELAY.—MONDAY MORNING.—BUELL ON THE FIELD.—BATTLE ON THE LEFT—ON THE RIGHT.—BEAUREGARD RETIRES.—COMMENTS.

THE field of Pittsburg Landing had been selected by General C. F. Smith,* who had immediate command of the troops in the field, and who soon acquired information of the rebel designs. It was on the west bank of the Tennessee, and for the most part densely wooded with tall trees, and but little undergrowth. The landing is immediately flanked on the left by a short but precipitous ravine, along which runs the road to Corinth. On the right and left, forming a good natural flanking arrangement, were Snake and Lick creeks, which would compel the attack of the enemy to be made in front. The distance between the mouths of these creeks is about two and a half miles. The locality was well chosen. The landing was protected by the gunboats Tyler and Lexington. Buell's Army of the Ohio was coming up to re-enforce Grant; and although the river lay in our rear, that was the direction of advance. Just at that time it was the best possible thing for our army to fight a battle, and the moral effect of a victory would be invaluable to our cause.

Grant, who arrived at Savannah on the 17th of March, a point from which he could best oversee his whole force, keep ac-

* Sherman's letter to the editor of the United States Service Magazine, January, 1865.



W. T. Sherman

*W. T. Sherman
Maj Genl*



count of his re-enforcements, and daily visit his detachments, had placed the five divisions of Prentiss, McClermand, W. H. Wallace,* Hurlbut, and Sherman. Lewis Wallace's division was thus disposed : the first brigade at Crump's Landing ; the second two miles above it ; the third at Adamsville ; all ready to concentrate and move down to join the main force whenever circumstances should render it necessary.

Grant's force on the field was thus arranged : Prentiss was on the left, about a mile and a half from the landing, facing southward ; McClermand at some distance on his right, facing southwest ; Sherman at Shiloh Church, on the right of McClermand, and in advance of him ; Hurlbut and Wallace a mile in rear of McClermand, in reserve, the former supporting the left, and the latter the right wing. The whole force was about thirty-eight thousand men.

To attack and overwhelm Grant's Army of the Tennessee, before the Army of the Ohio could arrive, was Beauregard's purpose ; for that general had, in his headquarters at Corinth, planned the whole movement, and even while Johnston was on the field, was looked upon as the leader. By the fall of Johnston, he became also the nominal commander, on the afternoon of the first day.

Beauregard had been very diligent in collecting troops from every available quarter, and although Grant had assumed the offensive, the rebel leader took the initiative in a very handsome manner. Bragg's corps had been brought from Mobile and Pensacola ; Polk had come down with the greater part of his troops from the evacuation of Columbus ; and Johnston had brought up his reserve army, which had retreated from Nashville to Murfreesboro'. These concentrated forces, first having been disposed as an army of observation, along the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, from Bethel to Corinth, and along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, from Corinth to Iuka, were now informed of the work before them.

* Owing to Smith's severe sickness, and McClermand's dissatisfaction at being commanded by a junior, Grant assumed the *immediate* command of the expedition, March 31.

What Beauregard hoped to effect, we can only now conjecture. His report, made after his discomfiture, declares—*Credat Judæus*—that it was only to stun our army, take our stores, and then return to Corinth.

The advance of the rebels was not without some premonitions. There was slight skirmishing at Crump's Landing, on the 2d of April, and on the 4th a grand reconnoissance of our position was made, from which, however, they rapidly retired. It was then known also that Beauregard expected to be reinforced by the trans-Mississippi armies of Price and Van Dorn.

On the 3d of April, General A. S. Johnston, their ostensible commander-in-chief, issued a stirring proclamation to the "Army of the Mississippi,"* and the march was begun. The rebel force thus set in motion, with high hopes and overweening fancies, was composed of the army corps of W. J. Hardee, Braxton Bragg, Leonidas Polk, and the reserves under Breckinridge.

Hardee's corps was in front, and contained the divisions of Hindman, Cleburne, and Wood; Bragg had two divisions, those of Ruggles and Withers; Polk had two, Clark's and Cheatnam's; Breckinridge's reserves were composed of the brigades of Trabue, Bowen, and Statham.

* SOLDIERS OF THE ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI:

I have put you in motion to offer battle to the invaders of your country, with the resolution, and discipline, and valor becoming men, fighting, as you are, for all worth living or dying for. You can but march to a decisive victory over agrarian mercenaries, sent to subjugate and despoil you of your liberties, property, and honor.

Remember the precious stake involved; remember the dependence of your mothers, your wives, your sisters, and your children, on the result. Remember the fair, broad, abounding lands, the happy homes, that will be desolated by your defeat. The eyes and hopes of eight millions of people rest upon you. You are expected to show yourselves worthy of your valor and courage, worthy of the women of the South, whose noble devotion in this war has never been exceeded in any time. With such incentives to brave deeds, and with trust that God is with us, your general will lead you confidently to the combat, assured of success.

By order of

GENERAL A. S. JOHNSTON, commanding.



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BATTLE OF PITTSBURGH LANDING

Engraved for "Grant and His Campaigns."



Positions of Maj Gen Sherman's Forces on the morning of April 6th
 Positions of Maj Gen Crittenden on the evening of April 6th
 Positions of Maj Gen Grant & Staff on the morning of April 7th
 Positions of Maj Gen Sherman & Staff on the 5th of April 7th

On Friday, the 4th, five days' rations had been issued,—they expected to have later issues from our stores, which they were going to capture. The rebel march was along the numerous narrow and heavy roads which converge towards the landing. They were unencumbered and light, but it rained very heavily, and they were not able to get into position in our front until Saturday night; and then so weary and worn, that they were in no condition to attack without a night's rest. The great armies being now fairly in contact, the men lay down to their rest in silence. Those nearest our lines were allowed no fires, and there were no sounds of drums or bugles which should disclose to us their position or their strength. Beauregard, weak from recent sickness, is the oracle of the more distant camp-fire at his headquarters; he completes his dispositions, and gives to his commanders their orders for the morrow. He declares, that the next night they would sleep in our camps, which they did; but if we may believe the current report of the time, he also said, that the next day he would water his horse in the Tennessee or in h—ll. Fortunately—and perhaps unfortunately—he was enabled to do neither.

But, it must be confessed, his plans were well conceived. Through spies, residents of the country, he had an intimate knowledge of the position and composition of Grant's army. He was in great hopes that Buell would not arrive in time to aid our forces; and stealing upon us, to some extent unawares, he and his generals were in admirable spirits; and there was not one in that informal council, who did not feel sure of an easy and complete victory on the morrow.

THE BATTLE.

The morning of the 6th rose bright and clear—a lovely spring day. By three o'clock the rebel army had breakfasted, laid aside their knapsacks, and stripped to the bloody work. Portions of the Union army were still wrapped in the most profound slumber; others, nearer the enemy, were making lazy preparation for breakfast. Prentiss, warned, indeed, of

an unusual demonstration in his front, but by no means suspecting that forty-five thousand men were about to spring upon him, had not only strengthened his pickets, but had sent out Colonel Moore, with five companies, to reconnoitre. The attack upon Moore was sudden, and he sent back in haste for re-enforcements, while he was falling back.

The shock had come: it was sudden and stunning. Prentiss was formed in two brigades. Peabody with the Twenty-first Missouri, Sixteenth Wisconsin, and Twelfth Michigan, was first to bear the brunt. His second brigade was at the landing, but was at once hurried up. But it was too late. Prentiss was driven back in great confusion: some guns and a few prisoners were lost. A glance at the original position of Prentiss and Sherman, on the map, shows a wide gap between them. Hurlbut is too far in the rear, and McClermand too far to the right. Into this gap Hardee pushes vigorously, forming the first rebel line, strengthened by Gladden's brigade of Wither's division, sent by Bragg; he is almost entirely unopposed, and thus he flanks not only the flying regiments of Prentiss, but those of Sherman, unless McClermand is ready in his support. Prentiss, re-enforced, endeavors to rally, but Bragg, whose corps forms the rebel second line, sends the rest of Wither's division to re-enforce Hardee; Chalmers attacks his left, Jackson his right. He is rolled up at both ends. Peabody is killed, and Prentiss and his division again driven back in confusion. He fights with varied fortunes during the day; but, by an overwhelming charge of the rebels, is cut off from the rest of the army and the landing, and captured, with the greater part of his division, late in the afternoon.

Let us turn to Sherman. His line to the right and rear of Shiloh church was thus formed and arranged: Hildebrand's brigade, of three Ohio and one Illinois regiments, was on the left; Buckland's, of three Ohio regiments, in the centre; and McDowell, with one Ohio, one Illinois, and one Iowa, on the right. His artillery, under Captain Taylor, was at the church. Sherman's pickets were driven in about sunrise, and his line hastily formed. To the men it was something of a surprise.

Some ran in confusion, but most of them stood firm, while Taylor's guns opened on the enemy's advance. Here, also, the contest was to be for a time unequal. Ruggles' division of Bragg's corps, with Hodgson's Battery, attacked him in front, while Hardee, having routed Prentiss, executed a left half-wheel, to flank and envelop Sherman. Ruggles' brigades were commanded by Gibson, Anderson, and Pond. Sherman's position at the church was on a ridge, and a creek lay in front. The first effort to stay the rebel tide was a charge by Hildebrand, but he was soon compelled to fall back before the enemy's numbers and vigor; and, in spite of our attack, the admirable fire of Taylor's guns, the help of McClermand, the splendid gallantry of Sherman, the rebels crossed the creek and surged upon our line, and into the gap on Sherman's left flank. Checked again and again by Taylor's fire, the tide swelled on, until at length an enfilading fire on our left compelled Sherman to fall back, with the loss of three of Waterhouse's guns; for, while this terrible struggle was going on on the left of Sherman, his right and centre were also hotly engaged. Buckland and McDowell were sustaining a vigorous attack from Pond's and Anderson's brigades, which advanced with a heavy artillery fire. Thus Sherman's flanks were rolled back, and he was compelled to take up a new position, which, however, he was not permitted to hold long; for Polk, with the third rebel line, had come up to aid Bragg, and they were moving to Sherman's rear, who was thus in danger of being cut off from the landing and from the rest of the army. His last position was taken up on a ridge, with his left flank on a run, covering the bridge across Snake Creek, by which he expected the arrival of Lewis Wallace's division.

In describing so confused a battle, we must not attempt to interweave the actions of the various commanders in one narrative, but to keep each distinct, until, by an array of the facts, we are able to combine and collate them. Having thus briefly disposed of the divisions of Sherman and Prentiss, and having brought upon the field the rebel force, Hardee, Bragg, and Polk—all, except Breckinridge's reserves—we are now ready

to notice the parts played by Hurlbut, McClermand, and W. H. L. Wallace, both in support of the advanced troops, and in separate actions of their own.

Hurlbut's division was composed of the brigades of Veatch, Williams, and Lauman, and a light battery was attached to each brigade. Upon the first urgent request of Prentiss, he had sent him Veatch's brigade; and as that had been unable to stem the tide, he formed Williams and Lauman, with batteries on the right and left, in a cotton-field on the Hamburg road, and there awaited the advancing rebels. In came Prentiss's command in hot haste, and on came Withers, pursuing. Meyer's battery, which had been placed on the left, was deserted by the gunners, but Prentiss called for volunteers to man it, and a dozen men came forward; they held their position, while Prentiss's debris were rallying in rear. This was the darkest hour, and Hurlbut and Wallace, who had been held in reserve, were now to bear the brunt of the battle. Hurlbut and McClermand were slowly pressed back until they came upon a line with the camps of Wallace's division. Prentiss was a prisoner, and his division broken up. Sherman had been forced back, and Hildebrand's brigade cut to pieces. The regiments sent by McClermand to Sherman had been very much cut up. Many guns were lost, and the rebels had driven our forces a mile, and were in our camps.

As far as mathematical statements and lines can indicate such a confused condition of things, the order at ten o'clock was the following: Colonel Stewart, of Sherman's division, who had been posted on the Hamburg road in the morning, far to the left, and who had held his position most gallantly against the overwhelming numbers of Breckinridge's reserves, had been slowly driven back to join Hurlbut's left, in spite of the re-enforcements of McArthur's brigade of Wallace's division. Next came Hurlbut, who had posted himself to resist the rebel advance; and behind him were the fugitives of General Prentiss. McClermand was on his right and rear; and Sherman's left in rear of McClermand.

General William H. L. Wallace had sent McArthur's bri-

gade to support Stewart, but it had lost its way, and was unable to join Stewart, who had, as we have seen, been obliged to fall back. As it was now manifest that the fury of the rebel attack was to be directed to our left, General Wallace marched his other brigades over to join McArthur, thus filling the space so threatened upon Hurlbut's left, and took with him three Missouri batteries—Stone's, Richardson's, and Webber's—all under Major Cavender. Here, from ten o'clock until four, this devoted force manfully sustained the terrific fire and frequent attack of the continually increasing foe. Upon Wallace and Hurlbut the enemy made four separate charges, which were splendidly repulsed. At length Hurlbut was obliged to fall back, and, their supports all gone, Wallace's division were satisfied that they too must retire. To add to the disorder, their commander, General Wallace, fell mortally wounded, and was carried from the field. The artillery had done admirable execution, Stone's Battery, particularly, retreating slowly, and firing continually.

The rebels had accomplished much, but they were paying dear for their experiment. Gladden and Hindman were killed; and at half-past two a minie ball pierced General A. S. Johnston's leg, and the wound, though small, was mortal.

But they had as yet far the best of it. We had lost Prentiss and three thousand prisoners, and the greater part of our advanced artillery.* The river-banks are swarming with fugitives and skulkers, who, when asked why they do not return to the front, say their regiments are cut to pieces, or they cannot find them, and who resist all the swearing, coaxing, and storming of the officers sent to bring them back. But the action of the day is not yet at an end. The rebels have reached the ravine, and, placing their guns in battery, they must clear a path for an infantry attack before they can drive away our forces, and seize the landing. And now the grand opportunity for our artillery, land and naval, has

* Only the organizations of four regiments were captured, viz., the Eighth Twelfth, and Fourteenth Iowa, and the Fifty-eighth Illinois infantry.

arrived. Captain Gwin, of the Tyler, sends an officer to General Grant for permission to shell the woods and sweep the ravine. He is told to act according to his own judgment; and he does it to good purpose. The Tyler and Lexington open, and sweep the ravine—enfilading the rebel lines and batteries. Colonel Webster, of General Grant's staff, with a quick eye and a skilful hand, has placed upon a ridge at the landing three thirty-twos and two eight-inch howitzers. Volunteers are called for to man them, and, to his great honor be it said, Dr. Cornyn, surgeon of the First Missouri artillery, offers his services, and does most excellent duty, cutting out work for other surgeons. All along the crest, our reserve artillery, consisting of twenty-fours, tens, and twenties, sixty guns in all, is placed in position, and the landing is safe beyond any peradventure.

But our army is exhausted; the line is reduced to one mile in length, in a curve at the landing; it is a forced concentration, but it really consolidates what remain.

Prentiss and Wallace's divisions, owing to the loss of general officers, are subdivided, and assigned to other divisions, and all the commands are greatly intermingled. The rebels encircle our reduced and crowded line south and west of the ravine. They have placed their artillery on the opposite crest, and still determine to cross that ravine, seize the road, and cut us off from the landing. Vain boast; if our troops have been worsted, Beauregard is not unscathed. His army is badly cut up, and the organizations are very much confused and mixed; and yet he essays the herculean task. As far as we can determine the rebel order now, the corps organization is lost; they are fighting by divisions and brigades. Chalmers is on their right, with Breckinridge in rear; and then ranging to the left are Withers, Cheatham, Ruggles, Gibson, Stewart, Anderson, Stephens, and Pond, much reduced, but still ready to fight.

But this new attack is destined to be a failure. Our artillery fire from the north crest is continuous and severe; and wherever the smoke and flashes of their guns disclose the

rebel positions, they are swept by the guns of Gwin and Shirk from the boats. At length the rebel column is launched forth, consisting of Chalmers and Jackson's brigades; they rush down the ravine and up the northern slope; but a few volleys cut them up, and drive them back like sheep. Three times they face the horrible fire, and are mowed down by an invisible enemy. The tide has turned. It is now nightfall, and Beauregard, professing himself satisfied with what he has done, and certainly checked in what he is now doing, ignorant too of Buell's arrival, determines to leave the finishing touch, the final overthrow of Grant's discomfited army, until the morning. But at last our men are in a secure position, while his are disheartened and demoralized by their last repulse. Grant, who had been all day upon the field, riding the whole length of the line, had visited Sherman about five o'clock, and, yet ignorant of Buell's arrival, had ordered him, with the assistance of Lewis Wallace, who was now crossing the Snake Creek bridge, to assume the offensive in the morning.

Of the movements of General Wallace, it must be said, that Grant had expected his appearance earlier upon the field. He had been particularly directed to move by the road nearest the river, and parallel to it, until he reached our right in rear of the camps of the Second (W. H. L. Wallace's) division, and there form in line at right angles with the river. He moved at twelve o'clock from a point only four miles and a half distant from that to which he was ordered; but, from some misconception or misunderstanding of the orders, he pursued a road almost at right angles to the one he had been directed to take, so that, after marching five miles, when he was overtaken by Colonel Rowley, of General Grant's staff, he was no nearer the battle-field than when he started. He marched back again to within half a mile from the point from which he started, where he struck the road to Pittsburg Landing, which he should have taken at the first. Thus it happened that he did not reach the field until after dark. General Grant's opinion is, that, had he not been delayed, Prentiss might have been saved from capture, and, perhaps,

the battle won the first day. He had not for a moment lost heart, and he has always believed that he could have successfully resisted the rebel army without further assistance.

But assurance is now doubly sure ; Buell has arrived, and is in person on the field. In the fading light, Nelson's division* of his army crosses above the landing, with the intelligence that McCook and Crittenden are coming up the river from Savannah. On the right, behind Sherman, Lewis Wallace, leaving only two regiments at Crump's Landing, is crossing the creek with his fresh division by a good bridge, near the landing. The tables are completely turned. Our artillery and the gunboats, having forced Beauregard to fall back for safety, are keeping his wearied troops awake during the night. All night long steamers will ply between Savannah and Pittsburg, bringing up the divisions of McCook and Crittenden ; and with the first streak of dawn, we shall be ready for an overwhelming advance. Sherman has already advanced to the right and front ; Lewis Wallace files in upon his right, and thus the worn-out troops sink into dreamless rest. The forest is full of dead and wounded, who cannot yet be cared for ; when, to add to the horrors, the woods are set on fire. Some of the wounded perish in the flames, while others are shrieking as the fiery death sweeps upon them. But, thanks be to God, a sudden April rain-storm quenches the fire, and tempers the fever of these helpless men, as rain only can.

MONDAY MORNING.

Commanders and men on both sides knew that the dawn must bring on the battle again,—a struggle the more bitter, because each was determined to assume the offensive, and the

* General Grant, hearing that Nelson's division had arrived on the night of the 5th in the vicinity of Savannah, had sent him an order, as early as seven o'clock in the morning of the 6th, to move to a point on the river opposite Pittsburg Landing ; but, according to his official report, he did not start until about one o'clock, and did not reach his destination until late in the afternoon.

shock would be like that of mediæval knights in mid lists. The fresh troops were placed in line as they came upon the field, far in advance, upon the ground abandoned by Beauregard after the failure of his last attack. Nelson was on the left; then in order Crittenden, McCook, Hurlbut, McClernand, Sherman, and Lewis Wallace,—the new line on the left nearly a mile in advance of our position on Sunday evening.

Nelson's division contained the brigades of Ammen, Bruce, and Hazen; and Ammen's brigade, which had first arrived, had joined in resisting the advance on Sunday evening, when they crossed.

Crittenden had two brigades—Boyle's and W. S. Smith's, with Mendenhall's regular battery, and Bartlett's Ohio battery.

McCook had the three brigades of Rousseau, Gibson, and Kirk, with the batteries of Stone, Goodspeed, and Terrill. Rousseau's brigade was a large one. Colonel Gibson commanded the brigade of R. W. Johnson, who was absent sick. Lewis Wallace's division contained the brigades of M. L. Smith, Thayer, and Whittlesey.

The battle began by a determined advance on our left and centre; simultaneously with which, Beauregard, having formed a strong rear-guard and whipping in all stragglers, undertook a vigorous assault upon our left. He was still deceived into the hope that he might capture the landing. The assault upon Nelson was tremendous; but while his troops were wavering, in spite of all his efforts, the regular battery of Captain Mendenhall, detached by Buell from Crittenden's division, came into action, unlimbering at a jump, while the rebels were rushing forward, and, by rapid discharges of grape and canister, hurled them back. Again and again fresh troops were poured upon our left, but only to be driven back. At length Hazen's brigade charged, captured a rebel battery, and turned it upon the astonished enemy.

Once more a rebel charge, and Hazen is driven back, when Terrill's battery, of McCook's division, being in search of its position, is posted by General Buell at the contested point

He opens with shell from his ten-pounders, and grape and canister from his brass twelves, and the brunt of the battle burns low in Nelson's front. Buell has admirably posted his artillery, and the guns have been splendidly served. Nelson can move forward. On his right, Crittenden and McCook advanced abreast, but to meet with a stubborn resistance. Throughout the war, as numerous examples could testify, the rebel generals always sought to pierce our line at its weakest point—at some joint in the armor. It was so now. In the slight interval between Crittenden and McCook they endeavored to force a passage. Rousseau, partially flanked, is driven back, but rallies upon the support of Kirk's and Gibson's brigades.

On the right, Sherman and Wallace have advanced with ardor to the same ridge occupied by the former on Sunday morning. But here again furious battle was to be joined, for the rebels, when satisfied that they could effect nothing on the left, had countermarched their troops to try the right once more, and the little log church of Shiloh was again to witness a desperate struggle. By well-concerted movements, our troops are kept well abreast throughout the whole line, and when at length a concerted advance was made, in spite of the great efforts of the enemy, it was successful. By four o'clock the rebel commander had seen the uselessness of further effort; by half-past five he was in full retreat.

He had failed in all his projects, and was driven finally back, to return no more, with an acknowledged loss of nearly eleven thousand men; and yet he had the hardihood to telegraph to the rebel secretary of war that night, that he had "gained a great and glorious victory."* He qualified this, however, by adding, with singular inconsistency: "Buell re-enforced Grant,

* CORINTH, Tuesday, April 8, 1862.

TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR, Richmond:

We have gained a great and glorious victory. Eight to ten thousand prisoners, and thirty-six pieces of cannon. Buell re-enforced Grant, and *we retired to our intrenchments at Corinth*, which we can hold. Loss heavy on both sides.

BEAUREGARD.

and we retired to our intrenchments at Corinth, which we can hold." The truth is, that having utterly failed, Beauregard burned his camp and withdrew his troops, defended by Breckinridge, with a powerful rear-guard, and trembling in fear of a pursuit, which would have scattered him like spray.* He made all haste to Corinth, began to dig with an energy incited by fear, while Grant's forces were "too much fatigued from two days' hard fighting, and exposure to the open air, in a drenching rain, during the intervening night, to pursue immediately."

* The following correspondence is significant :

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF MISSISSIPPI,
MONTEREY, April 8, 1862.

SIR—At the close of the conflict yesterday, my forces being exhausted by the extraordinary length of the time during which they were engaged with yours on that and the preceding day, and it being apparent that you had received, and were still receiving, re-enforcements, I felt it my duty to withdraw my troops from the immediate scene of the conflict. Under these circumstances, in accordance with the usages of war, I shall transmit this under a flag of truce, to ask permission to send a mounted party to the battle-field of Shiloh, for the purpose of giving decent interment to my dead. Certain gentlemen wishing to avail themselves of this opportunity to remove the remains of their sons and friends, I must request for them the privilege of accompanying the burial party; and in this connection, I deem it proper to say, I am asking what I have extended to your own countrymen under similar circumstances.

Respectfully, general, your obedient servant,

P. G. T. BEAUREGARD, General commanding.

To MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT,
Commanding U. S. Forces, Pittsburg Landing.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY IN THE FIELD,
PITTSBURG, April 9, 1862.

GENERAL P. G. T. BEAUREGARD, *Commanding Confederate Army on Mississippi, Monterey, Tenn. :*

Your dispatch of yesterday is just received. Owing to the warmth of the weather, I deemed it advisable to have all the dead of both parties buried immediately. Heavy details were made for this purpose, and it is now accomplished. There cannot, therefore, be any necessity of admitting within our lines the parties you desired to send on the ground asked. I shall always be glad to extend any courtesy consistent with duty, and especially so when dictated by humanity. I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, Major-General commanding.

Sherman went out, however, on the morning of the 8th, with two brigades, and some cavalry, to reconnoitre the retreat, and found abandoned camps and hospital flags, with signs of a disorderly and precipitate departure.

Our own losses were great, amounting in all to not less than fifteen thousand.

Beauregard's were far greater: he confesses to a loss of one thousand seven hundred and twenty-eight killed, eight thousand and twelve wounded, nine hundred and fifty-five missing—total, ten thousand six hundred and ninety-nine; and as his army went into action forty-five thousand strong, and he could not on Monday, by his own account, bring twenty thousand into action, there must have been from fifteen to eighteen thousand stragglers.

The news flew over the country. Telegraphed to Washington, it was read by Mr. Speaker Colfax to the House. The people, careless of military criticism, were satisfied with the victory, and there was general rejoicing. General Halleck, in orders, thanked Generals Grant and Buell, "and the officers and men of their respective commands, for the bravery and endurance with which they sustained the general attack of the enemy on the 6th, and for the heroic manner in which, on the 7th, they defeated and routed the entire rebel army."

General Halleck then, retaining Grant and Buell in command of their respective armies, took command of the whole in person, and advanced upon Corinth, that important point for whose security Beauregard had fought and lost the battle of Pittsburg Landing.

But our task would be incomplete, without a brief consideration of the battle as subjected to the canons and rules of military criticism.

The great features of the action are clear and simple; but the details, notwithstanding, or rather in part by reason of, the crowd of reports, Union and Confederate, are extremely confused. At the outset, our troops were shamefully surprised and easily overpowered; there was a want of proper

adjustment in our advanced lines; the panics were disgraceful, and swelled "that sickening crowd of laggards and fugitives which thronged the landing."

Halleck had ordered in general terms that the position should be fortified; but C. F. Smith opposed it, and his views were corroborated by Grant and all the division commanders, on the ground that it would tend to injure the morale of our army, and that we could stand any rebel attack.

For want of this precaution we were surprised at the outset, driven back from every point, in three grand movements of the enemy on the first day—viz., at the early morning, at half-past ten, and at four. But there the disasters were at an end.

It is useless to speculate upon what would have happened had Buell not come up, or to accumulate *ifs*, which always set the fancy into most fantastic working. There has been much controversy and heart-burning between commanders and partisans of the companion Armies of the Tennessee and the Ohio—criminations and recriminations, which are unwise and ungenerous.

Grant never despaired of the issue. At the first sound of the battle he had left his headquarters at Savannah, in a steamer, and by eight o'clock he was upon the ground. He immediately dispatched an order to Lewis Wallace to hasten to the field.

Feeling the fierceness of the onslaught, Grant rode along the lines all day long, recklessly exposing himself, while attempting to stay the torrent. At ten he visited Sherman. Again, at five, he saw him, and declaring with perfect coolness that the fury of the rebel attack was expended, he ordered that at the dawn, with Wallace's division to aid, we should assume the offensive. It was just about sunset that Buell, a portion of whose army was now on the opposite bank, rode up in person, and, in the words of Sherman, "his arrival made that certain which was before uncertain."

Whatever might have happened had Buell not come up,

one thing is certain, his arrival did put a new face upon the affair. Whatever we may have been able to effect without him, the battle of Monday as fought, and the victory of Monday as gained, were due to the fresh troops which he brought with him.

Buell's arrival, then, was most timely; his re-enforcements gave us largely preponderating numbers; his troops were handled with great coolness, judgment, and skill. He and his army deserve the greatest praise, which every military man is ready to accord; but let us not, in the glitter and glory of Monday, be so dazzled as not to estimate at its full value the severe fighting, the heroic endurance, and the unshaken purpose which were displayed in the dark hours of Sunday. Let us not forget that Grant had organized his army with great quickness; had brought them fearlessly to the front, looking for the enemy, determined to fight him wherever he could find him, and with troops, most of whom had not only never seen a battle, but hardly been drilled at the simplest company manœuvres, had fought the best material in the Confederacy for a whole day. Nay, more than this; undismayed by ill fortune, and unappalled by the cowardly conduct of thousands of stragglers, he had formed his line at night, under cover of a line of batteries, the fire of which caused the rebel attack to melt away; he had ordered Sherman to assume the offensive in the morning, with the aid of Lewis Wallace's division of his own army; he had confidently anticipated Buell's arrival as one of the elements of the victory; and, by all these in combination, the greatest victory until then ever achieved on the American continent had been won.

To those who still think that he risked too much by placing his army on the west bank, and thus came very near total defeat, we can only quote the words of General Sherman's letter: "If there were any error in putting that army on the west side of the Tennessee, exposed to the superior force of the enemy, also assembling at Corinth, the mistake was not General Grant's; but there was no mistake. *It was necessary that a combat, fierce and bitter, to test the manhood of two armies,*

should come off ; and that was as good a place as any. It was not then a question of military skill and strategy, but of courage and pluck : and I am convinced, that every life lost that day to us was necessary ; for otherwise, at Corinth, at Memphis, at Vicksburg, we would have found harder resistance, had we not shown our enemies that, rude and untutored as we then were, we could fight as well as they."

Of the subordinates on that field, many deserve praise ; but of them all, Sherman claims the greatest. He then gave splendid earnest of his future achievements. Although severely wounded in the hand on the first day, his place was never vacant. Again he was wounded. He had three horses shot under him ; but he was undaunted and undismayed to the last.

Of Beauregard, the rebel commander, it is also our duty to speak. His place as a military man has not been understood. For some personal reasons, he afterwards fell into disfavor with Jefferson Davis, which impaired his services as a soldier ; and his silly and wicked letters have caused him to be hated and despised by our own people. But we do not except Lee, when we express the opinion, that he had no equal among the Confederate generals.

Of strong, clear mind ; thoroughly instructed in the military art ; at once enthusiastic and tenacious of purpose ; brave and self-reliant,—he had the power to bring all he was, and all that he knew, into practical use. His plans in this battle were excellent ; his generalship, admirable ; his battle-tactics, sagacious and rapid ; and had it not been for the skill of our chief commander, the determined valor of some of our troops, the effective management of the artillery, the accurate fire of the gunboats, and the timely arrival and admirable co-operation of Buell, he might longer have contested the field, and even defeated our army entirely.

NOTE.—The Confederate general has called this the battle of SHILOH. I have preferred the name of PITTSBURG LANDING, and hope we shall retain that name. The battle was fought by Beauregard to take the landing, and by Grant to hold it. Shiloh church was but one among the important positions on the field.

CHAPTER X.

THE SIEGE OF CORINTH.


“ Captiva Corinthus.
Si foret in terris rideret Democritus.”

HORACE, Epis. I., Book ii.

CORINTH DESCRIBED.—SHERMAN'S RECONNOISSANCE.—THE ARRIVAL OF HALLECK.—POPE'S ARMY COMES UP.—BEAUREGARD'S ORDER.—HIS FORCE—OURS.—POPE TAKES FARMINGTON.—THE BATTLE OF FARMINGTON.—ELLIOT'S RAID.—CORINTH EVACUATED.—THE OCCUPATION AND PURSUIT.—CO-OPERATING MOVEMENTS.—MITCHEL'S MARCH.—THE NAVY.—FIGHT AT MEMPHIS.—NEW EFFORTS OF THE ENEMY.

CORINTH was the objective point, at which Beauregard was to make his stand, and which Halleck was to capture at any cost. Specifically, the immediate matter in hand for the Union general was to cut the enemy's communication from east to west, on the new line which he had established, and the strength of which he vaunted; and thus to force him back upon the southern route from Vicksburg to Montgomery. In executing this, the commander of the land forces was to move *pari passu* with the naval armament, which was endeavoring to clear the Mississippi; and finally, he was either to beat Beauregard, or, if that wily commander would not stay to be beaten, he was, at the least, to compel him to abandon Corinth in a disastrous retreat.

Only a small village, not upon common maps, Corinth owes its military importance to the fact that it is at the intersection of two great arterial railroads—the “Mobile and Ohio” and the “Memphis and Charleston.” The length and value of these routes are indicated by their names. Corinth is forty miles east of the Grand Junction, which it covered from Hal-



THE SIEGE OF CORINTH.

leck's army, and nineteen from Pittsburg Landing, where the last great battle was fought. It is built upon a low and clayey plain, but has for natural defences ridges at some distance outside. The country beyond, to the banks of the Tennessee, is very much broken by ridges, valley streams, and marshes. The approach was rendered more difficult from the fact that, in his retreat from Pittsburg, the bridges over the creeks had been destroyed by Beauregard, and the roads heavily obstructed by timber. Farmington, on the east, and College Hill, on the north, are the highest points in the immediate vicinity of Corinth, and were occupied by the enemy as the signal-outposts of his vast intrenchments, encircling the town.

The advance of the Union army upon Corinth was determined upon by General Halleck, as soon as the battle of Pittsburg Landing had been fought. Had Beauregard won that battle, the advance would have been impossible: as Grant won it, it was the next obvious move upon the chess-board.

On the 8th of April, as we have seen, Sherman had reconnoitred the retreat of the enemy, with two brigades and a cavalry force, and had found the roads very bad. But the badness of the roads was compensated for by the signs of haste in the enemy's retreat. They were strewed with the accoutrements, wagons, ambulances, and limber-boxes of the retiring rebels; who had also, as an expedient to save time, left here and there a hospital flag flying. Sherman returned that same night to Pittsburg, to report.

On the 9th of April, Halleck left St. Louis for the scene of action. But before his arrival Grant had not been idle. He had sent an expedition under Sherman up the Tennessee, accompanied by the gunboats, as far as Eastport, to destroy the railroad-bridge over Big Bear Creek, east of Iuka. This was effectually done, and thus Corinth was cut off by that route from Richmond.

On the 22d of April, General John Pope came up to the landing, with his army, from New Madrid, twenty-five thousand strong. On the 30th, General Wallace was sent through

Purdy to the track four miles beyond, to destroy the bridge across the Mobile and Ohio railroad; thus cutting off supplies and re-enforcements that might come from Jackson, Tennessee. This also was effectually done.

These precautions having been taken, the "Grand Army of the Tennessee"—for such was now its style and title—was ready to move, which it did with the greatest caution. On the 1st of May, Monterey, a town about half-way from the landing to Corinth, was occupied; and on the 2d, Beauregard, being now assured of our purpose, prepared to receive Halleck's attack. Whatever his hopes may have been, his words were defiant. In grandiloquent orders, to the invincible "soldiers of Shiloh and Elkhorn,"*—in both which battles the Confederates had been defeated,—he assured them of victory, and invoked an echo from "the historic fields of Yorktown," which, it so happened, were hastily evacuated the very day on which his order was written. He is unfortunate with a pen, but in this respect does not differ from many other generals on both sides, who do violence to the adage, that "the pen is mightier than the sword."

Beauregard's army, concentrated at Corinth, was composed

* HEADQUARTERS OF THE FORCES AT CORINTH, MISS., May 8, 1862.

SOLDIERS OF SHILOH AND ELKHORN!—We are about to meet once more, in the shock of battle, the invaders of our soil, the despoilers of our homes, the disturbers of our family ties, face to face, hand to hand. We are to decide whether we are to be freemen, or vile slaves of those who are only free in name, and who but yesterday were vanquished, although in largely superior numbers, in their own encampments, on the ever memorable field of Shiloh. Let the impending battle decide our fate, and add a more illustrious page to the history of our revolution—one to which our children will point with noble pride, saying—"Our fathers were at the battle of Corinth." I congratulate you on your timely junction. With our mingled banners, for the first time during the war, we shall meet our foe in strength that should give us victory. Soldiers, can the result be doubtful? Shall we not drive back in Tennessee the presumptuous mercenaries collected for our subjugation? One more manly effort, and trusting in God and the justness of our cause, we shall recover more than we lately lost. Let the sound of our victorious guns be re-echoed by those of the Army of Virginia, on the historic battle-field of Yorktown.

P. G. T. BEAUREGARD, General commanding.

of several elements : the "soldiers of Shiloh," the army which had fought at Pittsburg Landing ; those of "Elkhorn," the combined army of Van Dorn and Price, from Arkansas and Missouri ; and the forces under General Lovell, which had evacuated New Orleans when, on the 28th of April, our gunboats appeared before it. In addition to these, a large militia force had been hastily sent forward from Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Bragg, as second in rank, had command of the "Army of the Mississippi." The old organization of the corps—under Hardee, Bragg, Breckinridge, and Polk—was retained. Breckinridge commanded the reserve, and Van Dorn the re-enforcements. The whole force was about sixty-five thousand men, most of them the best troops in the Confederacy ; and they were expected to accomplish great things under Beauregard at Corinth.

To drive this well-appointed and large army from its stronghold, and even, perhaps, to capture it, General Halleck moved with about ninety thousand men, comprising three armies—the Army of the Tennessee,* originally Grant's, now confided to General George H. Thomas and General John A. McClernand ; the Army of the Ohio, commanded by Don Carlos Buell, and composed of the divisions of McCook, T. J. Wood, Nelson, and Crittenden ; the Army of the Mississippi, General John Pope, originally containing three divisions, and re-enforced by one division from General Curtis. Thomas formed the right wing, Buell the centre, Pope the left, and McClernand the reserve. Grant, being in orders second in command, retained the command of the district of West Tennessee, and had a general supervision of the right wing, under Thomas, and the reserves under McClernand. This general command of Grant also extended to the compiling of reports, ordering the discharge of soldiers on surgeon's certificate of disability, and similar duties.

On the 3d of May, our advance had reached a point eight miles from Corinth, and, on the same day, Pope sent Paine's

* See note at page 116.

division to reconnoitre, and, if possible, occupy Farmington, an important outpost of Corinth, already mentioned.

The resistance made by the Confederate garrison of Farmington, four thousand five hundred strong, under General Marmaduke, was not by any means a vigorous one. Indeed he retired rapidly to Corinth, leaving his camps with all its supplies, and only thirty dead. At the time it seemed as though his orders had been to withdraw, but the subsequent efforts of the rebels to recover Farmington prove that this could not have been so. An artillery reconnoissance, well supported by cavalry, as far as Glendale, on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, was successful in destroying the track and breaking up two important trestle-bridges. Halleck's scheme was working well; we were gradually approaching in front, and at the same time cutting and recutting the communications on both flanks. Meanwhile Beauregard, while apparently plying tooth and nail to render Corinth impregnable, was already meditating an evacuation and retreat.

We have said the advance was made with great caution; the movements of the several armies were in a kind of echelon, and at every step strong intrenchments were the order of the day. If Beauregard was fortified at Corinth, Halleck was equally so in almost every encampment. It is easy now to say, and to say truly, that the caution was too great and the approaches too slow, but that was our day of experiments.

The rebel defences at Corinth were very strong. In a general way, they may be described as a continued line of intrenchments, occupying the brow of the first ridge outside of the town of which we have spoken. On the east there was a ravine, and Philip's Creek in front; on the north was a heavy abatis, and a cleared space in front. The exterior lines were fifteen miles long—a miniature Torres Vedras—and at every road-crossing there were either strong redoubts, or batteries with massive epaulments. Here, as always in engineer work, Beauregard had acquitted himself well, not without pride that his work was now to test the skill of his fellow West Pointer and engineer, Halleck.

The experience of the last battle had taught our generals the value of intrenchments, by the dangers which their absence incurred, and now all our approaches were strengthened by the spade, or such other impromptu implement as often takes its place. A crib of fence-rails, hastily made, was the receptacle into which the earth was thrown: the batteries were made heavier than the lines, and the log-houses in the vicinity formed rude but strong platforms for the guns.

The right wing of Thomas and McClernand in reserve, all under Grant's general supervision, moved in three columns; the centre, under Buell, in two, while Pope occupied Farmington with one column from the north and one from the east.

THE BATTLE OF FARMINGTON.

On the 9th of May, the battle of Farmington was fought. The rebel general was not content to let General Pope retain the position so easily gained, and hold the front of that town with a single brigade, separated from it by a small stream. Launching with great rapidity and secrecy a force of twenty thousand men, the enemy fell upon this advanced brigade of Pope's army, which, though separated from the rest, had been advantageously posted, under the supervision of Generals Paine and Palmer. It resisted the attack for several hours, but at length fell back, because it was believed that General Halleck did not desire, by supporting it, to bring on a general engagement. The front attack of the enemy was conducted by Van Dorn, while Price had been ordered early in the day to make a detour around our extreme left, and get into the rear of these isolated troops. Either he was too late, or Van Dorn too early. The combination was a failure; they did not capture any portion of Pope's army, although they occupied Farmington, and found a small quantity of baggage there. By a little foresight and valor, they need never have lost it; with a stronger advanced force, Pope might have held it against these last attacks.

We need not stop to detail the painfully slow approaches

to Corinth. The digging was excessive. A slight advance of four miles brought a new parallel. In later days, when flanking movements were better understood—the days of Chattanooga, and of the Wilderness and Spottsylvania—the evacuation of Corinth would have been greatly expedited. Without designing to be critical, we can only now believe that, in the process of education which our generals were receiving, the *no-intrenchments* at Pittsburg led to the excess at Corinth: safe practice certainly, but rather expensive, and utterly unnecessary. The happy medium was fully developed in our later campaigns; but they had all this experience to act upon.

On the 17th, the army, eager for action, was enlivened by a gallant battle on a small scale—that projected by Sherman for the capture of Russel's house. This was an important eminence, commanding the junction of the roads three hundred yards beyond, and only a mile and a quarter from the enemy's outer intrenchments. General Hurlbut sent two regiments and a battery on the road leading from his front to Russel's house. The attacking force consisted of General Denver, with two regiments and a battery, moving by the right, and General M. L. Smith in front. The attack was successful: the position, found to be of great natural strength, was at once fortified and occupied by a large force.

At length, on the 21st of May, we were fairly in line, three miles from Corinth, with detached works in our front corresponding with the general direction of those of the enemy. A desperate struggle was at last to be expected, when the spade should give way to the bayonet. Would the enemy stand up for the fight? No one doubted that he would. Corinth would fall, but not before, at least, one desperate struggle had been made in its defence. Such was the general belief.

ELLIOT'S RAID.

The position of Beauregard was now becoming critical: his railroad communications were cut at Purdy and Glendale; the

bridges had been destroyed beyond Iuka. To isolate him completely, making either a vigorous attack or an evacuation the only alternatives, Halleck now ordered his southern communications to be interrupted. This was done by Colonel Elliot, of the Second Michigan cavalry (a captain in the United States cavalry), who, with his regiment and the Second Iowa cavalry, marched on the night of the 27th. His route was from Farmington, across the railroad east of Iuka; then along the Tuscumbia road to Cartersville and Boonesville, twenty-five miles distant. The expedition was well conducted, and entirely successful: the surprise of the people along the route was very great; and there was no little consternation in the army of Beauregard. Elliot destroyed at Boonesville five cars loaded with arms, five containing loose ammunition, six filled with officers' baggage, and five with subsistence stores. He paroled the prisoners and the sick whom he found in his route, burnt trains and depots, and destroyed many locomotives. His work was done in the most admirable manner, and he set out upon his perilous return. He had been directed, in the event of finding his pathway blocked in returning, to strike off, and join General Mitchel's column at the east. But, by taking the Tuscumbia road, he eluded pursuit, and joined General Pope's army on the 31st. For this service he was afterwards made, as he fully deserved to be, a brigadier-general of volunteers.

THE EVACUATION OF CORINTH.

And now, by slow movements, our combined forces have closely embraced the Confederate lines. On the 28th, Halleck advances three strong reconnoitring columns, one from each army: on the 28th, also, Sherman attacks a strong position in his front, commanded by a house which had been arranged for defence, like a blockhouse, and takes it, establishing his lines within a thousand yards of the enemy: on the 30th, Pope's batteries are opened. But they will not be needed.

The rebels are evacuating Corinth. The fierce display is but a mask. They had begun their preparations for retreat on the 26th. The musketry ceases on Friday. Soon clouds of smoke and sheets of flame announce that Beauregard is firing the town; and as he moves out, filling the southern and western roads, our forces move in.

He has destroyed all that he can, and is off. The "soldiers of Shiloh and Elkhorn" may now put "Corinth" on their colors!

With an immense army, after loud boasts and protestations, in a position and with works of amazing strength, why has he fled without a blow?

His own statements are such as would indeed make Democritus laugh, if he still lived. In his report, written at Tupelo, on the 13th of June, he declares that he had "accomplished his purposes and ends." He denies Elliot's capture of cars, etc., and charges him with inhumanities in burning his sick soldiers,—criminations ably and boldly answered in a letter by Gordon Granger, to which Beauregard has not vouchsafed a reply. He says he twice offered battle, which we declined; and the appearance he would put upon matters is, simply, that the occupation of Corinth was merely a temporary shift, and that it was to be abandoned when weightier matters, then in train, should have made sufficient progress. How does this agree with his former declarations, that Corinth was "the strategic point of that campaign," and that "he could hold it?" The facts in the case are few and simple. His strategy was entirely at fault. He must either drive back Halleck's army, or abandon Corinth; he could not stay there. When he fought the battle at the landing, he expected to overpower Grant. That was his first failure.

He considered the Mississippi secure, both above and below; whereas New Orleans and Island No. 10 fell, Vicksburg was not yet strong, and Memphis was shaking to its centre. Farragut had attacked Forts St. Philip and Jackson on the 18th of April; had destroyed the rebel fleet of thirteen gunboats and three rams; and had so isolated the forts that they sur-

rendered on the 28th. On the same day Lovell retired, and New Orleans was ours. By its capture, the heaviest blow of the war, up to that time, had fallen upon them. Unprepared for such crushing disasters, the entire people of rebeldom began to exhibit signs of distrust, and even the "soldiers of Shiloh and Elkhorn" were in no condition to bear our attack. Under the influence of these moral and strategical causes, like the massive portal of that Corinth of which Byron describes the fall,

• "It bends—it falls—and all is o'er;
 Lost Corinth may resist no more."

Virginia was in a blaze of lurid fires, with the advance of McClellan. Yorktown was evacuated on the 3d and 4th of May; Norfolk on the 10th. Pensacola and Natchez came into Federal possession on the 12th.

The second great rebel line in the West had dissolved like the fabric of a dream, and the enemy must fall back on the third and last—that upon which the strategic points were Vicksburg, Jackson, Meridian, and Selma.

Unfortunately, notwithstanding the clear intelligence and dashing valor of General O. M. Mitchel, they were still to hold Chattanooga, which was long to be to them a tower of strength, and to us a cause of great trouble, carnage, and delay. But, to an unprejudiced eye, it was evident that the decree had gone forth. Line after line had been cut. Boasting of victory, they had retreated from every field; but ever hopeful, ever deluded by siren voices, the rebels prolonged the war, when, by a simple application of military principles, it became daily more manifest that success was impossible.

The occupation of Corinth by our forces was both picturesque and inspiring. From the highest points of the rebel intrenchments it was a magnificent sight, on that brilliant May morning. The eye ranged over a horizon five miles distant, and the intervening space was glistening with bayonets; fluttering with banners, battle-torn, and inscribed with the rubricated glories of former fields; and busy with martial life.

They entered Corinth in triumph and joy ; but, except the garrison hastily designated, not to stay there.

THE ADVANCE.

The pursuit was immediately begun. On the 30th, at seven in the morning, Pope's advance drove the small rear-guard of rebel cavalry through the town, only stopped for a brief time by the burning of a bridge. Gordon Granger, brave and ardent, set out with a brigade and a battery on the Booneville road, from Farmington, at noon, and pushed the flying foe through Booneville. The next day he had crossed Twenty-mile Creek, the main army following close at his heels. On the 10th, our advance was at Baldwin and Guntown, still on the railroad ; and at the latter point the pursuit ended. Beauregard had taken a strong position at Tupelo, a few miles below, where the railroad is crossed by Old-town Creek, an affluent of the Tombigbee, and Halleck bethought himself of the safety of his communications and the strengthening of his base. And thus the brief campaign of Corinth was brought to an end.

Although General Grant was not in command, as second in rank he was exceedingly active and eager, always on the field, constantly making valuable suggestions, and lending important aid in achieving the final result. His position was a singular, and in some respects a painful one ; but he was assured by Halleck that no censure was intended, but that his position was that due to his rank. We have no comments to make.

We have dwelt upon the siege and capture of Corinth as a necessary link in the story of Grant's life. It was in pursuance of the plan formed before the battle of Pittsburg Landing was fought. It opened the way to the next and immortal campaign of Vicksburg, of which he was the projector, and in which he was to be the chief actor. To this, after a few details of organization and preparation, we shall come.

The Union army returned to Corinth, and remained there in busy labors, making ready for a new movement, until the

10th of June. The Tennessee River was already low, and the summer heats would make it lower; so, in order to secure the communications when the river should fail, the railroad was put in good order to Columbus. Buell, with the Army of the Ohio, was detached, and sent towards Chattanooga, while Grant's army occupied the new strategic line of railroad which the rebels had lost, from Memphis to Iuka, and which they were never to regain.

CO-OPERATING MOVEMENTS.

Pending the operations which we have been describing, two grand co-operating movements were in progress, which materially aided the advance on Corinth, and had such important direct results that we must briefly allude to them. Indeed, so thoroughly are the parts of the great war in relation with each other, that no campaign can be properly described without a reference to the co-ordinate movements.

The first was General Mitchel's rapid march and captures in Northern Alabama; and the second, the successful advance of our naval armament on the Mississippi. Let us take them in order.

MITCHEL'S MARCH.

General Ormsby McKnight Mitchel, a graduate of West Point, the founder of the astronomical observatory at Cincinnati, and the director of that at Albany, had brought to the service of the country, energy, intelligence, patriotism, and a genius for war. His career in this war was brief but brilliant, and his exploits at the Southwest excited the admiration of the whole country.

Originally commanding a division in Buell's army, he had been detached to act, to some degree, independently, when that army marched to join Grant at Pittsburg. Early in March he was at Murfreesboro'. On the 6th of April he marched to Shelbyville; on the 10th he was at Fayetteville, and on the 11th he reached Huntsville, in Alabama. There,

seizing the rolling-stock, he immediately sent out two railway expeditions, east and west, to Decatur and Stevenson, conducting the latter in person. He thus threw the whole of the adjacent country into a panic. Taking advantage of this, he marched towards Chattanooga, which he saw at once to be a most important strategic point. He called for re-enforcements, but they could not be had; and he was fain, therefore, to draw back, not having accomplished all he desired, but writing, however, to the Secretary of War, under date of May 1: "The campaign is ended, and I now occupy Huntsville in perfect security; while all of Alabama, north of the Tennessee River, floats no flag but that of the Union." In that day of experiments and caution, Mitchel's fault was seeing too far and daring too much.

THE NAVY ON THE MISSISSIPPI.

Let us now look at the state of affairs on the Mississippi. On the 12th of April, Commodore Foote, with his fleet of gunboats and mortar-boats, had steamed down the river from New Madrid on a new voyage of discovery, with the divisions of Stanley, Hamilton, and Palmer on transports. The first fortified point where they expected a check was Fort Pillow, a strong work on the Tennessee shore, about forty miles above Memphis, which was afterwards to have such atrocious notoriety for the massacre of our prisoners by Forrest. It stands upon the first Chickasaw Bluff, near Islands Nos. 33 and 34, and sixty-five miles above Memphis. As our fleet approached, the rebel gunboats and rams kept retreating down at a respectful distance, turning back occasionally to try our strength. But when Pope's army was withdrawn to join the advance on Corinth, the expedition of Foote came to an end, or rather awaited the fall of Corinth. The effect of that fall was like magic. After Beauregard had retreated, Fort Pillow was evacuated, on the 4th of June. Fort Randall, some miles below, was abandoned by the enemy soon after, and the great river was open to Memphis.

THE FIGHT AT MEMPHIS.

The people of Memphis, emboldened by the presence of a formidable rebel fleet, and encouraged by the confident predictions of its commander, Commodore Montgomery, that he would "soon send Lincoln's gunboats to the bottom," had collected upon the banks of the river, and at all points of observation in the city, to see this great sight, not at all doubtful of the result.

Commodore Foote had, at his own request, on the score of his health, which had greatly suffered, been relieved from duty, and our fleet was now in charge of Commodore Charles Henry Davis, an officer well known for his scientific attainments, and who was now determined to lose no time in winning honors like those which a grateful country had awarded to the gallant Foote. Memphis gave him a splendid opportunity, and he made the most of it. On the 5th of June he left Fort Pillow, with a fleet of nine boats—five gunboats, two tugs, and Colonel Ellet's two rams, the Queen City and Monarch. To oppose this force Montgomery had eight boats, mounting twenty-four guns, most of them rifled and pivoted.

Want of space, and direct relevancy to the subject, forbid our describing the famous battle. It should be read in its terribly picturesque details. The city on the hill-side, like the tiers in an amphitheatre; the crowding inhabitants, eager, bitter, hopeful, and breathless; the hostile lines of armed vessels—the roar of their artillery; the Queen City, under Colonel Ellet, crushing in the sides of the Price like pasteboard; the Monarch, under Captain Ellet, drenching the Beauregard with boiling water; the burning of the boats; the humanity of Davis and his men, as they pick up the drowning rebels; the explosion of the Jeff. Thompson, which shakes Memphis to its foundations; such are some of the elements of this grand pictorial display. We can only state the results. The rebel flotilla, rammed by Ellet's boats, and torn to pieces by our shot, was put entirely *hors de combat*. Three of the largest vessels, the Price, Beauregard, and Lovell, were sunk; one,

the Jeff. Thompson, was burned; and the three others, the Bragg, Sumter, and Little Rebel, were captured. It was a clean sweep, and with no loss to ourselves. Colonel Ellet was the only man wounded, and his ram, the Queen City, the only boat disabled, and that but temporarily. It was a gallant action, and will rank high among the most memorable achievements of the navy.

Memphis, a hot-bed of treason, was thus brought into our possession, on the 6th of June. The river was open to Vicksburg, above and below, and the new element, waited and longed for by Grant, had at length fairly come into his calculation. "On to Vicksburg" was now his cry, not to be abated until Vicksburg should fall, and the great river, upon which the last chances of rebel success depended, flow, with Union boats, barges, and commerce, "unvexed to the sea."

NEW EFFORTS OF THE ENEMY.

But the rebels were now fairly awake to their condition. If the people were alarmed and distrustful, and ready, upon Federal occupancy, to "come back to their old allegiance," the responsible leaders, selfish, clever, and determined, made good use of the lessons of disaster. The war was inaugurated for them and by them, and the people must be made to carry it on for their behoof. If they could not, as at first, "fire the Southern heart," they could at least press the Southern body into service; and this they did in a most unscrupulous and tyrannical, but effective manner. A sweeping conscription act was passed by the Confederate Congress, giving virtual power to the President to call out and place in the military service all white men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, for three years or the war. No military despotism was ever so severe and so uncompromising.

A little later, camps of instruction were established in each State: the levies were distributed according to a proportional system among the States; lieutenant-generals were appointed, to command corps and departments; and troops from the

same State were brigaded together,—this latter being an infinitesimal concession to the Grand Lama of States-rights. In a word, every nerve was strained by the Confederate authorities to regain lost ground, repair their broken fortunes, and achieve, at least, a partial success.

The results were striking. The disasters of the spring of 1862 were followed by the successes of the Peninsula, the victories of the second Bull Run, and the advance into Maryland. Rebel troops gathered in large numbers in the West, and Grant was to have no easy task in his advance upon Vicksburg.

The first step towards Vicksburg was the capture and occupation of Holly Springs, by Sherman, on the 30th of June.

NOTE.—Beauregard left the army at Tupelo on the 15th of June, relieving himself from duty, on account of ill-health, which he certified by the opinion of two surgeons. For two months he was in retirement with his family at Mobile and Bladon Springs; and turned up again at Charleston, in an unimportant command. He had evidently fallen under the displeasure of the Davis administration.*

* The rationale of this is thus presented by the Confederate General Jordan, in an excellent article on Jefferson Davis, in Harper's Monthly Magazine for October, 1865:

"General Beauregard, for some time in bad health, thought it best for the service to take advantage of the lull in operations, incident to the position of his army at Tupelo, after the successful evacuation of Corinth, and by a short respite from duty, seek to recuperate. He therefore retired to Bladon Springs, some twelve hours distant by railroad, turning over the command to General Bragg, with instructions looking to the preparation of the army for the field at once on his return, which he anticipated would be in three weeks. But no sooner had Mr. Davis heard of this step than he telegraphed General Bragg to assume permanent command. General Beauregard was thus laid on the shelf—not to be reinstated, as Mr. Davis passionately declared, though the whole world should urge him to the measure."

The last sentence he substantiates by referring to "Notes of interview of Congressional Committee with Mr. Davis, to request restoration of General Beauregard to his command."

NOTE (see page 104).

The portion of the Army of the Tennessee, commanded by General Thomas, consisted of the divisions of T. W. Sherman—formerly Thomas's, of the Army of the Ohio—Hurlbut, W. T. Sherman, McKean, and Davies. That commanded by General McClernand, of the divisions of Judah and Lew. Wallace.

CHAPTER XI.

IUKA AND CORINTH.

AFTER A BRIEF HALT, FORWARD.—ADMINISTRATION.—IUKA.—PRICE MARCHES UP.—GRANT'S SAGACITY.—THE BATTLE.—ROSECRANS AND ORD.—DIFFICULT GROUND.—PRICE RETREATS SOUTHWARD.—CORINTH.—THE FORTIFICATIONS.—PRICE'S ATTACK.—VAN DORN'S.—THE BLOODY REPULSE.—ORD AND HURLBUT IN FLANK AND REAR.—“HOW DOES IT ALL SUM UP?”—SKETCHES OF COMMANDERS.

ON the 11th of August, by general orders from the War Department, General Halleck was assigned to the command of “the whole land forces of the United States, as general-in-chief.” This caused a new arrangement to be made at the West; and for the time, until that could be made, it gave General Grant an extended military jurisdiction, great labors of administration, and—one good thing at least—“ample room and verge enough” for his new schemes. In the mean time, from June till September, there was but little fighting in his department. He bent his energy to a thorough reorganization, and sent some of his troops, by orders from Washington, to re-enforce Buell's army, seriously threatened by Bragg's advance through East Tennessee and Kentucky towards the Ohio River. He also kept his cavalry in constant reconnoissances, to ascertain the position of the enemy, and to guard all parts of his command against secret movements and surprises. With his weakened force he could not do more.

His orders with regard to passes and paroles—carefully distinguishing between innocent, suffering citizens and the friends and sympathizers of the rebellion—are clear and statesmanlike. His treatment of guerrillas, who were batten- ing, like birds of prey, upon friends and foes alike, was sharp

and relentless.* Rebel sympathizers were to pay, by sudden seizure of their property, for such depredations. "The Memphis Avalanche," a newspaper echoing the secret thoughts of the citizens, in an overbold manner, was suddenly suspended for uttering treasonable sentiments, and only permitted to renew its issue upon the withdrawal of its seditious editor. The disposition made of fugitive negroes was practical :† they

* GENERAL ORDERS, No. 60.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF WEST TENNESSEE,
MEMPHIS, TENN., July 3, 1862.

The system of guerilla warfare now being prosecuted by some troops organized under authority of the so-called Southern Confederacy, and others without such authority, being so pernicious to the welfare of the community where it is carried on, and it being within the power of the community to suppress this system, it is ordered, that wherever loss is sustained by the Government, collections shall be made, by seizure of a sufficient amount of personal property, from persons in the immediate neighborhood sympathizing with the rebellion, to remunerate the Government for all loss and expense of the same.

Persons acting as guerrillas, without organization, and without uniform to distinguish them from private citizens, are not entitled to the treatment of prisoners of war when caught, and will not receive such treatment.

By order of

MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT.

JOHN A. RAWLINS, A. A. G.

† We give the following order in full, as indicating the true military course, in pursuance of the Act of Congress :

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 72.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF WEST TENNESSEE,
CORINTH, MISS., August 11, 1862.

The recent act of Congress prohibits the army from returning fugitives from labor to their claimants, and authorizes the employment of such persons in the service of the Government. The following orders are therefore published for the guidance of the army in this matter :

1. All fugitives thus employed must be registered ; the names of the fugitive and claimant given ; and must be borne upon the morning report of the command in which they are kept, showing how they are employed.

2. Fugitives may be employed as laborers in the Quartermaster's, Subsistence, and Engineer department ; and whenever by such employment a soldier may be saved to the ranks, they may be employed as teamsters and as company cooks, not exceeding four to a company, or as hospital attendants and nurses. Officers may employ them as private servants ; in which latter case the fugitives will not be paid or rationed by the Government. Negroes thus employed must be secured as authorized persons, and will be excluded from the camps.

were put to useful employment, and kindly treated, while awaiting the further action of the Government concerning them.

In a professedly military work, we have not deemed it necessary to dwell upon these details of departmental organization; but when all his orders and dispatches are published in a body, as they will be hereafter, they will show that such duties form by no means the lightest and easiest labors of a general charged with an extensive department. To a military man, fighting battles is truly an easier task; and besides, it is not often the case that the commander, who marshals men skilfully upon the field, is equal to this more judicial and diplomatic task. The converse is also true. It adds greatly, therefore, to the reputation of General Grant, that he could do both in so admirable a manner. Sound judgment, clear good sense, and pithy expression, characterize all these executive papers.

But the wild fire of battle was soon to sweep over his command, and give him the more technical duties of a general to perform.

3. Officers and soldiers are positively prohibited from enticing slaves to leave their masters. When it becomes necessary to employ this kind of labor, the commanding officer of the post or troop must send details, all under the charge of a suitable commissioned officer, to press into service the slaves of persons to the number required.

4. Citizens within reach of any military station, known to be disloyal and dangerous, may be ordered away or arrested, and their crops and stock taken for the benefit of the Government or the use of the army:

5. All property taken from rebel owners must be duly reported, and used for the benefit of the Government, and be issued to the troops through the proper department; and when practicable, the act of taking should be accompanied by the written certificate of the officer so taking, to the owner or agent of such property.

It is enjoined on all commanders to see that this order is executed strictly under their own direction. The demoralization of troops, subsequent upon being left to execute laws in their own way, without a proper head, must be avoided.

By command of

MAJOR-GENERAL GRANT.

JOHN A. RAWLINS, A. A. G.



General Pope, who had commanded the Army of the Mississippi, in the advance upon Corinth, had been called away to the far more difficult task of commanding the Army of Virginia. A personal friend of Mr. Lincoln, and a regular officer of Topographical Engineers, his labors in Missouri, his success at New Madrid, and his activity at Corinth, had preferred him to this dangerous honor. Rosecrans, of West Virginia repute, replaced him in command of the Army of the Mississippi. Our gunboats were still busy on the Mississippi. On the 26th of June, the mortar-boats had gone down to Vicksburg, and engaged the batteries, now manned by a portion of the rebel army which had retreated from Corinth. The importance of Vicksburg being now manifest to the Confederate authorities, every nerve was strained to make it strong against the day of Grant's attack.


On the 5th of August, General Breckinridge attacked Baton Rouge, but was repulsed, after a terrible struggle, in which the Union commander, General Tom Williams, was killed.

Such are some of the collateral events which bore, more or less directly, upon the welfare of Grant's department. And now, Grant's careful reconnoissances disclosed the rebel designs upon his own department, and enabled him to make skilful combinations to defeat them.

THE BATTLE OF IUKA.

General Sterling Price, with a force of twelve thousand men, marched boldly up from the south, to cross the Memphis and Charleston Railroad at some point between Corinth and Tuscumbia, probably at Iuka. As he advanced, on the 10th of September, to Jacinto, the small Union garrison at that place retired to Corinth. Tuscumbia was also evacuated by Colonel Murphy, of General Stanley's division, who fell back in haste to Iuka. The little garrison of Iuka was, in pursuance of the same general orders, withdrawn to Corinth, and Murphy was left behind it, to destroy the stores collected

there, and fall back also upon Corinth. But Price was too quick, or Murphy was too slow in destroying the stores, and too quick in leaving them, for the latter was driven out by Price's advance, leaving a quantity of supplies undestroyed.



a. Powell's Battery.
 b. 63d Ohio.
 c. 43d Ohio.
 d. 27th Ohio.
 e. 39th Ohio.
 f. 8th Wisconsin.

g. 26th Illinois.
 h. 47th Illinois.
 i. 10th Iowa.
 k. 48th Indiana.
 l. 16th Iowa.
 m. 5th Iowa.

n. 25th Missouri.
 o. 17th Iowa.
 p. 4th Minnesota.
 q. 11th Ohio Battery.
 r. Spoor's Battery.
 s. 11th Missouri.

OPERATIONS AT IUKA.

The game, the opening of which Grant had been expecting, was now becoming interesting. Price occupied Iuka and the railroad; but it was manifestly Grant's intention to permit this temporary possession, in order that he might fully discern the enemy's plans, and form his own intelligently. The reports with regard to Price's designs were numerous, confused, and deceptive. Grant's caution was eminently proper, and

was abundantly repaid; for it became evident that Price was making a feint to cross the Tennessee, as if to follow Buell, who was then retreating upon Nashville, in order to draw Grant's forces away from Corinth, upon which stronghold the foolhardy, brave, but unskilful Van Dorn was marching with all speed.

But the rebel government was most unfortunate in the choice of its generals sent to confront Grant. Van Dorn and Price were no match for Grant, Rosecrans, and Ord, either in planning or fighting. Their every movement was promptly met, their wildest attacks repulsed, and their armies scattered. The reader cannot help pitying such military imbecility.

Grant's course was now taken. He knew, from his scouts, that Van Dorn's army could not reach Corinth for *four* days. This would give him time to punish Price's temerity at Iuka, and then return to receive Van Dorn's visit with a warm welcome at Corinth. But every hour was of incalculable importance, and there was not a moment's delay.

He directed General Ord, with a force of three thousand men, having left garrisons at Corinth and other points, to move on the left of the railroad, through Burnsville, to Iuka. General Ross was telegraphed to come at full speed from Bolivar, on the same route, and, leaving a small rear-guard at Burnsville, to join Ord, with three thousand four hundred men. This force, six thousand five hundred in all, was to attack Price from the north, wherever he should offer or receive battle.

To complete this programme, Rosecrans was ordered to send one division of Stanley's, with Mizner's cavalry, by way of Jainto, to strike the enemy's flank, while Hamilton moved round by the Fulton road, to cut off his southward retreat, or turn it into a rout. The force thus commanded by Rosecrans was nine thousand men, making the entire Union force in the field something more than that of Price; the disparity, however, being more than neutralized by the rebel choice of position. The combined movement of Grant's troops began at four o'clock in the morning of September 18. That night the

wearry troops of Rosecrans, after marching through a drenching rain-storm, bivouacked at Jacinto.

Advancing early on the 19th, after a sharp fight, they drove the rebels in from Barnett's Corners, and at once pushed on to Iuka. There, on an exterior ridge, Rosecrans found Price, and there was heavy fighting till night, principally by the Eleventh Missouri, Fifth Iowa, and Eleventh Ohio Battery, of Hamilton's division, which were so admirably handled by that officer, that he received the special encomiums of Grant and Rosecrans. The ground was exceedingly broken, and tangled with thickets, and interlaced by small creeks and ravines. It was very difficult to bring the troops into action in considerable bodies. Most of the fighting was done by congeries of troops, where the ground would permit them to be formed. Superior numbers gave small advantage, and yet the action was of the severest character. Three or four times the guns of the Eleventh Ohio were taken and retaken. But when nightfall closed the action, they were in the hands of the enemy. The slaughter was great.

While we behold Rosecrans thus fighting the battle, the question arises, Where was Ord? Grant had started with the column of Ord on the morning of the 18th; and expected, upon reaching the neighborhood of Iuka, to be in constant communication with Rosecrans, so that Ord's troops might make a combined and simultaneous movement.

Arrived upon the ground, the tangled nature of the country made it necessary for both commanders to send dispatches a long way round. These dispatches arrived too late for concert of action, gave rise to misunderstandings, and prevented the timely co-operation of Ord's force.

To illustrate the difficulties of the situation: On the 19th, at half-past ten o'clock p. m., General Rosecrans, resting upon his arms, only two miles southwest of Iuka, sent a dispatch to General Grant, stating that he had been heavily engaged for several hours, and had lost three pieces of artillery, and asking for the assistance and co-operation of the troops under Ord. This dispatch, which should have been in Grant's hands

in two hours, did not reach him until thirty-five minutes past eight the next morning. Grant, stung by the delay, wrote to Ord, in urgent language: "Rosecrans may find his hands full. Hurry up your troops—all possible." Ord, a dashing soldier, always ready for a fight, rushed in; but too late for blows. Indeed, he had pushed on with the morning light, without waiting for orders. To give some idea of the character of the country between the two attacking forces, Colonels Dickey and Lagow, of Grant's staff, who had gone to General Rosecrans in the afternoon, became lost and entangled in the woods on their return, were out all night, and did not reach headquarters until nine in the morning. But the presence of Grant and Ord, if not so brilliant a service as the hard fighting of Rosecrans, had greatly conduced to the result. Price made double-quick time to Bay Springs, twenty-seven miles south, on the Fulton road. One of his best generals, Little, was killed. He had lost upwards of a thousand prisoners, left his dead unburied, and his wounded to our care. From rebel sources, we learn that, on their retreat, his troops committed thefts, burglaries, and every kind of outrage, upon their own people, exhibiting a barbarous spirit, which their officers could not restrain. Iuka was a success; but it was more as one part of General Grant's complex plan, and in the fact that the rebels retreated during the following night, than in the fighting of the 19th, as valorous and terrific as it was.*

* The following is Grant's telegraphic dispatch:

IUKA, MISS., September 20, 1862.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief*:

General Rosecrans, with Stanley's and Hamilton's divisions, and Mizner's cavalry, attacked Price south of this village about two hours before dark yesterday, and had a sharp fight until night closed in. General Ord was to the north, with an armed force of about five thousand men, and had some skirmishing with the rebel pickets. This morning, the fight was renewed by General Rosecrans, who was nearest to the town; but it was found that the enemy had been evacuating during the night, going south. Generals Hamilton and Stanley, with cavalry, are in full pursuit.

This will, no doubt, break up the enemy, and possibly force them to abandon much of their artillery. The loss on either side, in killed and wounded, is from

If General Grant had not accomplished every thing he had hoped—and the capture of Price's army was one of his hopes—he had done much. Price's plans and his army were totally defeated and scattered within the time Grant had proposed to himself. On the 22d, he withdrew his forces, and returned to Corinth, to greet Van Dorn. If Price had ever meant to move northward, upon Buell's track, he was making good time now in the opposite direction.

And now having disposed of Price, let us look after Van Dorn, in whose behalf the grand diversion of Iuka had been made.

THE BATTLE OF CORINTH.

Although Van Dorn was approaching from the West, it was still uncertain where he would attack. Grant, therefore, provided for the safety of all the posts within the theatre of his operations. Rosecrans was marched back through Jacinto to Corinth, which he reached on the 26th. Ord went to Bolivar, which might be the point of attack, and from which, in any event, he could easily move a succoring force; and Grant removed his headquarters to Jackson. General Hurlbut was thrown out, with his division, towards Pocahontas. The rebel generals now combined their forces. Price, by a decided circumflexion of about one hundred and eighty degrees, as a glance at the map will show, joined Van Dorn at Dumas.

four hundred to five hundred. The enemy's loss, in arms, tents, etc., will be large. We have about two hundred and fifty prisoners.

I have reliable intelligence that it was Price's intention to move over east of the Tennessee. In this, he has been thwarted. Among the enemy's loss are General Little, killed; and General Whitefield, wounded.

I cannot speak too highly of the energy and skill displayed by General Rosecrans in the attack, and of the endurance of the troops. General Ord's command showed untiring zeal; but the direction taken by the enemy prevented them from taking the active part they desired. Price's force was about eighteen thousand.

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.

The force thus united proceeded northward to Pocahontas, on the State line, where they met the troops of Mansfield Lovell. Thus strengthened, Van Dorn moved by the railroad though Chewalla upon Corinth, once more to become a field of carnage, and a scene of rebel discomfiture.

The rebel defences of Corinth, to which we formerly alluded, had been so extended—fifteen miles of fortification requiring a great many men to man them—that when General Halleck occupied the post, he had constructed an inner line, more easily defensible by a smaller force. But Grant was not satisfied with these. Major F. E. Prime, the chief engineer of General Grant, under his direction, threw up a line of batteries on the north front, far inside of Halleck's line, and close to the town of Corinth, having an enfilading fire upon the Bolivar and Chewalla roads, and a sweeping cross-fire upon all assailable parts of the entire front. On the extreme right were the old works of Beauregard; and from that point the chain of forts reached to the extreme left.

When General Grant had been appointed, in July, 1862, to the command of all the forces in the District of West Tennessee and Northern Mississippi, he had examined the defences of Corinth, which were then being constructed under the superintendence of General Cullum, and expressed the opinion to General Halleck that they would be appropriate if we had an army of one hundred thousand men to defend them, but that they were of too great extent for the force we then had. Immediately upon General Halleck's departure for Washington, these works were pushed forward with energy, and by the 25th of September, when Rosecrans took command, they were nearly completed. To Major Prime, under General Grant's orders, belongs the credit of laying out and constructing the fortifications against which the enemy was now about to hurl his masses, with impetuous but unavailing valor.

To a late moment doubtful of the rebel plans, and judging that, cognizant as they were of the strength of the works at Corinth, the enemy would try a weaker point—unprovided,

too, with a proper map of the country north and west of him—General Rosecrans made ready, like a prudent mariner in thick weather, for whatever might befall.

He called in his outposts from the south and east; sent a reconnoissance, under Oglesby, on the Chewalla road, and posted his small force well in front to receive him. Stanley was stationed beyond Bridge Creek; Oliver, with a brigade and a battery, on the left, in advance; Davies in the centre, and Hamilton on the right. Mizner's cavalry was disposed in every direction around the town, watching the roads at Burnsville, Boneyard, Kossuth, and also in the front.

At length they came, announcing their plans in person; it is on the Chewalla road. Oliver's brigade is soon hard pressed, and is supported by McArthur's. The fighting, which begins with skirmishing, assumes the proportions of a battle. The rebel numbers constantly increase. McArthur is pressed back in turn, when Davies, next on his left, becomes engaged. An interval appears between McArthur and Davies, in which the rebels push so vigorously that Davies rapidly falls back a thousand yards to save his left flank, and in so doing he loses two heavy guns. The rebel advance has been bold and impetuous.

New dispositions were now made, bringing our forces nearer the town, when night ended the conflict, which was but the herald of a greater. Deceived, however, by the comparative ease of his advance, General Van Dorn sent a telegraph to Richmond, announcing a great victory!

The morning of October 4 ushered in the great battle. The Confederate line was well closed up to within a thousand yards of our works, and during the night they had thrown up some batteries in our front. Besides Van Dorn, Price, and Lovell, they had among their generals Villepigue, Rust, Maury, and L. Hébert,—all determined men of our old army, but gifted, except Hébert, with little military talent. Their troops were excellent stuff, and deserved better commanders.

The ground in front of our position, over which they were to come, was of varied character. On the north and east it

alternated in hill and swampy land, both covered by forest-trees and undergrowth.

On the north and west there were fields interspersing the woods; in front of the right centre, a swamp; and in front of the left centre, impracticable hills. Our left, held by Stanley's division, was protected by Battery Robinette on the left, and Battery Williams on the right. Our centre was on a slight ridge, just north of the houses of Corinth, and consisted of Davies' division, slightly retired, with sharp-shooters in front, and having Battery Powell on the right. Hamilton's division was on the right, with Dillon's battery, advanced beyond Davies, and having two regiments in rear of his left.

The first act of the rebels was in the form of a cannonade from their newly erected batteries; but these were soon silenced by our guns. At half-past nine o'clock they moved to the attack upon our centre. The battle raged upon Davies and Fort Powell. The Bolivar road, by which they came, was swept by our guns: huge gaps were made in their column, but, without halting, they opened out in a loose deployment, encircling our lines, and losing fearfully as they came up. Nothing stopped them. "They came up," writes an eye-witness to the *Cincinnati Commercial* (October 9), "with their faces averted, like men striving to protect themselves against a driving storm of hail." They reach the broad glacis; our troops are on the rude covered way, and will certainly repel them, were it not for an unaccountable panic which struck a portion of Davies' division. This will never do. Davies struggles manfully to check it. Rosecrans flies into their midst, fights like a simple grenadier, and, with entreaties, threats, and the flat of his sabre, puts an end to the "untimely and untoward stampede," which was but partial after all.*

This momentary success has, however, encouraged the Confederates. Once and again swept away by the fire of Battery

* The report of the stampeding of General Davies' (Second) division was premature and exaggerated. It was only partial, and soon checked. General Rosecrans indorsed General Davies' report of the battle; and not only is the apparent disgrace removed, but the investigation reflects credit on Davies and

Richardson, they return to the charge, storm Fort Powell, and "the ragged head of the column" even penetrates into the town, when a section of Immel's battery, supported by the Tenth Ohio and the Fifth Minnesota, drives them out. General Sullivan comes to Davies' aid; together they retake Battery Powell, while on the extreme right Hamilton's guns sweep the avenues of advance and retreat.

Such was the failure of Price's attack on our right centre.

The attack on the left was conducted by Van Dorn in person. Under cover of a cloud of skirmishers, he had formed his men in column of attack, and twenty minutes after Price moved forward, he launched four columns upon Battery Robiette and our adjacent lines. His heavy guns are disposed in rear. Then began those "gorgeous pyrotechnics of the battle," spoken of by General Rosecrans, the description of which he leaves to "pens dipped in poetic ink." The fighting was indeed Homeric. From the moment they came in sight, until they were within fifty yards of the work, they were mowed, and torn, and shattered by grape, shell, and canister; and when, after a gallant advance, these brave Mississippi and Texas troops pause for a breathing space, before a final charge, the Ohio and Missouri regiments, which have been lying flat, rise at a signal, and pour in a volley, before which the enemy reel and fall back in horror. But even this does not keep them long dismayed. They came to take Corinth, and they are not going to give it up so easily.

Once more the devoted band is formed. At least, they now know what to expect; they have tried it, and are ready to try it again; no coming storm can equal the last in fury. On they come, breasting the furious fire of the batteries, every gun now double-shotted; they reach the edge of the ditch;

his men. That division did yeomen's service; it bore the brunt of the first day's fight. One of its brigade commanders, the gallant Hackleman, was killed; another, Oglesby, was wounded—at the time it was supposed mortally. There is no doubt that much confusion existed on the part of the line held by this division, on receiving the rebel attack on the morning of the 4th, but it did not extend far, and only a portion of the line gave way.

they are crossing, when the stunning fire of the Eleventh Missouri and Twenty-seventh Ohio is again poured in; the cry of the Federal brigade commander, Charge! rings above the noise of battle; the men repeat it, and the regiments, swarming over their works, chase the broken fragments of these gallant stormers back to the woods; many, crouching in the abatis, surrender at discretion, waving their handkerchiefs on sticks, and begging to be spared for God's sake. Van Dorn had done no better than Price. By noon the battle was ended. After waiting a brief space for the reappearance of the enemy, our skirmishers advanced to find him gone. Rosecrans galloped, in person, to all parts of his line, to inform his command, and to give them rest and rations, preparatory to a pursuit at daylight. Upon his return, he found McPherson, with a fresh brigade, in the square: he had come up after the battle, and was directed to take the advance of the pursuit. The enemy's loss was one thousand four hundred and twenty-three officers and men killed, and upwards of five thousand wounded; two thousand two hundred and forty-eight prisoners were taken, with fourteen colors and two guns.* They were pursued forty miles by the entire force, and sixty miles with cavalry.

Back, like the king of France, posted the rebels, on the Chewalla road, to the bridge across the Tuscumbia, near Poehontas, and a body was detached to guard the crossing of the Hatchie; but they were not yet through their troubles. A thorn was in their side. One part of Grant's plans had been most gallantly carried out by Rosecrans, at Corinth; the complementary part was to come. Hurlbut had been sent to

* The troops engaged in the battle of Corinth were: Hamilton's division, containing the brigades of Buford and Sullivan; Davies' division, brigades of Oglesby and Hackelman; Stanley's division, nine regiments; McArthur's and Oliver's brigades, commanded by McArthur; batteries—First Missouri; Third Michigan; Company F, United States artillery; Tenth and Eleventh Ohio; Eighth and Twelfth Wisconsin; three Missouri companies. The Batteries Robinette, Richardson, etc., were named from their commanders. Captain Richardson was killed.

attack the enemy's rear, or intercept his retreat. On the morning of October 5th, near Pocahontas, he met the head of Van Dorn's retreating column, and was driving it back across the Hatchie, towards Corinth, when Ord came up and took command. The fighting was severe. Late in the afternoon, Ord fell, severely wounded, and Hurlbut assumed the command. The disheartened rebels, battle-worn and weary with the rapid flight, were driven by Ord's impetuosity to make a wide circuit, and cross the Hatchie at Crum's Mill, six miles

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 88.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF WEST TENNESSEE,
JACKSON, TENN., October 7, 1862.

It is with heartfelt gratitude the general commanding congratulates the armies of the West for another great victory won by them on the 3d, 4th, and 5th instant, over the combined armies of Van Dorn, Price, and Lovell.

The enemy chose his own time and place of attack, and knowing the troops of the West as he does, and with great facilities for knowing their numbers, never would have made the attempt, except with a superior force numerically. *But for the undaunted bravery of officers and soldiers, who have yet to learn defeat*, the efforts of the enemy must have proven successful.

Whilst one division of the army, under Major-General Rosecrans, was resisting and repelling the onslaught of the rebel hosts at Corinth, another, from Bolivar, under Major-General Hurlbut, was marching upon the enemy's rear, driving in their pickets and cavalry, and attracting the attention of a large force of infantry and artillery. On the following day, under Major-General Ord, these forces advanced with unsurpassed gallantry, driving the enemy back across the Hatchie, over ground where it is almost incredible that a superior force should be driven by an inferior, capturing two of the batteries (eight guns), many hundred small-arms, and several hundred prisoners.

To those two divisions of the army all praise is due, and will be awarded by a grateful country.

Between them there should be, and I trust are, the warmest bonds of brotherhood. Each was risking life in the same cause, and, on this occasion, risking it also to save and assist the other. No troops could do more than these separate armies. Each did all possible for it to do in the places assigned it.

As in all great battles, so in this, it becomes our fate to mourn the loss of many brave and faithful officers and soldiers, who have given up their lives as a sacrifice for a great principle. The nation mourns for them.

By command of

MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT.

JOHN A. RAWLINS, A. A. G.

above. Rosecrans was recalled from the pursuit, and Grant was master of the field for future movements.

On the receipt of the intelligence at Washington, Mr. Lincoln telegraphed his congratulations, and asked the question: "How does it all sum up?" This is a significant inquiry, which we may now answer. The brief campaign had demonstrated the clearness of Grant's military judgment, and the admirable interrelation of his plans. Doubtful of the purposes of Price and Van Dorn, he lured the former onward to Iuka, to obtain the desired information. When he found that they were in collusion, and that Price was trying to draw him off, that Van Dorn might attack, he calculated his time, sent Ord and Rosecrans to whip Price, and to return in time to beat Van Dorn. Van Dorn, foolhardily, advanced on Corinth, and Grant, confiding that part to Rosecrans, set a trap for Van Dorn's retreat. All this was clock-work, calculated to hours, if not to minutes.

Of the principal officers on both sides, we may draw hasty pen-and-ink sketches, which we believe will be recognized by their acquaintance:

ROSECRANS.—This general, a graduate of West Point, in the engineers, of 1842, is active, earnest, and especially *enthusiastic*. He became a Roman Catholic, after having been a very devout Episcopalian, and is a proselyter. Having found what he thinks the good way, he spares no efforts to bring others into it. Cheerful, easy of access, careless in matters of dress and show, his hold on his army is by means of his knowledge, his intense interest in the least of his military duties, and his great valor in the field. The reputation gained by his successes in West Virginia, and his victories at Iuka and Corinth, was increased by the battle of Stone River, and somewhat impaired by that of the Chickamauga.

ORD.—Ord is essentially a fighting man, on the lookout for a chance of battle, and yet not wanting in that cool judgment which makes the general. His defeat of Stuart's rebel brigade, at Drainesville, was of great moral value at the time, and drew from his friend and fellow-brigadier, John F. Reynolds,

himself a fighting general, the remark: "Confound that fellow! I knew, if there was a fight to be scared up, Ord would find it."

VAN DORN.—This doughty Confederate cavalier, of Rosecrans' class at West Point, has greatly astonished his old associates. West Point men of his time remember him as a small, handsome, modest youth, literally at the foot of his class. In Mexico, he was on the staff of General P. F. Smith, and was very popular; for, to his other qualities he added dashing bravery. His conspicuous course in the rebel interests, at the breaking out of the war, deceived them into thinking him a general. A good soldier he certainly was—brave, dashing, a splendid horseman; but he lacked *head*, and was always taking his men into *culs de sacs*. He died by the hand of a man who believed that he had seduced his wife.

PRICE.—As a general, Price was inferior to Van Dorn; for to want of head he added want of knowledge. His march with Doniphan was not soldiering, and he had no experience. He was at swords' points with the regular Confederate officers.

CHAPTER X.

THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE.

THE EXTENT OF GRANT'S COMMAND.—DISTRICTS.—RETROSPECT.—WILLIAMS' CANAL.—FARRAGUT'S FLEET.—THE ARKANSAS DESTROYED.—GRANT MOVES.—PEMBERTON IN COMMAND OF THE REBEL ARMY.—GRANT'S ARMY AND STAFF.—TRADE.—THE VALUE OF VICKSBURG.—PORT HUDSON.—THE TALLAHATCHIE.—HOVEY'S MOVEMENT.—THE PROSPECT BRIGHT.—MURPHY'S SURRENDER.—SHERMAN'S EXPEDITION TO VICKSBURG.—UNSUCCESSFUL.—ARKANSAS POST.—ARMY CORPS.—EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION, AND COLORED TROOPS.

By general orders from the War Department, bearing date of October 16, 1862, General Grant was assigned to the extended command entitled the Department of the Tennessee. He had virtually exercised it before, since the departure of General Halleck; but he officially assumed it, by a general order, on the 25th of October. It included Cairo, Forts Henry and Donelson, Northern Mississippi, and those portions of Tennessee and Kentucky west of the Tennessee River. His headquarters were at Jackson, Tennessee, from which he could most conveniently organize and arrange for supplies and re-enforcements to carry out his new plans—plans, as the sequel proved, of colossal dimensions, and testing the utmost endeavors of a great commander. Buell having been defeated at Perryville on the 8th of October, Bragg began a leisurely retreat on the 12th; and, to expedite it, Rosecrans superseded Buell on the 30th.

Grant's first care was to make a provisional division of his department into districts. His force was in four divisions, and they were thus posted: Major-General Sherman, with the first division, commanded the district of Memphis; Major-General Hurlbut, with the second, that of Jackson. The district of Corinth was in charge of Brigadier-General C. S.

Hamilton, with the third division; and that of Columbus was in charge of Brigadier-General T. A. Davies, with the fourth.

His executive and administrative ability were now displayed in preparations for the new campaign, and, not less, in his control of the conquered territory which he commanded. He republished and carried out the judicious order of General Halleck (No. 160), principally limiting the kinds and numbers of army trains, baggage, etc., cutting down these *impedimenta* to the smallest figure, both for officers and men; and he set the example so rigorously himself, that during the ensuing campaign, his own baggage was said to be a *toothbrush*: nothing more—not even a clean shirt.

Vicksburg, not within his command, but in the Department of the Gulf, was the grand objective point, blocking the river, and daily growing stronger. It was a problem of very difficult solution: the greater honor to him who should work it out.

RETROSPECT OF OPERATIONS ON THE RIVER.

To preserve the chronological order, let us state, very briefly, what had been already attempted in the Department of the Gulf. The grand co-operation of the fleet needs, and will have, its own historian: we can only now refer to it briefly, to subserve our present purpose. Memphis, notwithstanding Montgomery's boasts and the sure hopes of the citizens, had fallen on the 6th of June.

On the 20th, the gallant Brigadier-General Thomas Williams had left Baton Rouge, and gone up to Vicksburg, with four regiments and eight field-guns. On the 25th he was off Vicksburg, and, unmolested, had begun to cut a navigable canal across the sharp turn of the river, which, if successful, would change the channel, and throw the city and its defences six miles inland. It was apparently a light task, and with twelve hundred negroes, taken from the neighboring plantations, was rapidly carried to completion; but alas! when, on

the 22d of July, it was finished, and the small barrier knocked away, the waters refused the passage, with what seemed singular caprice. A simple plough-furrow had elsewhere frequently changed the channel in a single night, but a larger and more inviting cut-off was now unsuccessful. So the siege, if it can be called one, was abandoned. Williams went back, without delay, to strengthen Baton Rouge, and unhappily to fall there on the 5th of August; and the rebels lost no time in filling up the canal.

THE FLEET OF FARRAGUT.

Farragut had steamed up on the 7th of June, the day after the capture of Memphis, and had silenced the Grand Gulf batteries on the 8th. On the 28th of the same month he had sent seven vessels past, silencing the lower batteries, and had then joined Flag-Officer Davis, who had brought down some four gunboats and six mortar-boats from the upper fleet, on the 1st of July; and Porter had again engaged the water-batteries below with the remainder of Farragut's fleet; but after an ineffectual bombardment, the rapid falling of the river threatening a dearth of water for the larger boats, Farragut's fleet was obliged to fall down the river to New Orleans.

Up the Yazoo River, the mouth of which is about twelve miles north of Vicksburg, the rebels had constructed a formidable ram, the *Arkansas*, which strengthened the defences principally by menacing the fleet. She came down the river to Vicksburg on the 15th of July, ready for any work; and was soon sent down to Baton Rouge, to aid the attack of Breckinridge on the 5th of August, and was there destroyed by Colonel Ellet's ram, the *Essex*.

GRANT MOVES.

With these few words, merely, to connect the great events in Grant's military history, let us return to his own movements. We have said that the great objective was Vicks-

burg. The immediate objective was the army of Pemberton, which lay on the line of the Mississippi Central Railroad, principally at Abbeville, behind the Tallahatchie River, and in the vicinity of Holly Springs, Mississippi. Its advance was near Grand Junction and La Grange.

On the 4th of November, his preparations having been completed,—his forces having been concentrated from Corinth, Jackson, and Bolivar,—Grant moved to La Grange, three miles east of Grand Junction, on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, pushing the enemy's advance back towards Holly Springs, and utterly neglecting, to the amazement of the rebels, their movements to the east and south, which were intended to draw him off in that direction. Grant's reconnoissances were now constant and energetic. Colonel A. L. Lee had first seized Ripley and Orizaba, holding them for twenty-four hours; and then, followed by two divisions under McPherson, had made a dash upon Lamar, on the railroad, and Hudsonville, defeating the rebel cavalry at the latter place. These and other approaches developed the enemy as intending to hold the line of the Tallahatchie River, and being in chief force in advance at Holly Springs and Coldwater, on the two railroads. Here Van Dorn had collected his forces and fortified the river-line. But Van Dorn, although a brave soldier, was a weak man, and by no means competent to encounter and defeat the Union strategy. His name was not a tower of strength to the rebels, and the Union generals began to despise his strategy.

But the rebel government was now fairly awake to the danger. As early as June 16th, the State archives had been removed from Jackson, to guard against dangers from the river approaches; and now, in order to make head against these formidable land approaches, they had overslaughed Van Dorn and Lovell, by appointing as lieutenant-general John C. Pemberton, a junior major-general, and sending him to command in and around Vicksburg. He was a better general than either, but not much, and his great unpopularity more than neutralized his superiority.

On the 2d of November, Lovell, who had been north of Holly Springs, fell back ; but he was promptly ordered forward again by Pemberton, whose troops were strewed along the railroad for facility of transportation ;—Price, seven miles below Lovell, with twelve thousand men ; and twenty-two miles further south, at Abbeville, a conscript camp.

Up to this time, notwithstanding his successes, Grant's army had not received that attention and consideration from the Government which it deserved. This was no designed neglect, but the situation in Virginia absorbed the general interest : little stress was laid upon the West. He had not been properly furnished with regular and instructed officers. With the aid of the few who were with him, he had every thing to make. His staff, selected with the rare sagacity which has since been more noticed in his later career, was at this time composed of men who were making themselves. Among them were—Brigadier-General J. D. Webster, the artillery hero of Pittsburg Landing, who was now superintendent of military railroads ; J. A. Rawlins, then a lieutenant-colonel, chief of staff, since a brigadier-general and brevet major-general in the regular army, an able staff-officer, the constant companion of his fortunes ; T. S. Bowers, then captain, now colonel and aid-de-camp. Major F. E. Prime, of the Engineers, and Lieutenant J. H. Wilson, of the Topographical Engineers, were the only two regular officers on that large staff,* and although excellent, not of the proper rank. The great characteristic of military genius is its creative power ; and Grant was now attempting the most difficult movement known to the military art, with a thoroughly improvised army : the greater glory, should he succeed.

ADMINISTRATION.

His military plans were greatly impeded by the civil and municipal difficulties incident to the state of war. The influx

* Prime, we have understood, declined promotion in the volunteers. Wilson became a most efficient cavalry general.

of negroes into his department, and their unsettled condition, gave him no little trouble. They were not yet declared free; they were escaping from their masters in vast crowds; many were playing a double part, at once fugitives and spies; they were encumbering his army, and eating his substance. To remedy this, he established a camp for them, as early as November 14,* and had them "organized into companies, and set to work, picking, ginning, and baling all cotton now outstanding in the fields." His orders against plundering—that bane of all armies—were very severe, and most vigorously carried out. An offending regiment, the Twentieth Illinois,—which had broken into a store at Jackson, Tennessee, and robbed it of property to the value of upwards of one thousand dollars,—he punished† by assessing the amount on the pay of certain officers, who were improperly absent, or derelict in their duty; and then he mustered two of their number out of the service. The subject of trade, as injurious to military operations in insurrectionary States, engaged his serious attention, and he long refused to permit it to be carried on. The Jews as a class, principally German Jews, having given him great trouble in connection with this subject, he excluded them, for some time, from his department. As illustrating their great pliability, we may state that they fell also under the rebel ban, for the alacrity with which, upon the surrender of Vicksburg, they "went forward and took the oath of allegiance to the United States."‡

Urged, at length, with great cogency of reasoning, he allowed a partial trade; but, when asked to name persons who should conduct it, he was sagacious enough to refuse, declaring that he would at once be accused of complicity, for his own pecuniary benefit.

Vicksburg, upon which Grant had concentrated his thoughts, and which had been in the department of General Banks, was now placed in Grant's department, and he was in

* Orders of that date.

† Orders of November 16.

‡ Pollard, Third Year, p. 69.

readiness to demonstrate upon it. To epitomize the value of his success, should he capture it, we may quote the words of Sherman, in his speech at St. Louis: "The possession of the Mississippi is the possession of America." Vicksburg alone kept us from that possession. And Jefferson Davis, in his speech to the Legislature of Mississippi, on the 26th of December, declared that the fall of Vicksburg would "cut off their communication with the Trans-Mississippi department, and sever the western portion of the Confederacy from the eastern." The great hope of the rebels, after their defeat at Island No. 10, was centred in Vicksburg and Memphis; and when the latter fell, Vicksburg was their best bower in the West. As soon as the demonstration of General Williams upon the city had failed, they had gone to work with great vigor to render it impregnable, strengthening the garrison and fortifying every available point with heavy earthworks.

As a strong outwork to Vicksburg, on the 25th of November they had also fortified Port Hudson, on the left bank, twenty-five miles above Baton Rouge, and the terminus of the Clinton Railroad. This inclosed a long stretch of the river, free from our gunboats, through which stores and troops might pass, and giving free communication with the rich productions of Texas, upon which they depended as a storehouse. The eyes of the country, and of military men throughout the world, were now turned with great interest upon Grant. Moving down by the railroads which met at Grenada, it was evident that the first line which the rebels would oppose to his advance, was that of the Tallahatchie and its parallel streams, upon which a small force, judiciously posted, might give great trouble to a large army. But the rebel generals were, as we have said, no match for the strategy of Grant.

THE TALLAHATCHIE.

While the main army was openly moving down from Grand Junction against the rebel forces strongly posted at Abbeville, on the Tallahatchie, and Sherman was moving from Memphis

direct on the same point, a co-operating force from Helena, unexpected by the rebels, was about to close the Tallahatchie region, as by a magic wand. This force, seven thousand strong, under Generals A. P. Hovey and Washburne, arrived at Delta, near the mouth of the Yazoo Pass, on the 28th of November. This was to flank the rebels, compel them to fall back, clear the country for Grant's advance, and gain undisputed possession of the rich resources of Northern Mississippi.

The exact character of the following movements requires some care in the study of the component elements, without which the reader is liable to fall into confusion. To state the plan in Sherman's sententious phrase: "Grant moved direct on Pemberton, while I moved from Memphis, and a smaller force under General Washburne struck directly for Grenada; and the first thing Pemberton knew, the depot of his supplies was almost in the grasp of a small cavalry force, and he fell back in confusion, and gave us the Tallahatchie without a battle."* Without space for many details, let us attempt to describe these allied movements, with their issues. The strategy was beautiful, and admirably executed. The conception of these movements was Grant's. Detailed dispatches give the itinerary: it was rapid and vigorous. On the 29th of November, Grant's advance was at Holly Springs; on the 30th, at Waterford; and, on the 1st of December, a junction was formed with Sherman.

General Hovey started from Helena on the 27th of November, and on the 28th was at Delta. Distributing his cavalry, that of Washburne proceeded to Cold Water, where it captured a rebel camp; then the forces moved along the Cold Water and Tallahatchie rivers southward, by a rapid march *via* Preston, to Garner's station, just north of Grenada, destroying the railroad and bridges; then to Charleston and Mitchell's cross-roads, both knots of country roads; northward still to Panola and Oakland, on the Memphis road, and thence to Coffeeville,

* Speech at St. Louis.

on that to Grand Junction. The work was well and thoroughly done; the enemy's rear was seriously endangered; steamboats and many river-craft were destroyed on the Tallahatchie; the railroad from Memphis to Grenada broken up; cars and locomotives burned and destroyed. Pressed in front by Grant, the rebel astonishment turned to panic; a precipitate retreat was all that was left to Pemberton, and so he fell back to Grenada, even while Hovey was quietly moving back to Helena. Perhaps Hovey was moved back too soon.

Pemberton retreated from the Tallahatchie on the 1st of December, leaving a small force at the railroad-bridge across that river; but they did not seriously dispute the passage. Onward still, the cavalry skirmishing at Abbeville, until, on the 3d of December, his headquarters were at Oxford, with his cavalry well in advance, driving Van Dorn out of Water Valley and Coffeerville, on the railroad. A glance at the map will at once display the value of Hovey's march, at this juncture, in preparing the way for the main army. To add to the rebel misfortunes, it was now learned that the United States gunboats were in the Yazoo, and steaming up to take them in rear, and perhaps cut off their retreat. One of our gunboats, the Cairo, was exploded by a rebel torpedo.

SHERMAN'S EXPEDITION.

The first act thus auspiciously performed, Grant proposed to General Halleck to hold the enemy south of the Yalabusha, and move a force from Memphis and Helena on Vicksburg; and, in reply, received orders from General Halleck to send the proposed expedition against Vicksburg. General Sherman was selected for the command;* and Morgan L. Smith's

* The following is General Grant's order to Sherman :

HEADQUARTERS, THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE, Oxford, Miss., Dec. 8, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, *Commanding Right Wing* :

GENERAL—You will proceed with as little delay as possible to Memphis, Tenn., taking with you one division of your present command. On your arrival at Memphis, you will assume command of all the troops there, and that portion

division, then near Oxford, immediately started back to Memphis to form part of the expedition. It was confidently believed, that if Sherman moved with all possible dispatch, he would be able, with the force at his command, and the co-operation of the navy, under Admiral Porter, to surprise and capture Vicksburg. If he should find this impracticable, it was almost certain that he would be able to take and hold Haines' Bluff, operate against the enemy's lines, and open up to General Grant the Yazoo River as a line of supplies; while Grant should press Pemberton in front, and hold him in force in the Yalabusha, until the result of Sherman's attack should be known.*

of General Curtis's force at present east of the Mississippi River, and organize them into brigades and divisions in your own way. As soon as possible, move with them down the river, to the vicinity of Vicksburg; and, with the co-operation of the gunboat fleet under command of Flag-Officer Porter, proceed to the reduction of that place, in such manner as circumstances and your own judgment may dictate.

The amount of rations, forage, land transportation, etc., necessary to take will be left entirely with yourself. The quartermaster at St. Louis will be instructed to send you transportation for thirty thousand men. Should you still find yourself deficient, your quartermaster will be authorized to make up the deficiency from such transports as may come into the port of Memphis.

On arriving in Memphis, put yourself in communication with Admiral Porter, and arrange with him for his co-operation.

Inform me at the earliest practicable day of the time when you will embark, and such plans as may then be matured. I will hold the forces here in readiness to co-operate with you in such manner as the movements of the enemy may make necessary.

Leave the district of Memphis in the command of an efficient officer, and with a garrison of four regiments of infantry, the siege-guns, and whatever cavalry may be there.

(Signed) U. S. GRANT, Major-General.

* The following letter of General Sherman to Admiral Porter gives his views of the movement.

HEADQUARTERS RIGHT WING, ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE,
OXFORD, Miss., Dec. 8, 1862.

REAR-ADMIRAL D. D. PORTER,

Commanding U. S. Naval Forces, Cairo, Ills.:

The movement thus far has been eminently successful. General Grant, moving down directly upon the enemy's strong lines behind the Tallahatchie,

On the 14th of December, General Grant telegraphed to Sherman, in cipher, as follows:—

I have not had one word from Grierson since he left, and am getting uneasy about him. I hope General Gorman will give you no difficulty about returning the troops that were on this side of the river, and Steele to command them. The twenty-one thousand men you have, with twelve thousand from Helena, will make a good force. The enemy are as yet in the Yalabusha. I am pushing down on them slowly, but so as to keep up the impression of a continuous move. I feel particularly anxious to have the Helena cavalry on this side of the river—if not now, at least after you start. If Gorman will send them, instruct them where to go, and how to communicate with me. My headquarters will probably be in Coffeetown, one week hence. In the mean time, I will be at Springdale. It would be well if you could have two or three small boats, suitable for navigating the Yazoo. It may become necessary for me to look to that base for supplies before we get through.

(Signed) U. S. GRANT, Major-General.

while the Helena force appeared unexpectedly on their flank, utterly confounded them, and they are now in full retreat, and we are at a loss where they will bring up. We hope they will halt and reform behind the Yalabusha, with Grenada as their centre. If so, General Grant can press their front, whilst I am ordered to take all the spare troops from Memphis and Helena, and proceed with all dispatch to Vicksburg.

Time now is the great object. We must not give time for new combinations. I know you will promptly co-operate. It will not be necessary to engage their Vicksburg batteries until I have broken all their inland communication; then Vicksburg must be attacked by land and water. In this I will defer much to you.

My purpose will be to cut the road to Munroe, La., to Jackson, Miss., and then appear up the Yazoo, threatening the Mississippi Central road where it crosses the Big Black.

These movements will disconcert the enemy, and throw them on to Meridian, especially as General Grant presses them in front. All this should be done before the winter rains make General Grant's road impassable. I will leave for Memphis to-morrow, Tuesday night, and will reach Memphis with one of my old divisions Friday night. We ought to leave Memphis before the 20th, and I do earnestly desire you should meet me there. At all events, even if the larger gunboats cannot proceed at once, send those of light draught down, with Captains Phelps, Gwinn, Shirk, or some officer to assist me in the preliminary work. Of course, Vicksburg cannot be reduced till you arrive with the large gunboats.

General Grant's purpose is to take full advantage of the effects of this Tallahatchie success.

I am, with great respect,
(Signed) W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.

Never did human hopes have a brighter prospect ; never had skilful combinations been more beautifully successful. Grant confined his operations against the enemy to such as seemed most probable to secure the success of his part in the grand movement. He pushed slowly but steadily forward towards Grenada, and sent cavalry expeditions against Pemberton's lines of communication and both his flanks, and menaced his front, while Sherman was about to make a grand attack on Vicksburg, by the Mississippi and Yazoo. Grant had left small but adequate garrisons at all the principal points in his rear : among them were Columbus, Humboldt, Trenton, Jackson, Bolivar, Corinth, Holly Springs, Cold Water, Davis's Mills, and Middleburg. He had neglected no precaution, and now he was about to grasp the glittering prize, when suddenly, in a moment, the prospect was blasted, the entire movement defeated, and a disaster which he could not anticipate was to fall upon his advance, and Sherman's gallant, but unaided attack.

As a lesson to all military men who may fall into isolated command, it is valuable ; otherwise, it was an unalloyed disaster.

MURPHY'S SURRENDER OF HOLLY SPRINGS.

The story is a very brief one. As soon as Van Dorn was assured of the return of Hovey's expedition, he took heart, and determined to attack some of the garrisoned posts in Grant's rear ; to destroy the railroad-bridges all along from Columbus to Corinth ; and thus to force him to abandon or postpone his grand movement. In a military point of view, Van Dorn deserves credit for this plan, which, aided by the disgraceful conduct of one man, was entirely successful. That man was Colonel R. C. Murphy, who had been intrusted with the command of Holly Springs, and who, upon being surrounded by rebel cavalry, surrendered his post without striking a single blow, on the 20th of December, while Grant was at Oxford, thirty miles away. Murphy had taken no pre-

cautions, although he knew what threatened, and had left the garrison in ignorance of all danger. It is difficult to understand his apparent unconcern at the vast issues which depended upon his holding out until he had not a man left. But we need not stop to moralize : he gave up the post, with vast quantities of ammunition, quartermaster, commissary, and medical stores, and one thousand bales of cotton. The blow fell like a stroke of lightning. Grant's communications were cut, the vast plans and preparations rendered useless, and the siege of Vicksburg indefinitely postponed. Grant fell back to Holly Springs.

Other attacks the rebels had made, at Cold Water, Davis's Mills, and Middleburg, which were bravely repulsed. Murphy was disgraced and dismissed, and all that Grant could do was to plan again, and hope for better aid in the future.*

This failure, lamentable in itself, was the more to be regretted because, in the summer, only a short time before, Pope had been signally defeated at Centreville on the 28th of August, at Manassas on the 30th, and at Chantilly on the 1st of September ; and because the battle of Antietam was not a compensating victory. The battle of Perryville, on the 8th of October, was not to our advantage ; and the chapter of disasters or barren victories was crowned with horrors by the wholesale slaughters of Fredericksburg, on the 13th of December.

But whoever might despair, Grant did not. Every one who has read his history thus far must have been struck with his singular tenacity of purpose. Not a day was lost in irresolution ; preparations were at once made for putting a new plan into execution.

And here let us pause to give a brief sketch of Sherman's fortunes, in the campaign which reached such an untimely end.

* The raiders of Forrest, in Grant's rear, were finally dispersed by General Sweeny.

Sherman's expedition to Vicksburg, like all the actions of that brilliant general, was carefully prepared, well-timed, and admirably conducted. With only a general knowledge of the ground upon which he was to attack, he embarked his troops at Memphis and Helena, and on the 21st of December, the day after the surrender of Holly Springs, but in unhappy ignorance of that fact, his fleet of sixty transports, convoyed by Admiral Porter, with three gunboats, rendezvoused at Friar's Point. His army, called the "Right Wing of the Army of the Tennessee," was composed of four divisions, under Generals G. W. Morgan, M. L. Smith, A. J. Smith, and Frederick Steele. Steele's division had four brigades, under Blair, Thayer, C. S. Hovey, and Hassendurpel. The other three divisions were of three brigades each. The men were the flower of the West. In an admirable order, issued December 18th, he had forbidden all citizens, traders, and women to accompany it, and allowed no cotton to be shipped, except what was needed for bulk-heads and protection. If any citizen should elude the order, he was to be conscripted as a private, or turned over as a deck-hand. We call attention to this order as indicative of the care with which his movement was conducted. Landing a detachment under M. L. Smith, at Milliken's Bend, he sent it to Delhi and Dallas, to cut the rebel communication by the Vicksburg and Shreveport Railroad, after which they were to join him.

On the 27th, the main body proceeded up the Yazoo, and debarked at and above Johnston's Landing, at various points from the junction of the Old River with the Yazoo to Johnston's Farm, about eight miles from Vicksburg.

The long line of Bluff upon which Vicksburg is situated touches the Yazoo at Haines' Bluff, and incloses, between that river and the bend of the Mississippi, a field of most difficult topography, intersected with bayous, and commanded by a succession of redoubts, lines of rifle-pits, and field-batteries, protected by abatis, on the bluffs and on the plain at their base. In front of all this, the Chickasaw bayou, coming eastward from the Yazoo, turns southward to flow as a deep

and wide wet ditch to the entire fortification, prolonged to the northward by the Cypress Lake slough.

The Confederate positions, from Haines' Bluff to Vicksburg, were exceedingly strong by nature, and doubly fortified by military skill. The rebel troops, who had been in Grant's front, now that he had fallen back, rushed to Vicksburg, full of hope, to overpower Sherman. It is not within our scope to give a detailed account of this action; we can only give its outlines. In landing, the forces were thus disposed: A. J. Smith on the right; M. L. Smith, the right centre; Morgan, the left centre; and Steele, the left. Steele's first landing, on the 28th, was above the slough, while Morgan had moved south of Chickasaw bayou, into the re-entering angle.

Steele was withdrawn, on account of the difficulties encountered in crossing the slough, and re-embarked, to land south of the Chickasaw, on the left of Morgan. Blair's brigade, which, in the temporary absence of M. L. Smith, had occupied the right centre, was now marched to join Steele on the left. The brigades of Thayer and Blair then advanced to the assault across the bridges, with the most distinguished bravery. They stormed the rifle-pits, entered the rebel line, driving them back in confusion. But they were largely re-enforced, while there were unaccountable delays in the movement of our troops. Morgan's division was not brought over in time to engage in the assault.

The movements of attack on the centre and right were greatly impeded by the difficulty of bridging the bayou, and were therefore very feeble. The attack on the left, which was extremely gallant, was made by only three thousand men, eight hundred of whom were put *hors de combat*. Sherman, ardent and impetuous, was very angry at this "lame and impotent conclusion," but he was also philosophical. Under the protection of a flag of truce, on the 31st, he buried his dead and carried off his wounded.

One more effort he thought to make; it was, to try a combined land and naval attack upon Haines' Bluff, turn the rebel right, and roll back his line or endanger his rear. This new

plan he was ready to put into execution on the 1st of January, when a dense fog made it impracticable : when it lifted, the rebels were prepared for him. Baffled, but not humiliated, he re-embarked his command and dropped down the Yazoo, having lost in his assault, one hundred and ninety-one killed, nine hundred and eighty-two wounded, and seven hundred and fifty-six missing.

At the mouth of the river he found General McClermand, waiting, by order of the President, to take command. He sent the transports up to Milliken's Bend. "The right wing" was merged into the "Army of the Mississippi," of which Sherman commanded one corps and Morgan the other, and the last act of the campaign was over. Sherman gracefully acknowledges the defeat in his order and report, and in his recent speech at St. Louis, but the world now knows, what it did not then, that he was "on time," and was the victim of unavoidable circumstances, and that his repulse was no less a consequence of Murphy's surrender of Holly Springs, than was Grant's falling back to that point; not because Grant could not co-operate, but because his retrograde movement enabled the rebels to send large re-enforcements to Vicksburg.

Of course, Pemberton was proud of the Confederate success, and he had a right to be. Following his impotence on the Tallahatchie, it was a great consolation—the last gleam of success which was to irradiate his path: let him make much of it.

ARKANSAS POST.

Before McClermand had taken command, General Sherman and Admiral Porter had discussed the propriety of an attack on Arkansas Post, and had decided, for numerous reasons, to make it. The proposition was Sherman's; but McClermand concurred in it. They went up the White River from the Mississippi, and thence by a connecting canal into the Arkansas. All the gunboats that could get into the canal were

sent forward, until they reached Fort Hindman, at the old post of Arkansas, on the left bank of the river. The joint attack by the army and navy could not be resisted; the firing began at noon on the 11th, and lasted until four o'clock, when a white flag gave token of surrender. Our loss was about six hundred; that of the rebels only one hundred and fifty. We destroyed the fort. The navy sent up and captured Des Arc and Duvals, while McClelland withdrew his forces to Napoleon.

Grant had come up the White River to meet Porter at the cutaway, and prepare for his new campaign. We have noticed the capture of Fort Hindman, on account of its bearing on the general plan. It was very opportune; it tended to inspire the men, and in some sort retrieve the repulse of Haines' Bluff: it was *doing something* with troops who would otherwise have lain idle, while Grant was moving his army to Memphis; and it changed the discord of defeat, in the ears of an impressible public, into the harmonious notes of a victory. It was also another rebel discomfiture. Otherwise it amounted to very little.

NEW ORGANIZATION INTO ARMY CORPS.

Grant had been steadily gaining ground in the confidence of the Government, and the great importance of his plans in Mississippi caused them to send him a larger number of troops, requiring a new organization. These, in accordance with historic experience, he disposed into *army corps*, instead of numerous distinct divisions. The advantage of this system is manifest. It gives to competent generals, commanding corps, a larger field in which to display their powers, and it relieves the commander of great official drudgery—all the division reports, etc., being settled at the corps headquarters, while only a digest is sent up by the corps commanders to the commander-in-chief. Also, on the field of war, the orders of the commanding general are given to corps commanders, and they are held responsible for the movements and actions

of the divisions constituting their corps. And still, in addition to these advantages, each army corps constitutes an army in itself, properly organized of the three arms, and ready for independent movement as such. The system is French, and our brief experience in handling large bodies of men, soon prompted its employment in the late war.

On the 22d of December, Grant issued the following order:

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 14.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,
HOLLY SPRINGS, MISS., Dec. 22, 1862.

By directions of the general-in-chief of the army, the troops in this department, including those of the Department of the Missouri operating on the Mississippi River, are hereby divided into four army corps, as follows:

1. The troops composing the Ninth Division, Brigadier General G. W. Morgan commanding; the Tenth Division, Brigadier-General A. J. Smith commanding; and all other troops operating on the Mississippi River below Memphis, not included in the Fifteenth Army Corps, will constitute the Thirteenth Army Corps, under the command of Major-General John A. McClermand.

2. The Fifth Division, Brigadier-General Morgan L. Smith commanding; the division from Helena, Arkansas, commanded by Brigadier-General F. Steele; and the forces in the "District of Memphis," will constitute the Fifteenth Army Corps, and be commanded by Major-General W. T. Sherman.

3. The Sixth Division, Brigadier-General J. McArthur commanding; the Seventh Division, Brigadier-General I. F. Quimby commanding; the Eighth Division, Brigadier-General L. F. Ross commanding; the Second Brigade of cavalry, Colonel A. L. Lee commanding; and the troops in the "District of Columbus," commanded by Brigadier-General Davies, and those in the "District of Jackson," commanded by Brigadier-General Sullivan, will constitute the Sixteenth Army Corps, and be commanded by Major-General S. A. Hurlbut.

4. The First Division, Brigadier-General J. W. Denver commanding; the Third Division, Brigadier-General John A. Logan commanding; the Fourth Division, Brigadier-General J. G. Lauman commanding; the First Brigade of cavalry, Colonel B. H. Grierson commanding; and the forces in the "District of Corinth," commanded by Brigadier-General G. M. Dodge, will constitute the Seventeenth Army Corps, and be commanded by Major-General J. B. McPherson.

District commanders will send consolidated returns of their forces to these headquarters, as well as to army corps headquarters, and will, for the present, receive orders from department headquarters.

By order of

MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT.

JOHN A. RAWLINS, A. A. G.

THE PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION, AND THE USE OF COLORED TROOPS.

No history of the war, and no biography of any one of its chief actors, would be complete without reference to a State paper of greater significance than any other issued during the period of hostilities. Indeed, it may well be doubted whether any public document ever issued in America had more important bearings than this. We refer to the President's Emancipation Proclamation. On the 22d of September, 1862, he had declared, by proclamation, that on the 1st day of January, 1863, all persons held as slaves within the States, the people of which were in rebellion, should be thereafter free. On the 1st day of January he had ratified that assertion by formal proclamation, enumerating the States and portions of States in which it should take effect.

This was the signal for new political controversies, and many of our high officers in the army were inclined to fight against it.

We need do no more than to declare, as we have done before, that this was a logical sequence for which we should have been prepared, and against which the rebels had not the shadow of a right to complain. The recruiting of negro regiments was also a bugbear to many people, though not a single valid argument can be brought against it. Disloyal sheets fulminated the fallacious *argumenta* of the schools, *ad populum*, *ad verecundiam*, and the like, and the swords of certain generals relaxed in their grasp; they halted on the negro question. Grant, no politician, but a straightforward, manly soldier, was instant and earnest in his obedience. "It is expected," he wrote in orders, "that all commanders will especially exert themselves in carrying out the policy of the Administration, not only in organizing colored troops, and rendering them efficient, but also in removing prejudice against them." As the servant of a great republic, he left to the departments of Government their specific duties, while he performed his own.

CHAPTER XII.

THE NEW MOVEMENT TOWARDS VICKSBURG.

ROUTES PROPOSED.—WILLIAMS' CANAL.—WHY IT FAILED.—MILLIKEN'S BEND.—LAKE PROVIDENCE.—THE YAZOO PASS.—STEELE'S BAYOU.—PORTER'S ENERGY.—TANGLED COUNTRY.—WHAT NEXT?—TO NEW CARTHAGE, AND BEYOND.—PASSING THE BATTERIES.—FIRST BOATS.—SHEETS OF FIRE.—SECOND LOT.—HARD TIMES.—ACROSS TO BRUINSBURG.—BATTLE OF PORT GIBSON.—ENEMY ROUTED.

STUNG by the failure of his plans, and spurred onward by an irrepressible spirit and unyielding will, Grant now determined to take Vicksburg at every hazard, and at any cost. In the perusal of the following history, it is curious to see his difficulties, his expedients; how, like a lime-hound on its track, he essayed many approaches, until at last he found the true one, or rather, burst through barriers of fire to reach it.

His plan was to move upon Vicksburg from the interior; but how to get a base by which he might do so was the question. The principal routes proposed, and, to a certain extent, prosecuted, were the following: first, Williams' canal, or cut-off; second, the route from Milliken's Bend; third, Lake Providence; fourth, the Yazoo Pass; and fifth, Steele's Bayou. Let us consider these in their order.

WILLIAMS' CANAL.

This cut-off had been located across the peninsula, at right angles, about six miles below Vicksburg. It was about one mile across; and, if it could be made effective, it would isolate Vicksburg, and make a channel for transporting troops and supplies to the new base south of the city, without exposure

to the batteries of the city. It has already been stated that the location was faulty, beginning in an eddy above, and debouching opposite the Big bayou and race-course, exposed to an enfilading fire from the lower batteries.

Immediately after the affair of Arkansas Post, McClelland had been ordered down to Young's Point, and McArthur's division was there on the 20th of January; and that was the destination of the entire Army of the Tennessee, less the garrisons of the towns in rear and Logan's division. A very large naval force, under Admiral Porter, had also rendezvoused there. On the 2d of February, Grant came down to Young's Point in person, and superintended the work on the canal. It was prosecuted with great vigor. The camps of the army were on the west side, and the earth was thrown up on that side, to form a sort of levee for their protection. The river was rising rapidly; but, while it promised a speedy opening, it also threatened danger to the embankments. Indeed it was with difficulty that the fast gathering waters could be kept out of the canal and the camps. It was now the 8th of March, and, between hope and fear, the former predominating, they were toiling on, when suddenly the great river asserted its strength; the mouth of the cut-off gave way with a grand burst; the waters swept through and swept over, carrying away implements and dykes, and flooding the camps, to the extreme discomfort and great danger of the men. The soldiers, seizing their tents and equipments, rushed for the levee: all that part of the peninsula south of the railroad was under water. The first step in the new plan was a failure, and the rebels laughed loud and long at our discomfiture.

Grant was not for a moment disturbed; he had not depended solely upon this: he had other projects for untying the Gordian knot, and was ready in default of all these to cut it with his sword. His army was large, and, in spite of malignant reports, healthy and in good spirits.

MILLIKEN'S BEND.

The engineers had reported to him a practicable route through the bayous which run from near Milliken's Bend, on the north, and New Carthage, on the south, through Roundabout bayou into the Tensas River. This also was tried: dredge-boats were sent forward to clear a passage, and a small steamer, with a few barges, was passing through, when the sudden fall of the river, commencing about the middle of April, put an end to this scheme.

LAKE PROVIDENCE.

While still at work on Williams' cut-off, and as an alternative or an additional route, Lake Providence had engaged Grant's attention, and he had put a large force to work upon it. This lake, situated seventy-five miles from Vicksburg, and just south of the Arkansas State line, is only one mile west of the Mississippi: through this short strip a canal was cut. The lake is six miles long, and is connected by Bayou Baxter with Bayou Macon, a water-channel which opens into the Tensas, and by the Washita and Red rivers into the Mississippi. The route was long and difficult, and the most that could be hoped from it was a means of communication with Banks at Port Hudson. This project served to employ the troops, but it was soon abandoned.

THE YAZOO PASS.

This route promised more than the others, and was most vigorously attempted. Yazoo Pass, eight miles below Helena, is a narrow, tortuous channel, running eastward from the Mississippi into Moon Lake, whence it again issues eastward, with a very snake-like course, until it empties into the Coldwater River, which, at some distance below, empties into the Tallahatchie. It was known that on both the Coldwater and Tallahatchie rivers the rebels were building gunboats and

other craft. At high-water, the Tallahatchie is navigable to Wyatt, far above the mouth of the Coldwater. Grant's plan was to get into the Coldwater with his light-draught boats, and destroy these vessels; and, finding the route more practicable than had been anticipated, he hoped the gunboats would then run down into the Yazoo, and co-operate with a land force in a new assault on Haines' Bluff. His plan was defeated by "the magnificent distances," and the difficulties of the route. Two heavy gunboats, one ram, six light-draught gunboats, and eighteen transports were made ready; and McPherson, with the Seventeenth Corps, and two divisions, one from the Thirteenth and one from the Fifteenth, was in readiness to embark, when the number of transports was found to be inadequate. Only one division could be taken; and while we were moving painfully and slowly with these troops, the rebels, informed of our projects, were as busy as bees blocking the rivers below, the principal fortifications being just above Greenwood, where the Tallahatchie and the Yalabusha unite to form the Yazoo.

One division of McClelland's Corps (Thirteenth), with the Twelfth and Seventeenth regiments Missouri volunteers from Sherman, as sharpshooters, formed the advance of the expedition, under General Ross. With great labor, and after the partial disabling of many of the boats, they succeeded in reaching the Coldwater on the 2d of March. From that point to Fort Pemberton the navigation was much easier, and not much opposed by the enemy. But the fort itself was well posted for defence. Within the angle of junction of the rivers, it was protected by them; and in its front, which extended entirely across, from river to river, the overflowed grounds formed a serious obstacle to attack by a land force. This being at once manifest, the gunboats were directed to endeavor to silence the guns; but, after a grand effort, they were unable to do so. When Quimby, with one division of McPherson's corps, came up to re-enforce Ross, on the 21st of March, and, as senior, to assume command, he found our troops on their return, near Fort Pemberton; and, by order,

withdrew the whole force, arriving at Milliken's Bend on the 23d of March.

STEELE'S BAYOU.

Nothing could exceed the energy of Porter and his fleet at this juncture; and no event of the campaign more strikingly illustrates this than the reconnoissance from the Yazoo below, through Steele's Bayou. Without the aid of a diagram, it is almost impossible to describe its tortuous course. The boats were to proceed up the Yazoo seven miles, to Cypress bayou,—a short opening into Steele's Bayou,—which, after a course of thirty miles, connects, by a short canal called the Little Black Fork, with Deer Creek. After navigating that stream for eighteen miles, there is a connection by the Rolling Fork with the Sunflower River, ten miles distant. This latter stream, after a flow of forty-one miles, empties into the Yazoo, not far above Haines' Bluff, and sixty miles from its mouth. This was a difficult, roundabout, but promising route, navigable throughout for the iron-clads; and it would flank Greenwood, threaten the rear of those who were there holding our troops and boats at a "dead-lock," and turn the flank of the rebel defences at Haines' Bluff. General Grant accompanied Porter on a part of this reconnoissance, and was a witness to its immense difficulties. The country was a wild and tangled thicket; the navigation was impeded by overhanging and interlacing trees, often wedging in the advance boats, and jamming those in rear; smoke-stacks and upper gear were swept away. Dark nights, realizing the "palpable obscure," added to the danger and difficulty, and would have discouraged less unconquerable hearts than those of our gallant navy, whose spirits seemed to rise as the obstacles accumulated and increased. General Grant hastened back to Young's Point, to send up a pioneer force, and one division of Sherman's corps, across from Eagle Bend, to clear the way. But the difficulty before encountered was here again met. While our forces were making slow but sure progress, the

rebels got wind of the movement, and were making ready for us, after the difficult navigation should have been completed. It was, therefore, thought best to abandon the route; and this was done, when we were but a few hundred yards distant from the Yazoo. A quintette of failures; what next?

TO NEW CARTHAGE, AND BEYOND.

Grant now determined to occupy New Carthage, which could be reached by land, even at the present stage of the river, and thus secure a point which should protect the main line of his communication by water. On the 29th of March, McClelland was pushed forward, with the Thirteenth Corps, for this purpose, to be followed by the Fifteenth and Seventeenth, as soon as they could get proper supplies. All went well until, upon the arrival of McClelland's advance at Smith's plantation, only two miles from New Carthage, it was found that the levee of Bayou Vidal had broken away, and that New Carthage was, for the time at least, an island. Surely the Mississippi, with its interlacing, circumjacent waters, was a rebel sympathizer.

The first effort of Grant, in view of this new obstacle, was to improvise boats to transport the troops across; but this was slow work, and so another route was projected: this was by a detour around Bayou Vidal, twelve miles further, making the distance traversed from Milliken's Bend thirty-five miles. The roads were horrible, and besides the passage of the troops over these, ordnance stores and supplies must be taken. The task was herculean, but the will of Grant provided a way.

PASSING THE BATTERIES.

And now we reach one of the most remarkable and brilliant features of the campaign—the running of the Vicksburg batteries by the fleet, with transports and barges—the inauguration of the great siege. The army, as we have seen, could be

marched down the west bank ; but the question was, how to get the transports below for the crossing of the troops, and the gunboats to protect the landings.

On the 16th of April, Porter was ready to make the attempt, which was to be entirely successful. With eight gunboats, all of which but one were iron-clad, and further protected by hay and cotton, he took three transports—the *Forest Queen*, *Henry Clay*, and *Silver Wave*—laden with supplies for the army, and their machinery protected by bales of cotton and hay. The gunboats were to move past in single file, engaging the enemy's batteries, if discovered, with their broadside guns ; while the transports, on the starboard, should try to slip through, under cover of the smoke. It was between ten and eleven o'clock that night as they came around the bend, the *Benton*, Captain Greer, leading. The embattled city slept in silence, apparently ignorant of the approach of the bold armament, which was to throw its boasted invincibility to the winds ; but, while it began to be believed on the fleet that the enemy were, for some ulterior purpose, allowing us to pass unmolested, two sharp and brilliant lines of fire gave the signal, and, in the words of a spectator, "in an instant the whole length of the bluffs was ablaze with fire." Not quite unscathed by all these grand pyrotechnics, the fleet ran the gauntlet, pouring in their broadsides upon the city, from twenty-five heavy guns, charged with grape and shrapnel. In an hour and a quarter the batteries were passed. The *Forest Queen* was disabled by a shot through her drum, but was towed below, and soon repaired. The ill-fated *Henry Clay** was the sole victim of the achievement. Her cotton was set on fire, her men demoralized, and she was abandoned, a blazing wreck, drifting down the river.

The batteries at Warrenton, below, were so intimidated by Porter's fire, that they scarcely responded. Here was a decided smile of Fortune : the fickle goddess was evidently be-

* A passenger steamer of this name was burnt on the Hudson, in 1852, with great loss of life.

coming propitious. Such brilliant success prompted another immediate attempt. Grant ordered six more transports to be made ready—the Tigress, Anglo-Saxon, Cheeseman, Empire City, Horizonia, and Moderator, and in tow of these were twelve barges, laden with forage. These were run by on the night of April 22. The Tigress was sunk by the enemy's shot. In all, five of the boats were damaged, but soon repaired; and one-half the forage on the barges was safely landed. War, even when successful, is an expensive game: this was considered quite a satisfactory result. In both these expeditions, the transports were manned by eager volunteers, who responded in great numbers to every call made for them. And in this connection, General Grant refers to the fact, that willing adepts, in all mechanical arts, could be found in his army, whenever wanted.

Let us now return to the movement of the army. The number of transports for a journey down the river being still inadequate, Grant determined to move his army, by a circuitous route, to Hard Times, on the Louisiana shore, just above Grand Gulf. This would make the distance travelled by the troops seventy miles from Milliken's Bend. At this time, only the Thirteenth Corps, under McClelland, had reached that point, followed by McPherson with the Seventeenth.

The next step to be taken was to cross the Thirteenth Corps over the river in transports and barges. Then, when the navy should silence the batteries of Grand Gulf, McClelland was to storm them. It is well that circumstances changed this programme. Grand Gulf is an exceedingly strong post, on the high bluff of the Mississippi, just south of the entrance of the Big Black River. Its batteries, sweeping the river, were arranged in tiers; and the range of hills was lined with rifle-pits, protected by field-guns.

At eight o'clock on the morning of April 29, the fleet moved to the attack, while a large portion of the Thirteenth Corps were held in readiness to land. General Grant, on a tug in the stream, watched the action, and was greatly impressed

with the extreme gallantry of the navy. They brought their vessels within pistol-shot of the batteries ; and, for five hours and thirty minutes, they rained shot and shell upon them, receiving in return a hail-storm of iron and steel. The lower batteries were silenced, but the upper ones were too high for the guns on the boats ; and at the end of the action, it was developed that they were entirely too strong to be taken by a *coup de main* of the land forces.

THE ADVANCE BY BRUINSBURG.

Once more upon the road ! Grant had learned that from Bruinsburg, on the east bank, a few miles below, there was a good road to Port Gibson ; and if he could reach that point, Grand Gulf must be evacuated. His plan, long hidden in his own counsels, was now manifest to the world ; and the world declared it audacious in the extreme. The authorities at Washington doubted its feasibility : the rebels felt sure that he was placing himself between two fires. Some of his best officers, it is said, protested against it. Grant was true to his own convictions. The force which had been held in readiness to attack Grand Gulf, had the navy silenced its batteries, was disembarked at Hard Times, and marched down the river to a point below Grand Gulf, opposite Bruinsburg ; while the navy and the transports ran the batteries and joined them.

On the 30th of April, from early morning, transports, barges, and gunboats were all in requisition, ferrying McClernand across to Bruinsburg. His corps then started at once, with three days' rations in haversack, so as to reach the highlands, and form line without resistance. The Seventeenth was following as rapidly as possible. General Grant also crossed in person on the same day. The enemy should have resisted the advance fighting in retreat ; but they did not. They were first met, eight miles from Bruinsburg, on the night of the 30th of April, and driven back a considerable distance before the fighting was discontinued. With the early morning

of May 1st, they were met in force, under Major-General Bowen, about four miles from Port Gibson, and thirteen from Bruinsburg. They were strongly posted, where two roads meet,—both, however, leading by detour to the right and left, to Port Gibson—the brigades of Green and Tracey (one thousand and one thousand five hundred strong respectively) holding their front line. Bowen at once sent for re-enforcements, which reached him during the battle. To defeat this rebel force, on both roads, was now the matter in hand.

THE BATTLE OF PORT GIBSON.

The roads upon which the rebels were posted were upon ridges, and there were ravines and very broken country on the sides. It was a position in which a small force could successfully resist a large one. McClelland divided his force, sending the division of Osterhaus to attack on the left; while on the right were those of Hovey, Carr, and Smith. As the action became serious, General Grant appeared upon the ground, directing and superintending the movements. The rebel general was aware how much depended upon a stubborn resistance; while Grant was well aware that to defeat him at this point would force the immediate evacuation of Grand Gulf, and lay open the rear of Vicksburg. On our right, the enemy was steadily pushed back all the day; but Osterhaus, on the left, experienced such a spirited resistance, that he was obliged to wait for re-enforcements. Logan's division, of McPherson's corps, and a portion of the Ninth Division, had now come up; and Grant sent one brigade to McClelland, who had also been calling for re-enforcements, and one to Osterhaus. The result was not long doubtful. Charging with the bayonet, and working their way through the young cane, Osterhaus and his re-enforcements drove the rebels from their strongest position, while our artillery played upon their disastrous retreat. The rebel losses in front of our left were, one hundred and fifty killed, three hundred wounded, and six hun-

dred prisoners. Night put an end to the combat; and our troops bivouacked in the bright moonlight, while the rebels, thoroughly beaten, fled across the Bayou Pierre, destroying the bridges in their flight towards Grand Gulf. These were speedily rebuilt. On the morrow, a new floating-bridge was erected by McPherson, and the enemy pursued on the road to Hankinson's Ferry, across the Big Black.

CHAPTER XIII.

VICKSBURG: THE BATTLES, ASSAULTS, AND SIEGE.

FORTUNE SMILES.—DEFENCES OF VICKSBURG.—GRAND GULF OURS.—SHERMAN'S FEINT ON HAINES' BLUFF.—GRANT'S GRAND TACTICS.—BATTLE OF RAYMOND.—BATTLE OF JACKSON.—JOHNSTON DRIVEN OUT.—WHERE IS PEMBERTON?—AT CHAMPION'S HILL.—BATTLE THERE.—ENEMY DEMORALIZED.—BATTLE OF THE BIG BLACK.—INVESTMENT.—FLEET CO-OPERATES.—TWO ASSAULTS.—BOTH FAIL.

AT length, Fortune, so long a fickle goddess, had smiled upon Grant. Behold him now fairly established on the east bank, and with little to impede his progress to the "high plateau in rear of Vicksburg," which had been his ardent dream ever since the siege of Corinth. It is now time to take a brief survey of that famous citadel. Vicksburg, the "city of a hundred hills," the "heroic city," was ranked by the rebels as the most important point next to Richmond in the entire theatre of war. In peaceful times it was noted as an important depot of the cotton-trade, one of the principal thrones of that monarch which, like the Jupiter of classic mythology, was but to

"Shake his ambrosial curls, and give the nod—
The stamp of Fate, the sanction of a god"—

the great Republic was to totter and fall, and even King Cannon was to cower in impotent silence.

In time of war, Vicksburg was less ironically potential. Perhaps there is no stronger position on the Mississippi. This has been already indicated in the record of the earlier movements. Situated on one side of a very sharp bend or bow in the river, on a high line of bluffs, extending for fifteen

miles from Haines' Bluff, touching the Yazoo on the north, to a point below Warrenton on the south. Its northern river defences are rendered most formidable by the vast triangle, the sides of which are the Mississippi, the Yazoo, and the bluffs, which is filled with interlacing bayous, and streams and swamps. This impracticable northern *terrein* is swept by the fire of the whole line—Haines' Bluff, Drumgool's Bluff, and Walnut Hills—and there is a concentrated fire upon the sharp apex of the bend. It is no abuse of language to say, that on the river-front it is impregnable. Immediately after New Orleans fell, it might have been taken, as we learn from an intercepted letter from one of Jefferson Davis's family. But that matters little: it was not.

On the land-side, it was scarcely less formidable at the time of Grant's approach. Bayou Pierre, with its steep banks, formed an outer line; then came the Big Black, with its tributaries, Big Sandy, Five-mile, Fourteen-mile, and Baker's creeks,—a network of exterior defences of great value to a skilful commander. And when the city was desecrated, the surrounding ridges were crowned with fortifications;—redoubts, bastioned forts; the main fort at the railroad entrance; lunettes, redans, on all the prominent points; detached batteries almost without number, and lines of well-constructed rifle-pits connecting all the parts. The profiles of the rebel forts and batteries were the strongest used in field-works, and of greater dimensions than those by which we approached them. It seemed that nothing but overpowering numbers, secure from all danger of a succoring army, regular approaches, and starvation could reduce this most real of the many rebel Gibaltars. And yet this was the work Grant had appointed for himself and his army. Having found the river impracticable, he would cross all the inland lines, and reduce it. Surely, if he should succeed, he would become immortal!*

* "One of the most extraordinary and audacious games that the enemy had yet attempted in this war. . . . In daring, in celerity of movement, and in the vigor and decision of its steps, it was the most remarkable of the war."—Pollard, *Third Year*, pp. 43, 44.

To defend this important point was the unenviable task of Lieutenant-General John C. Pemberton, who was now, with a force of thirty odd thousand men, about to be rapidly driven into his inner works, only to leave them as a paroled prisoner. It has since been charged against him that he did not lay in proper supplies to stand a siege; and it would appear that for some time he was entirely deceived as to Grant's movements, believing that he was going to re-enforce Rosecrans, and even asking by telegraph whether he should not himself send troops to Tullahoma. But time, which makes all things even, will show that Pemberton, who has been made the scapegoat for the sins of many, did better than his advisers and maligners would have done. If Pemberton was lulled into fatal security, it was the fault of the Confederate Department of War; and that he was not succored by a large army betokens ignorance and impotence, for which he certainly was not responsible.

So, a strong foothold having been now gained, and Grand Gulf evacuated by the enemy, Grant made this point temporarily a new base, abandoning Bruinsburg. He went himself, with a small escort of cavalry, to Grand Gulf, to direct matters, and he was amazed at the great natural strength of the position; but it was designed to resist a river attack, and had but weak defences on the land side. It had been greatly damaged by the fire of our fleet, but the rebels, in their hasty evacuation, had left behind them thirteen heavy guns.

SHERMAN'S FEINT ON HAINES' BLUFF.

When Grant was about to make his landing at Bruinsburg, he had directed Sherman to make a demonstration on Haines' Bluff, for the sole purpose of diverting the enemy's attention, and keeping a considerable number of men in his front to repulse his assault. Sherman's orders were received on the 28th of April, and the false attack was to be made simultaneously with the proposed attack of Grant on Grand Gulf. Sherman says:* "Knowing full well the army could distin-

* Sherman's Speech, May 24, 1865.

guish a feint from a real attack by succeeding events, and assured the country would, in due season, recover from the effect, I made the necessary orders, and embarked."

Proceeding up the Yazoo, on the evening of the 29th, he was at the mouth of the Chickasaw, and the next morning the naval force opened upon the bluffs. Towards evening of the 30th, he disembarked one division in full view of the enemy, as if to prepare to assault, although he knew that there was no road across the submerged field, between the river and the bluff. The feint was eminently successful. The gunboats again opened with spirit. The enemy were seen moving troops and artillery back and forth, evidently expecting a real attack. Similar demonstrations, with reconnoissances on both sides of the Yazoo, were made the next day; and on that evening (May 1), rapidly embarking, he dropped down to Young's Point. The next day his troops were put in motion for Milliken's Bend, and thence to Hard Times, which he reached on the 6th of May.

The main portion of Grant's army having now reached Hankinson's Ferry, across the Big Black, he made a short halt for rest, concentration, and supplies; and for a moment the question was presented to his mind whether he should join Banks, reduce Port Hudson, and then march upon Vicksburg with a force increased by twelve thousand men. But it was not a question long: this would take time, and hours were worth more than men. Rumors were heard in every quarter that the South was rising to save Vicksburg, and that Beauregard, their "Little Napoleon," was coming to make head against Grant. The rebel governor of Mississippi, John J. Pettus, under date of May 5, had issued an inflammatory proclamation to the people, calling every man to arms. In any event, twelve thousand additional men, a month later, would be fewer in reality than his present force at the present time; and so he wisely decided to push forward, and take Vicksburg.

Sherman's corps was now up, having reached him on the 8th of May, and was at once marched forward to Big Sandy.

Grant's design was now to secure his rear by a rapid march on Jackson, the destruction of its public property, which could aid the enemy, and the railroad; and then suddenly marching West, to come upon the devoted city. To deceive the enemy, he moved up the Big Black, by both banks, threatening a direct attack, by way of Hall's and Baldwin's ferries, and he even sent an expedition to within six miles of Warrenton. McPherson was moved to Rocky Springs, on the Hall's Ferry road, and McClermand to Willow Springs. We held the ferries. Sherman was on the right, on both roads. By thus hugging the river, Grant completely deceived the enemy as to his real intentions, which were to push McClermand and Sherman forward to the railroad between Edward's Station and Bolton, while McPherson should move rapidly upon Raymond and Jackson. It was on the 11th of May that he telegraphed to Washington that he should communicate with Grand Gulf no more.

Nothing in the history of the war is more admirable than the grand tactics which now ensued. The general plan was carried out; the details were decided by the movements of the enemy, and the new circumstances arising. McClermand was moved up to Fourteen-mile Creek, nearest the river, having sent one division to Baldwin, still to deceive and frighten the enemy. Sherman, who was at Auburn, on the 11th, marched up to the bridge, across that stream, on the Edward's Station road, on the 12th, and after spirited skirmishing, and the improvising of a crossing, in lieu of the bridge, which the enemy had burned, they crossed and encamped. Grant was with Sherman at this point, seven miles west of Raymond, and there heard of the success of McPherson at Raymond.

THE BATTLE OF RAYMOND.

General McPherson, in pursuance of orders, had marched directly upon Raymond, and was met, two miles south of the town, on Fondreu's Creek, by Gregg's rebel brigade, soon



A. D. W. Sherman



re-enforced by that of W. H. T. Walker. Logan's division came up to these troops at ten o'clock on the 12th of May. The rebel infantry were concealed by the woods bordering the creek, and their artillery, posted on an eminence, swept the field across which our troops must move. The fighting was severe, falling mainly to the share of Logan's first and second brigades; but in two hours and a half it was ended, by the retreat of the enemy, after we had sustained a loss of sixty-nine killed, three hundred and forty-one wounded, and thirty-two missing.

When Grant received notice of the victory at Raymond, Sherman was at once set in motion to join McPherson, and move with him upon Jackson, to which point the enemy had retreated. He must be beaten there, and his stores destroyed without delay, for intelligence has now arrived that General Joseph Johnston is coming with a large force to the aid of Pemberton, and to place Grant between two fires.

The rebel situation is now critical, in spite of such fallacious promises. Pemberton, who should have fought with his entire force at Port Gibson, and who should not have fought at Raymond, had formed an intention of fighting the great battle at Edward's Station. But on the night of the 13th, when our troops reached Clinton, on the railroad, Johnston, who had now reached Jackson, dispatched a courier to urge Pemberton to attack our forces, beat the detachment, and re-establish the communications. More easily said than done. Pemberton moved out irresolutely, struck but a weak blow at Champion's Hill, and so demoralized his troops, that they made but a show of resistance at the crossing of the Big Black.

But we are anticipating. On the 13th, McPherson struck the railroad at Clinton, destroying the track, and capturing important dispatches from Pemberton to Gregg. He then moved upon Jackson. Sherman also moved to Jackson, by the parallel road from Raymond through Mississippi Springs. McClernand was held, as a general reserve, near Raymond.

The movements of Sherman and McPherson were so timed

as that they should attack the enemy together. On the morning of the 14th, they came up to within three miles of Jackson, the rain pouring in torrents, and the roads miry and slippery. By noon, however, it had cleared, but not before our troops were engaged. Before describing the battle, let us observe for a moment, the great care, and yet great promptitude, with which the army was manœuvred. When McPherson and Sherman were coming into line at Jackson, McClermand was moved up to Clinton with one of his divisions; another was at Mississippi Springs; a third was at Raymond; a fourth, with Blair's division of Sherman's corps, was near New Auburn, with the wagon-train; while McArthur, with one brigade of his division of General McPherson's corps was moving up to Raymond, on the Utica road. These were all within supporting distance, and ready for any demonstration of the enemy.

THE BATTLE OF JACKSON.

General Johnston was in command at Jackson, and must be beaten, and driven away before we could invest Vicksburg. Upon the approach of Sherman and McPherson, he came outside the city limits, with a large force, to resist McPherson, who occupied our left, only confronting Sherman with a small number of infantry and artillery, on our right. The ground over which the troops were to move was swept by the fire of the rebel guns, which they opened as soon as we came in sight. But their batteries on our right were soon silenced by the fire of Sherman's guns, and a charge of Mower's brigade of Tuttle's division drove them to their rifle-pits just outside the city. Ignorant of the force in his front, it occurred to Sherman to send a reconnoissance, to find the left flank of the enemy and feel its strength. This was effected by Captain Pitzmann, engineer, with the Ninety-fifth Ohio; and while he was making this detour, Steele's division was closed up. Pitzmann reported the flank weak and exposed, and Sherman at once moved Steele to the right, over the same

ground, while Tuttle was pushed forward on the main road. The enemy did not wait long for our attack, but sought safety in a northward flight, retreating towards Canton. McPherson had thoroughly beaten him on his front, and he thought himself happy in escaping capture. We pursued him until nightfall.

Grant and the two fighting commanders, Sherman and McPherson, now met at the hotel near the State House, in Jackson, for congratulations, council, and new action. Johnston, indeed, was driven away, but he had urgently ordered Pemberton to come out, and "re-establish the communications;" and this, Grant had just learned, Pemberton was endeavoring to do. But he was too late, and all that Grant had to do, thanks to his rapid and skilful combinations, was to face to the rear, march on the dirt-roads to Edward's Station, and do to Pemberton even as he had done to Joseph Johnston. Sherman was left to destroy the arsenals, public works, factories, bridges, etc., very properly including an extensive cotton factory which had been engaged in making clothing for the Confederate army. The convicts, who had been released by their own authorities, fired the penitentiary; and, shameful to relate, there was considerable pillage by some of our soldiers, who, having found some bad rum, could not be restrained by their officers.

McPherson was moved out on the Clinton road, and on the 15th was a mile and a half from Bolton, within supporting distance of Hovey's division of McClernand's corps; while McClernand, with the remaining divisions, was ordered to Edward's Station, but was not to bring on a general engagement, unless he was sure of success. Blair was with him, and Sherman was soon to follow from Jackson.

Every thing now was on the tiptoe of expectancy. Where was Pemberton? at what point would he throw Grant off his track, and open the communications?

At five o'clock on the morning of the 16th, two railroad employees who had passed through Pemberton's army the evening before, were brought to Grant's headquarters, and

informed him that the enemy had marched out from Vicksburg, and was coming to meet him with a force of twenty-five thousand men. It was Johnston's desire that he should move upon Clinton, but Pemberton determined to try and cut off Grant's supplies: but it was too late to do either. This was not unexpected news, but it made definite what was before vague. Grant should need Sherman, at least in support, sooner than he had thought. Without delay, at half-past five, he sent a dispatch to Sherman, to come up at once. Sherman received it at ten minutes past seven, and at eight his advance was in motion for Bolton. Mower's brigade was left behind to parole the prisoners taken, and Jackson was at once evacuated, to be cautiously reoccupied by Johnston, and again taken, after great events should have transpired, by Sherman.

Blair's division was pushed forward towards Edward's Station; McClernand and Osterhaus were directed to move *pari passu* with Blair; McPherson was ordered up to join McClernand. In order to guard against all mistakes, General Grant sent Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, of his staff, to explain the situation to McClernand, and to urge him to come up promptly.

These preliminaries and precautions having been arranged, Grant went in person to the front, and reached Bolton, on the railroad, the terminus of a short railroad line from Raymond. There he found McPherson, with the pioneers, rebuilding the bridge across Baker's Creek, which had been destroyed the night before by the cavalry of Osterhaus's division. This delay in the crossing had blocked the road with wagons and trains, which impeded the advance of the army. Grant in person directed the trains to draw up on both sides of the road, and McPherson's troops passed through and forward.

THE BATTLE OF CHAMPION'S HILLS, OR BAKER'S CREEK.

The position taken by the enemy lay across the road, on the left of which rose a high hill, covered by a dense forest and

undergrowth; and on the right, the timber extended a short distance down the hill, which then opened into cultivated fields; the slope being a gentle one on the right. The first signal of the coming battle was received by Hovey's division, which had moved up the road and in the ravine, and occupied the centre. McClelland, with the divisions of Osterhaus, Carr, Smith, and Blair, was to come up on the left—McPherson on the right.

To oppose this gathering force, the rebel army, commanded by Pemberton, was strongly posted, their batteries being placed in the bend of the creek. Major-General W. W. Loring (who, previous to the rebellion, held a citizen appointment in our army, but who had seen service in the Mounted Rifles, and lost his arm in Mexico) commanded their right; Major-General John Bowen (a graduate of West Point, and an impetuous soldier), the centre; and Brigadier-General Carter L. Stevenson (who had held a citizen appointment in the Fifth United States Infantry), the left.

It was Grant's intention not to fight until he could hear definitely of McClelland's dispositions. Again he sent him an urgent message to push forward, before he would begin the battle; but, when troops are brought in such close contact, it is not easy to postpone a conflict. It began, without McClelland, at eleven o'clock. Hovey's advance in the centre had developed the enemy's skirmish line, and when this was assailed, it was supported by the enemy's masses. A large force was massed upon our left and centre, which were weak. We were there re-enforced, first by one, and then by another, brigade of Crocker's division.

In the mean time, Logan's division, of McPherson's corps, had vigorously attacked Stevenson, on the enemy's left, overpowered and driven him back, and threatened to pass to the rear and capture Pemberton's entire army, especially if the strong simultaneous attack could be made in front. But Hovey's men, out of ammunition, were found falling back, by McPherson's re-enforcements.

The rebel attack on our centre and left had not been without success, but it had been more than counterbalanced by

Logan's successes on our right. Still desiring to beat our left, in accordance with his original purpose, Pemberton ordered Loring to attack with Bowen, detaching, at the same time, two brigades of Bowen to re-enforce Stevenson. Loring refused to attack, and persisted in this refusal, when again urged to move to the aid of Stevenson. Stevenson, re-enforced by Bowen's brigades, fought well. But our fire was terrific; nearly all their artillery horses were killed; and, at five p. m., Stevenson's force gave way in confusion. It was in vain that Pemberton rode upon the field, and told him that he had sent for Loring. But it was too late, even had he come. His troops were retiring in panic; and he had left Ridley's, Corput's, and Johnston's batteries, and a section of Waddell's, on the field, to fall into our hands. The battle was over. Loring, like one demented, drew off his men by a large circuit around Jackson, and without artillery, and joined the troops of Johnston at Canton. Pemberton's army was entirely demoralized, as was plainly demonstrated in the next battle. General Tilghman, of Fort Henry fame, was killed in the retreat; and pursued and pursuers pushed on to the Big Black. McClernand came up just when the battle was over. Only one of the divisions with him—Osterhaus's—met with any serious resistance, although the enemy had deployed so as to confront and delay them. The battle was fought by Hovey, of his corps, and Logan and Quinby, of McPherson's.

Grant was on the field during the battle, and directed the pursuit, for which the troops were thus disposed: Carr, of McClernand's corps, on the left; then McClernand in person: next him came Osterhaus. Carr moved forward with all speed, passing McPherson's fatigued troops, to the Big Black, with orders to cross it if possible.

Sherman, informed of the result, was deflected northward to cross at Bridgeport, taking with him the only ponton train for that purpose; and Blair was ordered to join him.

Although routed at Baker's Creek, Pemberton was determined to make one more effort, before shutting himself up in Vicksburg. It was, however, a very weak one.

THE BATTLE OF THE BIG BLACK.

The pursuit, stopped at nightfall, was resumed with vigor on the morning of the 17th. McClernand was in advance. It was not, however, continued far, the enemy being discovered in force on both sides of the river. The opposite bank, which was steep, was crowned by their guns; while in the flat, cultivated bottom, on this side, by which our troops were advancing, they had arranged admirable defences. About a mile from the river, a bayou and overflowed space formed a wet ditch in front of their position, which was protected by rifle-pits and field-guns. Behind these, in the natural defences thus formed, were posted the brigades of Green, Villepigue, and Cockrell. Besides the railroad-bridge, they had improvised one, just above it, from an old boat, placed at right angles across the stream.

The resolute stand and excellent defences of the rebels promised a vigorous resistance; but, when Lawler's brigade, of Carr's division, which was on our right, after a rapid artillery fire, charged to gain a better position, the enemy fled in terror. Panic-stricken, they fired the bridge, before their troops were across, and the garrison, with seventeen guns, fell into our hands. "All is lost," was the cry of those who succeeded in crossing. It was shameful in the extreme. Pemberton and his staff rode most gallantly over the field, threatening, begging, and swearing; but to no purpose. A soldier, at whom one of the staff presented his pistol, said, "Bigger guns than that, back there!" Staff authority was absolutely gone.

A motley, terror-stricken crowd of fugitives, less like an army than like a flock of frightened sheep, poured into Vicksburg at ten o'clock that night. The aroused citizens, trembling and "whispering with white lips;" women and children, wailing, and flying through the streets, expecting our immediate arrival; the rumbling of guns; the tramp and oaths of the troops; the confused accounts of our terrible advance, form a picture which no pen can describe. The avenger

of blood was upon them, and Vicksburg was no city of refuge.

THE INVESTMENT.

Sherman, who had been sent to Bridgeport, crossed with the pontons on the morning of the 18th, and marched by the common road, driving small parties of the enemy before him, to within three miles and a half of the city. He then turned to the right, to get possession of Walnut Hills and the Yazoo River. McPherson and McClernand built floating-bridges: the former crossing above the road to Jackson, and following Sherman; and the latter crossing below, and marching through Mount Albans, and thus extending the investing line to the south.


Thus Vicksburg was at first invested—Sherman occupying the right of the line, McPherson the centre, and McClernand the left.

Pemberton had immediately reorganized his shattered columns, and posted them in the defences,—Major-General Martin L. Smith on the extreme left, confronting Sherman; Major-General Forney in the centre; and Brigadier-General Stevenson on the right. Bowen was held in reserve.

THE FLEET CO-OPERATES.

On the 18th of May, Porter hearing the firing, which indicated the approach of our army, came over to the Yazoo, to be in readiness to co-operate; and dispatched the De Kalb, Choctaw, Romeo, and Forest Rose—all under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Breese—to open communication with Grant and Sherman. This was handsomely effected in three hours. The De Kalb steamed up, and took possession of Haines' Bluff, which the enemy had begun to evacuate the day before. This was a great point gained. The mere works taken—the armament of fourteen rifled guns, which they left





SIEGE OF VICKS

Engraved for Grant and His G.

Union Works ———
Rebel - - - - -



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
VICKSBURG

MISSISSIPPI RIVER

MAJ GEN. J. B. M^r PHERSON'S 17TH ARMY CORPS

MAJ GEN. SHERMAN'S 1ST ARMY CORPS

MAJ GEN. GRANT'S
HEADQUARTERS
DURING THE SIEGE



TO JACKSON

behind—were nothing: it was that a new route of supplies had been opened! Since leaving Grand Gulf, our troops had been “living upon the country;” now they could get full supplies from Memphis: while the rebels, according to Pemberton, had but sixty days’ rations upon which to sustain the siege. General Johnston bears another testimony to the value of this capture. On the 17th of May, he wrote to Pemberton: “If Haines’ Bluff be untenable, Vicksburg is of no value, and cannot be held. . . . If it is not too late, evacuate Vicksburg and its dependencies, and march to the northeast.”

THE FIRST ASSAULT.

As soon as Grant’s troops had come into position, he determined to take advantage of the demoralized and disordered state of the rebel army, and assault the works at once. His force was not sufficient to make a complete investment; and he was not without concern lest Johnston, largely re-enforced from Bragg, should come to the succor of Pemberton. The assault was ordered for two o’clock on the afternoon of the 19th, and was vigorously made by Sherman’s corps, which was nearest the enemy’s works. The other corps only succeeded in getting good positions, nearer the works, but not so much exposed to the fire. Sherman’s men were moved to the assault at the time appointed; Blair’s division moving on both sides of the road; Tuttle’s division in rear, covering and supporting the movement. The artillery was posted so as to have a cross-fire on the point where the road entered the enemy’s intrenchments. The approach was very difficult, the ground broken, and cut up in deep chasms, filled with standing and fallen timber. The Thirteenth Regulars, Eighty-third Indiana, and One Hundred and Twenty-seventh Illinois, crossed the ditch and gained the exterior slope, but were unable to enter, and under cover of the night, the attack not having proved successful, they were withdrawn. The men needed rest and rations; they had had too much fighting and too little food.

THE SECOND ASSAULT.

Impelled by the same, and additional urgent considerations, General Grant issued his orders on the 21st for a grand assault along the whole line, at ten o'clock A. M. on the 22d. Johnston was at Canton, with the troops which had been driven out of Jackson, largely re-enforced. Grant believed that by making this assault he would take Vicksburg at once, capture its garrison, drive Johnston away, and save great expenditures of men; money, and time.

He informed Admiral Porter of his intentions, and requested him to engage the batteries on the river-front as a diversion. Porter kept six mortars firing during the night of the 21st, on the city, and engaged the batteries on the morning of the 22d, from half-past nine to half-past eleven o'clock.

The preparations for the attack were soon made. The corps commanders set their watches by that of General Grant, and at sharp ten, the storming columns were in motion. Grant stationed himself on a summit in McPherson's front, from which he could see the whole of McPherson's corps, with portions of Sherman's and McClernand's. With no space for details of the assault, we may say that it was most gallantly made at all points, and that the flags of each column were placed upon the exterior slopes of the works in their front.

Sherman placed Blair's division in front, with Tuttle's in support; while Steele was directed to make the attack half a mile to the right. A small number of volunteers carried poles and boards to cross the ditch; and the artillery was posted to concentrate its fire on the position. From the nature of the approaches, comparatively few men could be used, while the enemy could bring to bear a large force, and a terrible fire, under which our men halted, wavered, and fled to cover.

McClernand engaged in an impromptu and rapid correspondence with General Grant on the field. The burden of it was, loud and reiterated calls for re-enforcements and diver-

sionary assaults. He declared that he had taken two forts, and needed assistance to hold them. Grant, whose position was such that he could see better than McClernand, doubting the accuracy of his report, first directed him to re-enforce himself from his reserve divisions; but afterwards, upon his importunity, sent him Quinby's division, and reluctantly ordered Sherman to make a new assault in his favor, which increased the mortality list at least fifty per cent., and gained us nothing.

To epitomize the results of this correspondence, we may say that, on account of it, and a congratulatory order of McClernand's to his corps, which reflected upon Grant and his dispositions, Grant relieved McClernand from his command and gave it to Major-General Ord. It was no time to consider personal feelings; the work must be done vigorously and cheerfully, without controversy, and in the spirit of a willing subordination.

But to return to the assault: like the former one, it was unsuccessful; it had been necessary to make it, in order to develop the strength of the garrison, the nature of its defences, and the character of the operations which must now be made. It was evident that a regular siege must be undertaken, and to do this Grant must have re-enforcements.

CHAPTER XV.

VICKSBURG BESIEGED.

RE-ENFORCEMENTS.—THE COMPLETE INVESTMENT.—THE CONDITION OF VICKSBURG.—THE FIRST MINE.—THE EXPLOSION.—EFFECTS.—WE GAIN A LODGMENT.—THE CANNONADE.—THE SECOND MINE.—PREPARATIONS FOR FINAL ASSAULT.—PEMBERTON'S CHANGE OF OPINION.—FURTHER DELAY USELESS.—IS READY TO SURRENDER.

OF the re-enforcements which reached Grant, Lauman's division, and four regiments from Memphis, with Smith's and Kimball's divisions of the Sixteenth Corps, came up, and were assigned to Major-General Washburne. On the 11th of June, the division of Major-General Herron arrived from the Department of the Missouri. On the 14th, two divisions of the Ninth Corps came up, under command of Major-General Parke.

Grant's army, re-enforced by these troops, was now thus disposed: Sherman occupied the extreme right with the Fifteenth Corps, from the river around to the roads leading to the northeast bastion. Joining his left, McPherson, with the Seventeenth Corps, extended to the railroad from that point. Ord, with the Thirteenth, continued the investment towards the left; which was completed by the divisions of Lauman and Herron, the latter lying across Stout's bayou, and abutting against the bluff at that point, separated by a belt of swamp and timber, not a mile wide, from the river.

Parke's corps, and the divisions of Smith and Kimball, were sent to Haines' Bluff, which had been fortified on the land side to resist any attempt of Johnston in that direction.

A force, under Major-General Sherman, consisting of one division of the Fifteenth and one of the Seventeenth Corps, was also held in readiness, with Lauman's, to move upon Johnston as soon as circumstances should prompt.

The approaches were now conducted with great vigor; and as Pemberton was in no condition to waste his ammunition, the trenches were opened much nearer to the rebel works than is usual. Thus our entire line was inclosing Vicksburg in the "snaky twine" of a "huge typhon." Along the entire front forts, batteries, and rifle-pits were erected; and, by reason of the irregularities of the ground, winding covered ways were constructed, through which our men could pass to and from the extreme works, concealed from the rebel sharpshooters.

The condition of Vicksburg was now pitiable in the extreme. As early as the 27th of May, a courier from Pemberton to Johnston came voluntarily into our lines, and gave to Grant the message he had been directed to deliver to Johnston. It was this: "I have fifteen thousand men in Vicksburg, and rations for thirty days—one meal a day. Come to my aid with an army of thirty thousand men. If you cannot do this within ten days, you had better retreat. Ammunition is almost exhausted, especially percussion-caps." This gave token that Vicksburg must fall; but Grant did not abate the vigor of the siege.

Mines were constructed at several points, particularly in McPherson's front, the excavations being under guard, and the greatest secrecy being observed; so that, although our men knew of a general intention to blow up the enemy's works, few knew where and when this would be done.

General Sherman, upon the receipt of information that General Johnston was again approaching the Big Black with a large force, set out, with the command already mentioned, to drive him back, leaving Steele in temporary command of his division. Grant's order to General Parke, on the 27th of June, indicates the character of the movement:

"GENERAL PARKE—Sherman goes out from here with five brigades, and Osterhaus's division subject to his orders besides. In addition to this, another

division, five thousand strong, is notified to be in readiness to move on notice. In addition to this, I can spare still another division, six thousand strong, if they should be required. We want to whip Johnston, at least fifteen miles off, if possible.

“U. S. GRANT, Major-General.”

Sherman, however, returned without finding Johnston within the prescribed distance, but learnt that he was making desperate efforts to come up in time to relieve Vicksburg.

THE FIRST MINE.

The mine which was now to be exploded was under the parapet of the works occupied by Forney's (rebel) division. A series of zig-zags, covered from the enemy's fire, passed over the distance of three hundred yards to reach the main sap, a trench six feet wide and six feet deep, which was then extended only thirty-five yards, to reach the entrance of the main gallery. This gallery was a square shaft, running with a gradual declivity under the enemy's parapet. From it diverged three short galleries, to the right and left, one being formed in front; these contained the chambers, in which a ton of powder was placed. A sap was also run off to the left of the main gallery, for fifty yards, to hold our sharpshooters.

The enemy's attempts to countermine were only successful in giving our working-party one good scare, from which they soon recovered. Mining is not an easy task; but countermining requires such accurate knowledge of an enemy's plans, localities, and progress, and such nice counter-calculations, as to render it far more difficult.

At length all was in readiness for the first explosion. A messenger reached Grant, at three o'clock, on the 25th of June, announcing that they were ready to apply the match. All troops, except sharpshooters, were withdrawn from the outer works. One hundred picked men of the Forty-fifth Illinois were to assault the right, and one hundred from the Twenty-third Indiana the curtain of the fort. Leggett's bri-

gade formed the reserve of the stormers; Stevenson formed the support, with a strong reserve in rear.

At length the word was given; the match applied to the fuse. The few minutes in which it silently burned seemed hours. The troops, now fully aware of the purpose, stood to their arms in breathless expectancy. The stout hearts of the forlorn hope were summoning up the blood and stiffening the sinews. In their shirt-sleeves, and divested of every thing save muskets and cartridge-boxes, they were ready for the rush. One terrific burst, and the air is filled to the height of one hundred feet with timbers and earth, gabions, stockades, gun-carriages, mingled with smoke and dust—a miniature Vesuvius. Six men of the Forty-third Mississippi, who are in a shaft countermining at the time of the explosion, are buried and lost. This is the signal for the stormers. The two columns fly to their points of attack. Leggett's brigade moves to their support. But the rebels make desperate resistance. The Sixth Missouri regiment attempts to charge: its colonel, Eugene Irvin, is killed at its head. Our other supports are poured in; and at length the flag of the Forty-fifth crowns the summit of Fort Hill, amid cheers that can be heard above all the varied din of the battle.

Simultaneously with the rush of the stormers, Grant had ordered the batteries to open along the whole line. The firing began on McPherson's front; it was taken up by Ord, Lauman, and Herron on the left, and soon joined by Sherman. The ships on the river-front caught and hurled back the echoes, until the classic thunders of Virgil were realized over the whole heaven, and from pole to pole. The nearness of our batteries caused almost every shot to tell. Some shells struck the parapet, others ricocheted, and fell into the lines of troops beyond. It was the grandest cannonade ever heard up to that time in America.

Grant wrote at once to Ord:

GENERAL ORD—McPherson occupies the crater made by the explosion. He will have guns in battery there by morning. He has been hard at work running rifle-pits right, and thinks he will hold all gained. *Keep Smith's divi-*

sion under arms to-night, ready for an emergency. Their services may be required, particularly about daylight. There should be the greatest vigilance along the whole line."

He then pushed the other mines to completion, and began new parallels, to make ready for a final assault, which, however, it was not necessary to make. On the first of July a second mine was sprung on the right of the Jackson road, which resulted in the entire demolition of the redan, the living burial of nine men who were countermining, and the killing and wounding of a large number who were manning the works. The explosion left an immense chasm where the redan had stood. Pemberton was in no condition to sustain an assault: after a fair show of valor, he was open to the dictates of discretion. From the night of his disordered entrance into Vicksburg, after the defeat at the crossing of the Big Black, to the 3d of July, he had been in a sad and helpless condition. The city was constantly bombarded; women and children were living in caves, at the entrance of which some were killed; houses and streets were ploughed by shot and shell; provisions were scarce, and mule meat, bean meal, and corn coffee were in great demand; the stench of dead animals, many of them starved to death, filled the air; and the inevitable "Yankee" was inclosing him so as to leave no loophole of retreat. It is reported, that in a speech made at Vicksburg, after the failure of our assault, he had said:

"You have heard that I was incompetent and a traitor, and that it was my intention to sell Vicksburg. Follow me, and you will see the cost at which I will sell Vicksburg. *When the last pound of beef, bacon, and flour; the last grain of corn; the last cow, and hog, and horse, and dog shall have been consumed, and the last man shall have perished in the trenches, then, and only then, will I sell Vicksburg.*"

But his spirit was now gone; he was ready to surrender. He had given up all hope of Johnston, who, whatever his difficulties may have been, had certainly done less than nothing to aid him, and has since reproached him in unmeasured, but

unjustifiable terms. The eight thousand men sent by Kirby Smith from the Trans-Mississippi army, "had been mismanaged, and had fallen back to Delhi." His men were worn out by duty, exposure, and want of sleep. A small supply he still had, and he might have held the works a few days longer; but we say, advisedly, that he was right to surrender. Whatever his faults, and they were great, and his misfortunes, which equalled them, he was now hopeless and helpless. Delay could do nothing but bring more suffering and loss of life.

CHAPTER XVI.

VICKSBURG FALLS.—“UNVEXED TO THE SEA.”

FLAG OF TRUCE.—PEMBERTON'S REQUEST.—THE INTERVIEW.—TERMS DESCRIBED.—CORRESPONDENCE.—TERMS ACCEPTED.—VICKSBURG SURRENDERS.—FOURTH OF JULY.—REBELLION OUT IN TWO.—ONLY NEEDS SHAKING, TO FALL APART.—GRANT'S TRIUMPHAL ENTRY.—THE MISSISSIPPI “UNVEXED TO THE SEA.”—COMMENTS.

ON Friday morning, the 3d of July, there was an unusual quiet upon all the defences of Vicksburg. The day was intolerably hot indeed, but more scorching suns had not heretofore hindered the fighting work. At eight o'clock in the morning a flag of truce was displayed upon the works in front of General A. J. Smith; it heralded the approach of General Bowen and Colonel Montgomery, with a sealed communication from Pemberton to Grant. The long-hoped-for day had at length arrived: Pemberton proposed the surrender of the city.

We must seek for historic analogies with which to picture to our fancy the overwhelming and unutterable joy of Grant, when he read this communication. But to all appearance he was imperturbable and cool; he gave no sign of the joy he felt.

The letter of General Pemberton proposed the appointment of commissioners, three on each side, to arrange terms for the capitulation; and he added, as a point in the bargain, that he was “fully able to maintain his position for an indefinite period.” Grant's reply demanded “an unconditional surrender of the city and garrison,” and refused the appointment of commissioners, “because he had no other terms” to offer. He had acquired a habit of using this phraseology. To General Bowen's request that he would meet Pemberton on neu-

tral ground, to arrange the matter by personal interview, Grant consented, and appointed three o'clock that afternoon as the time; hostilities, however, continued until noon, when a temporary cessation was ordered, on account of the interview.

At three o'clock a signal-gun from our side, responded to by one from the rebels, announced the approach of the generals. The interview took place in front of McPherson's lines, a spot untrodden by either army during the siege. An immense oak formed a fitting canopy, and under its overspreading branches they met. General Grant was attended by General McPherson and General A. J. Smith; General Pemberton by General Bowen, and his adjutant-general, Colonel Montgomery. After shaking hands, and an introduction of the officers, the following conversation was opened by General Pemberton:

“General Grant, I meet you in order to arrange terms for the capitulation of the city of Vicksburg and its garrison. What terms do you demand?”

“*Unconditional surrender,*” replied General Grant.

“Unconditional surrender?” said Pemberton. “Never, so long as I have a man left me! I will fight rather.”

“*Then, sir, you can continue the defence,*” coolly said General Grant. “*My army has never been in a better condition for the prosecution of the siege.*”*

The appearance of the two men, on this important occasion, was indicative of their characters. The stormy, irascible spirit of Pemberton could hardly be restrained by a sense of the dignity of his position; while Grant, puffing his cigar, was calm as though engaged in a casual colloquy in a sauntering meeting on the road-side.

The generals wandered off to confer privately, and seated themselves upon the grass, and the interview was soon ended with the understanding that Pemberton would submit the matter to a council of war, and send his answer in the morning.

* From Mr. Keim's dispatch to the New York Herald.

The oak-tree has long since disappeared, its trunk having been cut up into walking-sticks and other relics: on the spot where it stood is a beautiful monument, which commemorates the occasion and the surrender.*

On his return, after a conference with his corps and division generals, Grant, taking time by the forelock, sent the following letter to Pemberton the same evening:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF TENNESSEE,
NEAR VICKSBURG, July 8, 1863.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL J. C. PEMBERTON,
Commanding Confederate Forces, Vicksburg, Miss. :

GENERAL—In conformity with the agreement of this afternoon, I will submit the following proposition for the surrender of the city of Vicksburg, public stores, etc. On your accepting the terms proposed, I will march in one division, as a guard, and take possession at eight o'clock to-morrow morning. As soon as paroles can be made out and signed by the officers and men, you will be allowed to march out of our lines, the officers taking with them their regimental clothing, and staff, field, and cavalry officers one horse each. The rank and file will be allowed all their clothing, but no other property.

If these conditions are accepted, any amount of rations you may deem necessary can be taken from the stores you now have, and also the necessary cooking utensils for preparing them; thirty wagons also, counting two two-horse or mule teams as one. You will be allowed to transport such articles as cannot be carried along. The same conditions will be allowed to all sick and wounded officers and privates, as fast as they become able to travel. The paroles for these latter must be signed, however, whilst officers are present authorized to sign the roll of prisoners.

I am, General, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.

* The monument is a pyramid twenty feet high, surmounted with a fifteen-inch globe. On the principal side is a large American eagle, with wide-spread wings, which cover implements of defence; in one claw he holds the laurel, in the other an American shield, and in its beak a pennant, inscribed, "*E Pluribus Unum.*" The eagle sustains on its wings the goddess of liberty. On one side of the monument is inscribed: "To the memory of the surrender of Vicksburg by Lieutenant-General J. C. Pemberton, to Major-General U. S. Grant, U. S. A., on the 3d of July, 1863." See article in August number of the United States Service Magazine, for 1865, "From Cairo to the Delta."

Pemberton lost no time in returning the following answer, which reached Grant early in the morning of July 4 :

HEADQUARTERS, VICKSBURG, July 3, 1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL GRANT,

Commanding United States Forces :

GENERAL—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date, proposing terms for the surrender of this garrison and post. In the main, your terms are accepted ; but in justice both to the honor and spirit of my troops, manifested in the defence of Vicksburg, I have the honor to submit the following amendments, which, if acceded to by you, will perfect the agreement between us. At ten o'clock to-morrow I propose to evacuate the works in and around Vicksburg, and to surrender the city and garrison under my command by *marching out with my colors and arms, and stacking them in front of my present limits*, after which you will take possession ; officers to retain their side-arms and personal property, and the rights and property of citizens to be respected.

I am, General, yours, very respectfully,

J. C. PEMBERTON, Lieutenant-General.

Grant's answer was dictated by magnanimity ; as a soldier, he was willing to allow some show of respect to the officers and men who had borne the horrors of the siege : it was as follows :

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF TENNESSEE,
BEFORE VICKSBURG, July 4, 1863.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL PEMBERTON,

Commanding Forces in Vicksburg :

GENERAL—I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of the 3d of July. The amendments proposed by you cannot be acceded to in full. It will be necessary to furnish every officer and man with a parole, signed by himself, which, with the completion of the rolls of prisoners, will necessarily take some time. Again, I can make no stipulation with regard to the treatment of citizens and their private property. *While I do not propose to cause any of them any undue annoyance or loss, I cannot consent to leave myself under restraint by stipulations.* The property which officers can be allowed to take with them will be as stated in the proposition of last evening—that is, *that officers will be allowed their private baggage and side-arms, and mounted officers one horse each. If you mean by your proposition for each brigade to march to the front of the lines now occupied by it, and stack their arms at ten o'clock A. M., and then return to the inside and remain as prisoners until*

properly paroled, I will make no objection to it. Should no modification be made of your acceptance of my terms by nine o'clock A. M., I shall regard them as having been rejected, and act accordingly. Should these terms be accepted, white flags will be displayed along your lines to prevent such of my troops as may not have been notified from firing on your men.

I am, General, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,

Major-General United States Army.

These terms Pemberton at once accepted. McPherson's corps was immediately placed under arms. The rebel troops marched out and stacked their arms, occupying three hours in so doing, and our troops marched in. General Grant's triumphal entry was in the afternoon of July 4.

THE FOURTH OF JULY.

We had become accustomed, in later years, and before the war, to sneer at Fourth of July celebrations; "buncombe" and "fustian" were the other names for the orations pronounced on that day; but the events of this wonderful year were to consecrate it afresh in the hearts of all true patriots. The shouts of Grant's conquering army were echoed back from equally sonorous voices at Gettysburg, where, after three days of hard fighting, in which the glorious Army of the Potomac had utterly baffled and defeated "an enemy superior in numbers, and flushed with the pride of a successful invasion,"* it rested on the 4th of July, to keep the nation's birthday. Vicksburg and Gettysburg! names which shall forever stand among the decisive battles in the world's history, and mark the great crisis in our country's fate; a new declaration of our independence—a seal of our perpetuity. All honor to the men who achieved them!

It is worthy to be recorded, that when Pemberton was asked his motives for selecting the 4th of July as the day of surrender, he said: "The answer is obvious; I believed that

* Meade's order to his troops.

upon that day I should obtain better terms. Well aware of the vanity of our foes, I knew they would attach vast importance to the entrance, on the 4th of July, into the stronghold of the great river, and that, to gratify their national vanity, they would yield then what could not be extorted from them at any other time.” We like that word *vanity*; it could not be improved, except, perhaps, by terms which can hardly be considered synonymous—*loyalty*, *patriotism*, and *self-respect*.

As to the great importance of the reduction of Vicksburg, we may refer to Sherman's recent statement, that it made the destruction of the rebellion certain, and that the rebels would have abandoned at once a lost cause, had they not been blinded by passion, and lured by false syrens to a greater destruction. Carlyle tells a story of a fabulous Norse warrior who possessed an invisible sword of magic sharpness. It clove his enemy in two, without his feeling the blow, and it was not until he shook himself that he fell apart. Thus Grant, with his magic sword, had cut the great rebellion in twain, but it needed the shaking of a few more campaigns to demonstrate to the rebels, and to the world, that the fatal blow had been given at Vicksburg.

Grant entered Vicksburg in triumph on the afternoon of the 4th, accompanied by Generals McPherson and Logan, and their staffs. He had defeated the enemy in five battles outside of the city, had taken the State capital, and by the capture of Vicksburg he had captured thirty-seven thousand prisoners, including nineteen general officers, and four thousand officers of lower grades. The rebels had lost in battle, from the beginning of the campaign, upwards of ten thousand men, three hundred and one pieces of artillery, and thirty-five thousand small-arms; they had also surrendered a large amount of public property, consisting of railroads, locomotives, cars, steamboats, cotton, and provisions.

But best of all, in the sententious language of Mr. Lincoln, the great river, which had been fretting and fuming under the iron chain of the rebels, now “*went unvexed to the sea.*” On

the 16th of July, the steamboat *Imperial* arrived at New Orleans from St. Louis, the first boat which had gone over that route for more than two years.

On the 28th of the same month she returned to her wharf at St. Louis, amid the welcoming shouts of thousands. Every shout was a tribute to him who had opened the river, and sent its waters forever "unvexed to the sea."

COMMENTS.

In a review of this great campaign, Grant's actions shine so pre-eminently, that an estimate of the biographer, in the way of a summary, is totally unnecessary. He was active, versatile, tenacious of purpose, Napoleonic in his judgment and use of men, with moral courage to assign or remove them according to their merits. And, combined with all these high qualities, he had exhibited remarkable skill in manœuvring large armies in the field; in learning instant lessons from repulses; in conducting an arduous siege; in brushing away a succoring army;—always preserving that equal mind which it is more difficult to keep in the extreme of prosperity than in that of adversity. Undisturbed by his great troubles, he was not puffed up by the great success, but was ready for new labors, and, if God should send them, final successes.

It is no injustice to others to say that his chief supporters were Sherman, McPherson, and Logan. Sherman, like Grant, has achieved such universal reputation, that we need not pause to eulogize him. McPherson here exhibited to the public those qualities which Grant had long known him to possess, and which were to shine with increasing lustre until his lamentable fall in the Georgia campaign. Logan's dashing valor was eminently conspicuous. Having declared that the Western men would hew their way to the Gulf, he was a bright example of the truth of his prediction; ever at his post, and always distinguished for that fearless impetuosity which the world now considers his characteristic.

NOTE.—The sketch of this great campaign would be incomplete without a brief reference to the unparalleled march of Colonel (afterwards General) B. H. Grierson, up to that time the most famous raid on record. Its object was, the destruction of public property and of the railroads, and to make a diversion in favor of the army moving upon Vicksburg. Grierson proposed it, and began his preparations on the 1st of April. His force consisted of the Sixth and Seventh Illinois Cavalry and the Second Iowa, commanded respectively by Colonels Loomis, Price, and Hatch.

Starting from La Grange, he moved upon Ripley. Thence he crossed the Tallahatchie. Detachments to deceive the enemy and destroy the railroads, were sent to the east, north, and even the northwest. From Pontotoc he sent back one hundred and seventy-five men, the least valuable, and one gun, to La Grange. A small detachment was sent to Columbus to destroy the track; and at Starksville he captured a rebel mail of great value. On the 22d he was at Louisville, and he crossed the Memphis Railroad at Newton. His route then lay through Raleigh, where he cut the telegraph wires; across the Leaf River, destroying the bridge across the Pearl; through Gallatin and to Union Courthouse. Thence southward, destroying as he went bridges and track. The rebels were now gathering on his track, to stop his return. But he had no idea of returning. At Oskya, where they tried to stop him, he broke them. Then, by Greensburg and Clinton, he rode into Baton Rouge on the 1st of May! A notable ride; in seventeen days he had travelled eight hundred miles through the heart of the State; given the people a great fright; entirely deceived and eluded the armed enemy; destroyed four millions of property; and so injured the railroads, as to make them incapable for some time of being used to our detriment.

CHAPTER XVII.

FINISHING TOUCHES : CLEARING THE WRECK.

EFFECT OF THE NEWS.—PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO GRANT.—PORT HUDSON WAITS THE FALL OF VICKSBURG—SURRENDERS.—CORRESPONDENCE AND CONDITIONS.—SHERMAN MOVES AGAINST JOHNSTON.—JOHNSTON HOLDS JACKSON.—HIS ORDER.—HE DECAMPS.

EFFECT OF THE NEWS.

WHEN some great fabric, long tottering to its foundations, and upon which the eyes of all men have been fixed, at length surges and falls with a mighty crash, crowds of workmen fly to remove the fragments, to clear the wreck, and prepare for rebuilding. So the fall of Vicksburg, resounding through the country, was the signal for new labors to the heroic Grant and his gallant army. The news, long awaited by the nation, gave rise to scenes of the wildest enthusiasm. The roar of artillery and the ringing of bells, swelled by the chorus of human voices, were heard from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The cry, "Vicksburg has fallen!" carried joy to Washington, and consternation to Richmond. The name of Grant was on every lip, and assurance was made doubly sure that, under God, we now had a commander upon whom the people could rely to lead us to final victory, and a thoroughly successful, honorable, and uncompromising peace.

He was at once appointed to the vacant major-generalship in the regular army, to date from that day, now doubly dear to every true American heart—the Fourth of July, 1863; the day when he entered Vicksburg, the chief of American conquerors.

While straining every nerve in the campaign, he had been

greatly misrepresented at Washington. Partisan politics and private malignity had arrayed themselves against him: to a charge of imbecility had been added that of drunkenness; and it was even said that Adjutant-General Thomas, who had started for the Mississippi in April, had carried with him an order relieving Grant from the command. But now his vindication was complete: it was VICKSBURG! We cannot pause to enumerate his honors. Mr. Lincoln, in the most magnanimous spirit, addressed him the following letter, as honorable to Lincoln as it was just and generous to Grant:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, July 13, 1863.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL GRANT:

MY DEAR GENERAL—I do not remember that you and I ever met personally. I write this now as a grateful acknowledgment for *the almost inestimable service you have done the country*. I wish to say a word further. When you first reached the vicinity of Vicksburg, I thought you should do what you finally did—march the troops across the neck, run the batteries with the transports, and thus go below; and I never had any faith, except a general hope that you knew better than I, that the Yazoo Pass expedition and the like could succeed. When you got below and took Port Gibson, Grand Gulf, and vicinity, I thought you should go down the river and join General Banks; and when you turned northward east of the Big Black, I feared it was a mistake. I now wish to make a personal acknowledgment *that you were right and I was wrong*.

Yours, very truly,

A. LINCOLN.

Congratulations and thanks poured upon him from States, cities, and institutions throughout the country; and even rebel journals for once dropped the Billingsgate with which it was their custom to describe the actions of our "Yankee" commanders, to declare that he had been skilful in his work, and magnanimous in his dealings with the garrison. He was pointed to as the only man to conduct the new and colossal campaigns now opening, of which Chattanooga was to be the base, and from which, in logical sequence, were to follow Sherman's grand gallop through Georgia, his flanking movement in South and North Carolina, and our final successes at and beyond Petersburg. We repeat it, Vicksburg was the key of the war.

Grant arranged affairs at Vicksburg by making McPherson district commander, and Logan post commander. The former general appointed Lieutenant-Colonel James Wilson district provost-marshal; and the latter, Lieutenant-Colonel Waddell post provost-marshal.

PORT HUDSON.

It has been seen that Port Hudson, in the Department of the Gulf, was besieged by General Banks, and held tightly embraced during the siege of Vicksburg; and it was well understood by both armies that when the latter should fall, the other must also surrender. Port Hudson, or Hickey's Landing, is a very strong point, on a sharp bend in the river, twenty-two miles above Baton Rouge. Situated on a commanding bluff, it had been well fortified. Invested on the 21st of May by our army, it had refused to surrender, and defied a first assault on that day. The investing army was commanded, under Banks, by Weitzel, Augur, Grover, and T. W. Sherman. Another assault on the 14th of June was also unsuccessful; and then Banks awaited the fall of Vicksburg.

This was decisive. On the 7th of July, General Frank Gardner, the rebel commander, wrote to Banks to ask if Vicksburg had surrendered; and if so, to propose an armistice for the surrender of Port Hudson. On the 8th, Banks replied, sending him Grant's letter announcing the fall of Vicksburg; and the same day Gardner gave up the works, surrendering five thousand five hundred prisoners, one major-general and one brigadier, twenty heavy guns, thirty-one field-pieces, a quantity of ammunition, and two steamers, one of them of value to us for immediate use. Banks took possession on the 9th.*

* The following is the correspondence :

HEADQUARTERS PORT HUDSON, LOUISIANA, July 7, 1863.

GENERAL—Having received information from your troops that *Vicksburg has been surrendered*, I make this communication to ask you to give me the official assurance whether this is true or not; *and if true, I ask for a cessation*

We do not design to derogate from the effective service of Banks or the gallantry of his army; but Port Hudson fell be-

of hostilities, with a view to the consideration of terms for surrendering this position.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

FRANK GARDNER,

Major-General commanding Confederate States Forces.

To MAJOR-GENERAL BANKS,

Commanding United States Forces near Port Hudson.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,
BEFORE PORT HUDSON, July 8, 1863.

GENERAL—In reply to your communication, dated the 7th instant, by flag of truce received a few moments since, I have the honor to inform you that I received yesterday morning, July 7th, at forty-five minutes past ten o'clock, by the gunboat General Price, an official dispatch from Major-General Ulysses S. Grant, United States Army, whereof the following is a true extract :

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,
NEAR VICKSBURG, July 4, 1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL N. P. BANKS, *Commanding Department of the Gulf*:

GENERAL—The garrison of Vicksburg surrendered this morning. The number of prisoners, as given by the officers, is twenty-seven thousand; field-artillery, one hundred and twenty-eight pieces; and a large number of siege-guns, probably not less than eighty.

Your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.

I regret to say that, under present circumstances, I cannot, consistently with my duty, consent to a cessation of hostilities for the purpose you indicate.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. P. BANKS, Major-General commanding.

To MAJOR-GENERAL FRANK GARDNER,

Commanding Confederate States Forces, Port Hudson.

PORT HUDSON, July 8, 1863.

GENERAL—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date, giving a copy of an official communication from Major-General U. S. Grant, United States Army, *announcing the surrender of the garrison of Vicksburg*.

Having defended this position as long as I deem my duty requires, I am willing to surrender to you, and will appoint a commission of three officers to meet a similar commission appointed by yourself, at nine o'clock this morning, for the purpose of agreeing upon, and drawing up, the terms of surrender; and for

fore the genius of Grant, as much as though it had been a fortification of Vicksburg, as, indeed, in a strictly military view, it was.

SHERMAN'S MOVEMENTS.

We have already mentioned that the army of Johnston, which could never be brought to the attack, was still hovering upon our flank and rear, and had reoccupied Jackson. Grant was now ready to dispose of it. A large force had been placed under the command of Sherman for this purpose, and it had been Grant's intention to launch it upon Johnston within a short time, to be determined by his success at Vicksburg. In ignorance of Pemberton's intention to surrender on the 4th, Grant had been making his arrangements for an

that purpose I ask a cessation of hostilities. Will you please designate a point outside of my breastworks, where the meeting shall be held for this purpose?

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

FRANK GARDNER, commanding Confederate States Forces.

To MAJOR-GENERAL BANKS,
Commanding United States Forces.

General Banks replied at once in the following language :

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES,
BEFORE PORT HUDSON, July 8, 1863.

GENERAL—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date, stating that you are willing to surrender the garrison under your command to the forces under my command, and that you will appoint a commission of three officers to meet a similar commission appointed by me, at nine o'clock this morning, for the purpose of agreeing upon and drawing up the terms of surrender.

In reply, I have the honor to state that I have designated Brigadier-General Charles P. Stone, Colonel Henry W. Birge, and Lieutenant-Colonel Richard B. Irwin, as the officers to meet the commission appointed by you.

They will meet your officers at the hour designated, at a point where the flag of truce was received this morning. I will direct that active hostilities shall entirely cease on my part, until further notice, for the purpose stated.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. P. BANKS, Major-General commanding.

To MAJOR-GENERAL FRANK GARDNER,
Commanding Confederate States Forces, Port Hudson.

assault at all points on the 6th of July, of the success of which he had no doubt; immediately after that, Sherman was to be sent against Johnston. The surrender of the city, two days earlier than he had anticipated, made this at once practicable, provided Sherman's troops and supplies were ready for the movement. That distinguished officer, always ready, reported that he could move at once. Happy the commander who has such lieutenants! Moving, not only with the expeditionary force before mentioned, but taking with it, by Grant's orders, the remainder of the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Corps, he reached Jackson on the 10th, and immediately began the investment, extending his lines in a half-circle from right to left, touching the Pearl River, which flows through the city at both points.*

JOHNSTON'S DISPOSITIONS.

We gather from Johnston's report, that it was his intention to hold the place only until he could draw off his army and remove his stores; but to judge from his defences, we should not have thought so. A strong line of rifle-pits extended along his entire front, protected at intervals by powerful batteries with heavy epaulments, which crossed their fire upon the ground in front. In constructing these batteries more than two thousand cotton bales had been used.

His army was thus posted from right to left: Loring, Walker, French, and Breckinridge. Gist had brought him ten regiments of the "best blood" of the "chivalry," the unconquerable type. He then issued the following order, worthy of the Delphic oracle:

HEADQUARTERS ON THE FIELD, July 9, 1863.

FELLOW-SOLDIERS—An insolent foe, *flushed with hope by his recent success at Vicksburg, confronts you*, threatening the people, whose homes and liberty you

* "General Sherman has Jackson invested from Pearl River on the north to the river on the south. This has cut off many hundred cars from the Confederacy. Sherman says he has forces enough, and feels no apprehension about the result."—*General Grant's dispatch to the general-in-chief July 12.*

are here to protect, with plunder and conquest. Their guns may even now be heard as they advance.

The enemy it is at once the duty and the mission of you, brave men, to chastise and expel from the soil of Mississippi. The commanding general confidently relies on you to sustain his pledge, which he makes in advance, and he will be with you in the good work, even unto the end.

The vice of "straggling" he begs you to shun and to frown on. If needs be, it will be checked by even the most summary remedies.

The telegraph has already announced a glorious victory over the foe, won by your noble comrades of the Virginia army on Federal soil. May he not, with redoubled hopes, count on you, while defending your firesides and household gods, to emulate the proud example of your brothers in the East?

The country expects in this, the great crisis of its destiny, that every man will do his duty.

JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON, General commanding.

A weak invention this, which could neither deceive his enemy nor inspirit his own people; its only merit being that he did not commit himself. Johnston, however, neither fought well nor retreated well. When he was at Canton, Grant had sent Blair to cut off his supplies, by laying the country waste for a distance of fifty miles around, destroying mills, factories, granaries, and crops. On the 13th, Herron, aided by the navy, had captured Yazoo City,* losing the gunboat *Baron de Kalb*, which was exploded by a rebel torpedo in the adventure.†

JOHNSTON DECAMPS.

Sherman, somewhat delayed for want of ammunition, which did not reach him in sufficient supply until the 16th, in-

* "Finding that Yazoo City was being fortified, I sent General Herron there with his division. He captured several hundred prisoners and one steamboat. Five pieces of heavy artillery and all the public stores fell into our hands. The enemy burned three steamboats on the approach of the gunboats."—Grant to Halleck, July 12.

† "Unfortunately, while the *Baron De Kalb* was moving slowly along she ran foul of a torpedo, which exploded and sunk her. There was no sign of any thing of the kind to be seen. While she was going down, another exploded under her stern."—Admiral Porter to Secretary of the Navy, July 14.

trenched himself, and erected counter-batteries. Johnston, taking advantage of a thick fog, made a determined sortie on the 13th, which, after creating some slight confusion, was successfully repulsed. Sherman's works now progressed rapidly, and a general assault would soon have been made, had not Johnston again vindicated his reputation as a hero of retreats, and evacuated the place. He began to do so on the 16th, very quietly; and instead of further attempts "to chastise and repel us from the soil of Mississippi," he led his willing soldiers away by Morton and Meridian from that very soil, upon a march, the terrible concomitants of which were intense heat, want of water, and general discouragement.

Sherman entered the beautiful city again on the 18th. It was now doomed to the horrors of war. Great blocks of houses were burned down. Soldiers were seen ransacking houses. The negroes who had been left behind (the able-bodied ones had been hurried away by their masters) thronged the streets—the infirm, the women, and the children—not knowing whether it was the year of jubilee or the day of wrath which had come. Piles of household stuff, pianos, bedsteads, fancy tables, were dragged into the streets, and fired or scattered about the crossings. Thick smoke, cinders, falling timber, fierce flames, form the *chiaro-oscuro* of a picture which we shall not undertake to describe.

In one of the expeditions to a house near Jackson, were found books and letters belonging to Jefferson Davis,—many of the latter from men of station at the North, and implicating them in the inauguration of the rebellion. We have not time to moralize, but surely at every page we have strong proof of the adage which declares the permanence of the written word, and a declaration that there is many an *irrevocable verbum* besides those that appear in print. If "the pen is mightier than the sword" to create and bless, it is often surely so to destroy.

CHAPTER XVIII.

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION.

EXPEDITIONS IN ALL DIRECTIONS.—THE HAUL AT NATCHEZ.—EXTRA MILITARY QUESTIONS.—THE SUBJECT OF TRADE.—TARIFF OF PRICES ON THE MISSISSIPPI.—HONORS AT MEMPHIS.—REVIEW AT NEW ORLEANS.—SAD ACCIDENT, AND ITS RESULTS.—PARTIAL RECOVERY.—BOARDS OF HONOR.—COMMENTS.

GRANT was now active in the organization of his department ; setting it in order, as it proved, to form one part of the great whole, over which he was soon to exercise an imperial military supremacy. He sent expeditions in every direction, to “spy out the nakedness of the land”—to Canton, Pontotoc, and Grenada. An important one was dispatched under Ransom to Natchez, to put a stop to the crossing of cattle at that point, from the West, for the enemy’s supply. Ransom captured five thousand head, of which Grant sent two thousand to Banks, retaining the rest for his own army.* After a

* “General Ransom was sent to Natchez, to stop the crossing of cattle for the Eastern army. On arrival, he found that large numbers had been driven out of the city to be pastured: also, that munitions of war had recently been crossed over to wait for Kirby Smith. He mounted about two hundred of his men, and sent them in both directions.

“They captured a number of prisoners, and five thousand head of Texas cattle, two thousand head of which were sent to General Banks. The balance have been or will be brought here.

“In Louisiana they captured more prisoners, and a number of teams loaded with ammunition. Over two million rounds of ammunition were brought back to Natchez with the teams captured, and two hundred and sixty-eight thousand rounds, besides artillery ammunition, were destroyed.”—*Grant to Halleck, July 18.*

short rest, he dispatched Steele with Kimball's division to Helena, to render important services to Schofield, then commanding the Department of the Missouri; while Ord and Heron were sent to Banks to take part in the new movements projected in the Department of the Gulf.

Grant's headquarters were temporarily at Vicksburg, but he spent his time in travelling from point to point, to see the condition and needs of his department. And again he had presented to him extra military and perplexing questions, which he settled with great good judgment. The guerrillas who thronged the river-banks were outlawed. Furloughs, which had before been impossible, were now judiciously granted, to "five per centum of the non-commissioned officers and privates of each regiment, battery, independent company, and detachment, for good conduct in their line of duty;" and while these were thus rewarded, stragglers and shirkers were denied furloughs, and were punished by extra duties and fines.

To illustrate at once the condition of the people, and Grant's caution in supplying them, we introduce the following order.

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 46.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,
VICKSBURG, MISSISSIPPI, July 21, 1863.

1. Hereafter no issues of provisions will be made for contrabands, *except those serving in regiments or in contraband camps.*

2. Issues of provisions will not be made to citizens, except on certificates that they are destitute, and have no means of purchasing the necessary supplies for their families. These certificates must state the number of the family, and the time for which they draw, which shall not exceed ten days at any one time.

3. In making issues to citizens, only articles of prime necessity will be given—*i. e.*, bread and meat, and these at the rate of one pound of flour, one half-pound of salt meat, or one pound of fresh beef, to the ration.

By order of

MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT.

JNO. A. RAWLINS, A. A. G.

He also addressed a letter to the Secretary of War, on the subject of trade, in which he declares, from his experience

in West Tennessee, that any trade whatever with the rebellious States weakened us to the extent of thirty-three per cent. of our force; "but," he adds, "no theory of my own will ever stand in the way of my executing, in good faith, any order I may receive from those in authority over me."*

His kind sympathy with good soldiers was indicated at this time by his requiring the captain of a steamer to refund the excess of passage-money which he had charged, thus compelling our brave men who were going on furlough to pay exorbitantly for the trip.

* HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,
VICKSBURG, MISS., July 21, 1863.

SIR—Your letter of the 4th instant to me, inclosing a copy of a letter of same date to Mr. Mellen, special agent of the Treasury, is just received. My assistant adjutant-general, by whom I shall send this letter, is about starting for Washington; hence I shall be very short in my reply.

My experience in West Tennessee has convinced me that any trade whatever with the rebellious States is weakening to us of at least thirty-three per cent. of our force. No matter what the restrictions thrown around trade, if any whatever is allowed, it will be made the means of supplying the enemy with what they want. Restrictions, if lived up to, make trade unprofitable, and hence none but dishonest men go into it. I will venture to say that no honest man has made money in West Tennessee in the last year, while many fortunes have been made there during that time.

The people in the Mississippi Valley are now nearly subjugated. Keep trade out for a few months, and I doubt not but that the work of subjugation will be so complete, that trade can be opened freely with the States of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi; that the people of these States will be more anxious for the enforcement and protection of our laws than the people of the loyal States. They have experienced the misfortune of being without them, and are now in a most happy condition to appreciate their blessings.

No theory of my own will ever stand in the way of my executing, in good faith, any order I may receive from those in authority over me; but my position has given me an opportunity of seeing what would not be known by persons away from the scene of war; and I venture, therefore, to suggest great caution in opening trade with rebels.

I am, Sir, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.

HON. S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the Treasury.

Afterwards, on the 29th of September, the general established an equitable tariff of fares from St. Louis to New Orleans, and intermediate places ; requiring that enlisted men should be allowed to travel in the cabin, when they desired it, at the same rates.

By an order of August 10th, he confirmed the judicious steps before taken on the subject of free people of color, establishing camps for those out of employment, and employing them for Government purposes ; also allowing contracts between citizens and free people of color, for their labor, which were to be registered with the provost-marshals, with bonds to secure the kind treatment of the negroes.

HONORS AT MEMPHIS.

On the 25th of August, General Grant arrived at Memphis. His appearance awakened a wild enthusiasm in that city, so lately a hot-bed of rebellion. A committee of the citizens waited upon him and importuned him to receive the hospitalities of the city, which were accompanied by a series of resolutions. Grant consented, without a speech, and received the citizens at nine that night. After an hour's ovation and handshaking, there was a grand banquet, and the general was toasted as the guest of the city. He refused to respond in a speech. A few words were said by his staff-surgeon, Dr. Hewitt ; and a poem was read, combining his name with that of De Soto, who had discovered the river, and Fulton, who had made it alive with steamers.

This combination of names was not very significant. The discovery of the river was an accident. Chance gave De Soto this historic fame ; and a grave beneath its waters, that no red-man might ever find and exhume his remains. Fulton made his grand experiments elsewhere, and peopled many other rivers with vapping keels.

It was the special glory of Grant, that from the day he moved upon Belmont until Vicksburg fell, he had bent all his energies to this mighty work ; had risen superior to all fail-

ures ; had been called on, again and again, to make new combinations ; and finally, by his conquest, had insured the destruction of the treason, and the speedy return of peace, with all its grand future developments.

In his letter to the committee of the loyal citizens of Memphis, in order that he might not be misunderstood or misconstrued by any of a different temper, he uses this language :

“In accepting this testimonial, which I do at a great sacrifice of my personal feelings, I simply desire to pay a tribute to the first public exhibition in Memphis of loyalty to the Government which I represent in the Department of the Tennessee. I should dislike to refuse, for considerations of personal convenience, to acknowledge anywhere, or in any form, the existence of sentiments which I have so long and so ardently desired to see manifested in this department. The stability of this Government and the unity of this nation depend solely on the cordial support and the earnest loyalty of the people. While, therefore, I thank you sincerely for the kind expressions you have used towards myself, I am profoundly gratified at this public recognition, in the city of Memphis, of the power and authority of the Government of the United States.”

Upon leaving the banqueting table at Memphis, he went directly to the wharf, and took boat for Vicksburg ; and thence proceeded on a tour of relaxation and inspection. He stopped for a few days at Natchez, and on the 2d of September arrived at New Orleans, to visit General Banks, for a short respite and rest after his protracted and arduous labors, and to confer with that officer about future military operations. In the complications of the vast theatre, it had not been yet decided what would be the next field of action ; but the progress of events seemed to point for a time to Mobile.

REVIEW AT NEW ORLEANS.

On the 4th, at Carrolton, a suburb of the Crescent City, a grand review took place, in which Generals Grant and Banks

were flanked by Washburne, Stone, Herron, Thomas, and other generals; and here Grant met, not without emotion, that glorious Thirteenth Corps, which had been with him under McClernand and Ord at Vicksburg, and had afterwards been sent to Banks. Mounted on a magnificent charger, placed at his disposal by General Banks, Grant dashed at a full gallop along the lines, with difficulty followed by his cortege; and at length he drew up under a fine old oak, for the troops to march past. He lifted his hat with something more than formal courtesy, as the torn, soiled, and shot-pierced colors of the Thirteenth were lowered in passing; for, as his eye rested on them, his memory rushed back to the days when, at Belmont, Donelson, Pittsburg Landing, and all the battles around and at Vicksburg, those over whom they waved had been the companions of his fortunes, and, in part, the achievers of his fame.

But the display was attended with a serious mishap. As General Grant was returning to his hotel from the review of the Thirteenth Corps, his horse became frightened by the letting off of steam, with a shrill whistle, by a railroad locomotive, and sprang wildly with such violence against a carriage that was coming in an opposite direction, that both horse and rider were thrown upon the street. The result was a most serious accident. His hip was temporarily paralyzed by the tremendous concussion, and he was for a time quite helpless; nor, indeed, did he recover so as to walk without crutches, or mount his horse without assistance, until after he had reached Chattanooga, near the end of October. There really seemed to be danger that his services would be lost to the country.

The subject of trade was provisionally arranged by a proclamation on the 13th of the month, declaring that unrestricted trade was opened to Cairo, and all towns on the Missouri and Ohio above it; while all places from Cairo to New Orleans were opened to trade, with proper restrictions.

Grant was also very solicitous that all his men should be paid; and as all official papers had, up to this time, been very

loosely made out, he now required, by order, that every man should be provided with a full descriptive list, whenever detached from his company or regiment, in order to enable him to draw his pay.*

The iron frame of Grant, aided by his iron will, conquered the illness incident to his fall in a few weeks; and while still lingering and suffering, he embarked on a steamer to proceed slowly up the river, in accordance with orders from Washington.

The following order will also show his solicitude that the organizations under his command should receive full credit for their gallant actions. This was done to carry out the spirit of General Orders, No. 19, February 22, 1862, from the Adjutant-General's Office.

CIRCULAR.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,
VICKSBURG, Miss., July 12, 1863.

Army corps commanders, and the commanders of detached divisions, with the army in the field, will each, as soon after the reception of this order as practicable, convene a board, to consist of three officers, to determine the battles participated in by the various regiments, batteries, and independent companies of this command; and forward through the usual military channels, to their headquarters, a list of such as are entitled, for gallantry and good conduct, to inscribe upon their banners the names of their actions.

By order of

MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT.

T. S. BOWERS, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

It was incident to this order that there was organized at Vicksburg, for the Seventeenth Corps, a board of honor, consisting of eight principal officers, with McPherson, its famous commander, as advisory member. General Logan

* "Hereafter, no enlisted man will be sent from his company or regiment without such descriptive list as is herein required being furnished to the proper officer in charge; and any neglect to comply with this order will subject the offender to trial by court-martial, and dismissal from the service.

"It will be the duty of all officers of the Inspector General's Department to properly inspect and report any neglect of duty in this particular."—*Grant's General Order*, Vicksburg, September 29.

was president. The duty of this board was to devise and present a medal of honor, both as a reward and as a means of exciting a proper emulation, to all non-commissioned officers and men whose names were forwarded as worthy of this honor. Company commanders sent them up to the colonels, by whom they were forwarded to the brigade commanders, who, in turn, sent them to the President.*

In our democratic fear, lest we should in any way approximate to titles and insignia of nobility, our Government has limited itself to presenting medals of honor only to distinguished generals. We are clearly of the opinion that the establishment of an order, analogous to that of the "Legion of Honor," would accomplish wonders in the military world. We see in the conduct of large organizations, like the one now mentioned, only efforts to supply the want to a partial extent. A grand cross from the President of the United States would be worth all the brevets he could confer. It is not too late to inaugurate such a system, and we hope to see it carried out yet.

* The device on the medals for the Seventeenth Corps was a crescent, with stars at each end, and a suspended shield; and upon the crescent were the words, "Vicksburg, July 4, 1863." We believe that this, or similar systems, were adopted in other corps, but to what extent we do not know.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI—THE DEPARTMENT OF
THE CUMBERLAND.

CHICKAMAUGA.—A GLANCE AT THE TOPOGRAPHY.—THE NEW COMMAND.—THE ARMY
CONCENTRATES.—AT CHATTANOOGA.—A FINE CHANCE OF STARVING.—SMITH'S
STRATAGEM.—HOOKER ADVANCES.—BRAGG'S FATAL ERROR.—SHERMAN MOVES.—
RECONNOISSANCES AND PLANS.

WE must now cast a rapid retrospective glance at the Department and Army of the Cumberland, which had been intrusted to the command of General Rosecrans. He had started from Nashville with a large force, to follow and defeat the enemy under General Bragg, and, if possible, to possess himself of Chattanooga. On the 2d of January, in the murderous battle of Murfreesboro' or Stone River, he had defeated and driven away the rebel army. After a long rest and reorganization at Murfreesboro', he had again moved upon the enemy, and in the battle of Chickamauga, on the 19th and 20th of September, had sustained a partial defeat, but had succeeded in occupying Chattanooga. His right and centre had been driven back; but, thanks to the inspiration of Granger, and the rock-like firmness of Thomas, his left had stood firm, and he had at least succeeded in holding the objective point of the active campaign—a point of none the less value because our people, depressed by the defeat, could not then appreciate it.

A glance at a topographical map will show the importance of Chattanooga. The key of the Tennessee River, which is navigable for steamboats for eight months of the year to that

point, and for smaller vessels all the year, it is the centre of a knot of railroads, and surrounded by mountain ridges, from which five States may be seen. It was, perhaps, the most important strategic position in the rebel States. The Government was very solicitous that, after so much trouble to get it, it should not now be abandoned. The name Chattanooga (Indian for "Hawk's Nest"), indicates its local character. Chattanooga commands the southern entrance into Tennessee. It lies at the mouth of Chattanooga Valley, which is formed by Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, between which Chattanooga Creek or river flows into the Tennessee. Roads run through the valley to Chattanooga, and through the Missionary Ridge there is a gap at Rossville.

Lookout Mountain is very steep and rocky, rising more than two thousand feet in height; the base is wooded, and the ascent by troops apparently impracticable.

The South Chickamauga runs along the eastern slope of Mission Ridge, through McLemore's cove. West of Lookout Mountain is the Lookout Creek and Valley, through which a short and unfinished railroad is constructed to Trenton.

GRANT'S NEW COMMAND.

To effect the purpose of maintaining Chattanooga, and at the same time to give one head to the three separate armies which were to concentrate upon it, and thus to secure a more perfect co-operation than had been possible in the separate commands of Burnside and Rosecrans, General Grant, alike distinguished by his remarkable services and his superior rank, was put in command of the whole.

He was telegraphed by Mr. Stanton to await his arrival at Indianapolis. There they met for the first time, and proceeded together to Louisville, reaching it on the evening of the 18th. Arrived in that city, the secretary handed to Grant the following order, the military significance of which we have already indicated:

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 337.

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, October 16, 1863.

By direction of the President of the United States, the Departments of the Ohio, of the Cumberland, and of the Tennessee, will constitute the Military Division of the Mississippi. Major-General U. S. Grant, United States Army, is placed in command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, with his headquarters in the field.

Major-General W. S. Rosecrans, United States volunteers, is relieved from the command of the Department and Army of the Cumberland. Major-General G. H. Thomas is hereby assigned to that command.

By order of the Secretary of War.

E. D. TOWNSEND, A. A. G.

Among Grant's most remarkable characteristics is his sagacity in the choice of subordinates. It was upon his recommendation that Thomas had been promoted to the command of the Department of the Cumberland, and Sherman to that of the Tennessee.

The following is the order by which Grant assumed his new command. It was the most extensive one ever controlled by one general commanding in the field in America. It comprised three departments, nine States and portions of States, and extended from the Mississippi into the Alleghanies.

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 1.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY, October 18, 1863.

In compliance with General Orders, No. 337, of date, Washington, District of Columbia, October 16, 1863, the undersigned hereby assumes command of the "Military Division of the Mississippi, embracing the Departments of the Ohio, of the Cumberland, and of the Tennessee."

The headquarters of the Military Division of the Mississippi will be in the field, where all reports and returns required by army regulations and existing orders will be made.

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.

The military force comprised the three armies of the Tennessee, the Cumberland, and the Ohio, and a grand division under General Hooker, in itself a large additional army. The department of the Army of the Cumberland was commanded

by General George H. Thomas; that of the Tennessee by General William T. Sherman; and that of the Ohio, temporarily, by General A. E. Burnside, soon to be relieved by General John G. Foster.

The corps commanders were Generals Gordon Granger, Potter, Howard, Slocum, J. M. Palmer, Logan, Hurlbut, McPherson, and Manson; commanding respectively the Fourth, Ninth, Eleventh, Twelfth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, Seventeenth, and Twenty-third corps. In this vast territory, and with this great array of men, Grant was about to try a Napoleonic problem. When that great master of the art of war had sent Moreau to the Rhine, in 1799, he had declared that there were not two men in France capable of commanding a hundred thousand men. Every other general had two enemies,—one in his front, and one in the number of his men. A much larger command, in a very difficult territory, was now about to try the calibre of Grant. Of course it was only a portion of the large force indicated, which was to be with him at Chattanooga; but he had the direction of the entire force.

The rebel armies which he was to encounter, although not perhaps equal to his own, were large and well appointed. There was the great army of Bragg, which, constantly recruited, had become veterans, in fighting into and out of Kentucky; and with it was the corps of Longstreet, from Lee's army in Virginia.

On the 21st of October, Grant was at Stevenson, where he met Generals Hooker and Rosecrans, and from there he sent a telegram in advance to Burnside.

He had already ordered the Fifteenth Corps, except Tuttle's division,* to the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, thence to proceed to Chattanooga; but this becoming known to the rebels, a force, three thousand strong, under Colonel Chalmers, collected upon its path at Colliersville, and came very

* General John E. Smith's division, of the Seventeenth Corps, which was at Helena, *en route* to join Steele, was transferred to the Fifteenth Corps, and marched with it in place of Tuttle's, Steele's exigency having passed.

near taking Sherman and his staff prisoners. After this, crossing the Tennessee, he marched by its northern bank to Chattanooga, to the great discomfiture of the enemy. This was done in accordance with detailed orders of General Grant, sent to Sherman on the 19th of October. Up to that time Sherman had been moving along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, repairing it, and putting it in running order as he advanced, under orders from the general-in-chief; but upon receipt of Grant's orders he abandoned the railroad, crossed the Tennessee, moved by the north bank to Stevenson, and thence to Chattanooga.

AT CHATTANOOGA.

On the 23d of October, General Grant arrived at Chattanooga, and lost not a moment in making a thorough examination into the condition of things. It was bad enough in all conscience. As early as the 19th, he had telegraphed to Thomas to hold Chattanooga at all hazards; and the reply of that thorough soldier had been: "I will hold the town till we starve." Grant now saw for himself that, unless something was done immediately, the chance of starving was admirable; indeed the fearful process was already begun.

The Union army had a strong position, with its flanks resting on the Tennessee River, near the mouth of Chattanooga and Citico creeks. The enemy had encircled this line by taking position on the western slope of a part of Missionary Ridge, across Chattanooga Valley, and on the top and on the northern end of Lookout Mountain. We were thus shut off from all communication with Bridgeport by the left bank; and the river-road on the right bank was infested by his small bands, and by sharp-shooters from the opposite bank.

All supplies had to be sent by a very difficult route over the Anderson road, almost impassable, across Walden's Ridge, from Stevenson, Alabama, a distance of sixty or seventy miles; and the supply trains were shelled from Lookout Mountain, from the very day that Rosecrans had abandoned

it. A season of uninterrupted rains had made the mountain roads very bad, and the low lands almost bottomless; and the destruction of a large wagon-train of supplies, by a rebel raid, had added to the mischief.

The animals were so weak that they could not draw half a load, the wagons were worn out by the wretched roads, the troops were on half-rations, and it was believed would be soon reduced to quarter-rations; the horses and mules ate voraciously feed not provided by the quartermaster's department—viz., wagon-boxes, fence-rails, harness, dry leaves, and woollen blankets. One could fancy that the bones of the artillery horses rattled as they moved; they were only fit for anatomical specimens in a veterinary museum, and they were dying by thousands.

The first thing to be done was to get supplies; otherwise we must evacuate, and retreat was utter ruin.

While Bragg's army had full supplies, it is worthy of notice that Wheeler's cavalry, which was operating in our rear, was unable to accomplish its purpose on account of the bad roads and want of forage. Bragg ordered him to Middle Tennessee, but he declined to go, on this account.

When Hooker was at Stevenson, he had been ordered to move to Bridgeport, on the right bank of the Tennessee, about thirty miles below Chattanooga, and be ready to cross the river, and secure the river and wagon-roads between Bridgeport and Brown's Ferry, immediately below Lookout Mountain.

In company with General Thomas, and General W. F. Smith, chief engineer, General Grant made a reconnoissance of Brown's Ferry, and the ranges of hills lying south of it, and the details of his plan were then arranged. Hooker, upon crossing at Bridgeport to the south side, was to march by the main wagon-road through Whitesides to Wauhatchie. He started on the 26th of October.

Palmer, with the Fourteenth Corps, was ordered to move by the only tolerable road north of the river, to a point on the north bank, opposite Whitesides. Then he was to cross

to the south bank, and follow in Hooker's track, holding and guarding the road in his rear.

A study of General Grant's plans and operations, from the moment of assuming the command in person, will amply repay the military student. Complicated as they at first seem, each little detail had its part in the grand tactics of that brief but immortal campaign; in judgment, skill, celerity, and results, second to none in military history. It was the very poetry of the art.

SMITH'S STRATEGEM.

To aid the movements of Hooker and Palmer, which would have drawn a large rebel force upon them at once, General William F. Smith, the chief engineer, was directed to take a small force of four thousand men, and proceed down the river to Brown's Ferry, on the sharp bend, six miles below Chattanooga, without alarming the enemy. He was then to seize the range of steep hills at the mouth of Lookout Valley, three miles below Lookout Mountain, held by the enemy in small force, and covering the roads to his various camps, by which he could at any moment have brought an overwhelming force to command the river and defeat our plans.

Smith's scheme, if successful, would oblige the rebel detachments between Lookout Creek and Shell Mound to fall back behind the creek, and would permit Hooker to advance. It would also at once open the river up to Brown's Ferry for steamboats, and give a much shorter distance for the wagoning.*

On the night of the 27th of October, General Smith set out on his secret but perilous expedition. Embarking from twelve to eighteen hundred picked men, on sixty ponton-boats, thirty

* I am indebted, in this portion of the narrative, to a very clear and interesting account of the entire campaign, which has also the merit of brevity, to be found in the January number of the United States Service Magazine for 1864. It is by Mr. Preston West, of the United States Coast Survey.

in each, under Brigadier-General Hazen, a young officer of great dash and daring—afterwards the hero of Fort McAllister, in Sherman's great campaign—they were floated down the river, unobserved by three miles of pickets, until they reached Brown's Ferry, six miles by water from Chattanooga. These, landing at two points—at only one of which they were fired upon—seized the pickets, and got possession of the spurs near the river. The remainder of the four thousand, who had marched by the north bank, and who lay in a concealed camp at Brown's Ferry, with the bridge material, were ferried over before daylight, strengthening the first party. At ten o'clock in the morning, the ponton-bridge, nine hundred feet long, was down, and the work accomplished. The points occupied were at once well intrenched; our artillery put in position, playing upon the main road from Chattanooga Valley to Lookout Valley; and the enemy's detachments between Lookout and Shell Mound, finding themselves liable to be cut off, retreated in hot haste behind the creek. The work, projected by General Smith, and executed by him, with the aid of Hazen, had been done in the handsomest manner. There was no delay, no bungling; the programme had been exactly carried out.

HOOKER ADVANCES.

This having been accomplished, the next step was the advance of Hooker. On the same day, the 28th of October, that commander brought his force into Lookout Valley, at Wauhatchie, on the direct road from Bridgeport, through Whitesides, towards Chattanooga. Careful dispositions were made for defending the road in his rear, and also that from Brown's Ferry to Kelly's Ferry, a very important route on his left, nearly parallel to the road by which he moved.

The force he had in hand was composed of Howard's (Eleventh) corps, and Geary's division of Slocum's (Twelfth). The left of Howard was thrown well out towards Brown's Ferry, while Geary was on the extreme right. As has been

indicated, Palmer, with the Fourteenth Corps, followed in Hooker's rear, forming a strong moving base for the entire movement.

And now, in order to appreciate what had been effected, let us again look for a moment at the former condition. Let it be observed that up to this time we had been literally besieged in Chattanooga. It is true that the rebels only confronted us in a concentric line, from river-bank to river-bank. Their force was distributed on both Lookout and Missionary ridges, and in the Chattanooga Valley. One brigade was in observation in Lookout Valley, and his pickets lay along the river-bank to Bridgeport. But we were equally besieged in rear. Starvation within, and the distance of sixty or seventy miles of an impracticable route for the transportation of supplies, constantly watched by the cavalry of the enemy. In this transportation by starved teams, it was calculated that ten thousand animals had perished.

Why not retreat then? The answer is clear. Retreat would have been disastrous in the extreme, and it was only possible without artillery and wagons. The communications were infested by the rebel cavalry and guerrilla parties. And yet, in one week more, it would have been the only horrible alternative.

Now look at the new picture. By the skilful combinations of Grant, and the fine invention of Smith, all was changed. We now held the two excellent parallel roads—the long one from Bridgeport to Brown's Ferry, and the short one from Kelly's to Brown's. The former was but twenty-eight miles long; and by means of the latter, if supplies were taken up the river on boats from Bridgeport to Kelly's, the wagoning was but eight miles. From this time the supplies, although not superabundant, increased so that there was no suffering for man or beast. Chattanooga could be held against all odds.

Bragg's main hope had been to starve us out, or to make us retreat. Now he could only vacantly wonder what Grant meant by taking Lookout Valley. Was it to cover a retreat?

or could he have the audacity to propose the offensive? In any case, he must be defeated at once; because, said a leading rebel paper, "to stay there during the winter would be the ruin of *both* armies." It was manifest that only one would stay, and the other be ruined.

Incident to this condition of things, Mr. Jefferson Davis came down to inspect the situation; and as his visit to Vicksburg had, in point of time at least, heralded its disasters, so now all his glowing words—and he has a trick of oratory—could not disguise to the sagacious officers around him that they could not mend Bragg's broken fortunes. Pemberton, the *enfant terrible* of the Confederate armies, is reported to have given his opinion in language that savored more of strength than righteousness.

The truth is, that although the enemy was fully aware of our condition, and knew that we were seeking a shorter line, he had not been sufficiently vigilant: he had left the weak point guarded by only a single brigade. True, after they were thus surprised, an effort was made to recover their lost ground, but it was too late. Longstreet, one of the boldest and most rapid fighters in the rebel army, made a night attack upon Hooker's extreme right, consisting of Geary's division, which held an untenable position near Wauhatchie, separated by too long a space—a mile and a half—from the remainder of the command. Penetrating into this gap, their attack was intended to cut off and capture Geary. But Howard was rapidly moved to the right—one division after another—to help Geary; and not only was the attack a failure, but the preponderance of Howard's troops enabled him to rout the enemy, and seize the remaining crests lying west of Lookout Creek. Thus were we confirmed in the quiet possession of the roads for which we had striven. His attack had ended in giving us still greater advantages. But great as was this success, it was only the beginning of Grant's work. He did not mean to content himself with holding Chattanooga. The rebel impudence was now to be punished. Bragg's army must not only raise the "siege," but must be made to fly in

confusion. The labor was still herculean, but the hero was not wanting.

Two steamers which had been captured from the enemy, and one which we had hastily built and equipped, at Bridgeport and Kelly's Ferry, were at once put into requisition; supplies were forwarded as rapidly as possible to the latter point, and then brought by wagons, eight miles only, to the town.

BRAGG'S FATAL ERROR.

Knowing that, at an earlier date, Burnside had been ordered to join Rosecrans from Knoxville, Bragg, in the vain hope of cutting him off, and beating him in detail—over-urged too by the clamors of the rebel government and press, that he should open the way for a new invasion of Kentucky—now committed the fatal error of making a detachment in the face of a numerous and vigilant enemy. He detached Longstreet to attack Burnside and take Knoxville. Nothing could have played more completely into Grant's hands. He could not conceal his joy; but it did not hurry him into extravagances.

His first idea was to attack Missionary Ridge without delay, and of this plan he informed Burnside; telling him to hold Knoxville to the last extremity. But a sober second-thought, suggested by that calm prudence which is one of his best characteristics, prompted him to await the arrival of Sherman and his army, and thus by skill and carefulness to leave little to chance. And so, while thus waiting, he spent the time in perfecting his plans, making complete reconnoissances, and getting all things in readiness for his consummate movement. Indeed, he could lose nothing by a delay which had the additional merit of completely deceiving the enemy.

SHERMAN MOVES.

Sherman's (Fifteenth) corps consisted of four divisions—Osterhaus, M. L. Smith, Tuttle, and Ewing. On the 24th of

October, he received a telegram from Grant to put them in motion for Chattanooga.* Pursuant to this, Osterhaus with the First Division, was sent to Vicksburg, and there embarked on steamers for Memphis, to go thence by the Memphis and Charleston Railroad to Chattanooga. Tuttle's division, it will be remembered, was left behind, but that of J. E. Smith, of the Seventeenth, was also taken, with the Second and Fourth, direct to Bridgeport, *en route* for Chattanooga. After varied adventures, they all reached their destination.

Grant again telegraphed to Burnside his new arrangement, and the information that Sherman was then (on the 14th of November) at Bridgeport. He could not send men to Burnside, for they could not then be supplied, the country around being devastated in a large area. The importunities from and in behalf of Knoxville were numerous and urgent. Halleck, the general-in-chief, besought Grant to relieve Burnside, and avert the catastrophe of losing Knoxville and East Tennessee. To none except those on the field, however, could the exact combinations be clearly manifest: it was a piece of grand tactics which could not be written in dispatches or projected on maps. The problem was in Grant's hands, and he alone saw the solution.† Longstreet at *Knoxville* must be neutralized and ruined by Sherman's new re-enforcements at

* HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
CHATTANOOGA, October 24, 1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, *Corinth, Miss.* :

Drop every thing east of Bear Creek, and move with your entire force towards Stevenson, until you receive further orders. The enemy are evidently moving a large force towards Cleveland, and may break through our lines and move on Nashville; in which event, your troops are the only forces at command that could beat them there. With your forces here before the enemy cross the Tennessee, we could turn their flank so as to force them back and save the possibility of a move northward this winter.

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.

† Mr. Dana, the able and energetic Assistant Secretary of War, was with General Grant, and always seemed highly satisfied with both his plans and their execution; indeed, never were such complex plans more judiciously made, and more precisely executed.

Chattanooga. The blow which would scatter *Bragg's force on Mission Ridge*, would pass like an electric shock to the *besiegers of Knoxville*, and send them, disjointed and destitute, to ravage "their own people," until they could join Lee in Virginia. Sending Colonel Wilson of his staff—accompanied by the Assistant Secretary, Mr. Dana—to Knoxville, to explain the situation, Grant hurried forward his plans. In the mean time, Burnside must lure Longstreet on, making a show of fight at Loudon, Lenoir, and Campbell's Station, as he fell back to Knoxville; and then allow himself to be besieged, only holding Knoxville at all hazards.

RECONNOISSANCES AND PLANS.

A careful reconnoissance of the country north of the Tennessee, eastward to the South Chickamauga, and another to the northern end of Mission Ridge, was made under the direction of General William F. Smith. There was a good road from Brown's Ferry, behind Chattanooga, concealed for the most part by hills, so that although the enemy saw the troops moving northward from the ferry, they might well suppose that it was a movement in favor of Knoxville, instead of a direct manœuvre in their front.

Grant's plan took consistency as follows: Sherman, with his own troops and one of Thomas's divisions, was to cross the river from the north bank, just below the mouth of the South Chickamauga, protected by a cross-fire of artillery. Thomas was to co-operate with Sherman thus: The troops in Chattanooga Valley, on his left, were to move directly forward upon the enemy, one division being a movable body for any service that the exigencies of the field might require. The point of attack was the northern end of Mission Ridge, and communication was to be kept open between Thomas and Sherman by the roads on the south bank of the river. Howard's (Eleventh) corps was to be marched to the north bank as a reserve, to co-operate wherever they might be needed. All the troops designed for the grand movement were furnished with two

day's cooked rations in their haversacks, and one hundred rounds of ammunition to the man.

While these arrangements were made for the attack in front, Grant gave special directions to Thomas and Sherman that it was of the greatest importance to send a cavalry force to the right and rear of the enemy to cut the railroad, somewhere between Cleveland and Dalton, and thus to sever Longstreet's southern communications with Bragg. Grant and the enemy were at cross-purposes, evidently: they had manœuvred to cut off Burnside, and he to cut off Longstreet! Which was wise and which foolish, we shall soon see. The rebels have often boasted that they were overpowered by numbers: they were here entirely outgeneralled.

CHAPTER XX.

THE GRAND MOVEMENT BEGUN.

SHERMAN MARCHES.—THOMAS'S ADVANCE.—SHERMAN CROSSES AND TAKES POSITION.—HOOKER CO-OPERATES.—ALL READY ALONG THE LINE.—THE CONFEDERATES.—WAITING FOR HOOKER.—STORMING OF THE RIDGE.—HOOKER ATTACKS.—THE FIGHT ENDED AND PURSUIT BEGUN.—PURSUIT DISCONTINUED.—COMMENTS.

HAVING anticipated, in order to indicate the principal features of the programme, let us now observe with what singular order and exactitude it was carried out.

Sherman's troops marched from Bridgeport by way of Whitesides, crossed the river at Brown's Ferry, moved up the north bank, and were kept concealed from the enemy, and thus reached a point not far from the mouth of the South Chickamauga. One hundred and sixteen ponton-boats had been carried by a concealed road to the mouth of the North Chickamauga. The bridge site had been selected just below the South Chickamauga, where the *terrain* in front formed a good natural *tête-de-pont*, and where the artillery could be advantageously posted. Sherman's force, which had arrived on the 23d of November, now consisted of the Fifteenth Corps, under the command of General Blair; but at the crossing of Brown's Ferry, the division of Osterhaus, having been detained by the breaking of the ponton-bridge, was directed to report to Hooker, and was with that general in the subsequent movements.





W. H. Wood

Geo. H. Thomas
Maj Genl. U.S.A.

1860

THOMAS'S ADVANCE.

Leaving Sherman for a moment, all ready to make his crossing on the 23d, we must now notice the very clever movement of Thomas, which was to play a most important part in the complications of the drama. On the 22d, some deserters from Bragg's army reported that he was falling back. This statement received some confirmation, in the opinion of General Grant, from the following dispatch received by him from Bragg :

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
In the Field, Nov. 20, 1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT,

Commanding United States Forces at Chattanooga :

GENERAL—As there may still be some non-combatants in Chattanooga, I deem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their early withdrawal.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BRAXTON BRAGG, General commanding.

Grant, not quite certain, however, of its meaning, determined to test the question. He directed Thomas to make a grand reconnoissance in his front, with his own Chattanooga troops, and Howard's corps, which had been brought across the river again, for fear of the destruction of the pontons. As events proved, this was a most timely movement: one division of Buckner's corps had already been sent to reinforce Longstreet, and another was just in motion to follow it, but was hastily recalled on account of Thomas's attack. This preponderance might have been fatal to Burnside.

Thomas moved forward on the afternoon of the 23d, in such close and well-ordered lines, that prisoners from the enemy afterwards declared they thought he was preparing for a review and a drill. General Wood's division was in front; General Howard's corps, in reserve; while General Sheridan's division, of the Fourth, and Palmer's (Fourteenth) corps, also stood ready, under arms, to move as might be required.

The heavy guns of Fort Wood were opened upon the enemy's first position, at the moment General Wood began to move.

Grant, with Thomas, Granger, and Howard, stood upon the ramparts of Fort Wood, watching the advance, than which nothing could be more admirable. Moving forward, without wavering for a moment, under a heavy fire, Wood reached the foot of Orchard Knob, a prominent peak, about a mile from Fort Wood. There, without halting, he ordered a charge. The summit was carried; an important point was gained; and an excellent diversion was made in favor of Sherman's coming movement.

On the night of the 23d, a heavy battery was taken to the captured position from Fort Wood, and our lines were strongly intrenched. Sheridan was moved up on the right, in echelon; and Palmer also moved forward his corps in support.

SHERMAN CROSSES AND TAKES POSITION.

We return to Sherman. At one o'clock in the morning of the 24th, concealed by the darkness, three thousand men of Sherman's command were conveyed, by the ponton-boats, from the mouth of the North Chickamauga to the point selected for the bridge. They were safely landed; and by noon of that day two ponton-bridges had been laid—one, one thousand four hundred feet long, over the Tennessee, and one, two hundred feet long, over the South Chickamauga, to open a route for the cavalry. The remainder of his force had been brought down by the captured steamer Dunbar, with a barge in tow; and they immediately threw up two strong lines of rifle-pits, to protect the approach to the bridge. By daylight of the 24th, eight thousand men of his command were on the south side; and the rest of his force, crossing upon the bridge, had reached the north end of Missionary Ridge by three o'clock, at a point near the railroad tunnel, and were soon intrenched. That night he still further fortified his position, rendering it unassailable by the enemy, and making it a strong point of departure for the grand movement which was to take

place the next day. The injunction of General Grant, that the railroad should be destroyed, was obeyed by sending Colonel Long, with a brigade of cavalry taken from Thomas's army. This officer was entirely successful. He moved along the Chattanooga and Cleveland Railroad; burned Tyner's Station; destroyed the depot at Cleveland, and also a valuable gun-cap factory; and captured one hundred wagons and two hundred prisoners.

HOOKER CO-OPERATES.

On the same day, the 24th, Hooker moved, to carry out his part in this great programme, which may be epitomized thus: He was to take Lookout Mountain, cross the Chattanooga Valley to Rossville, and advance upon Missionary Ridge by the Rossville Gap. Howard having been detached, the force with which Hooker moved to effect this was composed of Geary's division, of the Twelfth Corps; a part of Stanley's, of the Fourth; and Osterhaus's, of the Fifteenth.

Climbing the precipitous slope of Lookout on the west, he drove the enemy from his defences on the northern slope, capturing a large number of prisoners. This set the seal to the raising of the blockade. Steamers now ran unmolested all the way from Bridgeport to Chattanooga; and although the Richmond Dispatch disposes of it by saying that Lookout Mountain was evacuated because it was no longer important after the loss of Lookout Valley, it was, in reality, a new defeat for the enemy.

ALL READY ALONG THE LINE.

Tuesday, the 24th, on which these movements were made, was a dark and disagreeable day. Rain and mist contended for the mastery; heavy clouds capped the bold mountain summits, giving a striking natural effect to the battle-clouds around; but a splendid battle-moon—called by General Meigs, in happy quotation, "the traitor's doom"—shone out

at night, and a clearer atmosphere displayed the long line of our camp-fires, marking the position from which our troops were to spring the next day, in glorious triumph, upon the enemy.

It was a sight beyond the power of the painter's art, but which may well inspire the pen of the epic poet. Sherman was on Missionary Ridge, in front of Tunnel Hill, forming the left of our line; Thomas in the centre, at Orchard Knob, and occupying the lines to the right and left; and Hooker was coming up on the right, to take part in the grand charge.

Communications were open between these bodies, from Lookout Mountain to the end of Missionary Ridge;—that between Sherman and Thomas being secured by the Eleventh Corps, under Howard; and that between Thomas and Hooker having been effected by Carlin, with one brigade, who joined Hooker from Chattanooga, not without some resistance from the enemy at the crossing of Chattanooga Creek.

On the night of the 23d, and during a part of the 24th, General Grant's headquarters were at Fort Wood. The rest of the time he was at Orchard Knob or "Indian Hill," from which he saw the embattled hosts spread out before him as in an amphitheatre; or else he was riding along the advanced line, frequently exposed to shot and shell, but so intent upon the successful carrying out of his plans, and the weight of responsibility resting upon him, as to be totally unconscious of the danger. Everywhere he was the impersonation of an untiring, sublime, resistless energy.

On the morning of Wednesday, the 25th of November, Hooker, leaving a small force on Lookout Mountain to hold the position, moved down the western slope into Chattanooga Valley, which had now been abandoned by the enemy. It was evident that the intention of the rebel general was to mass his troops on Sherman's front. Hooker was delayed at the creek for three hours, in building the broken bridge upon which he was to cross, and move by the Rossville road to the ascent of Mission Ridge. In the mean time, an artillery duel took place between Orchard Knob and Missionary Ridge, and

from Wood's redoubt a fierce fire was kept up over the heads of our men. It was now evident that the rebels were concentrating their forces to crush Sherman, whose line lay across the mountain and to the railroad-bridge across Chickamauga Creek, and thus threatened the enemy's stores and the railroad at Chickamauga Station.

Grant and Bragg were now in entirely new relative positions. To the rebel general it was evident that Sherman must be driven away, or retreat was inevitable. It was equally Grant's determination to carry the ridge, and drive Bragg away. To confront the rebel masses now thronging the ridge, Grant was bringing all his forces to attack it. Foiled in his strategy, overreached in his grand tactics, Bragg must now resort to the simplest battle-tactics. It was a great fall; and if he should be beaten even in this, how great the humiliation!

From the position occupied by Sherman's line a valley stretched in front. Then came another hill, intrenched by the enemy, which in turn was commanded by a higher hill, with a plunging fire upon the first. Between these two was a gorge, through which the railroad-tunnel passed, and in which the enemy sheltered his masses of troops until they could be brought into action. The enemy had every advantage of position.

Sherman's troops were thus disposed in line: The brigades of Cockerell, Alexander, and Lightburn held the hill first occupied, as the key-point. Corse's brigade on the narrow ridge formed the right centre, and was to be re-enforced, in moving to the attack, by one regiment from Lightburn. General Morgan L. Smith was to move along the east base of Missionary Ridge, connecting with Corse; while Colonel Loomis, supported by the two reserve brigades of General John E. Smith, moved along the west base.

General Sherman's duty was twofold;—to beat the enemy if possible; and, at all events, to keep him in full force in his front, while an attack should be made in another part of the field. The assault of General Corse was entirely successful; while M. L. Smith and Loomis, by gaining ground on the left

and right, formed an excellent diversion in favor of the assaulting party. Two reserve brigades, which were brought up to re-enforce the attacking column on the right, were exposed to a severe fire in flank in an open field, and fell back in some disorder to the edge of the timber.* No better service was done on that day than that by Sherman in stemming the furious attacks of overwhelming rebel masses, and in his judicious counter-attacks. His whole conduct on that day gives a new application of Burns' homely couplet—

“What's done, we partly may compute,
And partly what's resisted.”

Grant was now occupying a post of observation on Indian Hill or Orchard Knob, from which he could observe the enemy massing heavily against Sherman, and Sherman's gallant resistance and counter-attacks. To re-enforce him, Grant started Baird's division; but learning, before it had proceeded far, that Sherman could dispense with its service, it was withdrawn and posted between Wood and Howard. Still more regiments did the enemy pour upon our left, now firing upon Howard's left and Mathies' brigade.

THE CONFEDERATES.

The rebel army was commanded, under Bragg, by Hardee and Breckinridge. Hardee, holding their right, embraced the divisions of Cleburne, Walker, Cheatham, and Stevenson. Walker's division, owing to the temporary absence of its

* Sherman says in his report: “The movement, seen from Chattanooga, five miles off, gave rise to the report, which even General Meigs had repeated, that we were repulsed on the left. Not so. The real attacking column of General Corse, Colonel Loomis, and General Smith were not repulsed. They engaged in a close struggle all day, persistently, stubbornly, and well. When the two reserve brigades of General John E. Smith fell back as described, the enemy made a show of pursuit, but were caught in flank by the well-directed fire of our brigade on the wooded crest, and hastily sought his cover behind the hill.”

general, was commanded by Gist. Breckinridge, on their left, had his own division, now commanded by General Lewis, and those of Stewart and Hindman, with a portion of Buckner's; a force not equal to our own, but having, in position and possession, far more than a counterbalance for the disparity of numbers.

Among the generals there was not one military head of a superior order. Bragg had the best, but that was neither cool nor capable of rapid combinations. Hardee, next in order, was an educated soldier, who had even been sent by the Government to France to profit by the cavalry training there. But, with no effort of his own, he had been vastly overrated. The tactics called by his name were but an exact translation from the French, which could have been made by almost any second-lieutenant. He was brave and constant, but not equal to any Federal corps commander on that field. Breckinridge had no claims to generalship, as few political generals on either side have had; and Buckner was known as the only general who had the manliness to remain and surrender Fort Donelson, which Floyd should have held. Many writers overestimate the power and talent of their enemy, in order indirectly to exalt their heroes. Conformity with truth compels us to say that the rebels were greatly outgeneralled. Grant's natural gifts were vastly superior to those of Bragg, and Grant's generals found no match in the rebel ranks.

BRAGG'S TACTICAL ERROR.

With a singular fatality, Bragg had now committed, in a tactical form, an error quite as great as that which he had made strategically by detaching Longstreet; an error which Grant had been tempting him to commit.

In strengthening his right, in order to crush Sherman, he had foolishly weakened his centre; and Grant immediately took advantage of it.

As the allied armies at Austerlitz had committed the great fault of uncovering their centre, in order to flank Napoleon's

right, so had Bragg done, to crush Grant's left; and, as the emperor waited until the movement was fairly completed, before he hurled Soult into the gap, thus did Grant stand in readiness to push Thomas and Hooker forward, and break the enemy's line irretrievably. Our troops fought magnificently, but the field was won by tactical superiority.

WAITING FOR HOOKER.

And now all eyes were fixed upon the direction in which Hooker was to approach, for the appearance of the head of his column in the Rossville road was to be the signal for the grand storming. Hooker, as we have seen, was unavoidably detained by the broken bridge across Châttanooga Creek; but no time had been lost in rebuilding it: indeed the Twenty-seventh Missouri, of Osterhaus's division, had run across upon the stringers as soon as they were laid.

At length Hooker approaches. It is now half-past three. Grant, Thomas, and other generals are conferring for a moment, and the result is an order which places the troops in readiness for movement. Twenty minutes to four, and from a battery at which the gunners have been waiting with ill-concealed impatience, the signal-guns agreed upon are fired,—a regular salute, one—two—three—four—five—six!

THE STORMING OF THE RIDGE.

Number six has hardly sounded his brazen note, before the inert mass is instinct with life. The skirmishers of Wood and Sheridan are away, followed by the fiery lines. All the forts and batteries bellow their harsh thunder over the heads of our men. Nothing can impair their ardor. They realize Byron's

"Fiery mass
Of living valor rolling on the foe."

They charge the rifle-pits at the foot of the ridge. On the

left of Wood moves Baird's division, under their gallant leader, while Johnston leads his division in line on the right of Sheridan. They have no orders to go further than the foot of the ridge, but when they see the enemy swarming like bees out of the rifle-pits, and flying before them, they do not stop for orders. They halt but a moment to re-form, and then, in spite of a terrible storm of soughing shot, screaming shell, pattering canister, and whizzing bullets, they dash forward to storm the height. An aid-de-camp follows them, crying out, "Take the ridge, if you can;" but it was an order to sanction what they were already doing.

The lines ascend the hill in many wedge-forms, the advancing colors in the forward angle of each. The artillery, from our positions, fires furiously over the heads of our men. A gun from Orchard Knob, sighted by General Granger in person, explodes a rebel caisson on the ridge. The enemy, in surprise and confusion, fire too high, and do less damage to our men than might have been expected.

It is now evident to the excited beholder that the color-bearers are running a race. The men partake of the enthusiasm, until all are at a white heat. Each regiment strains forward to place its colors first upon the rebel battlements. Let all win. Many regiments have claimed the honor, but those who have the best right to judge, have declared that it is impossible to discover what color-bearer first planted the stars and stripes upon the enemy's works.

Just as the sun is sinking in the west, the great sea of Union soldiers bursts upon the rebel ridge, and the day is ours. To the searcher among military picturesques, there is no more splendid scene than this in any war;—the wild mountain scenery; the crests gilded by the slanting light; the ravines and valleys in shadow; the thunder of battle, the shouts of victory, and the great sun, seeming to pause for a moment, to take in the story which he was to tell as he journeyed to the Western lands, and which the whole world was to learn and never forget.

The rebels throw down their arms by regiments. Our sol-

diers, in their battle-rage, bayonet the cannoneers at their guns. In an instant the guns are turned upon the fleeing foe. Bragg and Breckinridge barely escape capture; their flying horses are seen as Wood and Sheridan ride upon the heights.

HOOKER'S ATTACK.

At the same time that the troops of Granger and Palmer, under Sheridan and Wood, were thus storming the enemy's heights, Hooker's forces came up through the gap on the Rossville road, full upon the left flank of the enemy, while Johnston charged in front; but the rebels were already so demoralized that they offered but a feeble resistance.

A final effort was made by the rebels upon Turchin's brigade of Baird's division; but although most fiercely led by their officers, who seemed to have devoted themselves to death, it was unsuccessful.*

If Bragg had failed as a general, he certainly exerted himself as a soldier to rally and reform his men. He was exposed to a severe fire, and the danger of capture; but he and his staff-officers were the last to leave the ridge.

The captured positions were now scenes of the wildest excitement; shouts and cheers rang out, and echoed from mountain-top to mountain-top, for a distance of six miles; while the stars and stripes fluttered telegraphic signals to each other along the whole line. Among the most distinguished of the generals who led the advance, where all were distinguished, were Wood and Sheridan. "Soldiers," said the former, as he rode along the line of his troops, "you were ordered to take the rebel rifle-pits at the foot of the hill. You

* Pollard says: "We (the rebels) ought to have won the day, especially considering the advantages of our position, by which the ranks of the enemy were exposed to an artillery fire while in the plain, and to an infantry fire when they attempted the ascent of the mountain." And again: "A disgraceful panic ensued; the whole left wing of the Confederates became involved, gave way, and scattered in unmitigated rout. The day was lost, and shamefully lost."

did so ; and then, without orders, you pushed forward, and took all the enemy's works on top. Here is a fine chance for having you all court-martialled ; and I will appear as principal witness against you, unless you promise me one thing, and that is, that you will continue to hold them against all opposition of Bragg, Johnston, Jeff. Davis, and the devil !”

Sheridan's horse was killed under him, and “Little Phil” mounted at once a captured gun, to gain the necessary elevation. He displayed that splendid mixture of coolness and dash which have since made him famous on the final fields of the war.

THE FIGHT ENDED, AND THE PURSUIT BEGUN.

Nightfall put an end to the fighting, and precluded a general pursuit ; but Sheridan pushed on without delay to Mission Mills. By twelve o'clock that night, Bragg had abandoned all his positions on Lookout Mountain, Chattanooga Valley, and Missionary Ridge, and his army was in rapid motion on the road to Ringgold, and thence to Dalton. He left behind him six thousand prisoners, besides stragglers who were picked up for several days afterwards, forty guns, upwards of seven thousand small-arms, and a quantity of ammunition.*

* No Spartan dispatches during the Peloponnesian war could have been more laconic than the terms in which the rival commanders announced the tidings to their respective governments. Grant writes to Halleck (mark the caution and modesty):

“Although the battle lasted from early dawn till dark this evening, *I believe I am not premature in announcing a complete victory over Bragg.*”

“Lookout Mountain-top, all the rifle-pits in Chattanooga Valley, and Missionary Ridge entire have been carried, and are now held by us.

“U. S. GRANT, Major-General.”

Bragg writes to General Cooper, from Chickamauga (mark the *suppressio veri*):

“After several unsuccessful assaults on our lines to-day, the enemy carried the left centre about four o'clock. *The whole left soon gave way in considerable disorder.* The right maintained its ground, and repelled every attack. I am withdrawing all to this point.

“BRAXTON BRAGG.”

Early the next morning, Sherman pursued the enemy by way of Chickamauga Station on the Dalton Railroad; while Hooker and Palmer moved on the Rossville road, to strike the railroad between Grayville and Ringgold. At the latter place Bragg had posted Cleburne in the gorge of the White Oak Ridge, and on the crest of Taylor's Ridge. And here a severe battle ensued. The enemy's forces were concealed until we were within a few paces of his guns, and in consequence we suffered severely. But this was only a Parthian shot, for he was soon driven away to Tunnel Hill, twenty miles from Chattanooga.

Great generals are only amenable to be criticised as to their strategy and tactics, but a special interest attaches to their personality. We are not content to know only their plans and their successes; we desire also to be told of their appearance and personal conduct on the field of war. The emasculated Saxe in his carriage; Napoleon at the bridge of Arcola; Wolfe, already twice wounded, leading the Highlanders to the last assault on the Heights of Abraham, have a peculiar charm for all readers. We are not without a record of Grant's bearing at Chattanooga. One of his staff writes:

"It has been a matter of universal wonder in this army that General Grant himself was not killed, and that no more accidents occurred to his staff; for the general was always in the front (his staff with him, of course), and perfectly heedless of the storm of hissing bullets and screaming shell flying around him. His apparent want of sensibility does not arise from heedlessness, heartlessness, or vain military affectation, but from a sense of the responsibility resting upon him when in battle. When at Ringgold, we rode for half a mile in the face of the enemy, under an incessant fire of cannon and musketry; nor did we ride fast, but upon an ordinary trot; and not once do I believe did it enter the general's mind that he was in danger. I was by his side, and watched him closely. In riding that distance we were going to the front, and I could see that he was studying the positions of the two armies; and,

of course, planning how to defeat the enemy, who was here making a most desperate stand, and was slaughtering our men fearfully."

THE PURSUIT DISCONTINUED.

Davis's division of Sherman's column came up to Ringgold at noon of the same day; and Howard's corps was sent over to Red Clay, to destroy the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton. On the 28th, the Fifteenth Corps effectually destroyed the railroad from a point near Ringgold to the State line; and then Sherman was permitted to send back his train, and make a sweep to the north as far as the Hiawassee. This was the end of the Chattanooga campaign. Had it not been for the necessity of relieving Burnside in Knoxville, Grant would have made an unrelenting pursuit, and utterly destroyed the demoralized army of Bragg; but the two were incompatible. Burnside had declared that his supplies would only last until the 3d of December, and Knoxville could not be abandoned; so Bragg was permitted to save himself by a rapid retreat, burning the railroad behind him as he went.

COMMENTS.

If we look back at this great theatre, and the scenes enacted upon it, we find no military common-places; every feature of it was very striking. It was a battle-field of the Titans, extending for six miles on Missionary Ridge, and five on Lookout Mountain. The movements and combinations were consummately planned and magnificently executed, with clockwork precision. It called forth the encomiums of the best military minds in the world. General Halleck, in a supplementary report, used the following language: "Considering the strength of the rebel position, and the difficulty of storming his intrenchments, the battle of Chattanooga must be regarded as one of *the most remarkable in history*. Not only did the officers and men exhibit great skill and daring in their operations on

the field, but the highest praise is also due to the commanding general, for his admirable dispositions for dislodging the enemy from a position apparently impregnable. Moreover, by turning his right flank, and throwing him back upon Ringgold and Dalton, Sherman's forces were interposed between Bragg and Longstreet, so as to prevent any possibility of their forming a junction."

Quartermaster-General Meigs, who was on the field, bears his testimony thus: "Not so well-directed and well-ordered a battle has taken place during the war."

Upon these hints we speak. The rebellion was again pierced through its centre; the way was opened for Sherman's magnificent campaign; the fall of Savannah, and the capture of Charleston, were foreshadowed; and the end of the rebellion, already a foregone conclusion, was rapidly hurried forward. The "question of time" was nearing its solution.

Other volumes must and will contain the records of the distinguished generals who here served under Grant: Thomas, the embodiment of prudence and rock-like courage; Sherman, of tireless brain, and equally tireless hand; Hooker, who retrieved at Chattanooga the disasters of Chancellorsville; Howard, the best type of the Christian soldier; brave Granger; constant Palmer; gallant Wood, and dashing Sheridan. Romantic pens will never tire of describing the picturesques of the great war in this Switzerland of America. Economists will show how we despoiled the enemy of his largest nitre and coal beds; and thus, by cutting off his resources, crippled his energies. The quick inventive genius of William F. Smith will not be forgotten. Of him General Grant said, in recommending him for promotion, that he "felt under more than ordinary obligations to the masterly manner in which he had discharged his duties;" and General Sherman attributed the ease and timeliness of his crossing the Tennessee to his genius and intelligence. We neglect none: they were all glorious. Nay, more; we cannot help pitying the utter discomfiture of Bragg, while we admire his bravery.

Impartial history will be just to all the acts and the actors,

but above them all will shine, in golden characters, the name of the great commander who, upon the heels of one great conquest, transformed a beleaguered army of starving soldiers into fiery columns of attack, and snatched an immortal victory out of the jaws of disaster and anticipated ruin. That man was GRANT.

We close this chapter with General Meigs' dispatch to the Secretary of War, to which we have already referred :

HEADQUARTERS CHATTANOOGA, November 26, 1863.

EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War* :

SIR—On the 23d instant, at half-past eleven A. M., General Grant ordered a demonstration against Missionary Ridge, to develop the force holding it. The troops marched out, formed in order, and advanced in line of battle as if on parade.

The rebels watched the formation and movement from their picket-lines and rifle-pits, and from the summits of Missionary Ridge, five hundred feet above us, and *thought it was a review and drill, so openly and deliberately, so regular, was it all done.*

The line advanced, preceded by skirmishers, and at two o'clock P. M. reached our picket-lines, and opened a rattling volley upon the rebel pickets, who replied, and ran into their advanced line of rifle-pits. After them went our skirmishers, and into them, along the centre of the line of twenty-five thousand troops which General Thomas had so quickly displayed, until we opened fire. Prisoners assert that they thought the whole movement was a review and general drill, and that it was too late to send to their camps for re-enforcements, and that they were overwhelmed by force of numbers. *It was a surprise in open daylight.*

At three P. M., the important advanced position of Orchard Knob and the lines right and left were in our possession, and arrangements were ordered for holding them during the night.

The next day, at daylight, General Sherman had five thousand men across the Tennessee, and established on its south bank, and commenced the construction of a ponton-bridge about six miles above Chattanooga. The rebel steamer Dunbar was repaired at the right moment, and rendered effective aid in this crossing, carrying over six thousand men.

By nightfall, General Sherman had seized the extremity of Missionary Ridge nearest the river, and was intrenching himself. General Howard, with a brigade, opened communication with him from Chattanooga on the south side of the river. Skirmishing and cannonading continued all day on the left and centre. General Hooker scaled the slopes of Lookout Mountain, and from the valley of Lookout Creek drove the rebels around the point. He captured

some two thousand prisoners, and established himself high up the mountain side, in full view of Chattanooga. This raised the blockade, and now steamers were ordered from Bridgeport to Chattanooga. They had run only to Kelley's Ferry, whence ten miles of hauling over mountain roads, and twice across the Tennessee on ponton-bridges, brought us our supplies.

All night the point of Missionary Ridge on the extreme left, and the side of Lookout Mountain on the extreme right, blazed with the camp-fires of loyal troops.

The day had been one of dense mists and rains, and *much of General Hooker's battle was fought above the clouds*, which concealed him from our view, but from which his musketry was heard.

At nightfall the sky cleared, and the full moon—"the traitor's doom"—shone upon the beautiful scene, until one A. M., when twinkling sparks upon the mountain side showed that picket skirmishing was going on. Then it ceased. A brigade sent from Chattanooga crossed the Chattanooga Creek and opened communication with Hooker.

General Grant's headquarters during the afternoon of the 23d and the day of the 24th were in Wood's redoubt, except when in the course of the day he rode along the advanced line, visiting the headquarters of the several commanders in Chattanooga Valley.

At daylight on the 25th the stars and stripes were descried on the peak of Lookout. The rebels had evacuated the mountain.

Hooker moved to descend the mountain, striking Missionary Ridge at the Rossville Gap, to sweep both sides and its summit.

The rebel troops were seen, as soon as it was light enough, streaming regiments and brigades along the narrow summit of Missionary Ridge, either concentrating on the right to overwhelm Sherman, or marching for the railroad to raise the siege.

They had evacuated the Valley of Chattanooga. Would they abandon that of Chickamauga?

The twenty-pounders and four-and-a-quarter inch rifles of Wood's redoubt opened on Missionary Ridge, which with rifled Parrott's answered, and the cannonade, thus commenced, continued all day. Shot and shell screamed from Orchard Knob to Missionary Ridge, and from Missionary Ridge to Orchard Knob, and from Wood's redoubt, *over the heads of Generals Grant and Thomas and their staffs, who were with us in this favorable position, from whence the whole battle could be seen as in an amphitheatre. The headquarters were under fire all day long.*

Cannonading and musketry were heard from General Sherman, and General Howard marched the Eleventh Corps to join him.

General Thomas sent out skirmishers, who drove in the rebel pickets and chased them into their intrenchments; and at the foot of Missionary Ridge Sherman made an assault against Bragg's right, intrenched on a high knob next to that on which Sherman himself lay fortified. The assault was gallantly made.

Sherman reached the edge of the crest, and held his ground for (it seemed to me) an hour, but was bloodily repulsed by reserves.*

A general advance was ordered, and a strong line of skirmishers followed by a deployed line of battle, some two miles in length. At the signal of leaden shots from headquarters on Orchard Knob, the line moved rapidly and orderly forward. The rebel pickets discharged their muskets and ran into their rifle-pits. Our skirmishers followed on their heels.

The line of battle was not far behind, and we saw the gray rebels swarm out of the ledge line of rifle-pits and over the base of the hill in numbers which surprised us. A few turned and fired their pieces; but the greater number collected into the many roads which cross obliquely up its steep face, and went on to the top.

Some regiments pressed on and swarmed up the steep sides of the ridge, and here and there a color was advanced beyond the lines. The attempt appeared most dangerous; but the advance was supported, and the whole line was ordered to storm the heights, upon which not less than forty pieces of artillery, and no one knew how many muskets, stood ready to slaughter the assailants. With cheers answering to cheers the men swarmed upwards. They gathered to the points least difficult of ascent, and the line was broken. Color after color was planted on the summit, while musket and cannon vomited their thunder upon them.

A well-directed shot from Orchard Knob exploded a rebel caisson on the summit, and the gun was seen being speedily taken to the right, its driver lashing his horses. A party of our soldiers intercepted them, and the gun was captured with cheers.

A fierce musketry fight broke out to the left, where, between Thomas and Sherman, a mile or two of the ridge was still occupied by the rebels.

Bragg left the house in which he had held his headquarters, and rode to the rear as our troops crowded the hill on either side of him.

General Grant proceeded to the summit, and then only did we know its height.

Some of the captured artillery was put into position. Artillerists were sent for to work the guns, and caissons were searched for ammunition.

The rebel log-breastworks were torn to pieces, and carried to the other side of the ridge, and used in forming barricades across.

A strong line of infantry was formed in the rear of Baird's line, and engaged in a musketry contest with the rebels to the left, and a secure lodgment was soon effected.

The other assault, to the right of our centre, gained the summit, and the rebels threw down their arms and fled.

Hooker, coming into favorable position, swept the right of the ridge, and captured many prisoners.

Bragg's remaining troops left early in the night, and *the battle of Chatta-*

* As we have elsewhere stated, General Sherman denies this repulse.

nooga, after days of manœuvring and fighting, was won. The strength of the rebellion in the centre is broken. Burnside is relieved from danger in East Tennessee. Kentucky and Tennessee are rescued. Georgia and the Southeast are threatened in the rear, AND ANOTHER VICTORY IS ADDED TO THE CHAPTER OF "UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER GRANT."

To-night, the estimate of captures is several thousand prisoners, and thirty pieces of artillery.

Our loss, for so great a victory, is not severe.

Bragg is firing the railroad as he retreats towards Dalton. Sherman is in hot pursuit.

To-day I viewed the battle-field, which extends for six miles along Missionary Ridge, and for several miles on Lookout Mountain.

Probably not so well-directed, so well-ordered a battle, has taken place during the war. But one assault was repulsed; but that assault, by calling to that point the rebel reserves, prevented them repulsing any of the others.

A few days since, Bragg sent to General Grant a flag of truce, advising him that it would be prudent to remove any non-combatants who might be still in Chattanooga. No reply has been returned; but the combatants having removed from the vicinity, it is probable that non-combatants can remain without imprudence.

M. C. MEIGS, Quartermaster-General.

CHAPTER XXI.

BURNSIDE AT KNOXVILLE.

HIS ENTRANCE INTO KNOXVILLE—FORTIFIES THE TOWN—ADVANCES TO LURE LONGSTREET ON.—LONGSTREET INVESTS AND ATTACKS—REPULSED.—RE-ENFORCEMENTS FROM GRANT.—SHERMAN COMES UP.—GRANT'S ORDER.—SUMMARY OF LOSSES.

WE must now turn for a moment to Knoxville, besieged by the yet hopeful, but soon to be ill-starred, expedition of Longstreet. This place had been occupied by Burnside as early as the 2d of September, and Burnside was a *locum tenens*, holding over until Foster should relieve him.

On the 16th of August he had moved from Camp Nelson, in Kentucky, on a perilous march for East Tennessee, then held by the rebel General Buckner, whose headquarters were at Knoxville. Avoiding the gaps, which were in the enemy's hands, Burnside marched across the mountains. On the 1st of September he was at Kingston, and on the 2d he entered Knoxville, amid the grateful cheers of the loyal people, who had been writhing under the oppression and cruelty of rebel rule. The enthusiasm was unbounded as the general rode in: he was regarded as a deliverer and a savior. On the 4th, General Shackelford was dispatched northward to Cumberland Gap, which, after a rapid and skilful march, he captured on the 9th.

Knoxville was at once strongly fortified by Burnside; and then, previous to Longstreet's advance, he had moved south-

ward by Grant's orders to Loudon, there to await and retard the rebel approach.

This part of the rebel programme could not have been confided to a more competent officer than Longstreet, but he has since complained that he was sent without proper supplies, and was disappointed in the force with which he was expected to make the siege. The division of Stevenson, which had been sent to Loudon, and which he expected to take with him, was recalled. He still, however, largely outnumbered the small force under Burnside.

At Loudon he was met by Burnside, and arrested in his march; and his cavalry, which he had sent by a detour to try and surprise Knoxville, was met and routed by ours, which had been skilfully posted for the purpose. In obedience to orders, the Federal general retreated slowly towards Knoxville. Again Burnside turned to confront him at Campbell's Station, and having repulsed his attack, withdrew at last within his fortifications at Knoxville. There he was surrounded by Longstreet, on the 17th and 18th of November; and now the fate of Knoxville hung upon the movements at Chattanooga. Nothing was left for Burnside but to hold it to the last. His arrangements were well made. There was a fort on College Hill; one near Summit House; one on the right of the street leading from the square to the depot; two on Temperance Hill; and the heights on the south were fortified. Strong lines of rifle-pits connected the forts.

LONGSTREET ATTACKS.

At length, on the 28th of November, Longstreet having been informed of Bragg's disaster and retreat, and knowing that Burnside would soon be re-enforced, made ready for an assault, which would either give him Knoxville, or—what was far more likely—serve to cover his retreat. The point chosen was Fort Sanders, on the northwest angle of our works, a fort standing just outside the town, and commanding an approach by the river. It was of the strongest profile, the ditch ten

feet deep, and the parapet unusually high. Around it, the thick pine-timber had been slashed, and it is said, a network of wire formed around the stumps, as an entanglement.*

The assault was made in the most determined manner, at daylight on the 29th, by three brigades of McLaws' division, and those of Wolford, Humphreys, Anderson, and Bryant. They moved in three lines; and some of them reached the outer slope, and even attempted to enter by the embrasures. The fort was occupied by the Seventy-ninth New York, the Twenty-ninth Massachusetts, two companies of the Second New York, and one of the Twentieth Michigan. Their guns were double-shotted. Hand-grenades were poured upon the enemy. His assault was also clearly discerned by the novel use of Roman candles, in default of a Drummond light.† The fighting was more desperate than any known in the war. But the rebel efforts were vain; and when they were finally repulsed, their dead and wounded lay in piles ten feet deep in the ditch. A gallant assault, most gallantly repulsed; and the failure left no course for Longstreet but instant retreat. This, of course, had been his alternative, and he put it in practice without delay.

RE-ENFORCEMENTS FROM GRANT.

On the evening of November 25, as soon as Grant's success at Chattanooga had been assured, he had directed Gordon Granger to move with his own (Fourth) corps, and detachments from others—twenty thousand in all—to the relief of Knoxville; and Sherman's march to the railroad crossing of the Hiawassee was intended to protect Granger's flank until he had crossed, and to prevent further re-enforcements of the enemy from being sent by that route into East Tennessee. Granger was to move with four days' rations, a steamer follow-

* Pollard, *Third Year of the War*, p. 162.

† For the curious application of these signal-lights, by Lieutenant Herzog, of the Signal Corps, see an article in the October number (1865) of the *United States Service Magazine*.

ing with more supplies. Elliot had also been ordered to Knoxville, from Alexandria, with his cavalry division.

To Grant's astonishment, on his return from the front, on the 28th, he found that Granger had not started, and that he was preparing to move "with reluctance and complaint." As no investigation has been made, we are not "wise above what is written," but simply quote the words of Grant's report.

Sherman, ever ready, was at once directed to assume command of Granger's corps as well as his own troops, and proceed to Knoxville without delay. Sherman was then at Calhoun, at the railroad crossing of the Hiawasse. The relief was confided to the ablest hands. It was a toilsome march; but Sherman was never tired, and always full of alacrity.

SHERMAN ENTERS KNOXVILLE.

On the 3d of December, the day upon which Burnside had declared that his supplies would give out, Sherman's cavalry entered Knoxville. The flank of Longstreet was thus turned, and although the siege had been already raised, Longstreet's movements were greatly expedited. The rebel general retired hastily to Russelville and Rogersville. Sherman conferred with Burnside as to the necessary strength of a pursuing force. It was decided that the garrison, augmented by Granger's corps, would be sufficient, and that the other forces might be at once withdrawn. Burnside, in a letter dated December 7, expressed his "heartly thanks and gratitude" to Sherman and his command, whose approach, he declared, "served to raise the siege." Leaving Granger's corps behind, Sherman then took his own command back to Chattanooga. After all these events had transpired, Grant issued an order of congratulation, which we give in full, as indicating his sentiments, and as a specimen of his clear and excellent style:

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 9.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
In the Field, Chattanooga, Tenn., Dec. 10, 1863.

The general commanding takes this opportunity of returning his sincere thanks and congratulations to the brave Armies of the Cumberland, the Ohio.

the Tennessee, and their comrades from the Potomac, for the recent splendid and decisive successes achieved over the enemy. In a short time, you have recovered from him the control of the Tennessee River from Bridgeport to Knoxville. You dislodged him from his great stronghold upon Lookout Mountain; drove him from Chattanooga Valley; wrested from his determined grasp the possession of Missionary Ridge; repelled, with heavy loss to him, his repeated assaults upon Knoxville, forcing him to raise the siege there; driving him at all points, utterly routed and discomfited, beyond the limits of the State. By your noble heroism and determined courage, you have most effectually defeated the plans of the enemy for regaining possession of the States of Kentucky and Tennessee. You have secured positions from which no rebellious power can drive or dislodge you. For all this, the general commanding thanks you, collectively and individually. The loyal people of the United States thank and bless you. Their hopes and prayers for your success against this unholy rebellion are with you daily. Their faith in you will not be in vain. Their hopes will not be blasted. Their prayers to Almighty God will be answered. You will yet go to other fields of strife; and with the invincible bravery and unflinching loyalty to justice and right which have characterized you in the past, you will prove that no enemy can withstand you, and that no defences, however formidable, can check your onward march.

By order of

MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT.

T. S. BOWERS, A. A. G.

In a summary of the entire campaign, General Grant states our losses to have been seven hundred and fifty-seven killed; four thousand five hundred and twenty-nine wounded; and three hundred and thirty missing. The captures have been already stated.

The failure at Chattanooga cost General Bragg his command. He was relieved, "at his own request," on the 2d of December, and the conduct of the army given to Hardee, who knew his own unfitness, and would only accept it temporarily. Grant expressed his satisfaction with the change: it made his task the easier. A few words will enable us to take leave of Bragg. He was "charged," very vaguely, "with the conduct of the military operations of the armies of the Confederacy,"—which means every thing, or nothing,—and turned up at the last as commander in North Carolina, when Fort Fisher fell.

CHAPTER XXII.

GREAT JOY IN THE LAND.

THE PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION.—PUBLIC HONORS.—THE GOLD MEDAL.—A LIEUTENANT-GENERAL PROPOSED.—SOCIETIES.—NAMESAKES.—NEW LABORS.—VISITS CUMBERLAND GAP.—AT NASHVILLE.—TO CHATTANOOGA.—VISITS ST. LOUIS.—THE BANQUET.—THANKS OF THE CITY.

THE news of the great victory at Chattanooga, followed by the intelligence of the signal defeat of Longstreet, carried great rejoicing into the loyal States. Again there were illuminations and salutes. The faith of the wavering was confirmed; patriot hearts were reassured; the people of the South began to lose hope of the issue; and the cause of the rebellion fell rapidly in the opinion of political speculators, both at home and abroad. The President of the United States, with a devout heart, issued, on the 7th of December, a proclamation, recommending to all loyal people to assemble in their places of worship, and thank God "for this great advancement to the national cause."

He also sent another of his sententious and expressive dispatches to Grant, who embodied it in orders, and caused it to be read by the adjutants to all the regiments in his army. It was as follows:

WASHINGTON, December 8, 1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL GRANT:

Understanding that your lodgment at Chattanooga and Knoxville is now secure, I wish to tender you, and all under your command, my more than thanks—my profoundest gratitude—for the skill, courage, and perseverance with which you and they, over so great difficulties, have effected that important object. God bless you all!

A. LINCOLN.

PUBLIC HONORS.

The Congress of the United States, which was just beginning its session, was not slow in expressing its appreciation of his distinguished services. A joint resolution, introduced into the lower house by his friend, Mr. Washburne, of Illinois, expressed the thanks of the Congress, and presented him a gold medal. It was put upon the military record by a general order of the War Department, dated December 21, 1863, and is couched in the following words :

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 398.

JOINT RESOLUTION of thanks to Major-General Ulysses S. Grant and the officers and soldiers who have fought under his command during this rebellion ; and providing that the President of the United States shall cause a medal to be struck, to be presented to Major-General Grant in the name of the people of the United States of America.

Be it resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That the thanks of Congress be, and they hereby are, presented to Major-General Ulysses S. Grant, and through him to the officers and soldiers who have fought under his command during this rebellion, for their gallantry and good conduct in the battles in which they have been engaged ; and that the President of the United States be requested to cause a gold medal to be struck, with suitable emblems, devices, and inscriptions, to be presented to Major-General Grant.*

SEC. 2. *And be it further resolved,* That, when the said medal shall have been struck, the President shall cause a copy of this joint resolution to be engrossed on parchment, and shall transmit the same, together with the said medal, to Major-General Grant, to be presented to him in the name of the people of the United States of America.

SEC. 3. *And be it further resolved,* That a sufficient sum of money to carry this resolution into effect is hereby appropriated out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated.

SCHUYLER COLFAX,

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

H. HAMLIN,

Vice-President of the United States and President of the Senate.

Approved, December 17, 1863 :

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

* On one side was the profile of Grant, surrounded by a wreath of laurels, with his name, the year 1863, and a galaxy of stars. On the reverse, a figure of Fame, with a trumpet and a scroll bearing the names of his victories. The motto was : "Proclaim Liberty throughout the Land."

Another resolution was offered, but did not then pass, to revive the grade of lieutenant-general. To the many, a lieutenant-general was a cumbrous Grand Lama to be enshrined at Washington, and Grant was absolutely needed in the field. To others, it seemed that we had military rank and titles enough; it was dangerous to increase them; and, besides, the rebellion was going to be crushed: it was no matter when, or by whom. Such counsellors have given rise to the charge that republics are ungrateful. Republics, governed by such men, are so. But if honor to Grant had been put to the popular vote, there was no limit to the tributes they would have poured at his feet.

Learned, religious, temperance societies elected him honorary or life member. Segars, revolvers, and gifts of various kinds were showered upon him. To none of which does he revert with so much pleasure as to a brier-wood segar-case, made with a pocket-knife by a poor soldier, and presented to him with feelings of veneration and regard, but with no desire for any return. The Legislatures of Ohio and New York* voted him thanks. Mothers called their children after him, and a large generation of little U. S.'s and Grants date their birthdays at this time. Every voice was heard in his praise, except that of an occasional blind adherent of some displaced general, or those whom he had the moral courage to treat according to their ill-deservings, and who had the good sense to speak only in whispers and innuendos. He was already the most famous man in America, the man to whom all looked as the one who should lead us through the storms of war to the quiet haven of a lasting peace. This was the prophecy; the fulfilment was to be speedy.

* "*Resolved*, That the thanks of the people of this State be tendered to General Grant and his army for their glorious victories in the Valley of the Mississippi, and the still more glorious victory of Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain, and that a certified copy of this resolution be forwarded to General Grant."

NEW LABORS.

As soon as order was restored in his front, and a proper organization given to his forces, General Grant set to work to acquaint himself with the needs and interests of his vast military division.

His laurels were not lotus flowers, but were the growth

“Of those immortal plants that bloom
 Upon Olympus, making us immortal;
 * * * * *
 And make the mind prolific in its fancies.”

He forwarded to Washington well-digested plans for the prosecution of the war in the Southwest; and such was the high opinion now entertained of his military capacity and administrative ability, that a joint resolution was offered in the United States Senate, on the 7th of January, 1864, requesting the President to call out a million of volunteers for ninety days; and also, that he would assign General Grant to the command.

At this time, General Grant made several tours of inspection. He visited Knoxville, and finding the rebel cavalry were attacking his outposts, he increased the commands from his now otherwise temporarily unoccupied troops.

VISITS CUMBERLAND GAP.

In order to satisfy himself of the character of Cumberland Gap, which had been won and lost several times, he made a mountain journey from Knoxville to Louisville, in the severest days of winter, on horseback, the precipitous roads being so sheeted with ice as to make the travelling very perilous. The most dangerous portions of the route he was obliged to walk over. Thus he passed through the Gap to Barbersville, and thence through Loudon and Lexington. “Hail to the Chief”—both air and words—greeted him at every stopping-place; but nowhere could he be prevailed upon to make a speech.

On this point he seems inexorable ; but, let us say, in passing, that this is no affected reticence : it springs from real diffidence. His embarrassment would be so great, that he dare not trust himself to make a speech. What thus springs from necessity, has, however, been as greatly in his favor as if it had been dictated by policy and worldly wisdom. His business has been action. Duty has never called upon him to speak ; and so no unfortunate extempores to satisfy a mob can be quoted against him.

At Nashville, his greatest concern was to open regular communication to Chattanooga, which was by no means yet overburdened with supplies. He arrived at Louisville on the 11th of January, and on the 12th the communications were fully opened, and a large quantity of stores poured into Chattanooga, in readiness for the future movements of Sherman.

On the 13th of January, he was again at Nashville, and immediately returned to Chattanooga.

Of course, the brilliant points in Grant's career are found in his splendid strategy and masterly battle-attacks, but a study of his life in these lulls in the storm of war really displays his character to equal advantage. His treatment of deserters, who were now coming in great numbers, is worthy of our observation.

It was just, prudent, and humane. Upon their taking an oath, which he prescribed, they were disarmed, fed, and provided with free passes on all military railroads and government steamboats to their own homes. Many were employed in the quartermaster and engineer departments, at fair wages ; and to avoid the danger of their recapture, they were exempted from military service in our army. (General Order, December 12, 1863.)

Our space will not permit us to reproduce the judicious orders issued at this period. His former experience as a quartermaster was now brought into requisition, in the control of that department, within the limits of his vast command, and the legislation with regard to the seizure of rebel prop-

erty was carried out by him in a prompt and skilful, but always just and humane manner.

VISIT TO ST. LOUIS.

On the 26th of January, 1864, General Grant was at St. Louis, whither he had gone only on account of the dangerous illness of one of his children. But the crisis of the illness had already passed when he arrived, and the announcement of his presence at his old home was the signal for festive demonstrations and new honors. Everybody was anxious to catch a glimpse of the man who had opened their grand river to the sea; and who had, if possible, rendered the glories of Vicksburg dim, by the lightning flashes of Chattanooga. He had come unheralded, and had registered his name on the hotel-book as U. S. GRANT, CHATTANOOGA. The news fled like wild-fire over the city, and the next day an invitation was sent him to a public dinner, offered by the citizens of St. Louis, represented by a large number of the principal gentlemen.

He accepted the invitation, and Friday, the 29th, was appointed for the banquet. He spent the 27th in visiting the university, in talking with his old friends, and in attending theatre, and devoted the two following days to his family.

The evening of the 29th was a proud occasion for Grant and for St. Louis. To many of the people he had been formerly known as a private citizen of moderate station, engaged in industrial pursuits; but now the prophet was receiving unsolicited honors in his own country and his own home. Or rather, he had fulfilled, without prophesying; and the people of St. Louis owed to him a debt which they could never repay, but only gratefully acknowledge. It was no stinted or extorted tribute of gratitude and admiration; the enthusiasm was intense.

“The observed of all observers,” he sat among two hundred guests at the table of the Lindell Hotel, receiving the applause and admiration of all with great modesty and evident em-

barrassment. Around him were several distinguished generals, and his father-in-law, Mr. F. Dent. The toast of the evening was, "Our distinguished guest, Major-General Grant," followed by a burst from the band of the well-known air, "Hail to the Chief." Grant rose, amidst the tumultuous cheering of the guests, but he could not reply. His words were, "Gentlemen, in response, it will be impossible to do more than thank you."

That same day, the Common Council of St. Louis had presented its thanks in behalf of the city;* and that night, after the dinner, he was serenaded, but again said but few words, declining to speak.

Ford says, in his "Handbook of Spain," that the best weapon for passing through the mountains, beset with banditti, is a segar-case filled with good Havanas. Now we do not mean to compare our people to Spanish contrabandistas; but Grant acts upon that principle, slightly varied in its application. On this occasion, as on others since, he satisfied the crowd by taking a segar from his pocket, lighting it, and puffing the smoke in their presence.

The invariable segar has thus done him good service on many occasions. The pantomime of lighting it is cheered in lieu of a speech.

* COUNCIL CHAMBER, CITY OF ST. LOUIS,
January 29, 1864.

Whereas, Major-General U. S. Grant has, since our last meeting, suddenly and unexpectedly arrived among us, and the opportunity not having presented itself whereby the city authorities and this body could testify their great esteem, regard, and indebtedness *due his modest, unswerving energies, swayed neither by the mighty successes which have crowned his genius and efforts in behalf of the Government, nor the machinations of politicians—evidences of the true patriot and soldier*; therefore, be it

Resolved, That the thanks of the Common Council of the City of St. Louis are eminently due, and are hereby respectfully tendered to Major-General U. S. Grant, in behalf of the City of St. Louis.

Resolved, That his honor the mayor be respectfully requested to give his official approval to this preamble and resolution, and cause the seal of the city to be affixed, and the same presented to Major-General U. S. Grant.

CHAPTER XXIII.

ELSEWHERE IN THE FIELD.

THE MISSISSIPPI.—BANKS.—STEELE.—ROSECRANS.—OUR FORCE COMPARED WITH THE REBELS.—SHERMAN'S EXPEDITION TO MERIDIAN.—THOMAS MOVES UPON DALTON.—SEYMOUR AT OLUSTEE.—ONE HEAD NEEDED.—NO POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS.

IT becomes us now to take a rapid glance at the general situation of affairs in other parts of the theatre of war. The Mississippi River had been fortified in numerous positions with heavy guns, and garrisoned principally by negro troops, from Cairo to Forts St. Philip and Jackson, below New Orleans. General Banks had his headquarters in New Orleans, and had detachments at Brashear City and Brownsville. General Steele had a considerable army at Little Rock, Arkansas, and General Rosecrans commanded the Department of the Missouri. We had eight hundred thousand men in the field, and to oppose these the rebels, now everywhere acting on the defensive, numbered half that force. The command of Lee, including Longstreet, and the troops in West Virginia and North Carolina, was a hundred and twelve thousand strong. The army which Grant had beaten at Chattanooga had been confided to General Johnston, and was upwards of fifty thousand strong. This included the garrison of Mobile, and the force with which Bishop Polk encountered Sherman's march to Meridian.

SHERMAN'S EXPEDITIONS.

We must recur for a moment to Sherman. After he had given relief to Knoxville his troops were returned to Chattanooga, and then stationed from Scottsboro', Alabama, along the Memphis Railroad to Huntsville. Towards the end of January, Sherman was ordered to Vicksburg, to command an expedition to the southeast. He moved from Vicksburg with McPherson's (Seventeenth) corps, in light marching order, to Morton, and thence to Meridian. He had collected a large cavalry force at Memphis, which was to start on the 1st of February, and join him at Meridian. Met, but not impeded, by the enemy, who were easily driven away from Champion Hill, Clinton, and Jackson, he moved forward to Meridian. Hurlbut had followed in rear of McPherson with the Sixteenth Corps, and the two corps had united at Jackson and marched together. The advance of this movable column into the enemy's country promised great results. Mobile was in terror, and a pathway to the Gulf seemed open, but it was all shipwrecked by a want of co-operation on the part of the cavalry. General W. S. Smith was to have started on the 1st of February, but did not until the 11th, and the rebel General Polk was rapidly collecting his forces with a good proportion of cavalry, which could only be met by cavalry; and ours failed to appear. The great railway centre of Meridian was destroyed, with the track running to Quitman, to Lauderdale Springs, and to Cuba Station. On the 25th of February, General Sherman returned to Vicksburg.

In front of Charleston, the condition of affairs remained unchanged. An expedition made by General Thomas, under Grant's order from Chattanooga, upon Dalton, was abandoned without results.

Foster had relieved Burnside in the command at Knoxville immediately after the siege was raised, but did not long retain the command. Schofield, who had relieved General Foster, had moved upon Longstreet, and reconnoitred his position.

On the 20th of February, General Seymour, in command in Florida, had met with a serious reverse at Olustee.

The army of the Potomac, under General Meade, was posted near Culpepper Courthouse from December, 1863, to May, 1864; and although cavalry reconnoissances were constantly made, and skirmishes were the order of the day, no great movements were undertaken within these periods by that army.

Such was, very briefly, the condition of affairs;—a military labyrinth, requiring one head to control, and one initiated mind to thread out, its intricate combinations. As the need became manifest, all eyes turned to Grant, and, by the unanimous consent of Government and people, he was exalted to the perilous and responsible position. A new grade of lieutenant-general was created for him, and with it a new labor, which, like those of Hercules, carried with it increased difficulty of achievement.

There were many who, carried away by enthusiasm, were disposed to offer him as a candidate for the presidency. But the most thoughtful preferred his services in the field; and he himself discountenanced such approaches, feeling that his great mission was to finish the war, and having in this so magnificent a scope for a patriot's ambition, that he would rather lose than gain by political preferment. We are reminded of the opinion expressed by Paul Louis Courier, concerning Napoleon's desire to be emperor: "*Etre Bonaparte est se faire, sire; il aspire à descendre.*" So, had Grant, with the weight and the glories of the giant campaign before him, been beguiled by visions of the White House and the presidency, he would have aspired to descend. But he did not.

Foiling the politicians that approached him with a pleasantry, he declared that when the war was over he would offer himself as a candidate to be mayor of Galena, and, if elected, would have the sidewalk put in order between his house and the depot. He has not had a single political thought during his career.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE LIEUTENANT-GENERAL—RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT.

GRANT LIEUTENANT-GENERAL.—ARRIVES AT WASHINGTON.—RECOGNIZED AT WILLARD'S.—COMMISSION PRESENTED.—PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS.—GRANT'S REPLY.—REVIVAL OF THE GRADE.—WASHINGTON, SCOTT, AND GRANT.—THE NEW LAW.—GRANT'S PERSONAL APPEARANCE.—THE HONOR UNSOLICITED.—THE COUNTRY NEEDS HIM.—WHAT HE HAD DONE TO EARN IT.—PROSPECT OF RESPONSIBILITY AND DANGER.—WILL HE SUCCEED?—UNRIVALLED GLORY.

ON the 2d of March, 1864, Grant was confirmed by the United States Senate, in executive session, as Lieutenant-General in the Army of the United States. This put him over all our other generals, but did not, without a special order, make him commander-in-chief of our armies.

At five o'clock on the afternoon of Tuesday, the 8th, he arrived in Washington to receive his commission. He seated himself, unnoticed, at the dinner-table of Willard's Hotel; but being discovered by a gentleman who had seen him in New-Orleans—for his face was not even then familiar to Washington people—he was brought to his feet by the cry that "the hero of Vicksburg was in the room," and by a storm of cheers which might well bewilder so modest a man. In the evening he attended the President's levee, where he was the observed of all observers.

On the afternoon of the 9th, at one o'clock, he was received by the President in the cabinet chamber, and was presented with the commission. In any one of the old European monarchies, the presentation would have been made among the grandest surroundings. In ancient Rome, it would have been inaugurated by a triumph like that in which Titus joined his father after the famous capture of Jerusalem.

But the scene was more in keeping with our republican manners and the still undecided issues of the war. It was no time for pageants : there was no brilliant gathering, no splendid staff. There were the President and his entire cabinet ; General Halleck, the retiring commander-in-chief ; General Rawlins, Grant's chief of staff ; Colonel Comstock, his chief engineer ; Mr. Nicolay, the President's private secretary ; and the Honorable Owen Lovejoy, of Illinois. It was eminently proper that one other person should be present, and that was the general's eldest son, a fine boy of fourteen, the inheritor of his father's glory, and who, with such an example and such training, may well be incited to a life of usefulness, and perhaps fame.

When General Grant entered the executive chamber he was cordially received by the President, and presented to the cabinet. Mr. Lincoln then addressed him in the following words :

“GENERAL GRANT—The nation's appreciation of what you have done, and its reliance upon you for what remains to be done in the existing great struggle, are now presented with this commission, constituting you Lieutenant-General in the Army of the United States. With this high honor devolves upon you also a corresponding responsibility. As the country herein trusts you, so, under God, it will sustain you. I scarcely need to add, that, with what I here speak for the nation, goes my own hearty personal concurrence.”

For once in his life, and we believe for the only time, the General could not refuse to make a speech ; but what he said was very brief, and to the point. The words, which have a peculiar significance in the light of the great events which have since transpired, were these :

“MR. PRESIDENT—I accept the commission, with gratitude for the high honor conferred. With the aid of the noble armies that have fought on so many fields for our common

country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. I feel the full weight of the responsibilities now devolving on me; and I know that if they are met, it will be due to those armies, and, above all, to the favor of that Providence which leads both nations and men."

Introductions followed. Half an hour was spent in conversation with the secretaries, and this simple but important interview was ended.

Making a rapid visit with General Meade to the Army of the Potomac on the 10th, he started on the morning of the 11th for the West; and on the 10th, a special order of the President assigned the new Lieutenant-General to the command of all the armies.

And here we may pause for a moment to consider what all this signified.

THE NEW GRADE.

The revival of this rank of lieutenant-general recalls to us the circumstances under which it had been before conferred in America, and which marked two important periods in our history. In 1798, incident to the threatening aspect of our relations with France, the Congress had conferred it upon Washington, who, in the next year, had he lived, would have been a full general, the only sensible and logical rank which a commander-in-chief should hold. Upon Washington's death, the rank was discontinued.

In the long years from February, 1849, to December, 1852, earnest efforts were made to confer this grade, by brevet, on General Winfield Scott, for his long and illustrious services to the country; but his enemies were ingenious and malignant, and among them the most pertinacious was the then Honorable Jefferson Davis.

These two great men were the only predecessors of Grant, for whom the full rank was now revived.

The bill reviving it was introduced into the lower House

by Grant's constant friend, the Honorable Mr. Washburne, and being referred to the Military Committee, was slightly amended, and finally presented to the House in the following form :

“ Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That the grade of lieutenant-general be, and the same is hereby, revived in the Army of the United States of America ; and the President is hereby authorized, whenever he shall deem it expedient, to appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a commander of the army, to be selected during war, from among those officers in the military service of the United States, not below the grade of major-general, most distinguished for courage, skill, and ability ; and who, being commissioned as lieutenant-general, shall be authorized, under the direction of the President, to command the armies of the United States.

“ SEC. 2. *And be it further enacted, That the lieutenant-general appointed as is hereinbefore provided, shall be entitled to the pay, allowances, and staff specified in the fifth section of the act approved May 28, 1798 ; and also the allowances described in the sixth section of the act approved August 23, 1842, granting additional rations to certain officers ; Provided, That nothing in this bill contained shall be construed in any way to affect the rank, pay, or allowances of Winfield Scott, Lieutenant-General by brevet, now on the retired list of the army.*”

To this, while in the course of debate, Mr. Ross offered an amendment recommending General Grant for the original vacancy. Mr. Washburne's speech in favor of the amended bill is a masterly and eloquent exposition of the services of General Grant, and his high eulogium has been vindicated in detail by the after history. The opposition was very small ; a triumphant majority of one hundred and seventeen to nineteen votes sent it to the Senate, who confirmed it, and on the

1st of March the President approved the bill, and nominated Grant. On the 2d, as we have said, the Senate, in executive session, confirmed him. Let us add that the country, with one voice, hailed and sanctioned the appointment, the most important ever made in America.

Perhaps we could select no better time to give some delineations of the presence and person of the general thus honored.

PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS.

He was not quite forty-three years of age, of medium height, and strong, well-knit frame. His appearance, at first sight, is not striking. Careless of dress, and with no grandeur of air or imposing carriage, he would not attract a casual observer in a crowd; but a study of his face while conversing with him would satisfy a physiognomist, even without a knowledge of his history, that he is no ordinary man. His hair is full, brown, worn short, parted at the side over a full forehead, slightly prominent, but not protuberant at the brows. He has a good nose, relieved from the elegant weakness of the Grecian by a slight curve; blue eyes, sad, but neither dreamy nor stupid, which dilate into bold expression in times of action and danger; a firm, evenly closed mouth, which would express more if free from beard; a beard of reddish brown, cut close, evidently for comfort, and for that readiness of action with which the razor interferes; and a square, but not projecting, jaw and chin. The face, in spite of former critics, tells to my mind its own story fully. I see in it will, energy, a sense of responsibility, reticence, and entire self-control. If any have doubted it, let them study the best photographs again, and they will be convinced.

To pass from his physiognomy to his character. He is a man of irreproachable life and habits; pure, humane, and generous. His everlasting segar deserves a place in history, for it is a part of the man; he is never without it, and his segars are very strong. But excess in tobacco depends upon

the constitution, and it evidently suits Grant. He is entirely without ostentation in his house and table; and his able staff is kept for use, and not show.

In many of his orders and dispatches he has devoutly recognized the providence of God, and his reliance upon it, as being the chief strength of nations and men; and if he ever swears, the religious world may be certified that his oaths are in the same category with those of my Uncle Toby and of Washington at Monmouth. He is phlegmatic, but not insensible; cool, but not without enthusiasm; habitually grave, with a simple dignity, but easily approachable by all, even to the poorest private; in speech, laconic, but unaffected; no official non-committal about him; clear-headed, forgetting nothing, arranging details easily in his capacious brain, without much reliance upon red tape; blushing when praised, and bearing both praise and blame with silent magnanimity. Above all, he combines what Guizot has called the "genius of common sense" with a determination to "go ahead."

Such, in brief, was the man who had made himself a model hero for the American people; such the man who had come to Washington, on his own merits, but not by his own solicitation, to be made lieutenant-general and commander-in-chief. In the words of Mr. Washburne, "*No man with his consent has ever mentioned his name in connection with any position. I say what I know to be true, when I allege that every promotion he has received since he first entered the service to put down this rebellion, was moved without his knowledge or consent. And in regard to this very matter of lieutenant-general, after the bill was introduced, and his name mentioned in connection therewith, he wrote me and admonished me that he had been highly honored already by the Government, and did not ask or deserve any thing more in the shape of honors or promotion; and that a success over the enemy was what he craved above every thing else; that he only desired to hold such an influence over those under his command as to use them to the best advantage to secure that end.*" But the country had need of him; the Government could not do without him, and so they saved themselves by honoring Grant.

And here, while he stands in our narrative at the parting of the ways, let us briefly advert to the retrospect, and then glance at the prospect before him.

RETROSPECT.

First, let us see what he had done to make himself, in violation of the maxim of the French philosopher,* a necessary man to the American people. From the day of his second entry into the service as a colonel of volunteers, he had been continually in the field, and not sunning his uniform in the streets of our great cities. He had been constantly enlarging his sphere of action. His name became speedily known to the country, and the laconic philosophy of his dispatches gave the people something to take hold of and ring the chimes upon; some undesignedly eloquent epigram of each great victory. At Fort Donelson, the "unconditional surrender" which he demanded gave a new significance to the initial letters of his name. "I propose to move immediately upon your works," struck a popular chord. Hard pressed at Pittsburg Landing, he told Sherman a characteristic story on the field, illustrating the secret of victory, and ordered him to assume the offensive.

After the great campaign which concluded with the capture of Vicksburg, he received from President Lincoln an autograph letter, magnanimously confessing that he had not been in favor of the plan of the campaign, and ending thus: "I now wish to make a personal acknowledgment, that you were right and I was wrong." He had opened the Mississippi from the head-waters to the mud-islands of the Delta.

In really serious straits at Chattanooga, his animals dying by thousands, and his men in danger of starving—not, however, by any fault of his own, for he only assumed command to find the situation such—he had received Bragg's merciful message to remove the non-combatants, and had heard

* La Rochefoucauld says: "Il n'y a pas d'homme nécessaire."

Bragg's characteristic boast that in three days' time Grant's army would be flying in hungry disorder to Nashville; whereas, in three days' time, Bragg's disordered hosts, flanked and beaten in front, were flying southward before Grant's attack.

He had asked for nothing from the Government; had refused to make capital by making speeches; would not be approached on political questions; escaped, except when cornered, from public demonstrations, public dinners, and the like; and now the young man, unknown to the public four years before—wood-dealer, collector, farmer, leather-dealer, and yet always an honest man and a gentleman—had come to Washington to receive his reward, the very greatest to which an American had ever attained.

PROSPECT.

But it was something far more and far different. We have glanced at the retrospect: let us look for a moment at the nature of the prospect—not simply, as before, one of partial trial and danger and glory, but of a sole and crushing responsibility. As his hand grasped the glittering wreath, it turned magically into a flaming sword, and a voice, like apocalyptic thunders, cried "Onward!" The stars shone, indeed, but only to disclose dimly in the darkness new dangers, new struggles, vigils never intermitted; and it was a very bold man indeed—one of sleepless soul, indomitable courage, and undying patriotism, who, amid the roaring Red Sea of battle, the breakers of official dictation, the misapprehension of profound plans by an impatient and impressible public, who saw only the surface, and last, but not least, the Syrtis Major of politics—could assume such a charge at such a time, even with all its honors. Would he flutter and flounder and fall, like the historical dignitaries of other days, and like the many experimental generals of our own times, who were tasked above their powers, and failed miserably? Or would he succeed completely, and achieve a colossal, an unrivalled fame? Surely, in the latter case, would be applicable to him the

words uttered by the eloquent Tully to the clement Cæsar, in which he declares, that in the praise then accorded, the great general has neither rival nor sharers ; it is beyond the power of cohort, centurion, or prefect.* He stands alone.

* "At vero hujus gloriæ, C. Cæsar, quam es paulo ante adeptus, socium habes neminem : totum hoc quantumcumque est, quod certe maximum est, totum est, inquam, tuum. Nihil ex ista laude centurio, nihil præfectus, nihil cohors, nihil turma decerpit."—ORAT. PRO M. MARCELLO, II. 7.

CHAPTER XXV.

THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

GRANT'S CONVICTIONS.—EVILS TO BE REMEDIED.—THE NEW PLAN.—THE GREAT THEATRE—HOW OCCUPIED.—THE REBEL ARMIES.—LEE AND JOHNSTON.—OUR OPPOSING ARMIES.—BANKS IN VIRGINIA.—DIRECTIONS TO GENERAL BUTLER.—SIGEL'S INSTRUCTIONS.

BEFORE proceeding to follow the personal movements of Lieutenant-General Grant, as he accompanied the Army of the Potomac, shared its fortunes, and generally directed its movements, let us now pause for a moment to glance at the whole field, and present a summary of his plans and purposes as the director and supervisor of all the campaigns. His clear and capacious mind had been silently at work on the great problem, before his appointment as general-in-chief. He had long been impressed with the idea that the operations must be continuous and unremitting, without regard to weather, season, or climate.

We had an active, brave, and desperate enemy. The absolute despotism of the Confederate government enabled it to bring into the service every man and boy capable of bearing arms; and if the enemy was inferior in numbers and in resources, that was more than counterbalanced by manifest advantages. He was able to move always upon interior lines, and stood upon a general defensive, which he could easily turn into an offensive. He could transport troops with ease, in order to mass the same bodies, at different times, against our separate armies. Seeking the strong points, he could abandon territory at pleasure, without losing in a military

point of view. While our armies were resting or inactive, by reason of weather and roads, he could furlough a portion of every force, to plant crops or provide supplies, calling them together, as soon as threatened, to resist our new advance. Those who were unfit to take the field, were employed in general preparations, and as provosts in collecting and returning deserters.

On the other hand, we had a very large territory to hold and garrison, surrounded by a hostile population; extensive communications by land and water to protect; and increased difficulty in providing supplies, the further we advanced. Independent action of our armies, at the East and West, had been productive of great evil. As in a baulky team, the "pull all together" was wanting; and it had frequently happened that a victory in the East was partially neutralized by disasters at the West, and *vice versa*. All this Grant had seen and deplored.

GRANT'S PURPOSE.

The plans of the lieutenant-general may be thus epitomized. Starting with the postulate that the sole object confided to him was to destroy the military power of the rebellion, and feeling sure that, this done, its whole power, its life indeed, would be destroyed, Grant proposed—*First*: To counterpoise the enemy's interior advantages, by engaging him at all important points at once and continuously, that he might not shift his troops as before, without exposing weak points where he would readily be beaten. *Second*: To make unrelenting war against his main armies. Beat them if possible; but if that could not be done at once, wear them out by constant shocks and constant attrition. In the latter case, he saw that force of numbers alone would, in the end, produce the desired result. He depended greatly, also, and not without reason, upon the valor and skill of our armies; and the country depended, with entire confidence, upon him.

THE GREAT THEATRE.

Let us now cast a glance on the condition of affairs in the vast theatre, and the positions of our forces, when he assumed command of the whole.

I. The seacoast was almost entirely blockaded by our navy, and the foreign resources of the rebels reduced almost to zero. We had footholds at many points. Plymouth, Washington, and Newbern, in North Carolina, had Union garrisons. We were in possession of Beaufort, Folly Island, Morris Island, Hilton Head, Port Royal, in South Carolina; Fort Pulaski, in Georgia; Fernandina, St. Augustine, Key West, and Pensacola, in Florida; New Orleans, with its river approaches, in Louisiana; and a small garrison at the mouth of the Rio Grande.

II. The Mississippi River, thanks to Grant and his gallant army, was ours in its entire length. It was strongly garrisoned at all points, from St. Louis to its mouth. The entire line of the Arkansas was also in our possession; so that we were armed masters of all the country lying west of the Mississippi and north of the Arkansas. We also held a few points in Southern Louisiana, west of the Mississippi, but not far from the river. All the remaining Trans-Mississippi territory was in rebel possession, and held by a force of not less than eighty thousand men. Of this force, however, it must be observed, that it had become somewhat disintegrated by inaction and want of opposition by our armies; so that one-half of it was in a state of partial disbandment, but could easily be called out when needed to join the garrisons. Suffice it to say, that the rebel army west of the river was quite large enough, with the numerous guerrilla bands, and the dangerous, because secret, co-operation of a disloyal and bitter population, to render it necessary to employ a large force in order to keep the river open to the navigation of our fleets and commerce, and to give protection to the loyal men—few, but marked men—in the country west of it.

III. If we look east of the Mississippi at this juncture, we

shall find that we held substantially the line of the Tennessee and the Holston, including nearly all of Tennessee. South of Chattanooga, in Georgia, we kept a small foothold, soon to be of greater importance, but now occupied to keep the enemy from marching up and attacking our garrisons in East Tennessee.

IV. While we had an armed occupancy of Western Virginia, the rest of Virginia, with certain important exceptions, was in the rebel hands. We had a small portion at the north, the line of the Potomac. We also held Norfolk, Fortress Monroe, and a small surrounding country, and the ground occupied by the Army of the Potomac, then lying north of the Rapidan.

To supply the troops, in these widely distant localities, was a colossal task. To guard the routes of communication and supply, by roads and rivers, against raids, guerrilla bands, and a bitterly hostile people, was a subordinate but most troublesome and annoying duty, subsidizing large numbers of men.

THE REBEL ARMIES.

The principal armies of the Confederacy, at this period, were those under Lee, in Virginia, and Johnston, in Georgia. Lee, the ranking officer in the Confederate army, was personally in command of the Army of Virginia, posted along the south bank of the Rapidan, from strong intrenchments on Mine Run, westward, covering Richmond against Meade's Army of the Potomac. Lee was an excellent general, clear-headed, quick in the dispositions of a battle-field, cool and brave, the military idol of the Confederacy. He had generally acted on the defensive, but was always ready to turn it into the offensive, in which he had made mistakes, like that at Gettysburg, which would have killed the reputation of any other Confederate general. But his reputation had a more solid basis in the affection of the Confederate people, and was to receive still additional glories in the Titanic battles about to follow with his greater antagonist, Grant.

Johnston, to whom our readers have already been introduced, commanded the second great army, at Dalton. With this he covered Atlanta, a great railroad centre, where four of the principal railroads terminate,—a depot for cotton and breadstuffs, equally a centre for foundries, machine-shops, and military magazines, and therefore of vital importance to the rebels.

Forrest, with a large force of cavalry, was operating in Northeastern Mississippi; while the Shenandoah Valley, portions of Western Virginia, and the extreme eastern angle of Tennessee, were in the enemy's hands. Besides these armies and forces now mentioned, there were garrisons of various size at the points on the seacoast, which we had blockaded.

To speak technically, the objective points of the campaign were Richmond, Atlanta, and the rebel armies which covered them; each city and its covering army merging into one objective, as we should drive the enemy back within the city defences.

OUR OPPOSING ARMIES.

To oppose and destroy the army of Lee, and to capture Richmond, was the work assigned to the Army of the Potomac, with certain co-operating columns. This army was commanded by Major-General George Gordon Meade, and its exploits will constitute the chief material for the remainder of our narrative. Lieutenant-General Grant was to accompany it.

The army of Johnston was to be driven back, and Atlanta taken, by the army of Major-General William T. Sherman, now at Chattanooga. This officer, upon Grant's promotion, had been placed in command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, and was thus the director of all the forces from the Mississippi to the Alleghanies, together with the Department of Arkansas, west of the Mississippi; but he was to lead in person the army against Johnston. He was entirely in Grant's confidence, had had long conversations with the lieutenant-general, and knew his desires thoroughly, even

without a written word. The instructions, therefore, were very general. He was to beat Johnston's army, destroy it if possible, and march down as far as possible into the enemy's country. On no account was he to let Johnston slip away and join Lee in Virginia. If he should attempt it, Sherman was to follow in hot haste, and neutralize him. Grant promised equally not to let large re-enforcements go from Lee to Johnston, to crush Sherman. The orders were very general, but the sequel proved that the trust reposed in Sherman was very just.

BANKS.

Major-General N. P. Banks, commanding the Department of the Gulf, was just going up the Red River on an expedition to Shreveport, Louisiana, which had been organized before Grant assumed the command in chief. The orders sent to Banks were general, but, in the light of after events, important. He was directed to take Shreveport without delay ; or in the event of its requiring ten or fifteen days over the time for which Sherman had sent him troops, he should send them back to their commands at the specified time, even should this make it necessary to abandon the main purpose of the Red River expedition ; for this force was absolutely necessary to Sherman in his movements east of the Mississippi. If he succeeded in taking Shreveport, he might hold it with an adequate force, but must take the bulk of his troops back to New Orleans, which might soon become the point of departure for an attack upon Mobile.

We need not dwell long upon the further instructions to General Banks. They were explicit on all the great points. If successful, he was to turn over the defence of the Red River to General Steele and the navy. Except the *piéd-à-terre* on the Rio Grande, which could be held by four thousand men well intrenched, a service for which the colored troops might in part be used, he was to abandon Texas entirely. A reduction might be made in the garrisons on the Mississippi, from

Port Hudson to New Orleans, and elsewhere in his department, and he would thus have thirty thousand effectives with which to move against Mobile, in co-operation with other troops which Grant promised to send him. In the advance on Mobile, which was to be a combined movement with the navy, he was to arrange with Admiral Farragut; but Grant suggested Pascagoula as a base. Profound secrecy was enjoined upon him.

IN VIRGINIA.

In considering the problem to be encountered and solved by the Army of the Potomac, more than one plan suggested itself. The primary, all-transcending instructions were to attack Lee, and wherever he went, to follow him. Of the feasible plans which presented themselves, the first was to cross the Rapidan below Lee's army, move rapidly upon his right flank, and turn or crush it.

The second, to cross above, and turn or threaten Lee's left.

By adopting the second plan, he would put Lee into great concern about Richmond, and make it impossible for him to move his army, or send large raiding parties northward. But this would separate him from direct, easy, and constantly shortening lines of communication with Butler. He could only move with a certain supply of rations, and if unsuccessful in beating Lee, must return to his base when those were out.

The first plan promised more. By crossing below he could approach Butler and Richmond, and force Lee to move down with him, or abandon Richmond and his base. It is true that Lee might move northward; but this involved a desperate purpose, and wonderful, almost miraculous fortune. In any event, Lee always moved upon an interior line and acted upon the defensive.

The first plan was adopted; and in carrying it out, never did Grant assume a more difficult task and a greater responsibility. It was enough to appal the stoutest heart. There are

few men besides Grant who would have undertaken it. We dare not assert that there are any besides him who would have succeeded in it.

The plans being definitely adopted, all the armies were busy in preparation. Expecting to move with the Army of the Potomac, he could issue to it daily orders. To the forces directly co-operating with it, his instructions were given specifically in writing.

DIRECTIONS TO GENERAL BUTLER.

As early as April 2, General Grant had informed Butler of his plans,—that all were to co-operate energetically, and that as all the forces could not be united, two or three large ones were to co-operate in a common purpose. As, by concert of action, these should approach each other, the territory to be guarded would decrease in extent, and the entire force of the enemy, in all portions, be employed at the same time. The conclusion of the matter was, that while the Army of the Potomac was to take care of Lee's army and approach Richmond, Butler was to move directly upon Richmond by the south side of the James. For this purpose he had twenty thousand men,—to be joined by Gillmore, who was to be at City Point on or about the 18th of April, with ten thousand more in transports, brought from the Department of the South. This body Gillmore was to command; and General William F. Smith was sent to Butler to command the remainder of the forces in the field.

With this force Butler was to move up the James and take City Point, intrench himself there, and make instant preparations to take the field. When ready he was to advance, hugging the south bank of the river closely. If Grant should force Lee back to Richmond, the two armies could speedily be joined. Enjoining upon him to use his cavalry to cut the railroad about Hick's Ford, and at other points, he left all minor details to Butler.

On the 16th of April these instructions were substantially

reiterated; and on the 19th, Butler was directed to begin his movement when Meade should move with the Army of the Potomac from Culpepper. Grant further informed him that if he could succeed in so investing Richmond as to make his left flank rest upon the James River above the city, he would join him there, if he succeeded in driving Lee back. In any case, Butler must so operate as to keep a large force in Richmond, or south of it, and away from Lee's army.

Besides the written instructions, Grant had a personal interview and long conference with Butler; and both Butler and Meade distinctly understood that, in last resort, Grant's purpose was to move across the James, and take position on the south,—the Vicksburg tactics slightly modified.

Butler was also informed of the great—if secondary—importance of occupying Petersburg, while Richmond was his principal objective.

SIGEL'S INSTRUCTIONS.

General Sigel had command of our forces in Western Virginia, in the Shenandoah Valley, and in defence of the frontiers of Maryland and Pennsylvania. Grant directed him to organize for two co-operating expeditions southward, one from Beverly and the other from Charleston, to be commanded respectively by Generals Ord and Crook. But just at this juncture General Ord was relieved at his own request, and the expedition from Beverly was abandoned. Two columns were substituted;—one, ten thousand strong, to move under Crook, on the Kanawha; and the other, seven thousand strong, under Sigel in person, up the Shenandoah. The former was directed to take Lewisburg, and move down the Tennessee Railroad, destroying the New River Bridge, and the salt-works at Saltsville, which were of incalculable value to the enemy.

We shall recur to all these projects where they take their places as distinct movements in the chronological order.

Pending the manœuvres of the principal armies under Grant against Lee and Richmond, and under Sherman against Johnston, all other organizations were actively employed in protecting our extended lines, and communication between the loyal States and the armies.

CHAPTER XXVI.

PREPARATIONS FOR THE FINAL CAMPAIGN.

GRANT'S ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE ARMIES.—AT WASHINGTON.—THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.—GENERAL MEADE.—THE ARMY REORGANIZED.—FIFTH CORPS—SECOND—SIXTH.—THE NINTH CORPS.—THE CHARACTER OF THE ARMY.—GRANT'S STAFF.—MEADE'S CHIEF, AND ADJUTANT-GENERAL.

GRANT had left Washington shortly after receiving the appointment of Lieutenant-General, and was at Nashville at the time that Mr. Lincoln's order was issued promoting him to the supreme command. He immediately announced it to the armies, by embodying it in the following order :

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
NASHVILLE, TENN., March 17, 1864.

In pursuance of the following order of the President :

“EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, March 10, 1864.

“Under the authority of the act of Congress to appoint to the grade of lieutenant-general in the army, of March 1, 1864, Lieutenant-General Ulysses S. Grant, United States Army, is appointed to the command of the armies of the United States.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.”

I assume command of the armies of the United States. Headquarters will be in the field, and, until further orders, will be with the Army of the Potomac. There will be an office-headquarters in Washington, to which all official communications will be sent, except those from the army where the headquarters are at the date of their address.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

The following is the General Order of the War Department :

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 98.

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, March 12, 1864.

The President of the United States orders as follows :

First. Major-General Halleck is, at his own request, relieved from duty as general-in-chief of the army, and Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant is assigned to the command of the armies of the United States. The headquarters of the army will be in Washington, and also with Lieutenant-General Grant in the field.

Second. Major-General Halleck is assigned to duty in Washington, as chief of staff of the army, under the direction of the Secretary of War and the Lieutenant-General commanding. His orders will be obeyed and respected accordingly.

Third. Major-General W. T. Sherman is assigned to the command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, composed of the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and the Arkansas.

Fourth. Major-General J. B. McPherson is assigned to the command of the Department and Army of the Tennessee.

Fifth. In relieving Major-General Halleck from duty as general-in-chief, the President desires to express his approbation and thanks for the zealous manner in which the arduous and responsible duties of that position have been performed

By order of the Secretary of War.

E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General.

On the 23d of March, six days afterwards, he arrived in Washington, accompanied by Mrs. Grant and his eldest son. Of his military family, only General Rawlins and three of his staff were with him. The eyes of the whole nation were upon him, and their hopes strong that he would not dictate the movements from Washington. It was, therefore, with the greatest satisfaction that both eyes and hopes followed him immediately to his new headquarters in the field. Loyal men drew a long breath when they found he was going to conduct the campaign against Lee in person. The spirits of all were raised, and the confidence of all was reposed in this one man whom God had raised up to deliver us. His movable headquarters were at once fixed with the Army of the Potomac, at





Walt. P.

Geo. G. Meade
Maj. Gen. U. S. A.

J. B. Whittier & Co. Engrs.

Culpepper Courthouse, and it was manifest that he proposed to himself the most difficult task of all. This army he proceeded at once to reorganize in the manner best suited to his purposes. Intending no disparagement to certain commanders who were removed at his suggestion, and transferred to other parts of the theatre of war, he selected those with whom he thought he could work best, for purposes either of independent command or concert of action. His selections were extremely judicious.

THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC—GENERAL MEADE.

General Meade, the hero of Gettysburg—that ever-memorable battle, which saved the Republic in one crisis of its fate—regarded by the army as a commander of the first rank, was retained in command of the Army of the Potomac. And here we may pause to consider the relations of these two officers. Grant had undoubtedly in an especial manner the charge and control of the campaign, and could at his pleasure direct the movement of any portion of the Army of the Potomac; but, in a general statement, we may say, that while he directed what movements were to be made, Meade had the handling of that army, and all the details of battle were in his hands. He was to Grant what the corps commanders were to him; and nobly throughout that campaign did Meade co-operate with Grant, doubtless sometimes hushing the utterances of those finer sensibilities which must occasionally have struggled for expression, on account of the necessary but somewhat anomalous condition of his relations to the supreme chief.*

* General Grant's words are: "Commanding all the armies, as I did, I tried, as far as possible, to leave General Meade in independent command of the Army of the Potomac. My instructions for that army were all through him, and were general in their nature, leaving all the details and execution to him." The campaigns that followed proved him to be the right man in the right place. His commanding always in the presence of an officer superior to him in rank, has drawn from him much of that public attention which his zeal and ability entitled him to, and which he would otherwise have received."

Until the flood of detailed reports is poured into the lap of history, the country can never know how much it owes to Meade for the campaign we are now about to describe. The army is always spoken of as Grant's army; the dispatches were sent through Grant's headquarters; and his presence in the field gave him not only the entire responsibility, but, in the public eye, the entire praise for what was done. Every page of the following narrative will show us the great glory of Grant; and we speak with authority when we say, that he would not detract for a moment from the masterly skill, the labors, the valor, and the constancy of General Meade, which endured even to the end. To these, indeed, the Lieutenant-General has borne public testimony, in recommending General Meade for promotion as a major-general in the regular army, a position he nobly deserved, and which he now holds.

Remembering this, our readers will not expect from us an attempt to make the difficult distinction, at all points of the campaign, between the functions of the Lieutenant-General and General Meade. At times, however, we shall make such a designation.

THE ARMY REORGANIZED.

The army was reorganized on the 24th of March. The corps were consolidated, and reduced to three—the Fifth, Second, and Sixth. Without giving the details of consolidation, arrangement, and transfer of divisions, we may present the general organization and strength of these corps, as follows.

The Fifth Corps was commanded by Major-General Gouverneur K. Warren, a young officer of engineers, who had been rapidly promoted on account of his dashing valor, his skill in handling troops, and his devotion to his military profession. He had been particularly distinguished at Bristoe Station. His corps consisted of four divisions, commanded respectively by Generals Wadsworth, Crawford, Robinson, and Griffin. The commanders of brigades were Ayres, Cutter, Baxter,

J. F. Bartlett, Barnes, and Rice, all veterans by reason of continuous service in the present war.

The Second Corps was commanded by Major-General Winfield Scott Hancock, an officer of infantry, who had received an appointment in the Quartermaster's Department; who had also risen with great rapidity; and who, in bearing, personal appearance, splendid gallantry, and influence over his troops, fully deserves the epithet which he received at Williamsburg—"Hancock the Superb." His divisions were commanded in the following order: by Generals Barlow, Gibbon, Birney, and Barr. The brigade commanders were Generals Webb, Owen, Ward, Alexander Hayes, and Mott; and Colonels Miles, Smyth, Frank, Brooke, Carrol, and Brewster. Colonel Tidball was chief of artillery.

The Sixth Corps was under Major-General John Sedgwick, highly esteemed as an officer, and greatly beloved as a man, throughout the army. Originally an officer of artillery, he had been made, before the war, a colonel of cavalry; and by his services since, he had risen to the first rank, having more than once been offered command of the Army of the Potomac, which his modesty caused him to decline. His division commanders were Generals H. G. Wright, Getty, and Prince; and the brigades were commanded by Generals Torbert, Shaler, Wheaton, Neill, Eustis, and Russell; and Colonels Upton, Burnham, and Grant. Colonel C. H. Tompkins commanded the artillery.

The reserve park of artillery was under the general direction of Brigadier-General Henry J. Hunt, chief of artillery; and under the immediate command of Colonel H. S. Burton, of the Fifth Artillery.

A brigade of engineer troops, and the ponton-trains, were under the command of Major (now General) James C. Duane, of the United States Engineers. The immense park of supply-wagons was directed by Brigadier-General Rufus Ingalls, chief quartermaster.

The cavalry of the entire army was consolidated under General Philip H. Sheridan, an officer of Regular Infantry,

who had already distinguished himself in the Southwest, and whose services in this campaign were to fill the country with his fame.

Of the principal commanders in the former army, Major-Generals Sykes, French, Newton, Pleasonton, and Brigadier-Generals Kenly, Spinola, and Meredith, were relieved and sent to other fields. General Kilpatrick was sent to command Sherman's cavalry.

THE NINTH CORPS.

The Ninth Corps, composed in part of colored troops, who were now for the first time fighting for their country, and who, after the experience of Fort Pillow and Plymouth, felt that there was no surrender for them, had been recruiting at Annapolis. It was commanded by General A. E. Burnside, already well known to the world as the captor of Roanoke and Newbern, and for his ill success at Fredericksburg. It was reviewed by President Lincoln on the 23d of April; and then, dispelling all doubts as to its destination, it was marched at once to Culpepper, to join the Army of the Potomac.

THE CHARACTER OF THE ARMY.

Such was the aggregate force with which General Grant was about to move upon his greatest campaign, bearing with him the hopes, the prayers, and the confidence of the country. As to its character, we may be permitted to say that it was as good an army as it was possible to produce, taking into consideration the rapidity of its organization, and the great numbers of new troops. Its generals were good men and true, thoroughly schooled and tested by former services; the lieutenant-general, General Meade, and all the corps commanders, most of the division, and many of the brigade commanders, were graduates of the Military Academy at West Point. The men were of admirable material, but many of them new troops, who had never been under fire before, and de-

pended, therefore, upon the nucleus of veterans upon which they were formed, and upon the example and directions of the company and regimental officers immediately commanding them; and here, what had been the weak point of the Army of the Potomac, as indeed of all our armies, in the early stages of the war, had grown into robustness and strength. The subordinate officers who had been at first appointed, were uninstructed and unfitted to command the men. The generals directed the movements, and the men carried them out, as well as they could; and the successes of the best manœuvres would frequently not have been achieved had it not been for the superior intelligence, bravery, and dash of the private soldiers, who had left their homes with their lives in their hands in defence of the country. But now, we have the authority of competent judges for saying, all this was changed. The worthless had been weeded out; brave men had risen from the ranks; and a new generation of officers, who had become so after hard service, directed the men, and were connected with them by a sympathy of the strongest kind.

The following officers composed the staff of General Grant in the field:

Brigadier-General John A. Rawlins, chief of staff; Lieutenant-Colonel T. S. Bowers, assistant adjutant-general; Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Comstock, senior aid-de-camp; Lieutenant-Colonel Orville E. Babcock, aid-de-camp; Lieutenant-Colonel F. T. Dent, aid-de-camp; Lieutenant-Colonel Horace Porter, aid-de-camp; Lieutenant-Colonel W. L. Dupp, assistant inspector-general; Lieutenant-Colonel W. R. Rowley, secretary; Lieutenant-Colonel Adam Badeau, secretary; Captain E. S. Parker, assistant adjutant-general; Captain George K. Leet, assistant adjutant-general, in charge of office at Washington; Captain P. T. Hudson, aid-de-camp; Captain H. W. Janes, assistant quartermaster, on duty at headquarters; First-Lieutenant William Dunn, junior, Eighty-third Indiana Volunteers, acting aid-de-camp.

General Meade's chief of staff was Major-General A. A.

Humphreys, a field-officer of engineers, who, as a division commander, had gained reputation at Gettysburg. His adjutant-general was General Seth Williams, an officer of the greatest value, on account of his ready, rapid, and systematic discharge of the duties of his department.

From what has been said, it will be seen that Grant's programme was an admirable one, and the prospect bright. If the collateral movements of Butler and Sigel should be successful, and the southern communication cut off by Petersburg and Lynchburg, Lee, although holding an interior position, and acting upon the defensive, would be obliged to divide his forces, and Grant's march to Richmond would be comparatively easy. But if they failed, Lee could concentrate upon Grant, and give him the more difficult task. Grant had a right to expect the success of these movements; but, as the sequel proved, he was fortunate in not placing entire dependence upon them. The resources of a great general consist in many alternatives, and in rapid modifications of his plans, when they are thwarted by the failure of subordinates or the hazardous chances of war. Such resources Grant was to find necessary in the impending campaign.

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE CROSSING OF THE RUBICON.

ALL READY.—GRANT MAKES FINAL PREPARATIONS.—THE POSITION OF THE ARMY.—LEE'S POSITION.—THE ROADS.—THE WILDERNESS.—MEADE'S ORDER.—THE CORPS MOVE.—PLANS AND COUNTERPLANS.—THE REBELS COME UP IN COLUMN.—EWELL ON OUR RIGHT, BY THE TURNPIKE.

EVERY thing was now in readiness for the Army of the Potomac to move. During the month of April, re-enforcements had been pouring in. Grant makes a tour of inspection; examines into the details of the organization; clears the army of citizens and sutlers; is closeted with the authorities at Washington, receiving their directions, and explaining to them his purposes; visits Butler's command, and gives general directions for the control of all the armies. And, just eight weeks from the day of receiving his commission as lieutenant-general, he issues the order of advance, to turn, if possible, the right flank of the enemy.

The position of the Army of the Potomac, just before the grand movement, was along the north bank of the Rappahannock, confronting and watching the army of General Lee. That army, composed of the corps of Ewell, Hill, and Longstreet, and the cavalry under J. E. B. Stuart, lay upon and near the south bank of the river, with its front strongly protected by field-works. The left flank was covered by the Rappahannock, and the mountains lying near Orange Courthouse;

and the right flank by a well-intrenched line from Morton's Ford to Mine Run.

General Lee was evidently in ignorance of Grant's plans, as to whether he would attempt to turn his left or his right, or attack him boldly in front. The first of these, perhaps, was that which he anticipated. To thwart them all, he had strongly fortified the river and Mine Run, from a point three miles below Racoon Ford, and his lines extended twenty miles on each side of Orange Courthouse. Ewell and Hill were nearest the river. Longstreet's corps, which had just returned from East Tennessee, where it had been wintering since his terrible repulse at Knoxville, was within easy supporting distance, near Gordonsville.


The plan of Grant was to cross the river below, and, by a sudden movement, turn Lee's right flank, and cut him off from Richmond; then, by fierce battles, to beat him and destroy his army. In case of failure in these plans, his alternative was to force him back by marching by the left flank, and by this flank movement to follow him to Richmond.

THE ROADS.

A glance at the map will show two roads running from Orange Courthouse to Fredericksburg—the turnpike and the plankroad; the former tolerably straight, and the latter tortuous, but in a general parallel direction.

Let it be particularly observed, to a proper understanding of the movement, that the Stevensburg plankroad runs from Culpepper Courthouse to and across Germania Ford, in a southeasterly direction, crosses the turnpike before mentioned, and terminates in the plankroad. At the junction of the plankroad and the turnpike is the old Wilderness tavern. Five miles beyond, at the junction of the two plankroads, is the old church. The Brock road leads southeasterly to Spottsylvania Courthouse.

To reach this latter point, and thus pass through the Wilderness, if possible, without encountering Lee's columns, was



FROM THE RAPIDAN TO RICHMOND.

Grant's desire ; for, that junction once being secure, Lee's position on the Rapidan was turned, and several roads to Richmond were laid open to us.

THE WILDERNESS.

The Wilderness is a broken table-land, covered over with dense undergrowth, with but few clearings, in which the rebels could conceal themselves, which proved a formidable obstacle to our advance. It was intersected by numerous cross-roads, generally narrow, and bounded on either side with a dense growth of low-limbed and scraggy pines, stiff and bristling chinkapins, and scrub-oaks. The undergrowth was principally of hazel. There were many deep ravines, but not sufficiently precipitous to offer us much trouble on that account ; the principal difficulty being in the almost impenetrable undergrowth, which would impede our advance in line of battle, and render the artillery almost useless. Besides the cross-roads mentioned, numerous narrow wood-roads pass through the Wilderness in all directions.

With these preliminary remarks, let us now come to the passage of the river.

On the 3d of May, General Meade issued a stirring order to the Army of the Potomac, which was read to every organization.*

* HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
May 3, 1864.

SOLDIERS—Again you are called upon to advance on the enemies of your country. The time and the occasion are deemed opportune by your commanding general to address you a few words of confidence and caution. You have been reorganized, strengthened, and fully equipped in every respect. You form a part of the several armies of your country—the whole under an able and distinguished general, who enjoys the confidence of the Government, the people, and the army. Your movement being in co-operation with others, it is of the utmost importance that no effort should be spared to make it successful.

Soldiers! The eyes of the whole country are looking with anxious hope to the blow you are about to strike in the most sacred cause that ever called men to arms. Remember your homes, your wives, and children ; and bear in

THE CORPS MOVE.

At midnight, on the 3d, General Wilson, with the Third Cavalry Division, moved to Germania Ford, with an engineer party and ponton-train, to prepare for the crossing of the infantry at that point. Gregg's division of cavalry proceeded at the same hour to make similar preparations for the crossing at Ely's Ford. After laying the pontoons, Wilson's division marched forward to the old Wilderness tavern and Chancellorsville, without meeting any opposition. Up to this time it was evident that Lee expected Grant to move in the direction of Orange Courthouse and Gordonsville, and was not prepared to contest our crossing. At an early hour on the morning of the 4th, Warren, with the Fifth Corps, followed the cavalry to Germania Ford, and crossed. Sedgwick's (Sixth) corps came immediately after, and both marched down from the ford towards the junction of the plankroads, which we have designated as an important strategic point.

Hancock, with the Second Corps, followed Gregg's cavalry, and crossed at Ely's Ford just after daylight. Thence he marched, according to directions, to Chancellorsville.

The supply-trains had been assembled at Richardsville, guarded by one division of cavalry. From that point they followed the Second Corps, crossed at Ely's, and also marched towards Chancellorsville.

mind that the sooner your enemies are overcome, the sooner you will be returned to enjoy the benefits and blessings of peace. Bear with patience the hardships and sacrifices you will be called upon to endure. Have confidence in your officers, and in each other.

Keep your ranks on the march and on the battle-field; and let each man earnestly implore God's blessing, and endeavor, by his thoughts and actions, to render himself worthy of the favor he seeks. With clear conscience and strong arms, actuated by a high sense of duty, fighting to preserve the Government and the institutions handed down to us by our forefathers, if true to ourselves, victory, under God's blessing, must and will attend our efforts.

GEORGE G. MEADE, Major-General commanding.

S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant-General.

A detachment of Sheridan's cavalry, after crossing, encountered and drove back Stuart, in the direction of Orange Courthouse.

Lee, who was keenly on the alert, if deceived for a moment, was soon aware of our purpose; and, with a vigor which must extort our admiration, moved up at once in two columns, to offer desperate battle on the morrow, and, if possible, to break our line of battle, hastily formed to meet his attack. It was now manifest that, although Grant had crossed the river by a surprise, he would not reach the point of destination, and leave the ugly Wilderness behind him, without a fierce struggle.

PLANS AND COUNTERPLANS.

Lee's effort was to strike him in his flank movement, by two columns, against his line, and, if possible, rout him in the Wilderness, after piercing his line, as Nelson and Collingwood did that of the French and Spaniards at Trafalgar. Grant had not intended to fight in the Wilderness, if he could help it; but he was compelled to do this. When he found Lee approaching in force, he at once proposed to himself three alternatives: first, to beat Lee and rout him, wherever he chose to accept or to give battle; second, to cut him off from the railroad and Richmond, and then to follow him up and beat him; and third, failing of these, to compel him to move southward towards Richmond, striking him a side-blow at every step by flanking him on the left, and thus constantly threatening his right flank and communications.

We can only undertake to present the grand features of the campaign. Indeed, its myriad details are so confused that it is impossible to describe them. They can never be fully known.

After crossing, Warren's (Fifth) corps was placed in position, on Thursday at noon, west of the old Wilderness tavern, across the turnpike, on the Germania and Chancellorsville plankroad, towards Parker's store, and five miles south of the ford. The line of battle was formed nearly north and

south. Sedgwick, with the Sixth Corps, was expected to come into line on Warren's right, and extend to the river, covering all approaches to the ford, but was long delayed in doing so. Hancock, who had been directed upon Spottsylvania, was deflected, and hurried forward by the Brock road, to take post on the left, across the plankroad from Orange Courthouse, and thus to complete the line. There was a frequent shifting of divisions, but the general positions of the corps remained nearly the same.

Burnside, who had just reached Culpepper before the movement, had been directed to remain twenty-four hours there, and then to move forward and join the main body. The Ninth Corps was designed to form the reserves.

It was now plain that the enemy was moving by the turnpike and plankroad from Orange Courthouse, to cut us off from the intersection, and that the battle must be fought in the Wilderness. Lee was playing an offensive-defensive in a country with which he was well acquainted, and where a small force could forbid the advance of a very large army. He was moving, as we have seen, in two parallel columns upon the flank of our line. Grant was entirely on the offensive, and had a far more difficult task. His artillery was paralyzed; and it may be stated as a curious fact, that although there were nearly three hundred guns on the field, only about twenty were used. Much of the cavalry also fought dismounted.

THE REBELS' COME UP IN COLUMN.

Let us now turn to the Confederate army. It consisted of three corps: the first, commanded by A. P. Hill, formerly an officer of artillery in our army, a brave and determined general; the second, by R. S. Ewell, an equally good officer, who was a captain of cavalry before the war; the third, by Longstreet, whom we have already mentioned as a determined and rapid fighter. General Lee, "the idol of the Confederacy," commanded in person. No sooner had he an intimation of our crossing, than he moved Ewell up by the turnpike, and on

the night of the 4th his advance division, under Johnson, encamped in front of Warren's left, at Parker's store, on the plankroad, three miles from Wilderness Run. Rhodes' division followed by the same route, and Early's took post within supporting distance, near Locust Grove,—all in readiness for the battle which it was evident to every commander, in both armies, must be fought on Friday.

Before day of the 5th, Johnson's division gained a hill in their front, forming in line of battle, with John M. Jones' brigade on the right, Stafford in the centre, and Stuart on the left. Walker was in potence on the extreme left.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS.

ORDERS TO WARREN AND SEDGWICK.—THE BATTLE-FIELD.—HANCOCK TO THE RESCUE.
—GENERAL ATTACK ON THE 6TH.—HANCOCK'S ENCOUNTER.—SECOND REBEL AS-
SAULT.—GORDON FLANKS OUR RIGHT.—GRANT ON THE FIELD.—COMMENTS.—LOSSES.
—DRAWN BATTLE.

ORDERS TO WARREN AND SEDGWICK.

EARLY on the morning of the 5th, the head of Warren's (Fifth) corps being near Parker's store, on the Orange and Fredericksburg plankroad, information was received that the enemy was coming up in force on the Orange turnpike. Orders were immediately sent to Warren to halt, concentrate his corps on the pike, and attack furiously whatever he should find in his front. The orders were explicit, and the manœuvres rapid. The Sixth Corps was directed to move at once by any wood-roads they might find, and support Warren, by taking position on his right, and joining in the attack: but Getty's division, of the Sixth, was detached, and hurried to the intersection of the Orange plankroad and the Brock road, with orders to hold it to the last, until Hancock, who had now been deflected from Chancellorsville, should come up into line on the left.

THE BATTLE-FIELD.

The battle-field in front of Warren, seen from the old tavern, may be thus described: In front is a brook, flowing

northeasterly, like the Fontanone, at Alexandria, fought over so furiously by the First Consul, and Melas, in the battle of Marengo. A bridge spans it at the turnpike; then the road rises to a ridge. On the southern slope is Major Lucy's house, in the midst of a lawn and green meadows; beyond which are wooded hills and cedar thickets. On the right of the turnpike the pines and cedars are thickly set: a ravine runs through still further to the right, on either side of which are the lines of Warren and Ewell. An Indian battle-ground truly, of broken, irregular surface, and almost impenetrable undergrowths; and yet here nearly a quarter of a million of civilized troops were to meet in the shock of battle.

The fighting began at twelve o'clock of the 5th. Warren had come into position, and attacked as directed, with the divisions of Griffin and Wadsworth. So energetic was the attack, that Ewell was driven back for some distance on the pike. Every thing would have been well, had it not been for want of the expected supports. Want of roads, and the extreme denseness of the thicket, had prevented the Sixth Corps from coming up in time, and thus completing the programme. Thus the very ardor of our attack exposed the flank of Griffin. The enemy, quick to take advantage of this, rolled him back, with a loss of two guns. Wadsworth, in turn, after desperate fighting, was forced back. In the mean time, Crawford's division, which had the advance in the morning, had been withdrawn to the right towards the pike, formed on the left of Wadsworth, and attacked with him. When Wadsworth was driven back, Crawford, in his turn, was for a time isolated, and although extricated, it was not without the loss of many of his men as prisoners.

Ewell's corps made desperate efforts against Warren to turn his left flank, before Hancock could come up. Getty, rapid and valiant, came into position as ordered, on the Orange plankroad, just in time to find our cavalry forced back by the overwhelming numbers of A. P. Hill's advance. With cool sagacity, Getty deploys his command on both sides of the road, takes the head of the advancing enemy in a *cul-de-*

sac, pours in a deadly volley, and checks them there until Hancock can come up.

The fighting was desperate and frightful; men were shot down by unseen enemies, and the confusion seemed inextricable. Johnson's division was precipitated upon Warren. Jones' brigade was driven back, and Jones and his aid killed in their efforts to rally his men. Stuart comes into the gap made by the retreat of Jones' brigade, and in turn our men are driven back; Rhodes' division comes up in rear of Johnson, with the brigades of Daniel and Gordon; and so vigorous is their movement, that they push our centre back and capture a number of prisoners. Such was the fighting in front of the Fifth Corps, and Getty's division of the Sixth. Warren lost terribly, but was not driven back far.

The Sixth Corps also sustained some attacks while coming into position. It was not until towards evening that it succeeded in making its way through the tangled thicket, and in forming a connection with the Fifth. But little was effected by either of these corps after the first attack of the Fifth. The red tide of battle swayed back and forward on the right, left, and centre, without important success on either side. On the whole, up to this time, the advantage seemed to be with the enemy; but it was not long to remain so.

HANCOCK TO THE RESCUE.

It was now two o'clock. The orders deflecting Hancock from Chancellorsville had not been sent a moment too soon. They were obeyed with such alacrity, that his arrival on the field was not a moment too late. He was directed to form at once, and attack with Getty.

In the early afternoon, Hancock, ever ready in the hour of danger, formed his line in front of the intersection of the Chancellorsville and Brock road, and was soon engaged with Hill's corps, which had come up by the plankroad on the right of Ewell. Hill's corps consisted of the divisions of Anderson, Heth, and Wilcox, all of them West Point men,

formerly in our army. Hancock attacked vigorously, driving in the skirmishers of Heth, who was in advance. The battle raged furiously for three hours; and, as in the other part of the field, it swayed back and forth until evening. When Heth was nearly overpowered, Wilcox moved up in his rear, on the right and left of the plankroad, first one brigade, and then another; and at half-past four, Hill's corps was fully deployed in Hancock's front.

The attack of Hancock and Getty was at first successful, although the enemy resisted stubbornly; but at length Mott's division of the Second Corps gave way, thus forming a temporary break in our line. Into this, with characteristic impetuosity, rushed Brigadier-General Alexander Hays, with the Second Brigade of Birney's division, to repair it. He was shot dead while gallantly leading his command into the thickest of the fight.

While this was pending, the enemy's columns now being distinctly seen in motion across towards the Orange plankroad, the division of Wadsworth and Baxter's brigade, all of the Fifth Corps, were marched over in that direction, to join and attack with Hancock. But again the impracticable nature of the country retarded their march, so that they did not arrive in time before dark to do more than drive in the enemy's skirmishers, and confront him, in readiness for the coming battle of the morning.

The coming of night, it was supposed, had put an end to the carnage. So desperate had been the enemy's attacks, and so determined his resistance to ours, that most commanders would have now been inclined to act upon the defensive. The nature of the ground, the great losses, and the small results were enough to discourage ordinary men; and doubtless many brave men in that army were already disheartened. But it was not so with Grant. With characteristic firmness and cheerfulness, after having received the reports of his commanders, he issued orders for a general attack to be made by each corps on whatever it confronted, at five o'clock the next morning. Greek had met Greek, and

the tug of war was to come. Those mighty hosts lay in close contact with each other, and in one place so near that the combatants drew their water from the same stream.

GENERAL ATTACK ON THE 6TH.

The arrangements for fighting the next day were these: Burnside was moved up to take post for a time in the gap between Warren and Hancock, between the Orange plankroad and the turnpike; while Getty's division of the Sixth Corps, and Wadsworth's division of the Fifth, remained detached as before, on the left of the Fifth, to re-enforce Hancock's right, upon which it was evident the most violent storm of the battle was to fall. His position was the most important. His attack would be vigorously made, and the enemy had massed heavily there to receive him.

Ewell's corps was now in front of Sedgwick and Warren, and Hill in front of Hancock. Longstreet, after a long march, has arrived during the night to re-enforce Hill. The sagacity of Grant in thus re-enforcing Hancock is now apparent, for otherwise the rebels would have overpowered him. To fill the gap in the rebel line between Ewell and Hill, Wilcox had been moved to his left to join on to Ewell; and there, still ignorant of Longstreet's coming, he intrenched himself.

Thus began a series of desperate conflicts from right to left, a repetition of the terrible carnage of the day before. Sedgwick contrived to hold his position in the right, and Warren his place in the line.

HANCOCK'S ENCOUNTER.

But the principal fighting, as was anticipated, is in front of Hancock. Attacking at five o'clock precisely, with Wadsworth and Getty, on the terrible plankroad, such is his momentum, that he drives Heth and Wilcox, of Hill's corps, a mile and a half to the rear, and within a hundred and fifty yards of Lee's headquarters. He takes possession of their

rifle-pits, many prisoners, and five stands of colors; but by eleven o'clock they have succeeded in slowly driving him back. It was at the critical moment, when the enemy was in some confusion, that Longstreet had appeared upon the field. McLaws' division of his corps, led by Kershaw's brigade, is handsomely deployed under fire; Field's division comes into the line, which is further strengthened by Anderson's division of Hill's corps; and these heavy masses now make overwhelming efforts to double up our left flank, and throw the whole army back upon the river. By eleven o'clock Hancock is driven back, and in danger of being turned, but sustains himself in the new position to which he has fallen back.

Wadsworth, pushing forward into a weak point between the rebel corps on the left centre, fights with the utmost gallantry to rally the retiring columns, has two horses shot under him, and at length falls dead by a shot through his head. The advancing rebels gain possession of his body, leaving his fate unknown until several days afterwards. General Getty, seriously wounded early in the action, refuses to leave the dubious field until compelled by loss of blood to do so.

SECOND REBEL ASSAULT.

There is now a lull in the battle, until four o'clock in the afternoon, betokening the still heavier massing of the enemy's troops in front of Hancock. At that hour the storm bursts again upon him. The troops of Hill and Longstreet, formed in four lines, move like a mighty sea upon Hancock's position, and roll into our lines, overwhelm the divisions of Birney and Barr, and approach very near to the headquarters of Grant and Meade. But that sea was soon to have its reflux wave. Gibbon's (Second) division, rapidly formed in rear of the breach, first checked and then pushed back this impetuous advance. Then, it is said, General Lee rushed forward to lead Gregg's Texan brigade, and was only prevented by the earnest entreaties of his officers and men.

Not long after Hancock is thus pushed back by the con-

centrated forces of the enemy—that is, after two o'clock in the afternoon—Burnside attacks towards the Orange plankroad, to the right and in advance of Hancock's position; but the enemy, relieved for a time from the pressure of Hancock, is able to advance his whole force against the Ninth Corps, and Burnside, unable to pierce his line, withdraws at nightfall, taking position between the Second and Fifth Corps.

(The skill and valor of Hancock, the firmness of Gibbon, and the distinguished gallantry of Colonel Carroll, commanding the Third Brigade of Gibbon's division, broke this surging wave of the rebel attack, and dashed Lee's hopes of breaking our left.

GORDON FLANKS OUR RIGHT.

And now the wearied Union army might well hope that the fighting for the day was over; but they were mistaken. At sunset, a heavy column of attack, under General Gordon—permitted to advance at his solicitation—moved from the extreme left of the enemy, which extended for a brigade front beyond our right, and, amid the deepening shadows, burst upon that flank, held by Rickett's division. Our men were worn out, and had thrown themselves upon the ground to rest, unconscious of the danger which was brewing. The result was a complete surprise. The roar of cannon and the flashing of a thousand muskets, heralded the instant charge of the enemy. On they came, like a whirlwind, on the flank and in front, rolling up and capturing the brigades of General Truman Seymour and General Shaler; (but the promptness of Sedgwick, commanding the corps, checked their advance, and prevented any further confusion. General Seymour was particularly unfortunate. He had that very day taken command of the Second Brigade of the Third Division, and had behaved with the greatest gallantry. We may say, in passing, that when marched as a prisoner to Richmond, he took occasion to tell the rebels, in the boldest manner, some unpalatable truths as to the issue of the war; which, if they had acted upon them, would have led to an earlier ending.

This little success of the enemy could not justify the rebel boasting with which it was announced! besides, it was very soon to be more than overbalanced; and Grant's great army, baptized by the fire, stood as firm as a rock in spite of it. It became necessary, however, to transfer the sick and wounded from the Germania Ford road to the one leading to Chancellorsville; and as for the ford, if Lee wanted that, Grant presented it to him as a free gift. He did not want it, however: business led him in the other direction. Impotent to stir Grant's army, Lee was about to abandon his position, and retire sullenly southward to guard his communications, and to find a new point where he might contest the advance of Grant.

During the fighting of Thursday and Friday, Wilson's division of the cavalry moved from Parker's store towards the Catharpin road, where it had several passages of arms with Stuart's rebel cavalry. For a time Wilson became isolated, and was fiercely attacked. He succeeded, however, in cutting his way through and rejoining the main body under Sheridan. On the 6th, Sheridan held the left flank and rear of our army, repulsing all Stuart's attempts to penetrate around our flanks, and on the 7th he repulsed the enemy with severe loss at Todd's tavern.

The fighting of the 6th of May substantially terminated what has become famous in history as the battle of the Wilderness; for on the next day, the 7th, Hancock's advance found Lee withdrawn from his immediate front, and pushing forward, discovered him in a new line, strongly intrenched, near Parker's store, and connecting with his intrenched line on the turnpike.

GRANT ON THE FIELD.

The headquarters of the lieutenant-general, during Thursday and Friday, were in rear of our centre, near the junction of the plankroad and a small road leading to Parker's store. Most of the time he was on a piny knoll with Meade, just in

rear of Warren. Those who observed him during the actions were struck with his unpretending appearance, and his imperturbable manner. Neither danger nor responsibility seemed to affect him; but he seemed, at times, lost in thought, and occasionally, on the receipt of information, would mount his horse and gallop off to the point where he was needed, to return with equal speed to his post of observation.

Divining Lee's purpose of retreat, Grant lost not a moment in irresolution, but set his army in motion on a night march fifteen miles to Todd's tavern, on his way to Spottsylvania Courthouse, whither, it was now evident, Lee was also hastening.

COMMENTS.

We may now pause for a moment to consider the desperate nature of the struggle in the Wilderness. Desperate it was in the extreme. Over a line of battle of six miles in length, in a thickly tangled country, adding confusion to slaughter, General Grant had forced his way past the enemy; had compelled him to abandon his works, positions, and plans of battle; but had neither demoralized nor thoroughly beaten him. On the other hand, Lee had no reason to boast of any success in his attacks. The rebel attack of Gordon upon Sedgwick had indeed given them some prisoners of ours, and had cut off Sedgwick's communication with Germania Ford; but as Grant had no intention whatever of returning, or of even holding the ford after his trains were safe, this apparent success of the enemy was really valueless; and when Grant withdrew Sedgwick, Lee, in concern about his right flank, had neither time, men, nor disposition to occupy Germania Ford.

Indeed, after the battle of the Wilderness, Lee, for a moment uncertain how severe Grant's losses were, thought we were retreating to Fredericksburg, to cover Washington. He was not long in doubt, for Burnside and Sedgwick were soon found to be in motion by the old Chancellorsville road towards Spottsylvania.

He had also other means of gaining information. Spies and traitors were all around our headquarters. Our signals were discovered and repeated; and, with a rapidity that savored of magic and diabolic arts, no sooner had an order been issued by Grant, than it was known at Lee's headquarters. On the other hand, we had no such information. There were not in the rebel ranks, wicked as they were, men as vile as Northern traitors, who, while wearing the uniform of the Republic, living on its bounty, and sworn to protect its glorious banner, were in secret league with the enemy, and doing more to defeat Grant's plans than did the men who were arrayed in battle against him.

LOSSES.

Our losses in these battles were not less than fifteen thousand men. Without means of accurate knowledge, we believe those of the rebels to have been less. Among those whom we could ill afford to lose were Generals Wadsworth and Alexander Hays, shot dead while gallantly leading the advance to repair the breach in our line on the afternoon of the 5th,—the former, a remarkable example of self-sacrificing patriotism. Past the prime of life, rich in the world's goods, of the highest social station, and distinguished in a political career, he needed nothing to gratify an honorable ambition; but, a loyal and loving son of the Republic, he had taken up arms to insure her integrity, and he gave, as he was ever ready to give, his life in vindication of the noble cause.

To an equally ardent patriotism, General Hays added the noble ambition of an educated and experienced soldier. Frank, brave, quick, and energetic, he was the model of a commander. His men loved him, and followed him, because he not only commanded, but led them; and although not in the highest position, we sustained no greater loss on that day than that of the noble Hays.

Among our wounded were Hancock (slightly), Getty, Gregg, Owen, Bartlett, and Carroll.

The rebels suffered also in the loss of generals. Longstreet, shot, they say, by one of his own men, was thrown out of the field for the rest of the year; and, with no disparagement to others, he was their best corps commander. John M. Jones, well remembered as one of the most efficient officers at West Point for many years, Jenkins, and Stafford, were killed. Pegram, Pickett, and Hunter were wounded.

DRAWN BATTLE.

In brief epitome, we may say that, considered in its immediate result, the battle of the Wilderness was a drawn battle. In the light of after events it does not so appear. It was the grand and bloody initiative of a splendid campaign, in which Lee was to be driven to Richmond, and eventually surrounded and captured there. We have the highest authority for saying that Grant was not for a moment dismayed, nor even for a moment doubted the final result.

CHAPTER XXIX.

ON TO RICHMOND.

SUSPENSE AT THE NORTH.—LEE'S RETREAT.—SEDGWICK KILLED.—WRIGHT TO SIXTH CORPS.—ATTACK ON SPOTTSYLVANIA.—HANCOCK'S FEAT OF ARMS.—THE AFTER-BATTLE.—OUR LOSSES UP TO THE 12TH.—WHO RETREATS, GRANT OR LEE?—THE LAND AHEAD.—A NEW FLANKING MOVEMENT.

SUSPENSE AT THE NORTH.

THROUGHOUT the country, the people, uninformed of Grant's plans, were in a state of great excitement; and, schooled as they were to expect disasters in Virginia, they would not have been astonished had his army made a "masterly retreat" across the Rapidan. The wild excitement in Washington during those battles cannot be described. It extended to the President and the War Department. High functionaries sat up all night to receive intelligence from the field. Orders were given to the outposts, mostly guarded by the Invalid Corps, to arrest all fugitives, not to permit a single man to enter the defences of Washington, and to put all officers who should be found retreating, in irons. The crowd of fugitives was great and sickening, and among the officers thus ironed and brought to the War Department, it is a significant fact that there were four colonels: so that at the very moment Grant was carrying out his plans of advance, and before his dispatches could be received, it was feared that his whole army was in retreat. This horrible fear and suspense were, however, soon dis-

pelled. The good news came, and with it came a call for reinforcements. Lee was not driven from the field in rout. This hope, if it had been entertained, was not realized; but the country breathed freely at the assurance that, in default of this, Grant was pushing him slowly but surely down to his defences at Richmond. Every available man was sent to the front. The heavy artillery regiments, which had been recruited for the purpose of forming garrisons, were pushed forward, and the last volunteers took their place. The President of the United States, now that the first suspense had been removed, proposed public prayers and thanksgiving, in token of our gratitude to God, and our dependence upon his mercies.*

LEE'S RETREAT.

At daybreak on Saturday, the 7th of May, hostilities were again resumed. Our artillery opened upon the enemy's positions, and skirmishers were thrown out. It soon became evident that battle tactics were for a time ended, and that grand tactics would be the order of the day. And here it should be observed how closely the minds of Lee and Grant divined and followed the plans of each other. Grant, as we have said, had abandoned Germania Ford, and withdrawn Sedgwick, marching him to the rear and left. Here seemed to be a chance for Lee to cut his communications; but this very movement of troops to our left compelled the enemy to pause, and to take care of his right flank and his own communications.

* EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, May 9, 1864.

TO THE FRIENDS OF UNION AND LIBERTY:

Enough is known of the army operations within the last five days to claim our especial gratitude to God. While what remains undone demands our most sincere prayers to and reliance upon Him (without whom all human effort is vain), I recommend that all patriots, at their homes, in their places of public worship, and wherever they may be, unite in common thanksgiving and prayer to Almighty God

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

There was a little desultory fighting in our front; but, by noon on Saturday, the fact was fully developed that Lee was abandoning his intrenchments, and moving down rapidly by his right, on a road parallel to our projected movement, in order to give us check at Spottsylvania Courthouse. The two armies moved simultaneously. On the night of the 7th, Warren's (Fifth) corps, preceded by a column of cavalry, moved southward by the Brock road, followed, with closed intervals, by Hancock's (Second) corps, through Todd's tavern; Burnside's, by a road to the east across the Ny; and Grant's headquarters were moved to the road running northeast from Todd's tavern, and crossing the Ny near Piny Branch Church. During the movement, Grant and Meade, with their staffs, were consulting at the front, and constantly exposed to the fire.

Both armies were now in motion for Spottsylvania Courthouse. The cavalry, after some skirmishing near Todd's tavern, had at length a general battle, in which our forces were only successful in holding their ground.

The Fifth and Second corps were pressed forward on the Brock road on Saturday night and Sunday morning. The Fifth, notwithstanding its great fatigue, was not suffered to rest, but marched all Saturday night. The Sixth and Ninth, on the east, in that order, by the Orange plankroad and the turnpike, preceded by the trains, were also in movement, all converging to Spottsylvania Courthouse. In order to clear the dense roads, it was found necessary to move the trains by daylight, which gave information to the enemy, and enabled him to meet our movements with corresponding checks.

Lee was retreating to the same point by a parallel line to the west, but in perfect order. Master of the situation, he displayed great skill in turning to the left, and striking sharp, well-aimed blows, for which Grant was prepared, and which he returned with interest. Thus was fought the battle known as "Alsop's Farm," where the Fifth Corps received one of these attacks.

The Fifth Corps, marching by the Brock road, arrived

within three miles of Spottsylvania, and here encountered the corps of Longstreet, prepared to dispute the crossing of the River Po at the Brock road. Longstreet's corps had arrived at the same point, where the Wilderness terminates, and the country is open and rolling. The battle began before reaching the field of conflict, by an engagement between the cavalry who had marched in Warren's front, with the enemy's cavalry. Warren pushed rapidly down the road, meeting with slight resistance, until he came into the clearing of about one hundred and fifty acres, which was Alsop's farm. Here he found the enemy's artillery posted, and ready to contest his advance across the Ny, an inconsiderable stream, but with an ascending wooded slope on the other side.

Warren posted his batteries on the right, where he could command those of the enemy; and after a fierce duel of cannon, he advanced Robinson's division to the assault. The intense heat of the day added to the labors and sufferings of the troops. Through two rebel lines he forced his way, but found their third line protected by strong intrenchments. These he assaulted without success, until, re-enforced by a brigade of the Sixth Corps, on Sunday afternoon, he drove the rebels out, and captured their position near the blockhouse, inflicting upon him a loss of fifteen hundred men. Generals Griffin and Robinson were particularly distinguished: the latter was shot in the knee early in the action, and disabled. The Sixth Corps was at once ordered up to take position on Warren's left, and the Second Corps posted temporarily at Todd's tavern.

In thus advancing and seeking the enemy, every corps was more or less engaged during the day. Miles' brigade, of the Second Corps, was vigorously attacked by the enemy at Corbyn's Bridge, but that gallant young officer, who had already been more than once severely wounded in former battles, punished the insolence of the brigade of the enemy by first repulsing his attack, and then driving him from the field.

Wilson, who had been sent forward to feel the way, actually penetrated into Spottsylvania Courthouse; but as it was im-

possible for the infantry to come to his support, he was obliged to retire.

The armies had now reached the scene of more desperate fighting; and fully aware of what was before him, Grant spent the morning of the next day, Monday, the 9th, in preparation; the Fifth and Sixth corps pressing the enemy, developing his position, and seeking for points of attack for the deadly struggle.

Early in the morning, two divisions of the Ninth Corps having been moved to the Fredericksburg road, had driven the enemy handsomely across the Ny. In the evening, the whole of the Second Corps moved up from Todd's tavern, and came into line on the right of the Sixth; except Mott's division, which was sent to take post on the left of the Sixth.

It was also on the 9th that Sheridan was sent on a co-operating and diversionary raid, to which we shall presently allude.

Artillery was put into position; divisions were marched and countermarched. Warren was in the centre. Hancock had now moved up on the right, and Sedgwick was on the left. The wings were thrown forward, to encircle the corps of Hill and Ewell, which had reached the courthouse and taken position some distance in front of it on Saturday night. During these movements, Brigadier-General William H. Morris, commanding First Brigade, Third Division, Sixth Corps, was severely wounded. A small creek, a branch of the Ny River, lay between the position of the enemy and that of Warren and Sedgwick, and also separated Hancock from Warren.

GENERAL SEDGWICK KILLED.

While strengthening the position, and when only a little desultory skirmishing was going on, General Sedgwick was in the front of the extreme right of his corps, with a few of his staff, superintending the posting of some guns. An occasional shot from a sharpshooter whistled, with elongated sound, about the group, causing some of the men to wince. The general

joked them about their nervousness, saying, "Pooh, men, they can't hit an elephant at that distance." The words had hardly passed his lips, when a ball pierced his face, just below the left eye, and with a serene smile, as if connected with his last words, he fell, the blood streaming from his nostrils. He died immediately, as he would have asked to die if he could have chosen the manner of his death. Words of eulogium which would seem like flattery if spoken of other men, are inadequate to express his virtues. A thorough soldier, a skilful general, and one of the very best of men, he was at once respected and beloved by all who knew him. Simple in heart and manner; modest as a youth; very generous to all around him; never seeking his own aggrandizement to the detriment of others, but rather preferring theirs to his own; he was the modern example of Chaucer's "very parfit, gentil knight." Forever green be the turf above his quiet grave at Cornwall Hollow, watered by the tears of friendship, and cherished by the pious care of patriot pilgrims.

GENERAL WRIGHT TAKES THE SIXTH CORPS.

The command of the Sixth Corps was now devolved upon General H. G. Wright, an engineer officer of distinction, whose after-career showed that he was eminently worthy of it. Burnside came into position on the extreme left, on the 10th, to complete our lines around Spottsylvania. Having established his lines, Grant now determined to test the strength, and find the exact positions, of the enemy.

To this end, on the afternoon of Monday, he ordered a new advance. It had been a race for Spottsylvania Courthouse, and the rebels, having the inside track, had won it by only ten minutes.

We had now occupied Fredericksburg as a temporary depot of wounded, and ponton-bridges were laid below the town, so as to complete the communication with Aquia Creek, and thence to Washington. It was now Tuesday morning, the 10th of May. The position of the troops was substan-

tially the same as on the day before. The enemy had been driven to his breastworks. Our line was complete: batteries covered our right flank, and also our left centre; a dense forest was in our front. The enemy's centre was well advanced on a commanding ridge, protected by breastworks, forest, and underbrush, and the marshy ground of the little creek lying on their front.

Before moving to the attack, the general ordered a fire of artillery from all our batteries during the forenoon. The assault was then ordered to be made by portions of the Second and Fifth corps. The object was to storm and take the enemy's rifle-pits. The battle now raged along the whole line. Barlow's first division of the Second Corps was at one time flanked, but was soon extricated, without great loss.

THE ATTACK ON SPOTTSYLVANIA.

Early in the morning, the divisions of Gibbon and Barlow were moved briskly across the branch of the Ny which separated them from the enemy, and assaulted his left, with the hope that they might turn his flank; but finding it too strong, they retired,—Barlow, in his retreat, repulsing an attack by Heth's rebel division, but losing one gun, which, being jammed among the trees in a narrow road, he could not withdraw. After this, Gibbon and Birney, in conjunction with the Fifth Corps, made a new and unsuccessful assault upon the enemy's line, in which the gallant Brigadier-General Rice, noted throughout the war for his personal intrepidity, fell mortally wounded.

Late in the afternoon, Colonel Upton, with the Second Brigade of the First Division of the Sixth, and D. A. Russell, in advance, with the Third Division, made a memorable and successful charge towards the close of the day. They sprang over the enemy's works, took upwards of a thousand prisoners and several cannon, and only retired, being obliged to abandon the captured artillery, because they were so far in advance as to make the position perilous, and were not sup-



ported by Mott on their left. Mott, however, succeeded in forming connection with the Ninth Corps, which had now moved to the left from the Fredericksburg road.

Although the carnage had been so great as to make the losses on our side not far from ten thousand, and the rebels not much less, the battle was indecisive. Again had the rival generals divined each other's purposes, and terrible shocks had been the result. Thus ended the first day of the battle of Spottsylvania Courthouse, and the troops rested on their arms, feeling sure that a struggle as desperate awaited them on the morrow, or, at least, at a very early time.

The morning of Wednesday, the 11th, rose bright and clear, and the closeness of contact of the two armies caused desultory fighting at many points, but no general engagement. We had lost very heavily, probably at least thirty-five thousand men, since the beginning of the campaign; but we had taken many prisoners, had inflicted terrible losses upon the enemy, and re-enforcements were rapidly pushing forward to us,—among the material of which, it is a significant fact that there were heavy artillery trains, designed for siege service at Richmond.

What General Grant thought of the military situation may be gathered from the following hopeful dispatch to the Secretary of War :

HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD, May 11, 1864, 8 A. M.

We have now ended the sixth day of very heavy fighting. The result, to this time, is much in our favor.

Our losses have been heavy, as well as those of the enemy. I think the loss of the enemy must be greater.

We have taken over five thousand prisoners by battle, while he has taken from us but few, except stragglers.

I PROPOSE TO FIGHT IT OUT ON THIS LINE, IF IT TAKES ALL SUMMER.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General,
Commanding the Armies of the United States.

No words could tell the story better. The last sentence is one of those eloquent epigrams, unconsciously uttered, of

which the people immediately took hold, and upon which the changes have been rung ever since. It spoke volumes.

At eleven o'clock on Wednesday, it is said that General Lee sent a flag of truce to Grant, asking an armistice of forty-eight hours to bury the dead; and that Grant very properly returned an answer refusing it, and saying that he had no time to bury his own. We do not vouch for the story; but if it be true, it indicates Lee's weakness, and Grant's determination of advance.

On this day, having assured himself that the enemy's left was so well guarded and so strong as to foil our attempts to crush it, arrangements were made by General Grant to attack his centre at a salient point.

Wednesday, the second day of the battle, was passed in manœuvring, reconnoitring, and desultory skirmishing. The enemy had strengthened his right and right centre with artillery, and it was evident that from that point he expected to make his strong counter-attack. But the prescience of General Grant was not at fault.

Rain fell during the afternoon, and under the cover of the heavy weather, Grant issued his orders to Hancock to leave his position in front of A. P. Hill, and, marching by the left flank, to take posts between the Sixth and Ninth corps, so as to be ready to attack in the morning. Hancock moved a little after midnight, favored by the storm and the darkness, and was in readiness at the time prescribed. Wright was directed to extend his left, to concentrate on that wing, and to be in readiness to assault. Warren was also to make a diversionary attack on the enemy's left, in his front, in order to keep him engaged in his lines at that point; while Burnside, with the Ninth Corps, was ordered to assault vigorously on the extreme left.

HANCOCK'S FEAT OF ARMS.

The morning of Thursday, the 12th, dawned, enveloped in an auspicious fog of great denseness. The orders were given in

silence. The Second Corps was formed in two lines. Barlow, with the First Division, in double column of battalions, on the centre, and Birney, with the Third Division, constituted the first line; the Second and Fourth, under Gibbon and Mott, formed the second line. The point of attack was a salient angle of earthworks, held by Johnson's division of Ewell's corps. Silently and unseen, the corps moved upon the unsuspecting enemy. They passed over the rugged and densely wooded space, the enthusiasm growing at every step, until, with a terrible charge, and a storm of cheers, they reached the enemy's works, scaled them in front and flank, surprising the rebels at their breakfast, surrounding them, and capturing Edward Johnson's entire division, with its general; two brigades of other troops, with their commander, Brigadier-General George H. Stuart; and thirty guns. The number of prisoners taken was between three and four thousand. It was the most decided success yet achieved during the campaign. When Hancock heard that these generals were taken, he directed that they should be brought to him. Offering his hand to Johnson, that officer was so affected as to shed tears, declaring that he would have preferred death to captivity. He then extended his hand to Stuart, whom he had known before, saying, "How are you, Stuart?" but the rebel, with great haughtiness, replied, "I am General Stuart, of the Confederate army; and, under present circumstances, I decline to take your hand." Hancock's cool and dignified reply was: "And under any other circumstances, general, I should not have offered it."

Hancock's pencil dispatch to Grant, within an hour after the column of attack had been formed, was in these words: "I have captured from thirty to forty guns. I have finished up Johnson, and am now going into Early." Early, it will be remembered, also commanded a division of Ewell's corps. In pursuance of this purpose, Hancock pushed upon the second line of rifle-pits, and, notwithstanding a desperate resistance, stormed and took it. But if the enemy had been surprised in the morning, he now made the most desperate efforts to

recover his lost ground. Thus the battle became general. The Ninth Corps on the extreme left, and the Sixth Corps on Hancock's right, were at once pushed forward to support Hancock's advance; while on the opposite side, Ewell was re-enforced by divisions from the corps of Hill and Longstreet. While the battle was thus concentrated on our left, Warren became hotly engaged on our right; but although he charged with great vigor and intrepidity, the enemy's position in his front was found to be impregnable. Thus for three hours the fighting continued; but although we resisted the desperate attacks of the enemy upon Hancock and Burnside, it was evident that we could make no further advance. The ground was, in our front, swept by a storm of projectiles of every kind. The captured cannon, covered by the muskets of sharpshooters on both sides, could not, for a long time, be secured by either; but we finally got off twenty pieces, and the remainder were subsequently withdrawn by the enemy. At noon it began to rain. The Fifth Corps, leaving only a weak line of skirmishers, was moved to the left, as it was found that the enemy was continually massing his troops in the same direction. Neither general was deceived for a moment, and our attempts to turn the enemy's right, at once met by the rebel commander, were not successful. Charge and countercharge were made until nightfall, and the carnage was terrific. When, at length, night put an end to it, the armies had fought for fourteen hours, and the losses on either side numbered about ten thousand. It would have been thought that neither army was in condition on Friday, the 13th, after such great losses, to continue the action. But there was a severe battle fought, of six hours' duration, between Burnside and A. P. Hill. The enemy fell back to a new defensive position, but the continuance of the storm, making the roads very heavy, for a time impeded rapid movement. Here we may pause for a moment to consider what had been accomplished. If we had not succeeded in entirely routing the enemy, as only the ignorant or the oversanguine had expected, the Army of the Potomac had covered itself anew with glory. The following

order of General Meade epitomizes the work thus far achieved :

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
May 13, 1864.

SOLDIERS—The moment has arrived when your commanding general feels authorized to address you in terms of congratulation.

For eight days and nights, almost without intermission, in rain and sunshine, you have been gallantly fighting a desperate foe, in positions naturally strong, and rendered doubly so by intrenchments.

You have compelled him to abandon his fortifications on the Rapidan, to retire and attempt to stop your onward progress ; and now he has abandoned the last intrenched position so tenaciously held, suffering a loss in all of eighteen guns, twenty-two colors, and eight thousand prisoners, including two general officers.

Your heroic deeds and noble endurance of fatigue and privations will ever be memorable. Let us return thanks to God for the mercy thus shown us, and ask earnestly for its continuation.

Soldiers ! your work is not yet over. The enemy must be pursued, and, if possible, overcome. The courage and fortitude you have displayed renders your commanding general confident your future efforts will result in success.

While we mourn the loss of many gallant comrades, let us remember the enemy must have suffered equal, if not greater losses.

We shall soon receive re-enforcements, which he cannot expect. Let us determine to continue vigorously the work so well begun, and, under God's blessing, in a short time the object of our labors will be accomplished.

GEORGE G. MEADE,
Major-General commanding.

Official, S. WILLIAMS, A. A. G.

Approved,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General,
Commanding the Armies of the United States.

Both in a metaphorical and literal sense, we were now "out of the woods ;" we had the prestige of advance, and the enemy had been constantly, although slowly and sullenly, falling back. Our losses had been very heavy, but had been fully made up by re-enforcements. They may be stated as follows : from the crossing of the Rapidan to May 12th—killed, two hundred and sixty-nine officers and three thousand and nineteen enlisted men ; wounded, one thousand and seventeen officers, and eighteen thousand two hundred and sixty-one men ; missing, one hundred and seventy-seven officers,

and six thousand six hundred and sixty-seven men. Total, twenty-nine thousand four hundred and ten. On this account the rebels amused themselves by giving Grant the cognomen of "butcher." The name, however, is entirely misapplied. There never was a kinder or more considerate general; but the carnage in these first battles was an absolute, although painful, necessity. No man in that army thought otherwise then, and no one abated a jot of heart or hope; and if the end crowns the work, even the rebels will now confess that Grant's butchery finally slaughtered the rebellion, when nothing else would have done it.

It was now Saturday, the 14th. The enemy still held on to Spottsylvania Courthouse, well intrenched in a semicircular line. Our army was closed upon him with a concentric embrace, stretched at right angles across the Fredericksburg road. Finding him so strongly intrenched, Grant commenced to throw up rifle-pits for protection. The fighting on this day was desultory, and principally on the enemy's right, which he was constantly in fear that we should turn.

WHO RETREATS, GRANT OR LEE?

If, as General Meade's order indicates, we were satisfied with our successes, the rebels were equally so with what they called their own. They asserted that "what we represented as the retreat of General Lee towards Richmond, was only a movement from a position abandoned by his adversary, to confront him across the new road which he was obliged to take." "In this sense," says Pollard, "it was Grant who was pursued." Be it so, but it is very like the story of the man who caught a Tartar. General Lee is by no means so self-compromising as this. It is true that in his General Order of May 14, he announces to the army a series of successes; but, in specifying them, he names the Valley of Virginia, the attack upon Averill, the defeat of General Banks, the retreat of General Steele, and what he calls the repulse of the cavalry force under Sheridan. All that he has to say of his own

action is this: "The heroic valor of this army, with the blessing of Almighty God, has thus far checked the principal army of the enemy, and inflicted upon it terrible losses." We need not waste words nor torture language: Driven or led, or prompted by whatever motive, Lee's army was moving southward towards Richmond, constantly refusing its right flank, and being severely punished at every stand it made. It had been characteristic of the press on both sides, as well as of the early dispatches of rival generals, in most campaigns, to make out as fair a case, each for himself, and as dark a one for the enemy as possible. This is not right in the abstract, but before we entirely condemn it, we must remember the element of expediency. The people behind either army were eager and impressible, and the intelligence was often toned down or dressed up to suit them; and besides, morally wrong as it is, the study of history shows us a universal military precedent for this. The truth follows slowly, and when we are prepared by slow degrees for the bad news.

Every thing remained quiet from this time until the 18th, the intervening period being passed in manœuvring and waiting for re-enforcements. During the 19th, there were more changes made in the position of the corps, and new dispositions were made of the cavalry and artillery, the former being moved out towards the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad.

The desperate shocks which had been sustained by both armies, and the bad condition of the roads on account of the rains, made the suspension of hostilities necessary. The time was also spent in making provision for the wounded. As the direct route to Washington was beset by guerrillas, Fredericksburg had been occupied as a depot. A large number of surgeons and agents of the Sanitary and Christian commissions had been sent down, and a route had been established by steamboats and gunboats, by way of Aquia Creek and Belle Plain, to Washington. It was now manifest, that if the army moved again to the south, Fredericksburg must be abandoned, and other points selected as depots; first, on the

Rappahannock, as at Port Royal, and afterwards on the Pamunkey and York.

THE LAND AHEAD.

Let us now look for a moment at the principal features of the topography in front of Grant. Spottsylvania Courthouse lies between the Ny and the Po; further South are the Ta and the Mat rivers, and the four streams join near the railroad, south of Bowling Green, to form the Mattapony. These present inconsiderable military obstacles in themselves, but might be used by the enemy as natural intrenchments, while moving southward to New Market. Beyond that, the country becomes more difficult; the North and South Anna, with a hundred tributary creeks, present great obstacles. The Pamunkey, which they form by their junction, is an important river-defence to the enemy; and still further south the Chickahominy is a strong line covering the approaches to Richmond. To these difficulties is to be added the very desperate and gallant resistance offered by Lee's army.

In consideration of all these, it began to be demonstrated that Grant might be forced to pursue his alternated design, and continue to march alongside of the enemy by the left flank, between the Mattapony and the Pamunkey, and crossing the latter river out of his reach, confront him upon the former battle-grounds of Cold Harbor and Gaines' Mill. But Grant was loth to come to this determination without another trial of the enemy's strength. Sending Torbert with the cavalry eastward to Guiney's Station, on the railroad, he massed his forces on the enemy's left, on the night of the 17th, and prepared to assault in the morning. The attack was made with great gallantry upon Ewell's corps, with the design of turning Lee's left, but was not successful, and an admirable *riposte* was made by Ewell. On the afternoon of the 19th, he made a bold attempt to turn our right. That portion of our line was held by Tyler's division, and Kitching's brigade of heavy artillery, acting as infantry, most of whom were under fire for the

first time. Ewell's veterans came on at a charge, and drove them back to the cover of the woods; but they held their retired position with commendable bravery, until Birney came up with the Third Division of the Second Corps, in support. A vigorous charge of our combined forces drove the enemy from the field. Some of Warren's troops that were on the extreme right participated in the success.

A NEW FLANKING MOVEMENT.

Convinced, by the nature and the point of the enemy's attack, that he was making ready again to abandon his position, Grant at once issued orders for a new movement. At midnight on the 20th, the main body of the cavalry, which had been posted at Mattaponax, followed Torbert to Guiney's Station, and advancing, drove the enemy's cavalry away from Guiney's Bridge and Downer's Bridge, on the Po, both a short distance west of the railroad. Bowling Green was then occupied without a fight. But at Milford Station, on the railroad, the enemy were drawn up, with artillery and rifle-pits, to contest the possession of the railroad-bridge across the Mattapony. At this point there had been concentrated quantities of stores for Lee's army, which we might have captured. But spies and traitors in our camp had given timely information; and although we flanked the enemy and drove him away precipitately, the stores were gone. This movement of our cavalry was designed to clear the way for the advance of the grand army by the left flank. Here we shall leave the direct advance for a short time, to consider the collateral parts of the great programme.

CHAPTER XXX.

CO-OPERATING MOVEMENTS.

SHERIDAN'S RAID.—THE BATTLE OF YELLOW TAVERN.—J. E. B. STUART KILLED.—THE RAIDERS REACH THE JAMES.—FORTUNES OF SIGEL.—DEFEATED BY BRECKINRIDGE.—BUTLER'S MOVEMENTS.—HIS DISPATCH.—BEAUREGARD'S ATTACK.—HERMETICALLY SEALED.—KAUTZ'S RAID.—STANTON'S DISPATCH.—BUTLER'S FAILURE.—HOW THE WANT OF CO-OPERATION AFFECTED GRANT.

THE co-operating movements which Grant had, as we have seen, so skilfully and carefully prearranged, claim a place in the history, not only as parts, although subordinate, of the great campaign, but also, and especially, because they display new traits of genius and skill on the part of the great commander. The failure of some of these caused him to alter his plans under the pressure of circumstances, and gave him a thousandfold additional trouble. The first that we shall consider, because it was made by a portion of the Army of the Potomac, and may be considered indeed a part of its movement, is the very successful, well-conducted cavalry raid of General Sheridan, to aid our advance by cutting Lee's communications with Richmond.

SHERIDAN'S RAID.

This gallant and self-confident general moved from Spottsylvania at daylight on Monday, the 9th of May, with portions of the three divisions of his corps,—General Merrit, with the First Division, leading; General Wilson, with the Third, in the centre; and General Gregg, with the Second, bringing up the rear. His first direction, to deceive the enemy, was

towards Fredericksburg; but when within three miles of that city, he turned southward, passed rapidly along the enemy's right flank, chiefly by the Niggerfoot road, to Child's Ford, and thence to the crossing of the North Anna by Anderson's Bridge. He captured the Beaver Dam Station on the Central Railroad, destroyed two locomotives, three trains of cars, ten miles of the railroad track, and one million five hundred thousand rations. Here also he recaptured four hundred of our men who had been captured in the recent battles, and were being taken to the horrors of the Libby prison at Richmond. With our later knowledge of the atrocities committed in the rebel prisons, this latter alone was a sufficient achievement, had nothing else been done. At the Beaver Dam Station they were violently attacked by the enemy in flank and rear, and met with some inconsiderable losses, but their advance was not long impeded.

On Wednesday morning, the 11th, Sheridan marched to the crossing of the South Anna River at Ground Squirrel Bridge, and sent one brigade, under General Davies, to Ashland Station on the railroad. There Davies burned the depot, destroyed six miles of the track, with the culverts and army bridges, and returned unscathed to the main body, which had been pursuing its march southward.

Hearing that the enemy's cavalry was in force at Yellow Tavern, Sheridan advanced boldly, by the way of Glenallen Station, to meet him. Here he crossed swords with the redoubtable General J. E. B. Stuart, and drove him away with loss. Stuart, no less anxious for battle than Sheridan, opened the fight, by attacking our advanced brigade, under Devens, which might have been overpowered had it not been promptly supported by the brigades of Custer, Gill, and Wilson. The greatest loss to the enemy, and a corresponding advantage to us, was found in the fact that General Stuart was mortally wounded in this action. This officer was perhaps the best cavalry general in the rebel service. A graduate of West Point in the class of 1854, he had resigned his commission in the United States army to join the rebel cause; and being

constantly engaged in Virginia, had greatly distinguished himself in many battles, and particularly in bold raids on the flanks and rear of our army. He had now met more than his match as a raider, and his death at the hands of a raiding party. A man of such skill and untiring energy should have fallen in a better cause.

Pursuing his advantage gained at Yellow Tavern, Sheridan made a bold dash upon the outer defences of Richmond. Having gained the Brook Pike, which lay west of the Yellow Tavern, he charged across the Brook creek or river against the first line, which he carried, Custer's brigade even capturing a section of artillery and a hundred prisoners. Finding the second line too strong, and thoroughly commanded by redoubts and bastioned works, and the enemy's troops rallying to the defence, Sheridan recrossed his advanced troops, and retired rapidly to the passage of the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge. To cut off his retreat, he found that the enemy had partially destroyed the bridge, and had commanded the ruins by a force of infantry from Richmond. He rebuilt it hastily under a galling fire, and then detaching a force to watch the enemy on his right flank, he moved rapidly through Mechanicsville, by a slight detour through Cold Harbor, to a second crossing of the Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge. After crossing he destroyed the bridge, and proceeded to Turkey Bend, where he communicated by messenger with General Butler. His weary troopers reached Haxall's, on the James, on the 14th of May.

As compared with the encounters of large armies, the terrible shocks of battle, in which thousands fall, such exploits as this of Sheridan's bold riders are for the time eclipsed; but this expedition, conducted with rare address and dashing valor, produced moral effects upon the enemy which cannot be ignored. It is, besides, one of the beautiful and logical steps in the progress of Sheridan's reputation, which found its acme of glory in the last days of the great war.

THE FORTUNES OF SIGEL.

In accordance with the precise instructions from General Grant, to which we have already referred, Sigel's movements in the Valley and in Western Virginia were commenced on the 1st of May.

He confided the immediate command of the Kanawha expedition to General George Crook, who divided his forces into two columns, one of which was under General W. W. Averill. Both columns, starting from Charleston, on the Kanawha, crossed the mountains by separate routes. Without attempting to present the details of their march, it is sufficient to our purpose to know that the column under Averill struck the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, near Wytheville, on the 10th, and then moved, not unimpeded by the enemy, to New River and Christianburg. Averill destroyed the New River Bridge, skilfully eluded the gathering forces of the enemy, but did not succeed in destroying the lead-mines. He joined Crook at Union, in Monroe County, on the 15th.

Crook, leaving Charleston on the same day, with three brigades, advanced rapidly, with the purpose of striking the railroad at Dublin Station, between Wytheville and New River. Fighting the enemy, as he marched southward, at Princetown, and near the southwestern base of Lloyd's Mountain, he advanced to the railroad, drove them through Dublin, and destroyed the railroad effectually, southwestward as far as Newberne. A large force of the enemy now appearing, he did not attempt to advance upon Lynchburg, but marched northward to Meadow Bluff, in Greenbrier County. This double expedition, although it had frightened the enemy and drawn off his troops, had not succeeded as a co-operating column.

Let us now turn to Sigel. This officer, in accordance with his instructions, had moved with a force not far short of eight thousand men, up the Shenandoah Valley, as far as Newmarket, a town near the Manassas Gap Railroad, about fifty miles from Winchester, and midway between Mount Jackson and Harrisonburg. To meet him and contest his advance, the

rebel General Breckinridge had been sent by Lee to gather up all the forces he could hastily collect, and, leaving Jenkins and McCausland to resist the advance of Crook and Averill, to fall upon and beat Sigel. Could Sigel succeed in beating him, and make a triumphant advance upon Staunton, and then strike right or left at Lynchburg or Gordonsville, the assistance to Grant would have been of incalculable value. But he was very far from such success. He made an entire failure, in part due to himself—that is, as far as concerned the battle which he fought with Breckinridge; and in part, as far as all further movements were concerned, to the want of co-operation in Crook's force.

On the 15th of May the armies of Sigel and Breckinridge met in the shock of battle; and although the enemy lost greatly, Sigel was driven back and entirely defeated, losing a portion of his train, six guns, and one thousand prisoners, and abandoning his hospitals. He retired behind Cedar Creek. Thus one part, and an important one, of General Grant's complex plan had been shipwrecked, and the rebel forces which had opposed the columns of Sigel came back, with all the prestige of victory, to swell Lee's forces, and make the work of the army of the Potomac still more difficult.

Without loss of time, at the request of Grant, Sigel was relieved, and General David Hunter placed in command. We shall allude to the part he played, a little later in the narrative.

It is time now to examine the co-operating movements of Butler; for upon these Grant had placed a still stronger dependence.

BUTLER'S MOVEMENTS.

Butler's force consisted of the Eighteenth Army Corps, commanded by General W. F. Smith, and the Tenth, commanded by General Quincy A. Gillmore. The former of these generals was held in great repute for his gallant services in the Army of the Potomac, when under McClellan and Burn-

side, and for his skilful and rapid engineering at Chattanooga. The latter had gained great renown by his magnificent approaches on Morris Island, and his matchless artillery practice against the city of Charleston.

At the opening of the campaign, Butler's army was concentrated at Yorktown and Gloucester, apparently threatening to move upon Richmond upon the old track of General McClellan. To give color to this view, a cavalry force, eighteen hundred strong, was sent to West Point, at the head of the river, but with the real design of marching across the country and joining the main body when it should have gained a foothold on the James River.

On the 4th of May, Butler embarked his forces on transports, but did not move until after dark, when he went rapidly down the York and up the James, unobserved by the enemy. Leaving one brigade of colored troops at Wilson's wharf, under General Wild, two regiments at Fort Powhatan, and Hink's division at City Point, he landed the main body at Bermuda Hundred, a very strong position on the south bank of the James, in the bend of the river, three miles above the mouth of the Appomattox. Here he rapidly intrenched himself, and the navy gunboats were placed to guard the flanks. Bermuda Hundred, which has become so famous a name in the history of the campaign, was not a town, but, when he occupied it, boasted ten or twelve old-fashioned houses, and a few negro cabins.

When he was ready to start from Yorktown, he had also sent General Kautz, with a cavalry force, to operate on the railroads south of Petersburg and Richmond.

Thus far the expedition, cleverly conducted, had been a complete surprise to the enemy. We had gained a most valuable point south of Richmond; and could our troops have been at once pressed forward in full force, great things might have been effected.

The 6th of May was spent in making reconnoissances, and on the 7th, General Brooks, with five brigades, was sent to destroy the railroad between Richmond and Petersburg. After

considerable fighting, this force succeeded in destroying a railroad-bridge about seven miles north of Petersburg, and tearing up a portion of the track ; but the enemy, sagacious and rapid, and now thoroughly alive to the condition of things, sent a heavy force, and our troops were compelled to retire. Little had been gained. Again a day intervened, and on the 9th, Butler dispatched three divisions of the Tenth Army Corps, and two of the Eighteenth, for a more thorough destruction of the railroad. This force was successful in destroying the track ; but after a night battle, in which they suffered terribly, they were compelled to fall back to their original position. General Butler's dispatch to Secretary Stanton, on the 9th, epitomizes his successes in far too decided and hopeful a vein. We give some of the paragraphs :

“ General Kautz, with three thousand cavalry from Suffolk, on the same day with our movements up the James River, forced the Blackwater, burnt the railroad-bridge at Stony Creek, below Petersburg, cutting in two Beauregard's force at that point.

“ We have landed here, intrenched ourselves, destroyed many miles of railroad, and got a position which, with proper supplies, we can hold against the whole of Lee's army. I have ordered up the supplies. .

“ Beauregard, with a large portion of his force, was left south by the cutting of the railroads by Kautz.

“ That portion which reached Petersburg, under Hill, I have whipped to-day, killing and wounding many, and taking many prisoners, after a severe and well-contested fight.

“ General Grant will not be troubled with any further reinforcements to Lee from Beauregard's force.”

This dispatch needs no comment. Those who follow the narrative will be astonished to find how much General Butler was deceived at this time. But the fighting was not over. These troops of Beauregard were to trouble both Butler and Grant. Indeed, the evening of the very day upon which this dispatch was written must have opened his eyes. More time

was lost in resting the troops which were driven back on the night of the 9th; and on the morning of Thursday, the 12th, Smith and Gillmore again moved forward, advancing their corps to the railroad and northward—Gillmore towards Chester Station, and Smith by the right, along the river-bank, towards Drury's Bluff and Fort Darling. This movement, vigorously conducted, promised to make all right again. Crossing the railroad, Gillmore advanced towards Chesterfield Courthouse, and then diverging to the right, joined Smith, against whom, it was evident, the enemy was now massing his troops. Still advancing, they encountered an outer line of intrenchments, running across the railroad to the river.

On the evening of the 13th, and the morning of the 14th, Gillmore carried the first line in his front with comparatively small loss, and General Smith the first line on the right; and the enemy retired to his second and stronger line.

While manœuvring to attack the interior redoubts, which commanded the outer line, Butler received, in battle form, the true story of Beauregard's appearance. That general had collected the loose forces in North and South Carolina, and, but little impeded by Kautz's gallant raid, had come up to take command of the forces and country south and east of Richmond, against Butler.

BEAUREGARD'S ATTACK.

On the morning of the 16th, under cover of a thick fog, he made a violent onslaught on our advanced troops. First attacking the extreme right, held by Heckman's brigade, Weitzel's division, Eighteenth Corps, he drives it back, and captures its commander. Moving by the turnpike, another force drives Ashley's battery from the field, but he saves his guns. Smith's troops behave with the greatest gallantry; but the rebels attack his line at all points, only making feints upon Gillmore, who forms the left. Smith's corps is pressed back. Gillmore sustains the charges now directed upon him, and even moves to flank the rebel attack upon Smith, when

orders come up from General Butler to fall back. He has lost three thousand men; and in spite of great gallantry on the part of generals and men, he finds his army hermetically sealed in Bermuda Hundred, by intrenchments of the enemy close and parallel to our own. He can hold it with a corporal's guard; but troops there are of no earthly use to Grant: they must be withdrawn and employed elsewhere.

KAUTZ'S RAID.

Kautz makes another splendid raid; but it is now, as the French have it, *à propos de rien*: it has no bearing on Butler's plans. In itself, however, it deserves special commendation. Starting again on the 12th (he had only returned from the former raid on the 8th), he moved against the Danville Railroad. He first struck it, not far from Richmond, at Coalfield Station; thence following the track, he reached Powhatan, and, crossing the Appomattox, he came to Chola. At these points he burned the depots, tore up the track, and destroyed two freight-trains, one locomotive, and a quantity of stores. Losing no time, he then pushed down the river by Goodes' Bridge and Devil's Bridge, and then southward to Wilson's Station, on the Southside road. This station, as well as those at Welville and Black-and-White, he destroyed; and then he made his way through Laurenceville and Jonesboro' to Jarrett's Station, on the Weldon road, and thence to City Point, which he reached on the 17th.

On the same day, General Butler telegraphed to Washington the success of Kautz's expedition; but either he was not communicative in regard to the condition of affairs within his own lines, or Mr. Secretary Stanton thought it prudent to withhold the information. The dispatch to which we refer is as follows:

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, May 17—9 P. M.

MAJOR-GENERAL DIX:

Dispatches from General Butler, just received, report the success of his expedition under General Kautz, to cut the Danville road, and destroy the iron bridge across the Appomattox.

On Monday morning, the enemy in force, under cover of a thick fog, made an attack upon Smith's line, and forced it back in some confusion, and with considerable loss. But as soon as the fog lifted, General Smith re-established his lines, and the enemy was driven back to his original lines.

At the same time, the enemy made an attack, from Petersburg, on General Butler's forces guarding the rear, but were handsomely repulsed.

The troops having been on incessant duty for five days, three of which were in a rain-storm, General Butler retired leisurely within his own lines. We hold the railroad between Petersburg and Richmond.

Persons state that Bragg and Davis were present on the field.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

No amount of elegant euphemism can conceal the fact, that whatever the causes, the movements south of Richmond had ended in lamentable failure—a failure not due to want of good intentions, nor to lack of energy, but apparently to a want of military *savoir faire*. According to that simple definition of strategy, “the art of directing masses against decisive points,” or “masses against fragments,” he had failed at the outset of the campaign, by dividing and detaching forces, instead of moving his whole force. Instead of moving at once, valuable time was lost in these detached movements. His army was badly handled. He assumed a weak offensive, indicating a want of military knowledge and experience; and a bitter, brave, and exasperated enemy, who was deficient in neither, turned the tables upon him by taking a strong offensive, beat him, followed him to his intrenchments, and hemmed him in so closely, that he was fain, while protected by the gunboats, to hurry his own defences to completion.

Grant was indeed beset, not simply by rebel armies, led by skilful and brave generals, but by Federal failures;—Sigel defeated in the west, and Breckinridge re-enforcing Lee with about fifteen thousand men; Butler defeated at the south, and Beauregard free to send Lee a great part of his troops. It was necessary for him to modify, without materially altering, his plans; and he moved with the Army of the Potomac, to try an alternative thought of at the beginning—the crossing of the James, and the union of the armies under his own eye and command.

CHAPTER XXXI.

FROM SPOTTSYLVANIA TO THE CHICKAHOMINY.

THE CORPS MOVE.—RE-ENFORCEMENTS.—LOSSES FROM MAY 12 TO 21.—ON THE NORTH ANNA.—WITHDRAWN.—SHERIDAN'S RETURN.—CROSSING OF THE PAMUNKEY.—CHANGE OF BASE.—SHERIDAN HOLDS COLD HARBOR.—LOSSES FROM MAY 21 TO 31.—W. F. SMITH DETACHED FROM BUTLER.—THE BATTLES OF COLD HARBOR.—THE CROSSING OF THE CHICKAHOMINY.

LET us now return to the Army of the Potomac, with which Grant had his headquarters, and which, when we left it, was preparing to follow its cavalry advance, under Torbert, marching by the left flank to its new destination, and to carry out plans modified for the reasons presented above. Hancock's (Second) corps moved silently, at midnight of the 20th, from its position on the Ny, near the courthouse, and marching by the left, in the track of the cavalry, to Bowling Green, crossed the Mattaponi at Milford Bridge, which Torbert had wrested from the enemy, capturing one hundred prisoners. The enemy presenting himself closely upon his right and rear, Hancock formed in line of battle, about one mile south of the river.

At daylight on the morning of the 21st, Warren, with the Fifth Corps, pushed after Hancock, in connecting distance, driving away that portion of the enemy's force which was again clustering around Milford Bridge. In this new order of movement from right to left, the whole army was put in motion during the day. But to cover the operation, Burnside, before he moved with the Ninth Corps, threw out Ledlie's brigade in a strong skirmish line, thus making a demonstra-

tion to retain the enemy in position. He then withdrew his corps after nightfall, and by a roundabout march, rendered so by small bodies of the enemy which obstructed his direct advance, he arrived at Bowling Green at four o'clock on the afternoon of the 22d. The next morning he joined the advanced corps at Milford Station.

The Sixth Corps, under Wright, also left its place in line on the evening of the 21st; and while retiring from Spottsylvania, it was attacked by the enemy in force, and with great desperation, but the assault was handsomely repelled by Russell's division, and the further march unmolested.

The enemy, entirely acquainted with our movements, was never for a moment irresolute. At one o'clock on Friday night, not more than an hour and a half after Hancock had moved, Longstreet's corps followed close upon its right, to contest its advance and block its further progress.

Meantime, re-enforcements of men, cavalry horses, and supplies were pouring down to Grant's army, and preparations were busily made for the new depots that were hereafter to supply him. Our losses, from the 12th of May to the 21st, were as follows: Killed, one hundred and fourteen officers, and two thousand and thirty-two enlisted men; wounded, two hundred and fifty-nine officers, and seven thousand six hundred and ninety-seven men; missing, thirty-one officers, and two hundred and forty-eight men;—total, ten thousand three hundred and eighty-one.

The powers of the lieutenant-general were now most severely taxed and tested in the manœuvring of a very large army, in an extremely difficult and thoroughly hostile country, and in the face of a desperate enemy, fighting for the salvation of his capital, and, with it, for the very life of his cause. In the flanking movements which he had inaugurated, and in which he must now persist until he should take more permanent ground south of Richmond, Grant's flank was constantly exposed. His troops must be kept well together; and he must be always ready to form in line of battle, to receive the enemy's attacks.

It was now the afternoon of the 23d of May, and the entire army—less the corps of Burnside, which was still *en route*—had reached the banks of the North Anna, and were thus disposed: The Fifth Corps was near Jericho Mills, with the Second on its left, reaching to the railroad, and covering Taylor's Bridge.


The North Anna has in that vicinity three important fords—Island, Jericho, and Chesterfield or Taylor's Bridge fords. About two or three hundred yards in front (*i.e.*, north) of Taylor's, is Long Creek, a small run parallel to the river. The ground between forms a little peninsula, occupied by the Second Corps. The bridge-head in their front was a redan, with its faces touching the river, and protected by batteries and rifle-pits on the southern bank. At this bridge the enemy made a determined stand. Hancock at once made his dispositions to drive them away and gain the bridge. Throwing out a cloud of skirmishers, he moved Birney's division to the attack, and by a determined charge this force drove the enemy away; and without occupying the bridge, batteries were at once placed in position to command it and keep the rebels at a distance.

Determined to regain it, and perhaps also to cover his purpose of falling back, the rebel commander made a rush forward at eleven o'clock that night, but was hurled back with great loss. Another charge made at midnight was more successful, and they seized and held the bridge until morning; but as Hancock moved forward with his corps to cross it, the enemy sullenly retired, having failed in his efforts to burn it. Hancock now crossed the North Anna in force. Warren, on his right, crossed at Jericho Ford, and both corps threw up slight intrenchments.

ON THE NORTH ANNA.

It was nightfall on the 23d before Burnside came up, and after some skirmishing with the enemy at Oxford, took post, on both banks, between Hancock and Warren. Wright, with

the Sixth Corps, marched to take position on the right of Warren, who had effected a crossing at Jericho Ford, and repulsed a terrific attack of the enemy soon after getting into position; and thus they lay for the two following days, to await the enemy's movements. This time served to develop the fact that the enemy was still strongly in our front, posted in a wedge-form, with the apex pointing to the space between Hancock and Warren, and threatening the weak point in our line. The Sixth Corps was on the south side, on our right, crossing the Central Railroad, and extending to Little River. Next on its left, and all south of the river, was the Fifth Corps. To the left of it was only a portion of Burnside's corps (one division), the rest being on the north bank. Hancock, with the Second, occupied the left, having two divisions on the south bank, and one on the north. The enemy's dispositions enabled him, by the aid of strong intrenchments, to cover Sexton's Junction with his right; while his left was *appuyée*



upon Little River. At the same time he threatened our line in front of Burnside, while secure from our attacks. We were, therefore, in a very disadvantageous position. We could hope little from an attack in front; and should the North

Anna become suddenly swollen by rains, the position was perilous in the extreme. Thus reasoned the lieutenant-general. As soon as full information was received, he had recourse to his flanking tactics. He directed Warren and Wright to make a demonstration in their front, threatening the enemy's left; and he sent Wilson, with a cavalry force, to destroy the Central Railroad thoroughly. Under cover of these operations, he prepared for the new movement by the left. Thus the 24th, 25th, and 26th of May were spent on the North Anna.

The corps were withdrawn, as in the former movement, one after the other, beginning on our right. Only a strong skirmish line was left to engage the enemy's attention; and then, on Thursday evening, the 26th, the Sixth Corps, recrossing the river, took up its line of march, followed by the Fifth, Ninth, and Second. Thus again the enemy was compelled to abandon his strong position, and move, *pari passu*, with our army; while Grant steadily pushed down towards Richmond, without uncovering Washington, at least to any considerable advance of the enemy, for a single day.

SHERIDAN'S RETURN.

The cavalry expedition of Sheridan, to which we have already referred, after remaining three days at Haxall's to refit and supply, had started on its return march on the 17th of May. On the 18th he was at Baltimore Cross-roads, south of the Pamunkey, near White House. On the 21st, a party destroyed two bridges and a long stretch of railroad-track, not far from Hanover Courthouse. Striking out in every direction, he encountered and drove a party of the enemy's cavalry across the Chickahominy, on the same day; and on the 23d he crossed the Pamunkey at White House. On the 25th he reached Milford, and joined the Army of the Potomac. A two-edged sword, his march southward had cut the enemy's communications, while his return march prepared the way for the southern movement of our army.

He was not allowed for a moment to rest. On the night of the 26th he moved, with two cavalry divisions and Russell's infantry division of the Sixth Corps, down the Pamunkey; and by noon of Friday, the 27th, he had seized the ferry crossing at Hanover town, and thrown a ponton-bridge across. This ferry is only fifteen miles from Richmond.

The problem now was to put the whole army across, abandoning all northern bases. In anticipation of this, a large quantity of supplies had been sent by transports, around by way of West Point, to White House on the Pamunkey. It was just two years, within ten days, since the White House had been the headquarters of General McClellan, who, respecting it as formerly the property of Washington, had refused to occupy it, but had planted his tent in a neighboring meadow. But the ruthless spirit of war is no respecter of persons or property, and it was afterwards used, like other buildings, as a military depot.

The crossing of the Pamunkey by the Grand Army occupied the 27th and 28th of May. The Fifth and Ninth corps crossed at Hanover Ferry, while the Second and Sixth made the passage at Huntley's Ford, above.


The change of base thus effected gave the enemy great concern, although they affected to indulge in some ribald pleasantries on the occasion. Grant had, after all his terrible losses, only come upon McClellan's old ground, without accomplishing any thing but "butchery." But behind this was an ill-concealed tremor. The army that had driven them down in spite of all their efforts—that had inflicted terrible losses upon them—was, by one means or another, slowly but surely approaching Richmond, and evidently intended to continue fighting to the end. A long way from the old bases, they had established new ones. The troops were in capital spirits, most anxious to be led against the enemy. The weather was beautiful. The jesters about the change of base wished Grant much further off. The country, too, was satisfied. If he was to take Richmond, he must go to it, and he was always on the direct road.

Our scouts having reported that Breckinridge was near Hanover Courthouse, on our right, with five thousand infantry and Wickham and Lomax's brigades of cavalry, a reconnoitring force was sent in that direction to check their advance, while we steadily moved southward. In this movement, the advance of Sheridan's cavalry, proceeding towards Mechanicsville, encountered the enemy at Hawe's shop, near the crossing of the Tolopotomy, after a severe conflict, in which he lost four hundred men, drove them back, and held the crossing until they were relieved by the Second Corps, which came up rapidly for the purpose.

The 29th was Sunday. Our army was entirely across the river and three miles beyond; and Grant, having discovered the positions and forces of the enemy, now made his dispositions to meet them. Lee's army was now more than ever specially arranged for the defence of Richmond. In a general way, his line may be described as forming a concave towards ours. His right was extended beyond Shady Grove and Mechanicsville; his centre covered Atley's Station, on the railroad; while his left stretched in the direction of Hanover Courthouse. His army, on the alert, was prepared to follow every motion of ours.

On Monday, the 30th, the Army of the Potomac was thus disposed: Hancock having been pushed forward, relieving Sheridan, on the road from Hawe's shop, towards Atley's Station, pushed the enemy across the Tolopotomy, and occupied the centre. Warren having advanced, skirmishing with the enemy on the road to Shady Grove Church, formed the left. Wright, who had been ordered up on the right of Hancock, had for a short time occupied Hanover Courthouse, but closing down to his left, now formed the right wing. But on the 30th, the Ninth Corps, which had been in rear of our left, moved into the space between Hancock and Warren, and pushed out on the road towards Pole Green Church. One division of cavalry, under Wilson, covered our right and rear, while those of Torbert and Gregg were moving in front of the left—the pickets well thrown out on the Cold Harbor road.

Thus, with all its antennæ feeling for the enemy, the army slowly advanced.



At two P. M. of the 30th, the cavalry pickets on our left, which were advancing by the Cold Harbor road, were driven in, and Warren—whose advance, gradually moving to the left, was then near Bethesda Church—was violently attacked by a division of Ewell's corps, at about five o'clock. His left flank was for a time endangered by the vigor of the enemy's assault; but by the timely arrival of the divisions in rear, the enemy was repulsed, and then driven back by a road parallel to the Cold Harbor road. As soon as General Meade heard of the enemy's assault upon Warren, he issued orders for an attack along the whole line, in order to turn the brunt from Warren; but most of the corps commanders did not receive the order in time. Hancock, however, did, and with most commendable promptitude he advanced Barlow to the attack, drove away the enemy's skirmishers, captured their rifle-pits, and held them all night, in spite of a midnight attack of the enemy to recapture them.

We pause for a moment to give a summary of our losses, from the time of taking position on the North Anna to the eve of the engagement at Cold Harbor,—*i. e.*, from the 21st to the 31st of May. They had been trifling in comparison with our former losses: Killed, twelve officers, and one hundred and thirty-three enlisted men; wounded, sixty-seven officers, and one thousand and sixty-three men; missing, three officers, and three hundred and twenty-four men;—total, one thousand six hundred and seven.

As it was now manifest to Grant that Butler had a much greater number of troops than he could use, he was directed to send to the army with Grant all the surplus troops forming the Eighteenth Corps, under Major-General William F. Smith. This corps having taken transports at City Point, had moved down the James and up the York and Pamunkey rivers to White House. Grant's headquarters during the 31st were at a point five miles southeast of Hanover Courthouse, where he could best direct the momentous operations upon which he was now to enter. Preparatory to these, Wilson was dispatched with a cavalry division to Hanover Junction, to destroy the track and the railroad-bridge over the Anna, and thus prevent Lee from detaching troops northward, if he should be inclined to do so. This Wilson effected completely, defeating and driving away a force of the enemy's cavalry which had been sent to prevent it.


To check our direct advance—to cover the Chickahominy, Richmond, and the Virginia Central Railroad near the city—the corps of Ewell, Longstreet, and Hill were drawn up in line parallel to our front, and their cavalry was posted *en vedette*, on both flanks, as far as Hanover Courthouse on their left, and Bottom's Bridge on their right,—a long line in observation, soon to be broken up and move in accordance with our movements. Still intending to move by the left flank, Grant now directed Sheridan to push forward to Cold Harbor, a point which it was important to secure before moving his whole army to the left. Sheridan moved forward rapidly, Torbert's division in advance, and seized the convergence of the roads; but no sooner had he done so, than the enemy, equally impressed with the value of the position,* came upon him with overwhelming numbers. Sheridan sent word back that he was hard pressed, but was directed to maintain the position at

* Grant had secured a position, the importance of which was that it was the point of convergence of all the roads, radiating, whether to Richmond (his objective point), or to White House (his base of supplies).—Pollard, "Third Year of the War," p. 270.

all hazards, until he could be relieved by the infantry. The contest was unequal and very severe, but this gallant officer held on with a tenacious grasp which the enemy could not shake off, for the space of twenty-four hours; when the arrival of the Sixth Corps, under Wright, and W. F. Smith's Eighteenth corps, from the White House, relieved him from his peril. Hoke's division had been hurled upon him twice to drive him out, but in vain. Wright came up on the afternoon of June 1st, and, immediately proceeding to attack, we forced the enemy from parts of his first line, forcing him to fall back to a second one. Wright then took post in front of Cold Harbor, on the road to Gaines' Mill—Ricketts' division on the right, Russell in the centre, and Neill on the left. It was now past three o'clock, when Smith brought up his corps, after a severe march of twenty-five miles from White House, and formed rapidly on the right of the Sixth—Martindale's division on the right, W. H. T. Brooks in the centre, and Devens on the left. Unimpaired by the fatigues of the march, these splendid fellows rushed at once upon the enemy in their front, crossing an open space and a small fringe of woods, and burst upon the enemy's rifle-pits, capturing five hundred prisoners. It was in vain that the enemy made vigorous attacks during the night, and posted batteries enfilading our line. They were unable to recapture their works. Our losses, which were about two thousand, were of course greater than those of the enemy, who sustained the principal attack behind his intrenchments.

The result of this severe fighting was that we held Cold Harbor, and thus were enabled to cover White House, and continue our southern movement.

Our line of battle on Thursday, the 2d of June, extended from Cold Harbor to Bethesda Church. Hancock, on the left, occupied Cold Harbor. On his right was the Sixth Corps; then in order the Eighteenth and Fifth; while Burnside, who had been drawn in to Bethesda Church, formed the right.



COLD HARBOR.

On Friday, June 3d, a new movement was begun, at four o'clock in the morning, and resulted in one of the most terrible and hardly contested battles of the war. Before making a new advance by the left flank, Grant determined again to try the strength of the enemy, and he had issued orders that an assault should be made upon him along the whole line. At the specified time, all moved forward with varying fortune. Hancock, on our left, advanced, with the divisions of Gibbon and Barlow, up the slope in his front, which was swept by a terrible artillery fire. So vigorous was this attack, that the enemy was pushed out of his works, and thrown back upon his second line. But here he rallied, threw in a fearful enfilading fire upon our advance, and in turn drove it out in hot haste to seek shelter from the iron storm; but not so rapidly as not to take with it three hundred prisoners and one color. Not content with this, however, the enemy attacked our lines furiously again and again, but were repulsed.

Quite similar to this was the fortune of the attack made by our centre, under Smith and Wright. They also carried the works in their front by a splendid charge, but were driven out by the enemy, and forced to throw up intrenchments near his works. As the enemy had massed heavily on our left and left centre, the principal fighting was in front of these corps and when it was found that we could not drive him from his

intrenchments, offensive operations ceased, at about eleven o'clock.

The fighting in front of Warren and Burnside was unimportant; but Burnside reported that he had carried an advanced line in his front. During the entire day the enemy made wild charges against our lines, which were never successful in breaking them.

On our extreme right, Wilson had been posted with the Third Cavalry Division, and there he came in contact with the cavalry of Wade Hampton, which he drove away. There, too, he fell upon an infantry brigade of Heth's division, which had been sent to envelop Burnside. He drove this force back, and took from it a number of prisoners.

The battle of the Chickahominy, or Cold Harbor, may be regarded from several points of view; and our opinion concerning it will vary with each. As a combined general movement against the enemy, to drive him away, and to uncover the bridges of the Chickahominy, forcing him into Richmond, it was not a success. As an effort to maintain a most strategic point, and to strike him a severe blow, under cover of which Grant might throw his army unmolested south of the James, it was by no means a failure. As a shock of arms, in parallel lines, with the right wing of the enemy strengthened, it was a drawn battle;—adding another to the many illustrations, that when troops of about the same excellence meet, under equal circumstances, in a mere trial of strength, force neutralizes force, and each party will reel back under the double momentum.

But if Cold Harbor was to Grant a battle of alternatives,—if he had determined, could he drive the enemy back, to take immediate advantage of it, and follow him across the river, and up to the fortifications of Richmond,—it was now evident, that failing in this, it was not possible, by a rapid flank movement in either direction, to interpose between him and the city. He now at once determined again to pass around Lee's right, join the Army of the Potomac with that of Butler, and lay siege to the southern defences of the redoubted capital.

He might still have moved against Lee's left, and thus continued to "cover Washington;" but he would have had a distant base, a long line of communication to guard, and would have left open to the enemy all his vital southern communications.

Sheridan was holding the lower crossings of the Chickahominy, and covering the roads to our new depot at White House.

Our losses had been about seven thousand five hundred, while those of the enemy were comparatively slight. General R. O. Tyler was severely wounded, being for some time after in danger of losing his foot.


We were now in another decade of battles, literally from the 1st, when Torbert held the courthouse, to the 10th of June, while we were pushing the enemy and perfecting arrangements for the crossing.

Burnside reported that the enemy had withdrawn from his front; and the reason of this was soon manifest.

On the 4th we were slightly intrenched in Lee's front; and at nine o'clock at night he made a vigorous attack upon the Second, Sixth, and Eighteenth corps in line, and after a severe action, with all the terrible but magnificent concomitants of a night-battle, he was driven back.

During Sunday, the 5th, we continued the work of intrenching. The lines were very close,—so close, that the sharpshooters did excellent work on both sides, by picking off the officers and men in the trenches. At half-past eight, with commendable activity, the enemy sallied out and assaulted Smyth's brigade of the Second Division of Hancock's corps; but being manfully met with firmness and steel, he was again compelled to retire discomfited to his own lines. It should have been said that Burnside was withdrawn from the extreme right on the 4th, and posted between Warren and Smith. So also on the 6th, while we still continued intrenching on our left and centre, Warren was withdrawn and massed in rear of the centre. A night attack on Burnside was again repelled.

The result of the hard fighting of the few past days was



now painfully manifest in the great number of unburied dead and suffering wounded lying between the two armies. After a correspondence between Grant and Lee, dictated by humanity, an armistice of two hours was agreed upon, during which the dead were buried and the wounded removed.

Again the operations of the army became problematical; and while considerable re-enforcements were reaching the army, Grant digested the details and co-operative portions of his new plan. He had seen that in the entire movement from the Rapidan, the enemy had been upon the defensive, willing to risk nothing, assuming occasionally a dashing but ephemeral offensive, and always falling back, when pressed, behind well-selected and thoroughly prepared intrenchments. To beat Lee's army, therefore, as had been his desire, north of Richmond, he found was impossible, without greater losses than he was willing to incur. He therefore determined to hold the ground which he then occupied for a few days. During this time he proposed to send Sheridan, with two divisions of cavalry, to destroy thoroughly the Virginia Central Railroad, and then to advance and join with Hunter, who Grant hoped would meet him at Charlottesville. The result of this combination would be, to destroy all railroad communications between Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley, and also between Richmond and Lynchburg, and then to join Grant. The second and great part of the programme was for Grant to move the Army of the Potomac to the south

side of the James, by the enemy's right flank ; and thus cut off all his sources of supply, except by the canal. A beautiful programme—destined, however, as we shall see, to fail, through the ill-success of some of his lieutenants, and fortuitous circumstances entirely beyond his control.

To aid him in carrying out the latter portion of the movement, Butler sent Gillmore to capture Petersburg, if possible, and to destroy the railroad crossing and common bridges over the Appomattox. We shall refer to these subordinate movements presently.

On the 7th of June the Second Corps was extended to the Chickahominy. The Fifth was removed by the left flank past the rear, and a portion of it marched to Dispatch Station, on the York River Railroad; while the divisions of Griffin and Cutler moved down towards Sumner's Lower Bridge, which, on reconnoitring, they found in possession of a large force of the enemy. To feel the nearest crossings below, Torbert and Gregg skirt the river to Bottom's Bridge. The enemy has extended his line that far. He cannot extend it much further, without so weakening it by the tension as to offer opportunities to break it.

Below Bottom's Bridge, are Long's Bridge and Jones' Bridge, the former six miles below, and on the direct road from White House; the latter about six miles further down, on a direct road to New Kent Courthouse on the north, and to Charles City Courthouse on the south.

Our losses from the 1st to the 10th of June, in what may be called the battles of Cold Harbor, were: Killed, one hundred and forty-four officers, one thousand five hundred and sixty-one enlisted men; wounded, four hundred and twenty-one officers, eight thousand six hundred and twenty-one men; missing, fifty-one officers, two thousand three hundred and fifty-five men;—total, thirteen thousand one hundred and fifty-three.

The projected movement of Grant must have been known to the enemy, but it was accomplished with such cleverness and dispatch, that it was, after all, of the nature of a surprise.

He directed the immediate destruction of the railroad from Dispatch Station, near the Chickahominy, to White House; and taking all the rails, sleepers, and ties to the latter place, had them shipped on barges for use below. This occupied the 10th and 11th.

The crossing of the Chickahominy began on the evening of the 12th (Sunday). Wilson's division of cavalry marched to seize the crossing at Long Bridge, and took position on the Long Bridge road, beyond where it crosses White Oak Swamp. The Fifth Corps followed in his track, Crawford, with the Third Division, joining Wilson on the morning of the 13th, and with him repulsing all the efforts of the enemy to advance upon our flank. The Second Corps, leaving Cold Harbor on the night of the 12th, then crossed, also at Long Bridge, passed the Fifth, and thus forming the advance, marched to the James River, which it struck at Wilcox's wharf, between Charles City Courthouse and Westover.

The Sixth and Ninth corps crossed at Jones' Bridge, entirely unmolested, and marched to Charles City Courthouse. The immense trains, making a wide detour to the south, crossed principally at Coles' Ferry, twelve or fifteen miles below Jones' Bridge. Smith's (Eighteenth) corps, which had been doing temporary but most valuable service with the Army of the Potomac, was now relieved. On the night of the 12th it was marched to the White House, where it took transports to sail down the York and up the James, again to report to Butler at Bermuda Hundred.

CHAPTER XXXII.

SOUTH OF THE JAMES.

THE CROSSING OF THE JAMES.—PETERSBURG.—GILLMORE RETIRES.—KAUTZ ATTACKS.—SMITH'S NEW ASSAULT.—THE CORPS COME UP RAPIDLY.—BUTLER MOVES FORWARD.—THE NEW ASSAULT ON THE CITY—NOT SUCCESSFUL.—SHERIDAN'S EXPEDITION.—NEW MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY.—AGAINST THE WELDON ROAD.—DEEP BOTTOM.—WILSON'S RAID.—TEMPORARY REST.

THE grand crossing of the James was next in order. Transports having been assembled, the Second Corps began crossing in them at noon. Under the direction of General Butler, General Godfrey Weitzel, the chief-engineer of the Department of Virginia and North Carolina, had selected points; and General Benham, arriving on the 14th, had laid ponton-bridges near Wilcox's wharf, and opposite Windham's Point. The bridges were a triumph of pontoneering skill. They were two thousand feet long, and the channel-boats were anchored in fifteen fathoms. They were ready by midnight. The army had been well massed around Charles City Court-house; and the crossing, which was made both by the bridges and by the ferry-boats, was effected in a most admirable manner, and was not materially molested by the enemy: it occupied Tuesday and Wednesday, the 14th and 15th of June. We did not lose more than four hundred men in all its casualties.

We must return now to the promised aid which Grant was to have in the attack by Butler's troops upon Petersburg, upon which the Lieutenant-General laid some stress.

Before doing so, let us cast a glance at the city and its environs. It is situated on the south bank of the Appomattox, and through it the great Southern railroad runs. It is twenty-two miles from Richmond, and about ten from City Point, where the Appomattox empties into the James. Vessels of one hundred tons go up the river to the wharves of Petersburg, while those of larger tonnage unload at Walthall's, six miles below the city. A canal takes smaller vessels past the falls, just above the city. It is the third city in size in Virginia; but it was to have a remarkable military value as the grand strategic southern outpost to Richmond. Indeed, in all the military operations, it was quite as important as the capital. There is a railroad from it to City Point; another to Norfolk; the third, already mentioned, runs south to Weldon and beyond; while the Southside Railroad runs to Lynchburg. Of these roads, the vital ones were those connecting it with Richmond and the Southside roads. The enemy's dispositions were admirably made to cover them both. The works, weak at the first, were rapidly strengthened. These consisted of continuous lines commanding each other, and flanked by strong batteries, square redoubts, and other inclosed works. Southeast of the city a gentle ridge rises, shutting it out from our view and our guns, except at a few points, and this was strongly occupied by the rebel lines.

Grant had gone in person to Bermuda Hundred to arrange the plan which contemplated the seizure of the town, before these works had become so strong. The result was, that General Butler had dispatched Gillmore with a small force—thirty-five hundred men—on the 10th of June, to cross the Appomattox near the Point of Rocks, to move by the river-turnpike directly upon the city, and capture it, if possible, while it was yet too weak to resist a *coup-de-main*.

Simultaneously with this movement two gunboats and a battery were to attack Fort Clinton below the city; and thirdly, Kautz, with a detachment of cavalry, fifteen hundred strong, was to move across the Norfolk Railroad and effect an entrance on the south. On the 10th, Gillmore moved without molesta-

tion until he came upon the works two miles from the city. He drove in the enemy's skirmishers, but on account of the small number of his own command, and the apparent strength of the works, he was deterred from assaulting, and marched back to his camp. Kautz, the hero of this assault, crossed the railroad, and marched so rapidly and secretly, that he penetrated into the town; but the enemy, unemployed on Gillmore's front, concentrated, fell upon Kautz's troopers, and drove them away.

Gillmore's force should have been double, and the attack could not have failed. As to the propriety of his withdrawing without an attack, we have not the necessary knowledge to consider the question. In such reciprocal movements it is the greatest of pities, whatever the cause, that either party should fail the other.

With characteristic energy, unimpaired by these failures, Grant hurried in person to Bermuda Hundred, and there gave Butler verbal instructions to dispatch Smith with the Eighteenth Corps, just arrived from White House, at one o'clock in the morning, and with all the troops which could be spared, without endangering the safety of his position, to Petersburg. He said he would hurry back to the Army of the Potomac, and pour it down, division at a time, without delay, and thus could re-enforce Smith more rapidly than the enemy could concentrate there. This the enemy was attempting to thwart; he was in great force south of Richmond, A. P. Hill's corps in advance. Smith was at once set in motion. He crossed the Appomattox on a ponton-bridge near the Point of Rocks, and following Gillmore's route, moved upon the northeast defences of Petersburg, from the Appomattox round for a distance of two and a half miles, reaching his ground before day on the 16th. A partial attack was made on some advanced lines by the colored troops under Hincks, who behaved with commendable gallantry, capturing a line of rifle-pits and two twelve-pounders. But we are ignorant of the causes which led Smith to delay his attack on the main works until late in the afternoon.

Just before the setting of the sun he moved to the attack of these, and his gallantry and impetuosity were rewarded by the capture of the entire line of rifle trenches. The enemy, routed, left behind as trophies for Smith three hundred prisoners, sixteen guns, and a battle-flag. Our loss was not more than six hundred. In ignorance of what lay behind these captured works, Smith did not pursue his advantage. It is now known that there were no works of importance between these and Petersburg. The night was clear, and there was a brilliant moon. Smith, however, made no further offensive operations that night. General Hancock came up just after nightfall with two divisions of the Second Corps, and courteously waiving his right to take the command from a general who had studied the ground, and already obtained a brilliant success, he placed the divisions of his corps under Smith's orders. Portions of these divisions were sent, at Smith's request, to relieve his own troops in the captured works, and there was a cessation of hostilities until morning. The auspicious moment for capturing Petersburg by a *coup-de-main* had passed. The enemy was now pouring down troops to defend it. Grant had fulfilled his promise of sending down the Army of the Potomac without a moment's delay. Hancock had moved without supplies. On the same day, the 15th, he had also ordered Warren to cross at early daylight by the ferries, and push forward. He reached Petersburg on the evening of the 16th. The Sixth, under Wright, was thus moved: the artillery and one division to Petersburg, and the other two divisions to City Point. Burnside, with the Ninth, reached Petersburg about noon on the 16th. These dispositions having been carried out by General Meade, that officer proceeded to City Point, and from thence to Petersburg. He met General Grant on the road, and, after consultation, was directed by him to assume the immediate command of the troops in front, and to assault at once. The position of our troops was just in front of the works captured by Smith on the 15th. After that capture, Martindale had been on the right, against the river, Brooks and Hincks occupied the

centre, and Kautz covered the left with his cavalry. As the Army of the Potomac arrived, the Second Corps had come on Smith's left, and the Ninth on the left of the Second. Warren had taken post still on the left, to extend our line around the city.

Meade, on leaving Grant, returned to the front at two P. M., and after consultation with the corps commanders, he ordered the Second and Ninth corps to assault. The attack began at six o'clock, and the fighting continued until six in the morning, with varying success. It was a terrible battle-night! Birney, of the Second Corps, stormed the advanced crest in his front. Barlow made a vigorous attempt, but was unsuccessful, losing a portion of his skirmish line. The brigades of Miles and Griffin, of the Fifth Corps, which came up during the night, succeeded in taking and holding a portion of the line in their front. Smith's (Eighteenth) corps only made a demonstration, as an assault was not thought by him to be expedient in his front.

During the night of the 16th, Neill's division, of the Sixth Corps, came up as expected—the others remaining at City Point—and at once relieved Brooks' division, of the Eighteenth, which, with General Smith, returned to Bermuda Hundred. Martindale was left in command of the remainder of the corps. Burnside, at the beginning of the assault, had encountered so terrible a fire, that he was unable to attack; but the next morning, at the earliest dawn, he directed Potter to take the work in his front, which was gallantly done. With the work were captured four guns, many prisoners, and several colors. Ledlie, who relieved Potter's stormers, pushed on to an additional success, and occupied the enemy's lines, distant one mile and a half only from the city. From this point, a few shells were thrown into Petersburg. Had the enemy permitted us to occupy these lines in peace, he could not have long held the town. But he did not. His troops were now pouring in in great numbers. He organized an overwhelming counter-assault for that night; and after heavy fighting, recaptured his works. Petersburg was now in condition to resist any attempt by a sudden storming.

BUTLER MOVES FORWARD.

General Butler discovering that the enemy, concerned about the safety of Petersburg, had withdrawn a large body of troops from his front, moved forward an expeditionary party on the 16th, to destroy, and if possible hold, the railroad between Richmond and Petersburg. To aid this movement, Grant ordered the two divisions of the Sixth Corps (which, it will be remembered, had not gone to Petersburg, but were embarking on transports at Wilcox's wharf, for City Point) to proceed at once to the aid of Butler. These troops arrived in time, but were halted at some distance from the advance to rest; and before they could come up in support, the enemy, with clear vision and vigorous attack, had forced Butler's troops back from the works they had captured, had reoccupied them, and had strengthened their lines permanently at that point.

THE NEW ASSAULT ON PETERSBURG.

Warren, it has been said, had come up during the night of the 16th, and taken post on the left of Burnside, thus extending our lines further around the place. During the 17th, our line was strongly posted, firmly adjusted, and gradually moved up towards the enemy. Grant had now determined on a general assault the next day. The corps were thus disposed from right to left: That portion of the Eighteenth Corps which had remained under Martindale and Hincks occupied the right, extending to within a short distance of the river-bank; Neill's division, of the Sixth, oc-



cupied the right centre ; the centre was formed by the Second Corps ; the left centre by the Ninth ; and the left by the Fifth Corps.

At four o'clock on the morning of the 18th June, the skirmishers moved forward along the whole line ; but to their astonishment found the enemy withdrawn from their second line, and strongly intrenched on an interior line, one mile nearer the city.

Although Grant still determined to assault without delay, it was necessary to make a change in the order of battle. Instead of an attack in line, points were to be chosen which might be attacked in column—the columns to be followed by the lines in rear as reserves. In front of the Second Corps, three brigades of Gibbon's division were organized into an attacking column. These devoted men moved gallantly up to the enemy's lines, near the City Point Railroad ; but success was not possible. The rebel works on the left poured in a terrible enfilading fire upon Gibbon's advancing lines, and drove them back to seek shelter.

Martindale, on the right, encountered less opposition, and succeeded in occupying the enemy's skirmish line, and taking some prisoners. This was at noon. At four in the afternoon, General Birney, who was now temporarily in command of the Second Corps,—as Hancock was suffering from an old wound,—formed a new column of attack, consisting of Mott's division and regiments detached from the other divisions. These were moved rapidly forward to attempt the dubious task ; but again success lay with the intrenched enemy. Torrents of musketry fire and tempests of artillery swept our men down, arrested their advance, and finally drove them rapidly back, after great loss.

The efforts of the Fifth and Ninth corps, on our left, were not more successful. We had, however, accomplished one thing : we had extended our lines across the Norfolk Railroad, and were gaining ground steadily to the left. We had also determined the facts that Lee's army, or the greater portion of it, now confronted us at Petersburg ; that little could be

gained by direct attacks upon a brave and vigilant enemy, strongly intrenched; and that we must resort to regular approaches, and constant attempts to encircle the enemy's right, and cut him off from the Southside Railroad.

From Wednesday, the 15th, up to nightfall of Saturday, the 18th, there had been continuous fighting of the most desperate character; and partly from want of celerity, partly from the skill and quickness of the enemy, the results had not been all we could have desired. To the unmilitary eye it would seem that we had gained nothing; but this is an erroneous estimate. We had taken some firm steps, and accomplished some important results. City Point was secured as an important base and depot, to remain so until the end of the war; we confronted the enemy closely, and kept him in his lines; and we threatened his right, requiring him to make a great extension in that direction. In a word, Grant had laid upon the devoted city of Richmond the first coil—ever tightening—of that anaconda grasp, never to be released until the monster should be strangled and lie lifeless in the embrace.

Pending these operations, the supply-trains were crossed at the bridge, covered by Wilson's division of cavalry and Ferrero's division of colored troops.

MOVEMENTS OF THE CAVALRY.

The reader will remember that Sheridan had been sent on an expedition to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad, and, if possible, to join Hunter. In the first part of the programme he was successful; but as he could hear nothing of Hunter's advance towards Charlottesville, he did not effect the second part, but returned from his expedition to White House, which he reached on the 19th of June, just as the enemy's cavalry were about to attack it. He drove them away, and relieved the garrison. Let us look back for a moment, and see what his raid had accomplished. Moving rapidly up the railroad towards Gordonsville, destroying as he advanced, he encountered Wade Hampton's cavalry at Trevillian Station, on the

11th of June. After a severe action, Hampton was driven back, leaving his wounded and dead upon the field, and four hundred prisoners, with several hundred horses, in our hands. During the 12th of June, Sheridan broke up the railroad effectually from Louisa Courthouse towards Gordonsville. As he approached the latter place, when about five miles from it, he encountered Hampton, who had been re-enforced by the infantry, and who had intrenched his men. Here the contest was unequal. An attack made by our troops on the right was repulsed, but might have been renewed with success. Night closed the battle; and Sheridan, making a new and vigorous attack, prepared, under cover of this, to withdraw. His ammunition having received drafts upon it which he had not anticipated, had given out. He was without forage, and in a country where the grazing was miserable. He could hear nothing of Hunter (who, as we know, had taken the Lexington route to Lynchburg); and so he listened to the dictates, not of prudence, but of necessity, and returned. On his return he met orders directing him to proceed to White House, which he reached, as we have seen, at a critical moment. There he was to supply his command, men and horses; and then break up the depot, and escort the garrison to the James River. All this he did in the handsomest manner. Throwing Gregg's division out on the right, to cover the roads in the direction of White Oak Swamp, he marched down his right flank, fighting all the way. The severity of the action fell upon Gregg, who was furiously attacked by Hampton, but who, after considerable losses, brought his troops off to the James. Sheridan arrived at the James on the 25th of June, and crossing near Wilcox's wharf, at once joined the Army of the Potomac.

NEW MOVEMENTS OF THE ARMY.

Sunday, the 19th of June, dawned upon the weary and battle-worn soldiers as a most welcome day of rest—disturbed only by the occasional dropping fire of the advance pickets, and a slight artillery practice. The remainder of the Sixth

Corps crossed the Appomattox on that day, and joined its advanced division ; as also did Ferrero's colored division, of the Ninth, which joined its corps and was posted in front.

The quiet, however, was disturbed at night, on the James River, and the scene made brilliant with the lurid fires of battle, in more than one hostile effort of the enemy. First among these was the movement of three rebel iron-clads, which came down from Drury's Bluff as far as Dutch Gap ; but they accomplished nothing. Admiral Lee was on the alert, and they were soon driven back. Pickett's division, of Longstreet's corps, favored by this naval diversion, attacked General Butler in his works at Bermuda Hundred, without success ; and small detachments of the enemy, moving by the north bank of the James, succeeded in destroying the wharves at Westover Landing and Wilcox's. As if to complete the programme, the rebels made an unsuccessful assault upon the centre of our lines in front of Petersburg.

And here we may pause to make a recapitulation of the losses in the memorable decade from the 10th to the 20th of June. They were great. Killed, eighty-five officers, one thousand one hundred and thirteen enlisted men ; wounded, three hundred and sixty-one officers, six thousand four hundred and ninety-two men ; missing, forty-six officers, one thousand five hundred and sixty-eight men ;—total, nine thousand six hundred and sixty-five.

On Monday, the 20th of June, there was but little fighting, but Grant ordered preparations to be made for an important movement the next day—still in the direction of the enemy's right. The Ninth Corps was ordered to relieve the Second, and to occupy its intrenchments ; and the Eighteenth to relieve the Sixth. The Second and Sixth corps were then moved rapidly out, on the morning of Tuesday, 21st, across the Norfolk Railroad, and then across the Jerusalem plank-road, to which the Fifth Corps was already extended. The great object of the movement was to extend our lines to the Weldon Railroad, one source of immediate and easy supply both to Petersburg and Richmond.

AGAINST THE WELDON ROAD.

But the enemy were quite as eager to hold it as we to take it. The Second Corps moved rapidly, followed by the Sixth, in support, which was to come up on the left of the Second, and extend to the Weldon road, if possible. The troops had, however, only reached Davis's farm, on the Jerusalem road, between the two railroads, when they encountered the enemy in such force, that, after a brief but severe action, they were compelled to retire for a short distance. On Wednesday, the 22d, this movement against the Weldon road was resumed by the Second and Sixth corps, the Sixth on the left; but by some misunderstanding, the corps waiting for each other, the attack was too long delayed; and, when moving independently of each other, a gap was formed between the Sixth, which had not completed its line, and Barlow's division, of the Second. Into this that skilful general, A. P. Hill, threw a division of his corps, rolling up Barlow's division, which exposed Birney's, now Mott's division: this, in turn, was now forced back from its rifle-pits; and Gibbon's division was in turn exposed, and so encountered as to lose four guns. But a new line was formed for the Second, which it was able to maintain.

Not unsimilar was the fate of the Sixth Corps. Its left flank was simultaneously attacked by another division of Hill's corps, and forced back. General Meade had now reached the field, and getting both corps well in hand, in the evening he ordered a general advance, by which the Sixth Corps was enabled to recover its line; and the Second a portion of its former position; all of which was strongly intrenched. On Thursday, the 23d, the attempt on the Weldon Railroad was again resumed. The Sixth Corps endeavored, by marching southward, to reach the enemy's right flank. Its advance at length reached the railroad, and cut the telegraph wires; but no sooner had three of our regiments been put in position to hold this valuable point, than Anderson's division of Hill's corps struck their flank, captured many prisoners, drove the

remainder back, and then made a furious attack upon the main body.

The country in which we were manoeuvring was of very difficult topography, and filled with dense undergrowth. The enemy were better acquainted with it than we. The Weldon Railroad was of very great, if not of vital, importance to him. He had thus far defended it persistently, turning his defensive into a skilful offensive in every battle; and forcing us to be content, for the time, with establishing our lines half-way to the Weldon Railroad, until we could mass our forces in strength sufficient to break his now greatly extended line.

Before this could be done, however, the character of the weather, and unforeseen requirements in another part of the field, made it necessary to contract our line by drawing in our left to the Jerusalem plankroad, and refusing it by a crotchet to the rear.

Pending these operations there were many reconnoissances and partial movements, to which our space will not permit us to allude. In every part of the immediate theatre, every day had its battle, and every hour its special interest. Brigades and regiments were detached; subordinate movements were projected and postponed; Petersburg, Pocahontas, and the bridges of the Appomattox were vigorously shelled.

DEEP BOTTOM.

But the most important of the operations resulted in the occupation of Deep Bottom, on the night of the 20th and morning of the 21st. To this important point, only ten miles from Richmond, General Butler had sent an infantry brigade of the Tenth Corps, under Brigadier-General Foster. A short distance above this, at Howlett's, the enemy had strong batteries. Deep Bottom was at once connected with Bermuda Hundred by a ponton-bridge. At the same time, in order further to develop these movements at the north, the remainder of the Eighteenth Corps was withdrawn from the Army of the Potomac to Bermuda Hundred, and during

the greater part of the siege served with the Army of the James.

While these movements were being made on the north and south of Petersburg—by way of a feint—the enemy advanced a strong skirmish line upon General Burnside's position in front of Petersburg, on Saturday, the 25th; but he produced no impression upon our lines.

WILSON'S RAID.

As an important portion of the operations against the Weldon Railroad, we must not forget to record the cavalry movements designed to co-operate with the infantry advance. On the 22d of June, General Wilson, with his own cavalry division of the Army of the Potomac, and Kautz's division of the Army of the James, eight thousand men in all, marched rapidly southward, first to destroy the Weldon Railroad, and then to make a circuit against the Southside and Danville railroads. The expedition struck the Weldon road at Reams' Station, where they destroyed the depot, and tore up a long stretch of road. Moving, without delay, westward, they struck the Southside road at a point fifteen miles from Petersburg. Thence they went to Nottoway Station, destroying twenty-two miles of the track; but encountering near this point the enemy's cavalry, under General W. F. Lee, Wilson defeated it, and drove it away. He then dispatched Kautz to Burksville Station, the junction of the Southside and Danville roads. This Kautz reached and destroyed on the evening of the 23d, and tore up the track as far as Meherrin Station, forming, at that point, a junction with Wilson on the 24th of June. The united forces then destroyed the Danville road southward to Roanoke Bridge, a distance of twenty-five miles. There they found the enemy in such numbers, and so strongly posted, that he could not be dislodged. Wilson now started back on a rapid return, beset by great perils, and not to be accomplished without great disasters. The rebels were gathering like wolves on his

track. On the 28th, he encountered a large force on Stony Creek, where the Weldon road crosses it. After a hard but undecisive fight, he was forced to make a detour to Reams' Station, which he supposed to be still in our hands. But he was sadly mistaken : the enemy had occupied it with a large force of infantry and cavalry, and, in his efforts to escape, Wilson lost his artillery and trains ; Kautz was separated from him, and made his way in independently ; and Wilson, after losing many prisoners, crossed the Nottoway River, and came in, his horses and men in a pitiable condition. Besides the trains, and the guns and prisoners he had lost, the enemy had recaptured a thousand negroes, who had vainly hoped, by following Wilson, to reach our lines, and gain their freedom. But, notwithstanding these disasters, he had succeeded in severing the communication with Richmond, by the railroads, for several weeks. General Grant says that "the damage done to the enemy in this expedition more than compensated for the losses we sustained."

TEMPORARY REST.

It was now manifest that, after nearly two months of continuous fighting of the most desperate character, and now that we had reached a point where the siege of a stronghold must take the place of battles in the field, there must be a brief period for rest and reorganization. Our losses had been between sixty and seventy thousand, and although corresponding re-enforcements had reached Grant, the losses sustained could not be repaired by the raw troops sent to the army. We had lost six hundred officers killed, more than two thousand wounded, and three hundred and fifty missing. These could not be immediately replaced. In many places, brigades were commanded by majors, and regiments by captains. Under these circumstances, should new columns of attack be organized, the men could not have the same confidence in their officers : the officers, and even the generals, would become confused in the varying pell-mell of the campaign.

The disasters we had sustained were not without their effect. The Second Corps, which had deserved the appellation given by the French army to the Ninth demi-brigade at Marenngo—"The Incomparables"—had suffered somewhat in the movements against the Weldon road. The Sixth had met with similar disaster. We had not lost prestige, but we needed a brief rest to heal all these wounds.

Added to these, a scorching summer sun and a pitiless drought had supervened: the sky was brass, and the earth was ashes. In many camps the water began to fail. Arrangements were made, however, for the comfort of the troops; the work of filling up and re-officering went bravely on; and a few days would have made all things ready for renewal of attacks, when circumstances in other portions of the theatre, at which we have already hinted, compelled a longer quiet in front of Petersburg, or rather less important and vigorous operations than had been anticipated. In order to come in logical order to these, we now proceed to consider the second set of collateral movements which had a bearing, beneficial or adverse, on Grant's principal operations.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY.

HUNTER'S INSTRUCTIONS.—HE BEATS THE ENEMY.—W. E. JONES KILLED.—ADVANCE TO LYNCHBURG.—RETREATS TO THE KANAWHA.—WHAT HE ACCOMPLISHED.—IN WHAT HE FAILED.—THE ROUTE HE SHOULD HAVE TAKEN.

WHEN General Sigel was relieved, after his defeat in the Valley, General David Hunter had been placed in command. What was expected of him may be gathered from the following extracts from letters of Grant to Halleck. On the 20th of May he wrote: "The enemy are evidently relying for supplies greatly on such as are brought over the branch road running through Staunton. On the whole, therefore, I think it would be better for General Hunter to move in that direction; reach *Staunton and Gordonsville*, if he does not meet too much opposition. If he can hold in it a force equal to his own, he will be doing good service."

Again, on the 25th, he writes Halleck: "If Hunter can possibly get to *Charlottesville and Lynchburg*, he should do so—living on the country. The railroads and canals should be destroyed beyond the possibility of repair for weeks. Completing this, he could find his way back to his original base, or, from about Gordonsville, join this army."

General Hunter, well known as an energetic, brave, and determined officer, but whose generalship had never, thus far, been severely tested, at once assumed a vigorous offensive. Moving up the Shenandoah, he beat up the enemy's quarters on the 5th of June, at Piedmont. He had passed through

Woodstock, Mount Jackson, and New Market, to Harrisonburg; at that point he divided his force into two columns, one of which moved by the Port Republic road, and the other on the direct road to Staunton. Thus he encountered the enemy on North River, twelve miles from Staunton. The battle was fought by both columns, and continued for ten hours. While Hunter was pressing the enemy in front, Crook was approaching from the west. The result was not long doubtful. Hunter routed the enemy's forces, taking fifteen hundred prisoners, three cannon, and three hundred stand of arms, and killing the rebel commander, W. E. Jones, while we sustained a loss of only fifty men.

ADVANCE TO LYNCHBURG.

On the 8th he occupied Staunton, where he was joined by Crook and Averill. Crook had moved through Lewisburg and White Sulphur Springs, to Gaston Depot, on the Virginia and Central Railroad. This he destroyed. From that point he crossed the North Mountain, at Pound Gap, and thus pushed forward by the railroad to Staunton.

The combined forces, now under Hunter, marched, on the 10th of June, towards Lynchburg, by way of Lexington. They reached Lexington on the 11th, where, on the 12th, they burnt the Military Institute, and the house of Governor Letcher. By the 16th of June, Hunter had invested Lynchburg; but that was the end of his success.

Lee—his communication unobstructed—poured re-enforcements into Lynchburg, amounting in numbers almost to a corps. Hunter's ammunition had given out; he was at a long distance from his base, in a hostile country; and, after skirmishing and manœuvring on the 18th, prudence dictated that he should retire in haste. This retreat was by the line of the railroad through Liberty, Bonsack, and Salem, to the Kanawha. A sad necessity, the result of mistaken strategy.

He had accomplished much; had won a battle; had destroyed important supplies and manufactures; and had com-

pelled the enemy to remove a large force from Grant's front ; but his retreat, in the wrong direction, towards the Kanawha, lost us the use of his troops for several weeks, when most needed to defend the North, now about to be again threatened by an invading force of the enemy. Had he moved from Staunton, by the railroad, southeast to *Charlottesville*, instead of to Lexington, and then from Charlottesville to Lynchburg, as Grant's instructions contemplated, he would have continued to cover the Shenandoah Valley against all northern movements of the enemy, should he demonstrate in that direction ; otherwise he could have reached the James River Canal, destroyed it, and cut off any force sent for the relief of Lynchburg, and been kept *en rapport* with Grant by Sheridan's movement upon Gordonsville. These are general criticisms. General Hunter had the right, by the terms of Grant's instructions, to use his discretion, and doubtless thought that he was right in taking the other line. The military critic will find it difficult to agree with him.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

THE MINE AT PETERSBURG.

GRANT'S DIVERSION.—THE STORY OF THE MINE.—ITS POSITION.—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL PLEASANTS.—DESCRIPTION.—EXCAVATED UNDER DIFFICULTIES.—MEADE'S ORDER.—THE FUSE LIGHTED.—FAILS.—GALLANT MEN RELIGHT IT.—THE DELAY.—THE STORMERS MOVE.—LEDLIE, WILLCOX, AND POTTER.—FERRERO.—THE CRATER.—THE COURT OF INQUIRY.

NOT without a fear that trouble was brewing in the Valley, Grant now sent the cavalry to cut the railroads north of Richmond, from points near Richmond to the North Anna, thus endangering the safety of the enemy's army in the Valley, on the one hand; and, on the other, if Lee should succeed in sending troops northward, Grant was ready to take advantage of this withdrawal of troops from Petersburg, to explode a mine which had been prepared under an advanced work of the enemy, in front of the Ninth Corps, and under cover of the explosion to make a stunning assault upon the enemy's lines, and in all probability capture the town. Further to induce them to weaken their works, that his assault might have a still better chance of success, Grant, holding the lines with the Fifth, Ninth, and Eighteenth corps, ordered the Second Corps, with two divisions of the cavalry, under Sheridan, to cross the James, and join that force of the Army of the James already intrenched at Deep Bottom. This was done on the night of June 26th. Advancing from that point on the 27th, they drove the enemy back, at first in confusion, and captured four guns, with some prisoners. On the 28th, our lines were

extended from Deep Bottom, across to the Newmarket and Long Bridge road. But in this new position the enemy attacked;—after hard fighting for several hours, obtaining but little success. Grant now prepared to execute the second part of his programme.

Having caused Lee to detach a large force from Petersburg to meet this force which he had crossed, and having paraded the crossing by taking a large train of empty wagons, he now proposed to take back the expeditionary force secretly, to spring the mine, and attack Petersburg, before Lee could return his troops for its defence.

One division of the Second Corps was recrossed, immediately after the fighting of the 28th, and at once relieved the Eighteenth Corps in line, that the latter might be in readiness to attack. The other two divisions, with Sheridan's cavalry, recrossed on the night of the 29th, and came up to their old quarters in front of Petersburg. The mine, which had been some days in readiness, was exploded on the morning of the 30th.

THE STORY OF THE MINE.

As this mine was the only one of any magnitude resorted to in this campaign, and as it has been the subject of not a little controversy, we propose to enter more into detail concerning it than the scope of our work will permit in describing the other operations. This is the more pardonable, because the explosion of the mine presents more stirring romance and terrible picturesque than most battle-scenes.

The position was chosen on account of a hollow just in rear of a deep cut in the City Point Railroad, in advance of which were General Burnside's lines. In this hollow, or ravine, such work could be carried on entirely out of the enemy's sight.

Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Pleasants, of the Forty-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers, a practical miner, whose regiment was recruited in the mining district of Pennsylvania, first proposed it to General Potter, who submitted the proposition

to General Burnside. The plan being warmly approved by General Burnside, Colonel Pleasants set to work vigorously with his regiment, but found it very difficult to obtain proper instruments and implements. It is not too much to say that most of the higher commanders—we do not include Grant—regarded it without favor. It was considered a very doubtful experiment, and the author of it was comparatively unknown.

The work was begun on the 25th of June, and completed, except the charging with powder, on the 23d of July; but in stating the obstacles he had to encounter, Colonel Pleasants declares that he would have done it in a third or fourth of the time, with proper tools and instruments.* On the 25th of July it was charged and entirely ready. He had not been able to procure a proper theodolite to lay it out; but his chief difficulty had been the excavation of the gallery, and what to do with the earth excavated. He used cracker-boxes, reinforced by hoops of iron taken from old beef and pork barrels, in place of barrows; and his men piled up brushwood to conceal the increasing mound of earth. Not being able to procure mining picks, he filed off and straightened the common picks for that purpose. The main gallery, which was horizontal, inclined for a short distance downward, at the entrance; it extended five hundred and ten feet under our own work and the intervening space, ending directly under the parapet of a rebel redoubt. It was more than twenty feet below the general surface. A vertical ventilating shaft was dug a little beyond the entrance, and a fire kept kindled in it. The dimensions of this gallery were four and a half feet high, by four and a half feet wide at the bottom. These depended for their security upon the tenacity of the earth, there being no frames. Two lateral galleries extended from the extremity of the mine under the rebel fort, the left one thirty-seven, and the right thirty-eight feet long. In these were placed the magazines, eight in all. It was originally de-

* Report of Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. Battle of Petersburg. Page 3.

signed to charge it with six tons of powder—twelve thousand pounds; but the same want of liberality, or rather of confidence, which had been displayed in not providing material for the construction, cut this down to four tons: and this was the charge,—about one thousand three hundred and fifty pounds in each magazine. These charges were strongly packed, or tamped, and the fuse set. The fuse was made of phosphorus, chlorate of potash, and other combustibles; and running the length of the gallery, it communicated with the charged magazines.

All being in readiness, orders were issued to explode the mine on the morning of July 30, at twenty minutes past three. Burnside was ordered to mass his corps on the night of the 29th, organize his columns, take down a portion of the parapet, clear away the abatis, if necessary, in his front, and be in readiness to move at the moment of the explosion. He was cautioned not to let his troops halt in the crater, but that they should press forward and crown the crest of Cemetery Hill, on the ridge which commanded Petersburg.

Warren was drawn up on his left; and Ord, just relieved by Hancock's returning troops, drawn up with the Eighteenth Corps on his right.

Meade's order, issued on the night of the 29th, gives an outline of the general movements to be made:

“The following instructions are issued for the guidance of all concerned:

“1. As soon as it is dark, Major-General Burnside, commanding Ninth Corps, will withdraw his two brigades, under General White, occupying the intrenchments between the plank and Norfolk roads, and bring them to his front. Care will be taken not to interfere with the troops of the Eighteenth Corps, moving into their position in rear of the Ninth Corps. General Burnside will form his troops for assaulting the enemy's works at daylight on the 30th, prepare his parapets and abatis for the passage of the columns, and have the pioneers equipped for work in opening passages for artillery, destroying enemy's abatis, and the intrenching tools distributed for effecting lodgment, etc., etc.

“2. Major-General Warren, commanding Fifth Corps, will reduce the number of his troops holding the intrenchments of his front to the minimum, and concentrate all his available force on his right, and hold them prepared to support the assault of Major-General Burnside. The preparations in respect to pioneers,

intrenching tools, etc., etc., enjoined upon the Ninth Corps, will also be made by the Fifth Corps.

"3. As soon as it is dark, Major-General Ord, commanding Eighteenth Corps, will relieve his troops in the trenches by General Mott's division of the Second Corps, and form his corps in rear of the Ninth Corps, and be prepared to support the assault of Major-General Burnside.

"4. Every preparation will be made for moving forward the field artillery of each corps.

"5. At dark, Major-General Hancock, commanding Second Corps, will move from Deep Bottom to the rear of the intrenchments now held by the Eighteenth Corps, resume the command of Mott's division, and be prepared at daylight to follow up the assaulting and supporting columns, or for such other operations as may be found necessary.

"6. Major-General Sheridan, commanding cavalry corps, will proceed at dark from the vicinity of Deep Bottom to Lee's mill, and at daylight will move with his whole corps, including Wilson's division, against the enemy's troops defending Petersburg on their right, by the roads leading to that town from the southward and westward.

"7. Major Duane, acting chief-engineer, will have the ponton-trains parked at convenient points in the rear, prepared to move. He will see that supplies of sandbags, gabions, fascines, etc., etc., are in depot near the lines, ready for use.

"He will detail engineer officers for each corps.

"8. At half-past three (3½) in the morning of the 30th, Major-General Burnside will spring his mine, and his assaulting columns will immediately move rapidly upon the breach, seize the crest in the rear, and effect a lodgment there. He will be followed by Major-General Ord, who will support him on the right, directing his movement to the crest indicated, and by Major-General Warren, who will support him on the left.

"Upon the explosion of the mine, the artillery of all kinds in battery will open upon those points of the enemy's works whose fire covers the ground over which our columns must move, care being taken to avoid impeding the progress of our troops. Special instructions respecting the direction of fire will be issued through the chief of artillery.

"9. Corps commanders will report to the commanding general when their preparations are complete, and will advise him of every step in the progress of the operation, and of every thing important that occurs.

"10. Promptitude, rapidity of execution, and cordial co-operation, are essential to success; and the commanding general is confident that this indication of his expectations will insure the hearty efforts of the commanders and troops.

"11. Headquarters, during the operations, will be at the headquarters of the Ninth Corps.

"By command of MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE."

The rebels were entirely ignorant of the locality of the mine, and the intention to explode it at that time. The

Petersburg and Richmond papers had indulged in some senseless pleasantry about our mining projects; but in that early morning, before daylight, the waking were as unsuspecting as those who slept.

Exactly at the given hour the fuse was fired, and went hissing into "the bowels of the earth." But the mine did not explode. Pleasants knew in a moment the difficulty. He had been obliged to use a spliced fuse, instead of a whole one, or, indeed, two or three fuses, and it had stopped burning at the splice. Two brave men of the regiment, who believed in the mine, and who had toiled at it night and day under Pleasants, volunteered for the dangerous service to go in and relight it. These were Lieutenant Jacob Douty and Sergeant Harry Reese. They go along the gallery one hundred feet, before they reach the point where the fire stopped. Again, at ten minutes before five, the insidious flame travels to its destined goal. Generals Grant and Meade are at the front. "It lacks a minute," said Pleasants. "Not a second," said Douty, "for there she goes!" A quiver, which becomes an earthquake-tremor—and then, with a tremendous burst, a conical mountain rises in the air, streaked and seamed with lightning flashes. The vast mass is momentarily poised; and as it thus hangs in air, discloses timber, planking, earth, bodies and limbs of men, and even one or two of the sixteen guns in the work. It is known that the work was occupied by portions of the Seventeenth, Eighteenth, and Twenty-second South Carolina regiments, under Colonel Fleming. Except the guard, the garrison was asleep. One instant of awakening, and then the crashing death. And then from every gun, great and small, that can be brought to bear, we pour in such thunder-storms of artillery as have rarely been witnessed or heard in America.

The mine, in spite of all croaking and unbelief, is a complete, a splendid success. The rebels are completely paralyzed; their frightened troops give way to the right and left of the crater; their artillery is silent. A huge gateway is opened for us up to Cemetery Ridge, and beyond, into Peters-

burg. But the attack must be instantaneous. What delays it? Where is the storming column? Too late. Five minutes pass, eight, ten, before Ledlie's division, which had been selected by lot to lead the charge, has moved. When it does, led by the gallant General Bartlett, instead of complying with the order, it halts in the crater, and absolutely remains there an hour.

General Burnside had at first contemplated sending forward his colored troops as stormers; but this being objected to by General Meade, and the objection being sustained by General Grant, his division commanders drew lots for the perilous prominence, and the lot fell upon General Ledlie.

The storming-party was then thus organized: Ledlie's division of white troops (Ninth Corps) was to lead the assault, charge through the crater, and seize the rebel works on the crest of Cemetery Hill. The other divisions (Willcox and Potter) were then to move forward, and form on the right and left. Ferrero's (colored) division of the same corps, was to follow in the track of Ledlie. The Eighteenth Corps was then to support the grand assault; and if more troops were wanted, Ayres, of the Fifth, was to be moved in.

As soon as General Meade hears this—that our advance will not move beyond the crater—he orders Burnside, at forty minutes after five, to push forward to the crest all his own troops, and to call on General Ord to move forward his troops of the Eighteenth Corps at once. Potter and Willcox have advanced to the right and left of Ledlie. Ferrero, with the colored division, was to have followed in rear of Ledlie, but the commander, who had remained in rear of the main line of the Ninth Corps works, when ordered to move, said there was no room until the troops already in his front should be moved out of the way. We are inclined to agree with him. His troops, however, after some further delay, were moved into the crater, where, with the rest, they moved forward, to be badly cut up, and then huddled, only increasing the confusion, and eventually the slaughter. Meade, on ac-

count of the continued delay in moving out of the crater, directed Ord to push his corps forward; but that officer very properly declared that this was impracticable, there being no opening except that made by the crater, which was now crowded with men.

THE CRATER.

The scene in the crater baffles all attempts at description. In this irregular chasm, two hundred feet long, sixty wide, and thirty deep, were clustered, among the wrecks of the explosion, the dead, and the buried alive, thousands of our men, with no competent commanders to lead them. Many were soon in a state of wild delirium; half-buried rebels were crying out, "Yanks, for God's sake, take me out; I'll do as much for you some time." Many were crying for water. The confusion became worse confounded. It was a horrible chaos come again.

Potter's division, and some of the colored troops, get out of the crater, two hundred yards in advance; but the rebels have aroused from their stupor. The guns of Cemetery Ridge have a direct fire upon the crater. Batteries to the right and left, pour in a cross enfilading fire. Some say the rebels are infuriated at the sight of the colored troops. The place becomes a veritable hell on earth. Literally, "cannon to right of them," to the left, in front; and soon the intervening space is swept. To remain in the crater is certain death; to advance is impossible; to retreat is death; and it seems for the same reason impossible to succor them by sending more troops. The officers have no longer any control. The carnage is frightful.

Burnside is now directed, at nine o'clock, to withdraw his troops at his discretion: this he does at about two in the afternoon. Every thing had failed. The mine, a great success under difficulties, had resulted in next to nothing. We are fortunate in having the fullest account of it, as an investigation was ordered; and the Court of Inquiry, composed of

Hancock, Ayres, and Miles, published its finding and opinion. From these we make a few quotations. The court says :

The causes of failure are—

1. The injudicious formation of the troops in going forward, the movement being mainly by flank instead of extended front. General Meade's order indicated that columns of assault should be employed to take Cemetery Hill, and that proper passages should be prepared for those columns. It is the opinion of the court that there were no proper columns of assault. The troops should have been formed in the open ground in front of the point of attack, parallel to the line of the enemy's works. The evidence shows that one or more columns might have passed over at and to the left of the crater, without any previous preparation of the ground.

2. The halting of the troops in the crater instead of going forward to the crest, when there was no fire of any consequence from the enemy.

3. No proper employment of engineer officers and working parties, and of materials and tools for their use, in the Ninth Corps.

4. That some parts of the assaulting columns were not properly led.

5. The want of a competent common head at the scene of the assault, to direct affairs as occurrences should demand.

Had not failure ensued from the above causes, and the crest been gained, the success might have been jeopardized by the failure to have prepared in season proper and adequate debouches through the Ninth Corps' lines for troops, and especially for field artillery, as ordered by Major-General Meade.

The reasons why the attack ought to have been successful, are—

1. The evident surprise of the enemy at the time of the explosion of the mine, and for some time after.

2. The comparatively small force in the enemy's works.

3. The ineffective fire of the enemy's artillery and musketry, there being scarcely any for about thirty minutes after the explosion, and our artillery being just the reverse as to time and power.

4. The fact that some of our troops were able to get two hundred yards beyond the crater, towards the crest, but could not remain there or proceed further for want of supports, or because they were not properly formed or led.

To these clear, candid, and impartial words, we need add nothing; nor is it necessary for us to introduce the blame attached by the court to certain officers in this connection. It is on record for those who desire to read it.

General Grant was exceedingly disappointed at the result, as indeed he had a right to be. He had marched and coun-

termarched the Second Corps and Sheridan's cavalry, in order to confuse the enemy, and all for nothing. Our losses, which were very great, numbered as follows: Killed, forty-seven officers, and three hundred and seventy-two enlisted men; wounded, one hundred and twenty-four officers, one thousand five hundred and fifty-five men; missing, ninety-one officers, one thousand eight hundred and nineteen men;—total, four thousand and three.


CHAPTER XXXV.

THE REBEL ADVANCE ON WASHINGTON.

EARLY MOVES DOWN THE VALLEY.—GRANT SENDS UP THE SIXTH AND NINETEENTH.
—WALLACE MOVES.—IS DEFEATED, BUT DETAINS EARLY.—DESTRUCTION.—WRIGHT
IN COMMAND.—EARLY RETREATS.—THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY.—GRANT VISITS
HUNTER.—SHERIDAN—LET LOOSE.—WINCHESTER.

WE must now go back, in point of time, to the beginning of July, and turn to the consideration of an event which promised to give Grant great additional trouble, and which caused him, as we have before indicated, to detach some of his troops, and send them northward for the defence of Washington towards the line of the Potomac.

When Hunter retreated from Lynchburg into Western Virginia, the ever-memorable Valley of the Shenandoah was left open to the enemy, for raids across our frontier, into the loyal States of Maryland and Pennsylvania. The rebel authorities were not slow to avail themselves of the opportunity thus afforded. A considerable force was moved down the Valley, under General Jubal Early, who had resumed the command during the disability of Ewell, with the intention of invading the North, opening the way for larger bodies, and perhaps so working upon the fears of our people, and the authorities at Washington, as to force Grant to abandon the siege of Petersburg. Early's force was his own corps, with a portion of that of Breckinridge, and detachments, making in all about twenty-five thousand men.



NORTHERN PART OF THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY.

Grant was disappointed at this new obstacle to his plans ; but his ready resources did not fail him.

He ordered Hunter, who was now in Western Virginia, to move as rapidly as possible, by river and railroad, to Harper's Ferry. But Hunter's delays were great. The water was low in the river, and the railroad was broken in several places. To meet this emergency, troops must be had at once ; therefore, early in July, the Sixth Corps was taken from its lines in front of Petersburg, and sent to cover Washington. The Nineteenth Corps, under General W. H. Emory, which had been ordered from the Gulf as soon as Grant had heard of the failure of the Red River expedition, had just arrived in Hampton Roads : without disembarking, it was also pushed after the Sixth. Rickett's division of the Sixth was sent to Baltimore. Wright, with the remainder, subsequently went to Washington.

In a military point of view, the enemy deserves great credit for the bold stroke he now made. Thundering down the Valley, on the 3d of July he was at Martinsburg. Sigel, who had a small command there, at once retreated across the Potomac to Shepardstown. Weber, in command at Harper's Ferry, likewise evacuated the town, occupying the Maryland Heights opposite. The enemy, being now unobstructed, crossed the river at Williamsport and Point of Rocks, and on the 6th of July was at Hagerstown ; from which he pushed a strong column towards Frederick, and other detachments to destroy the railroad and canal, and to plunder the surrounding towns. Grant's foresight had been admirable, and the re-enforcements had been sent not a moment too soon.

WALLACE MOVES.

General Lewis Wallace, in command of the Department of Annapolis, with his headquarters at Baltimore, taking with him his own command, and Rickett's division of the Sixth—eight thousand in all—promptly moved out, first to Frederick, and then took position on the Monocacy, near the railroad

crossing, where, on the 8th of July, he fought the advancing enemy. The contest was unequal. The enemy were sixteen thousand strong. Except the Sixth Corps, Wallace's command consisted of one hundred days' men, heavy artillery regiments, invalids, and volunteers; and although he was defeated by a flank movement of Early upon his right, he deserves great credit for his prompt advance, his brave reception of the impetuous rebel attack; and, in a word, for doing every thing in his power, with the inadequate means at his command. By this course of conduct he employed and detained the enemy, while Wright could reach Washington with the remainder of the Sixth Corps and the advance of the Nineteenth.

These troops entered Washington at the very nick of time; for the enemy, inspired by his success on the Monocacy, at once moved upon the Federal capital; while Wallace fell back to defend Baltimore. On the 10th of July, Early's cavalry was at Rockville. On the 12th, the commander of the troops in Washington, General Augur, threw out a reconnoissance in force from Fort Stevens, and encountered the enemy, losing two hundred and eighty killed and wounded; but skirmishing was continued during the day, and the enemy retired that night, recrossing the Potomac at Portersville and Edwards' Ferry.

Let every man have his just tribute. To give the arch-enemy his due, the rebels certainly gave us a good scare, and accomplished humiliating wonders in this brief period. The rebel cavalry destroyed a long stretch of the Northern Central Railroad, and burned Gunpowder Bridge; and, reaching a thoroughfare never dreamed to be insecure, captured a train on the Philadelphia and Baltimore road.

At a quarter before twelve o'clock, on the night of the 12th, Grant telegraphed to Washington to have General Wright put in command of all the troops in the field there; and he urged that our men should now be put out of the trenches, and push Early vigorously at every step of his retreat. In accordance with these directions, Wright began the pursuit, and overtook

the rear-guard of Early at Snicker's Ferry, on the Shenandoah, where a sharp battle ensued, in which the enemy was worsted. Averill, who had promptly moved up the Valley with his cavalry, caught a portion of Early's force at Winchester, and defeated them, capturing four guns and five hundred prisoners.

THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY.

The very difficult duty now devolved upon Grant of directing the movements of troops from City Point,—difficult, because not only were they out of his sight, but he had conflicting reports of the details of the operations. Messages and orders crossed each other in such a manner as to confuse, not only the lieutenant-general, but also General Wright and the authorities at Washington.

His first impulse, when he found Early retreating, was to bring back the Sixth and Nineteenth corps to Petersburg, and make a new assault on Lee before Early could re-enforce him; but orders to that effect were postponed, and at length countermanded, as soon as he found that Early did not design to return to Richmond, but meant to continue his operations in the Valley. Grant then directed General Hunter, who had now arrived with his troops from Western Virginia, to maintain a defensive in the Valley, and thus deter the rebels from again advancing on Washington.

Again concentrating his forces, on the 24th Early attacked Crook and Averill, and flanking them, drove their forces through Winchester and across the Potomac. He was now ready for a forward movement. On the 25th he again came proudly forward, as if to cross the river; and to meet him, Grant ordered the Sixth Corps to Harper's Ferry.

Connected with this movement of Early, was a rebel raid into Pennsylvania by a small cavalry force—only three or four hundred—under McCausland, which perpetrated the diabolical outrage of burning the undefended town of Chambersburg, because the people would not, or could not, pay half a million of dollars ransom. He then retreated, with our cavalry after

him, to Cumberland, where being met and defeated by General Kelly, his force dispersed into Western Virginia.

But the main body of Early was by no means so easily moved. They were reaping the splendid harvests of the Valley, and sending large supplies to Richmond. We have already referred to the difficulty of communicating orders at this most perplexing period. From the time of Early's first raid, the telegraph wires were down between Washington and City Point. To send messages and receive answers required from twenty-four to thirty-six hours. New developments and constantly changing circumstances gave rise to contradictions, embarrassments, and misconceptions. It was evident to Grant that he must have one competent head there, and it was due to this that he projected the Middle Military Division, to which we shall presently refer; and on the 2d of August he ordered General Sheridan to Washington, with a view of assigning him to the command of this new division, which was subsequently done.

Indeed our position in that quarter was extremely precarious, and might well give the lieutenant-general the deepest concern. No time could be lost in irresolution. The enemy was concentrated in the neighborhood of Winchester, while the bulk of our forces were still on the Monocacy, at the crossing of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.

Thus Western Maryland and Southern Pennsylvania were exposed to invasion, should the rebels be bold enough to attempt it; and yet Grant hesitated, without an examination of the field himself, to order a forward movement, for fear of exposing Washington.

GRANT VISITS HUNTER.

In order, therefore, to act with full intelligence, he left City Point on the 4th of August, and went in person to the important points in this theatre of operations. On the 5th he visited General Hunter, and gave him written instructions to concentrate all his forces near Harper's Ferry, using the railroad to

its utmost, in order to save time. He further instructed Hunter, if the enemy should move north of the Potomac, to move north promptly and attack him; but if the enemy should move southward, sending only small raiding parties to the north, then Hunter was to push southward after him, without a moment's delay, using the large force of cavalry which he had to enable him to do so. He also directed Hunter to sweep the Valley clean of provisions, forage, and stock—to destroy what he could not use, but to protect the buildings as far as possible. As if to add another word of caution to the already explicit instructions, Grant told him to keep the enemy always in sight.

In accordance with these instructions, Hunter's troops were put in motion at once, and the advance reached Halltown, on the railroad to Winchester, that night.

THE MIDDLE MILITARY DIVISION.

In Grant's interview with Hunter, this general, without at all asking it, had expressed his willingness to be relieved from the command; which offered Grant the opportunity of carrying out the purpose, already indicated, of forming the Middle Military Division, and giving Sheridan the temporary command over all the generals and troops in the departments of Western Virginia, Washington, and the Susquehanna—up to this time separate and independent commands. The cavalry divisions of Torbert and Wilson were at once ordered up from the Army of the Potomac to Harper's Ferry; and Sheridan, who was waiting at Washington, was ordered, on the night of the 5th, to come up by the morning train to Harper's Ferry.

This Sheridan did; relieved Hunter at once; and received, in addition to the written instructions to Hunter, special instructions from Grant, who then, better satisfied with the condition of things, immediately returned to City Point, to supervise the operations around Petersburg and Richmond. Torbert's division of cavalry arrived at Harper's Ferry on the 11th





Wm. W. W. W.
W. W. W.

of August, and Torbert became chief of cavalry to Sheridan's army.

SHERIDAN.

With his usual sagacity, Grant had made an admirable choice of a commander. A young man—then only thirty-three years of age—Sheridan had already become the most distinguished cavalry officer in the service. He was a graduate of West Point, and devoted to the profession of arms. To great and untiring energy, dashing bravery, and enthusiasm in fighting, he added the natural gift of being able to control, in an electric manner, the affections and wills of his men; and he was now to show that he had strategic intuitions of the first order, and tactical intelligence of the most clear and rapid kind. To no better man in the whole army could the difficult task have been assigned of utilizing all the troops, and grasping the strategy of this extensive and important division.

He at once brought order out of the chaos. To confront the enemy, who had fallen back as if to lure him forward, and who now occupied the west bank of Opequan Creek, covering Winchester, Sheridan posted his forces in front of Berryville. They consisted of the army which Hunter had brought up from Western Virginia; the Nineteenth Corps, under Emory; and the Sixth Corps, under Wright; with the commands of Crook and Averill. Torbert had command of the cavalry.

Movements were made back and forward, and there were numerous cavalry engagements. When Sheridan feared that Early was going to decamp, he fell back, to hold him in his front.

Acting with proper caution, Grant did not yet feel authorized to permit him to bring on a general engagement, fearing that, if we were defeated, Maryland and Pennsylvania might be open to the rebel incursion. But on the other hand, it was of great importance to us to secure the use of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal;

and if successful in a battle, we should be no more troubled by the threats or fears of a rebel invasion at the North.

Sheridan was very anxious to attack; and so Grant, after weighing the chances well, determined to risk it. But fearing to give orders to that effect, without himself knowing the ground and the positions, and without an exact knowledge of Sheridan's views, he again left City Point, on the 15th of September, and had an interview with Sheridan at Charlestown, not far from Harper's Ferry.

SHERIDAN LET LOOSE.

Never was commander-in-chief more fully satisfied with the knowledge and power of a subordinate, than was Grant with the statements of Sheridan. Two words, he said, contained all the orders it was necessary for him to give, and these were, "*Go in!*" It was like the "*laissez aller*" of the heralds to the impatient knights at the old tournaments. Grant asked him if he could be ready to move on Tuesday morning. Sheridan said, "Yes, and before; on Monday morning, before daylight." General Grant adds, in his report: "He was off promptly to time; and I may here add, that I have never since deemed it necessary to visit General Sheridan before giving him orders." High praise, tersely expressed, and richly deserved. With this permission to move—to change a skilful defensive (which had, indeed, enabled him to perfect his organizations) into one of the most brilliant offensives recorded in any war, and upon which the historian would fain linger, forgetful of the proper relation of the parts of his narrative—with this permission begins a magnificent series of victories.

WINCHESTER.

On the morning of the 19th, he attacks Early at the crossing of the Opequan, fights him all day until five o'clock, with severe losses on both sides, but beats him thoroughly; carries his entire positions, from the Opequan to Winchester, and drives

him through Winchester, taking several thousand prisoners and five guns. Early is absolutely stupefied at the shock. This is not the fighting he has been accustomed to, nor will he ever be. Great credit is undoubtedly due to Sheridan's subordinates; but Sheridan is the life of the entire battle, and in giving the enemy this taste of his quality, he sets an example to his own troops of what he expects of them in the future.

Early had lost three thousand five hundred killed and wounded, five thousand prisoners, five guns, and fifteen battle-flags. Three of his generals were killed and four wounded. Among the former was reported General Fitzhugh Lee. Not only was Early driven through Winchester, but he was sent "whirling up the valley," so vigorously pursued, that he did not make a stand until he reached Fisher's Hill, thirty miles below Winchester.

Here again, by a rapid and overwhelming assault, pursuing his favorite tactics of columns attacking in front—the Sixth in the centre and the Nineteenth on the left, and a flanking reserve of cavalry on each flank in succession—Sheridan dislodged and routed him on the 20th, pushing him down through Harrisonburg and Staunton, and scattering portions of his force through the gaps of the Blue Ridge.

Sheridan then returned leisurely to Strasburg, and posted his victorious forces, for a brief season of rest, behind Cedar Creek. The operation had been brilliant in the extreme. From early morning on the 19th of September to the 25th, Early had lost his positions, his prestige, and ten thousand men, with a large number of guns.

Torbert was now dispatched to Staunton on a destructive raid, during which he tore up seven miles of the Virginia Central Railroad, and destroyed the iron bridge across the Shenandoah. All the grain which he could not use was likewise destroyed, to keep it from the enemy, should he return on our track, which, it was certain, he would endeavor to do.

We can only briefly advert to the other movements in the Valley. On the 8th of October, General Rosser, a "new


cavalry general," came up to try his hand on a portion of Sheridan's force, but was soon "settled" by an attack on his front and flanks, in which he lost caissons, ambulances, supplies, and wagons, and was pursued up the Valley "on the jump."

CEDAR CREEK.

The rebel troops in the Valley, thus roughly handled, lost confidence in Early, and Longstreet was sent with large reinforcements to command and reassure them. Again his cavalry suffered, but, nothing daunted, the rebel general now undertook one of the most daring operations of the war, and one that narrowly escaped being a success almost as brilliant as the recent victories of Sheridan. With his force well in hand, he rapidly crossed the mountains which separate the forks of the river; forded the North Fork, came upon our left flank, which was not properly protected; crept along the front of Crook's Corps, thus exposing himself to immense danger. But, favored by darkness and fog, he came into position unobserved, and just before dawn of the 19th of October, his men were lying in battle order not six hundred yards distant from our unsuspecting lines. Sheridan was absent, and the enemy knew it. The rebels also believed that the Sixth Corps had been withdrawn from the Valley and sent to Grant. Those real advantages gave them power; the supposed advantages strengthened their *morale*. When fairly in position, they sprang up with an unearthly yell, poured upon our sleeping troops, seized batteries, which they turned upon us, enfilading our lines, and rolled back our left. The confusion spread—the troops began to retreat—in parts it was a rout.

SHERIDAN RIDES POST FROM WINCHESTER.

Sheridan was at Winchester, twenty miles away, when the distant and faintly audible booming of cannon struck his ear. He mounted in hot haste, and riding like a



SHERIDAN'S OPERATIONS IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY.

courier, he arrived upon the field at ten o'clock, his horse covered with foam, and, like the Twin Brethren at the Lake Regillus, his presence stayed the ebbing tide, and turned it into a destructive flood. Moving like lightning among the retreating troops, he swung his hat in the air, shouting at the top of his voice, "Face the other way, boys! we are going back!" Pushing forward past the stragglers, who at once began to rally, he reached the main body, repeating his fiery words. "Boys," he added, "if I had been here, this never should have happened; we are going back." Arranging and strengthening his lines while the enemy had, most of them, stopped for a time to plunder our camps, he was just in readiness to move forward, when the rebels came in for a new and overwhelming assault. Resisting this manfully, he caught its surge, and hurled it back; assumed the offensive; attacked again in two columns; employed his cavalry in vigorous charges on both flanks; succeeded, with Custer's division, in turning their left and rolling it up, and again routed them. Thus he snatched victory out of the jaws of defeat. And all this—no one can gainsay it—was due to the brilliant genius and personal *élan* of Sheridan himself. The slaughter of the enemy was great. We captured almost every thing they had, including the guns and camps which we had lost in the morning. The rout of the enemy was again complete. They flew to Staunton on wings of fear, while Sheridan pursued as far as Mount Jackson. No one was more gratified than Grant, who, as soon as he heard the news, telegraphed to the Secretary these words:

"I had a salute of one hundred guns fired from each of the armies here, in honor of Sheridan's last victory. Turning what bid fair to be a disaster into a glorious victory, *stamps Sheridan, what I have always thought him, one of the ablest of generals.*

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General."

This was, as it might well be, the last attempt of the enemy to invade the North through the Shenandoah Valley, which was now called, for them, the Valley of Humiliation.

General McClellan having resigned his commission, to take effect on the 8th of November, it was ordered by the President:

“That for personal gallantry, military skill, and just confidence in the courage and patriotism of his troops, displayed by Philip H. Sheridan on the 19th of October at Cedar Run, whereby, under the blessing of Providence, his routed army was reorganized, a great national disaster averted, and a brilliant victory achieved over the rebels for the third time in pitched battle within thirty days, Philip H. Sheridan is appointed major-general in the United States Army, to rank as such from the 8th day of November, 1864.”

Such a prestige as that now established by Sheridan enabled Grant to take the Sixth Corps away, and it was ordered to the vicinity of Petersburg.

The historian would fain linger upon such brilliant records as these, but it is necessary that we should now return to take a brief survey of what was being done in the Army of the Potomac.

NAMES OF UNION FORTS AROUND PETERSBURG. (SEE MAP FACING NEXT PAGE.)

A. Fort McGilvery.	L. Fort Howard.
B. Fort Steadman.	M. Fort Wadsworth.
C. Fort Hascall.	N. Fort Dushane.
D. Fort Morton.	O. Fort Davison.
E. Fort Meikle.	P. Fort McMahan.
F. Fort Rice.	Q. Fort Stevenson.
G. Fort Sedgwick, or Fort Hell.	R. Fort Blaisdel.
H. Fort Davis.	S. Fort Patrick Kelley.
I. Fort Prescott.	T. Fort Bross.
K. Fort Alexander Hayes.	

FORTS ON THE PROLONGATION OF THE LINES WEST OF THE WELDON RAILROAD.

A. Fort Keene.	G. Fort Wheaton.
B. Fort Urmston.	H. Fort Sampson.
C. Fort Conahey.	I. Fort Cummings.
D. Fort Fisher.	K. Fort Emory.
E. Fort Welch.	L. Fort Siebert.
F. Fort Gregg.	M. Fort Clarke.

FORTS PROTECTING CITY POINT.

O. Fort Abbott.	S. Fort Lewis O. Morris.
P. Fort Craig.	T. Fort Merriam.
Q. Fort Graves.	U. Fort Gould.
R. Fort McKeen.	V. Fort Porter.

NAMES OF CERTAIN REBEL FORTS AROUND PETERSBURG.

a. Colquit's Sallent.	d. Fort Mahone.
b. Pegram's Battery, the fort blown up at the mine explosion.	e. Fort New Orleans.
c. Reeves' Sallent.	f. Fort Lee.

X. Fort Harrison (on Chapin's Farm, north of James River).

CHAPTER XXXVI.


AROUND PETERSBURG.

TO THE WELDON ROAD.—THE CATTLE RAID.—MOVEMENT ON BOTH FLANKS.—THE WESTWARD MOVEMENT.—BUTLER MOVES.—THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC IN MOTION.—THE DUTCH GAP CANAL.—GREGG AT STONEY CREEK.—COMPARATIVE REST.

THE greater part of July and the early days of August were spent in a proper adjustment of the defensive works, and in strengthening them from the Appomattox to the Jerusalem plankroad. The important points were crowned with redoubts, and heavy siege-batteries were erected in the most advantageous positions.

In the early part of August, the lieutenant-general, believing that Lee had detached three divisions from Petersburg to re-enforce the rebel army in the Shenandoah Valley, determined to make a strong diversion north of the James in favor of another movement against the Weldon road.

Let us look at these co-operative movements in their order. To this end the Second Corps was placed on transports and ostentatiously moved down the river, as if proceeding to Fortress Monroe; but, under cover of night, the vessels turned and steamed up the river, and the expeditionary force landed at Deep Bottom on the 14th of August. There it was joined by a cavalry division under Gregg, and a force from Butler's army under Birney, which marched from Bermuda Hundred and crossed the river on the ponton-bridge at Deep Bottom.



Plan of
 OPERATIONS
 around
RICHMOND and PETERSBURG
 prepared by
 Lt. Col. W. H. Paine, Engineer.
 Engraved for Grant and His Campaigns.



The general order of battle, superintended by General Grant, who visited the field, was as follows : The cavalry well thrown out on the Charles City road ; the Second Corps on the right, and the troops of the Army of the James on the left, while the gunboats moved up to shell the rebel works as our troops advanced. The whole force moved out silently from Strawberry Plains towards the enemy. On the 14th, Hancock manœuvred to the right, connecting with the cavalry, and an attack was made upon the enemy's position, in which Birney's troops were quite successful, capturing the enemy's rifle trenches, and wresting from him six guns, four colors, and several hundred prisoners. In this engagement, the Tenth Connecticut and Fourteenth Massachusetts regiments greatly distinguished themselves. The attack of Barlow's division, made at the same time, was not quite so successful. Again Hancock manœuvres to find weak points in which to attack, and on the 16th another assault is made, but without important results. Gregg makes a fearless advance on the right ; drives the enemy's cavalry before him to White's tavern ; but is in turn driven back by strong re-enforcements of the enemy, to Deep Run, where he makes a stand. In these actions the rebels lost heavily, and among their killed were Generals Chambless and Gherardie. The 17th, 18th, and 19th were spent by the troops in skirmishing. On the night of the 18th a strong attack of the enemy was handsomely repulsed : but the main purpose of the movement north of the James is already accomplished ; and besides, the enemy is too strong to be broken there. Grant has learned that Lee has not detached *three* divisions to the Shenandoah, but only *one*, that of Kershaw. This movement north of the James has retained the others, which were under marching orders when it began. On the 20th, Hancock, who has already sent back one division, that of Mott, is ordered to take the remainder of his corps back to Petersburg, to be in readiness for the movement by the left. Our losses north of the James were about five thousand.

TO THE WELDON ROAD.

Having attracted the enemy's attention to the north side of the James River, and given him some concern as to the defences of Richmond in that quarter, Grant now put Warren in motion, on the 18th of August, with four days' rations, to strike the Weldon road at Six-mile Station, near Globe Tavern. Warren reached this point and began to destroy the track. On the 19th his position was thus fully three miles from the left of our intrenched line on the Jerusalem road. While he was extending his pickets to connect, the enemy, ever ready and skilful to take advantage of gaps—those open joints in the harness of armies—thrust in heavy masses in the form of a Virginia brigade, under Watkins, and a Mississippi brigade, under Davis, (the two forming Mahone's division of Hill's corps), struck his right flank heavily, held by Crawford, and turned upon his right rear. This attack was of the nature of a surprise, but Warren was equal to the emergency, and although he lost several hundred prisoners at the first, he changed front to meet the flanking dash, moved the divisions of Willcox and White (late Ledlie's), of the Ninth Corps, to strengthen his right, and sustained a violent attack of Heth's division of Hill's corps on his left, which was at first partially successful. In this action on the left we lost many prisoners, and among them, General William Hays. The result of this engagement presents a decided balance in our favor. For although we had lost heavily, we had gained permanent possession of the Weldon road, and had intrenched upon it, while notwithstanding the valor of the enemy, the prisoners he boasted, and the skilful attacks which at first broke our line and sent it back in confusion, he had lost the railroad forever, the question, *par excellence*, for which he was fighting.

On the 20th our troops on the left were allowed by the rebels to rest and strengthen the new position, which should have been at once assaulted, had Hill hoped to succeed. After thus giving us twenty-four hours of invaluable time, Hill at-

tacked, on the 21st, to dislodge Warren, striking boldly our left wing and centre simultaneously, but without success. Their attack having failed, Warren then made a gallant *riposte*, in which he captured four flags and four hundred prisoners. In this action General Cutler was wounded, and the brave Colonel Dushane of the Maryland brigade was killed.

The advanced position of Warren on the left now led to a gradual extension of the other corps westward. The Second, under Hancock, was moved in the vicinity of the Weldon road on the 22d; and on the 23d, Miles' division and Gregg's cavalry were once more dispatched to the fatal Reams' Station, to destroy it. The enemy contesting the advance of this force, Hancock goes down to its assistance with Gibbon's division, and driving the rebel troops away, Hancock's command proceed with the destruction of the road on the 24th. But the enemy is not disposed to yield the station. On the 25th he comes down in stronger force, and obliges Hancock to concentrate and fight a battle there. The attack was made with great fury, and after several handsome repulses, he succeeds in breaking a portion of our line, and capturing five guns.

Upon the receipt of intelligence that Hancock was pressed, Meade sent down Willcox's division of the Ninth Corps to his assistance, but it did not arrive until the action was over. At nightfall Hancock withdrew his force, the enemy moving away at the same time. During this brief period our losses had been great. From the 18th to the 21st inclusive, they were not less than five thousand men, and in the battle at Reams' on the 25th, they numbered two thousand five hundred.

We are not prepared to concede that the losses at Reams' Station were compensated for by the results; indeed it seems to have been proven that we did not need that position, for after many severe actions it was eventually abandoned to the rebels. But the great movement began on the 18th of August resulted in our permanent occupancy of the Weldon Railroad. The enemy fell back to within three miles of Petersburg, and we were at once enabled to follow, and intrench on the railroad, within three and a half miles of the city, with our skir-

mishers advantageously thrown out to a point near the Vaughan road. Our intrenchments were laid out on this new line connecting with the former left on the Jerusalem road.

For a brief period the army again had rest, and an opportunity to strengthen their positions. By the 13th of September a railroad was completed, uniting the City Point and Petersburg road with the Weldon road; thus insuring supplies of all kinds, without concern as to the weather, which had often made wagoning difficult in the extreme.

THE CATTLE RAID.

Just at this time occurred a stratagem of the enemy, known as the famous *Cattle Raid*, which indicated at once the difficulty of attaining perfect security in rear of such an extended position, and also the danger of neglecting proper precautions, because the security seems great. Three regiments of rebel cavalry came swiftly down through our lines to Coggins' Point, surprised the small force guarding the grazing-ground, and succeeded in driving off two thousand five hundred head of cattle collected there, and helping the rebels to a few rations of fresh beef, with the hearty laugh of "those who win," at our expense.

MOVEMENT ON BOTH FLANKS.

While constantly keeping an eye on the Southside Railroad, General Grant, satisfied that on so extended a line as the rebels were compelled to hold, in order to confront his own, there must be weak spots, and that these points were mostly to be found on or near their flanks, determined to make a demonstration on the north side of the James River, with Butler's troops, in co-operation with one to be made by Meade against the enemy's right,—a mode of tactics which would require the movement of rebel troops to the greatest distances, and which would be ready to punish his concentration on one flank by an overwhelming attack on the other.

The movement north of the James was under General Ord. The Tenth Corps, under Birney, and Ord's (Eighteenth) corps, crossed on the ponton-bridge to Deep Bottom, on the night of the 28th of September, and moving forward the next morning against Fort Morris, and the long line of intrenchments just below Chapin's farm, they successfully assaulted these. The Eighteenth Corps was on the left, Birney in the centre, while the cavalry extended to the right. Sixteen guns were captured in this engagement. Ord took Fort Morris. But, in pursuing this success, that general was wounded, and General Godfrey Weitzel succeeded to the command. General Burnham was killed. In front of the intrenchments mentioned was a strong work called Fort Gilmer, which resisted the attack of the Eighteenth Corps, although some of the stormers reached the ditch; but Birney took New Market Heights, while the cavalry, under Kautz, taking advantage of the battle, penetrated by the road to the right to the toll-gate, only two or three miles from Richmond. Here the multiple lines of the enemy's works checked their advance, and Kautz was obliged to retire. But this movement of our right had resulted in a valuable success. We had gained a strong position, from which the enemy could not dislodge us.

THE WESTWARD MOVEMENT.

Let us now turn to the left, from which the counter-movement was to be made. On the 30th of September, General Grant had ordered the demonstration to be made, for the alternative purpose of seeing whether the enemy had weakened his lines at that point—of which he would at once take advantage—and also to prevent such a movement of troops as would crush the force operating north of the James.

The expeditionary force in this direction was composed of two divisions of the Fifth Corps, under Warren, and two of the Ninth, under Parke. They moved from our left towards Poplar Spring Church and Peeble's farm, which points the enemy had strongly intrenched, to cover our approaches upon the Southside Railroad. Gregg's cavalry accompanied this

force, and moved further towards the enemy's right and rear. Griffin's division of the Fifth Corps came upon the enemy's intrenchments on Peeble's farm, and gallantly stormed the rifle-pits and a small redoubt, taking one gun and about one hundred prisoners. Ayres' division of the same corps moved up the Squirrel Level road, and also carried a small work in its front. Parke, moving past them on the left, towards the Boydton plankroad, was met by the enemy in force, and compelled to fall back for a short distance; but Griffin moved up to his support, and the enemy was thus checked. Gregg's advance on this day drove the enemy before it. As soon as word had reached Meade's headquarters that Parke was pressed, Mott's division of the Second Corps was pushed forward to his assistance. This was on the 1st of October, but before these re-enforcements arrived the conflict was at an end.

By this time Gregg had reached the Duncan road, where he had a sharp encounter with the enemy, and succeeded in driving him back with loss. Among the rebel killed was General Dunnovan. The success thus far assured now led to a combined advance along the line, which found the enemy strongly intrenched. Having gained a new point of value in our encircling movement to the left, it was thought best to intrench in the enemy's front, and join this new acquisition to our former left flank. Our losses, in these actions, were about two thousand five hundred in killed, wounded, and prisoners.

Thus our approaches were slow, but sure, and the enemy found himself daily more contracted in his lines, with his communications constantly threatened. On the 7th of October the enemy made a new movement against the cavalry of Kautz, north of the James, to turn our left flank, which resulted in disaster. He lost nine guns, and a considerable number of prisoners; but when he fell back to our infantry positions, all efforts of the enemy to take them were entirely unsuccessful.

Pending these movements, there was much picket and artillery firing all along the line of the trenches, in front of Petersburg, especially in the neighborhood of the salient

called "the sore point," and "Fort Hell," which was the soubriquet of Fort Sedgwick, covering the Jerusalem plank-road.

BUTLER MOVES.

On the 13th of October, General Butler again made a strong reconnoissance, resulting in an assault designed to drive the enemy away from some new works which the rebels were constructing, but they were found too strong, and the partial attack was repulsed. On the 15th, Mr. Stanton, the Secretary of War, visited the armies operating against Richmond and Petersburg, accompanied by the chiefs of the Quartermaster and Commissary departments, and the Surgeon-General, to find out the condition of the troops, and to provide all that should be needed.

THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC IN MOTION.

It was now late in the autumn, and approaching the winter, in which movements on a large scale in that quarter must be suspended; but before such a period of comparative inaction should set in, Grant determined to make one solid effort to find the enemy's right flank. To this end, orders were issued for the movement of the entire Army of the Potomac, leaving only the necessary guards of the trenches and redoubts. The men were provided with four days' rations for the infantry, and three for the cavalry, and the army left its intrenchments, secretly and suddenly, on the morning of Thursday, the 27th of October. The new objective was the enemy's line of works covering Hatcher's Run, and the White Oak road.

A glance at the *terrain* which was to be the principal field of operations from this time until the last days of the struggle, will show that the enemy, after being forced to abandon the Weldon road, placed such dependence upon the Boydton plankroad that he covered this by works extending from the right of his Petersburg defences; and the crossing of this road

at Hatcher's Run became a point in dispute. Should he lose this road, the White Oak road became an important line; and should that be flanked, as it eventually was at Five Forks, the Southside Railroad must be strongly fortified, or it would fall into our possession. Hancock, with the Second Corps, moved forward, crossed Hatcher's Run, on the Vaughan road, and reached the Boydton road, near Burgess's mills, on the run, thus being only about six miles distant from the Southside road. Two divisions of the Fifth, with some cavalry, moving in advance on our left, forced the passage of the run at Armstrong's Mills, and then marched up the run towards the railroad, to join Hancock. But the country was almost a *terra incognita*; the only map we could obtain was an old one of Dinwiddie County; the thickets were dense, and the roads winding, and therefore this junction was not made. The efforts of the Ninth Corps were repelled by the strongly posted enemy, and after due consideration, Grant, finding that we could not strike his flank, and that in an attack in front the enemy fought at great advantage, issued orders to return. Before these could be carried out, however, the enemy, with characteristic adroitness, penetrated into the space between the Fifth and Second corps, and struck a heavy blow upon the flanks of both. It should be observed that the commander of neither corps considered the orders he had received as contemplating a junction of the corps, and that the penetration of the enemy was due to the nature of the ground, and not to the fault of the corps commanders. With commendable judgment and rapidity, however, Hancock faced his corps to meet the attack, and, after a sanguinary conflict, he drove the enemy away, and then complied with the orders, and withdrew. The Army of the Potomac returned to its intrenchments, having gained little besides the practical knowledge of the ground, which was to be fought over many times before the end should be.

In accordance with a system established on so many precedents, while this movement was going on, Butler made another demonstration on the north, in two columns, which attacked

the enemy on the Williamsburg road and on the York River Railroad. In the first he was unsuccessful, and in the second he took a fort, which, however, was afterwards abandoned.

THE DUTCH GAP CANAL.

We must here mention a project or experiment made by General Butler, to cut off a long double stretch of the James River. The peninsula known as Farrar's Island, inclosed in this loop of the river, is, at the nearest points of the river, less than half a mile wide. On the 10th of August work was begun on a deep cut at this point, which it was hoped would open a passage for our iron-clads. It was prosecuted with vigor, negroes being employed as laborers; and afterwards, rebel prisoners were set to digging by Butler, under fire of their batteries, in retaliation for rebel outrages. The project was never popular; and among the men it was proposed, in the way of pleasantry, that courts-martial should sentence hardened offenders to two years' hard labor on the Dutch Gap Canal. On the 25th of November the steam dredging-machine was sunk by the enemy's shot. On the 1st of January the bulkhead was blown out, but the earth came cruelly back into the canal; and on the 2d, the enemy's enfilading batteries ploughed through it from end to end. Although small vessels eventually passed through it, it was useless during the war, but may become of value hereafter for purposes of peaceful commerce.

The quiet at Petersburg was now only broken by slight reconnoissances and artillery firing.

GREGG AT STONEY CREEK.

On the 4th of December, Gregg marched with his cavalry to the crossing of the Weldon Railroad at Stoney Creek. It had been reported that the enemy was constructing from this point a branch railroad to connect with the Southside road. Here he found a part of the grading made; but after a slight

resistance, he succeeded in burning the buildings and supplies of material, and set out on his return. He was fiercely followed by Hampton, who harassed his rear. Gregg's dispositions were skilful. His second brigade brought up the rear, and held the enemy in check; and when hard pressed, the first brigade relieved it, the second marching past it. The first was in turn relieved by the third; and thus he returned to the army.

COMPARATIVE REST.

From this time, the operations of the armies of the Potomac and the James were principally of a defensive character. The lines were strengthened, and busy preparations were made for the spring campaign, designed and destined to be the final one. On the 28th of November, General Hancock was commissioned to recruit, as rapidly as possible, a new corps, to be called the First Corps; and General Humphreys, who had been General Meade's chief of staff, was promoted to the command of the Second, which he exercised with signal ability during the remainder of the war.

Notwithstanding the vague threats of the rebel journals, that Lee was contemplating some grand movement, General Grant now permitted many officers to go on furlough for Christmas holidays. Nor were the festivities of the season forgotten in camp. Luxuries were sent down to the soldiers by loving friends and admiring countrymen at the North; and that Christmas in camp will long be remembered with pleasure by the soldiers.

It is proper now to take advantage of this pause, to place on record what had been done by the Army of the Potomac, after a campaign unparalleled in the annals of war, ancient or modern. The want of proper documents alone prevents our giving similar statements with regard to the Army of the James,—a lack which we sincerely regret.

Tabular Statement of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac, from May 5, 1864, to November 1, 1864.

BATTLES.	DATES.	KILLED.		WOUNDED.		MISSING.		Aggre- gate.
		Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	
Wilderness.....	May 5 to 12.....	269	3,019	1,017	18,261	177	6,667	29,410
Spottsylvania...	May 12 to 21.....	114	2,032	259	7,697	31	248	10,381
North Anna.....	May 21 to 31.....	12	138	67	1,063	3	324	1,607
Cold Harbor.....	June 1 to 10.....	144	1,561	421	8,621	51	2,355	18,153
Petersburg.....	June 10 to 20.....	85	1,113	361	6,492	46	1,568	9,665
Ditto.....	June 20 to July 30.	29	576	120	2,374	103	2,109	5,316
Ditto.....	July 30.....	47	372	124	1,555	91	1,819	4,008
Trenches.....	Aug. 1 to 18.....	10	128	58	626	1	45	868
Weldon RR.....	Aug. 18 to 21.....	21	191	100	1,055	104	3,072	4,548
Reams' Station..	Aug. 25.....	24	93	62	484	95	1,674	2,432
Peeble's Farm...	Sept. 30 to Oct. 1..	12	129	50	788	56	1,700	2,685
Trenches.....	Aug. 18 to Oct. 30.	13	284	91	1,214	4	800	2,417
Boydton Pl'kr'd.	Oct. 27 to 28.....	16	140	66	981	8	619	1,902
		796	9,776	2,796	51,161	775	23,083	88,387

Statement showing the Number of Colors captured from the Enemy, during the Operations of the Army of the Potomac, from May 4, 1864, to November 1, 1864.

Number of Colors captured..... 67

Captured by Cavalry Corps..... 3

Captured by Second Corps..... 40

Captured by Fifth Corps..... 10

Captured by Sixth Corps..... 3

Captured by Ninth Corps..... 11

— 67

NOTE.—The foregoing statement is made up of the reports of captured colors that had been received at this time.

Two divisions of the Cavalry Corps and the Sixth Corps having been transferred from the Army of the Potomac, it is not certainly known that all the colors captured by these troops, prior to their transfer, are here reported.

Statement showing the Number of Prisoners captured by the Army of the Potomac, during the Operations from May 4, 1864, to November 1, 1864.

From May 1 to May 12..... 7,078

From May 12 to July 31..... 6,506

From July 31 to August 31..... 573

From August 31 to September 30..... 78

From September 30 to October 31..... 1,138

Total..... 15,373

NOTE.—The tabular statements here made are taken from unpublished material, kindly furnished me by a staff-officer of General Grant.

Statement showing the Number of Guns captured from the Enemy, also the Number of Guns lost, during the Operations of the Army of the Potomac, from May 4, 1864, to November 1, 1864. Thirty-two guns were captured, and twenty-five guns lost, as follows :

DATE.	CORPS.	NUMBER.		WHERE.	REMARKS.
		Capt'd.	Lost.		
May 5	Fifth.	—	2	Wilderness.	Winslow's battery "D," First N. Y. Artillery.
" 10	Second.	—	1	South of the Po River.	Brown's battery "B," First R. I. Light Artillery.
" 11	Cavalry.	2	—	Yellow Tavern.	
" 12	Second.	20	—	Spottsylvania.	
June 17	Ninth.	4	—	Petersburg.	
" 22	Second.	—	4	Ditto.	McKnight's Twelfth N. Y. battery.
" 29	Cavalry.	—	8	Reams' Station.	Maynadier's, "K," First U. S., 4; Fitzhugh's, "C" and "E," 4.
July 28	Second.	4	—	Jones' Neck.	
" 28	Cavalry.	—	1	Deep Bottom.	Denison's, "A," Second U. S.
Aug. 15	Second.	1	—		
" 25	Second.	—	9	Reams' Station.	Sleeper's Tenth Mass. batt., 4; McKnight's, Twelfth N. Y., 1.
Sept. 30	Fifth.	1	—	Poplar Gr. Ch.	
		32	25		

While thus we leave the armies around the rebel capital in winter-quarters, and Grant in his little wooden hut at City Point, it becomes necessary to cast a glance around the horizon, and note the work which was done, and which was to be done, elsewhere. In the biography of any other general, this would be only an incidental mention ; but it must be remembered, that although Grant had his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac, he had the entire control of all the armies in the field, and his plans were formed with reference to the combined movements of all the armies.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

OTHER PARTS OF THE GREAT THEATRE.

SHERMAN.—HOOD MOVES INTO TENNESSEE.—GENERAL THOMAS.—GENERAL HOOD.—MOBILE.—PRICE INVADES MISSOURI.—TO WYTHEVILLE AND SALTVILLE.

SHERMAN.

IT is not within our scope to give a detailed account of the doings of this illustrious general. They constitute a special theme, and are elsewhere written. We shall only present the outline.

Moving from Chattanooga, with the three armies of the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and the Ohio (commanded, respectively, by Generals Thomas, McPherson, and Schofield), he marched upon Johnston at Dalton; and when that commander fell back upon the strong position of Buzzard's Roost, Sherman, moving forward with Thomas and Schofield in front, turned the position by sending McPherson to Snake Gap. Johnston fell back to Resaca; and after a desperate battle there, retreated to Cassville, and across the Etowah River. After a rest, Sherman moved to Dallas, and thus turned the Alatoona Pass. After several fierce battles near New Hope Church, in the neighborhood of Dallas, Johnston retreated to Kenesaw, Pine Hill, and Lost mountains, where he strongly intrenched himself. Once more Sherman moved by the right flank; and Johnston crossed the Chattahoochee, eventually

falling back upon Atlanta. Here, dissatisfied with the tactics of Johnston, the rebel authorities relieved him, and placed Hood in command. At this point, a furious battle ensued, in which General McPherson was killed, and his army temporarily commanded by General Logan, until Howard was assigned to the command.

But Hood's fierceness met no better fate than Johnston's retreating tactics. Sherman makes a flank movement by the right, on the Montgomery and Macon Railroad, and Hood has no alternative but to retire from Atlanta, which was at once occupied by General Slocum, with the Twentieth Corps, on the 2d of September. Sherman spends some time in refitting at Atlanta, and preparing for a new move, while the enemy, seemingly now purposeless, moves round to the north to cut the communications, which Sherman was preparing to abandon.

Amazed at Hood's folly in leaving the south utterly defenceless, Sherman did not waste much time in following and driving his army before him; but, making his arrangements to leave Thomas to protect Tennessee and take Hood in charge, he sets out on that magnificent march southward, which has no parallel in our history. Detaching the Fourth Corps, under Stanley, and the Twenty-third, under Schofield, to Thomas, he begins his movement on Savannah on the 14th of November, threatening Augusta and Macon as he advances, and finding no enemy to oppose him in that "grand gallop through Georgia." Never had the people so lost their confidence in the Confederate government as now. Their cry of agony was fierce and bitter. Passing around the City of Savannah, he stormed Fort McAllister, while Beauregard and Hardee were only too glad to escape with the garrison of the city.

Leaving the thread of Sherman's movements for future consideration, let us now look at Hood.

HOOD MOVES INTO TENNESSEE.

The Confederate commander, a gallant soldier but an unskilful general, breaks up his encampments at Tuscumbia and Florence, and marches northward upon a road which leads him to swift destruction. Of this movement General Grant says, with simple, but severe criticism: "Hood, instead of following Sherman, continued his move northward, which seemed to me to be leading to his certain doom. At all events, had I had the power to command both armies, I should not have changed the orders under which he seemed to be acting." Our observing corps, under Schofield, which had been watching his advance, now retire rapidly before him. Hood comes on so fast that it becomes necessary to fight a battle at Franklin, in order to get our trains across the Big Harpeth River and into Nashville. The battle of Franklin was skilfully fought by Schofield on the 30th of November, our lines being drawn up in semi-circular form, with both flanks resting on the river. All Hood's attacks were repulsed, and Schofield did not fall back until after he had accomplished his purpose, and the trains were secure. The rebel loss was six thousand; ours, two thousand three hundred. He had six general officers killed, six wounded, and one captured. Of this battle, General Grant speaks as follows: "This was the first serious opposition the enemy met with, and, I am satisfied, was the fatal blow to all his expectations. During the night, General Schofield fell back towards Nashville; this left the field to the enemy—not lost by battle, but voluntarily abandoned, so that General Thomas's whole force might be brought together."

Hood now advanced upon Nashville, and drew his lines around the city, but was no sooner in position than Thomas attacked, broke his lines, and, in a battle which lasted two days, defeated and routed him, capturing nearly all his artillery, and a large number of prisoners, and driving him southward, a disorganized mass of stragglers rather than an army. He had come into Tennessee with fifty thousand men, impa-

tient for action and certain of victory. He left it with less than twenty-five thousand, never again to have any value or status as an army in the field.

GENERAL THOMAS.

General Grant had felt greatly concerned at this bold advance of Hood, and feared that Thomas was postponing too late the auspicious moment to check and hurl it back. His views at this time, and the great satisfaction which he experienced at the result, we will present in his own words :

“Before the battle of Nashville, I grew very impatient over, as it appeared to me, the unnecessary delay. This impatience was increased upon learning that the enemy had sent a force of cavalry across the Cumberland into Kentucky. I feared Hood would cross his whole army, and give us great trouble there. After urging upon General Thomas the necessity of immediately assuming the offensive, I started west to superintend matters there in person. Reaching Washington City, I received General Thomas's dispatch announcing his attack upon the enemy, and the result, as far as the battle had progressed. I was delighted. All my fears and apprehensions were dispelled. I am not yet satisfied but that General Thomas, immediately upon the appearance of Hood before Nashville, and before he had time to fortify, should have moved out with his whole force and given him battle, instead of waiting to remount his cavalry, which delayed him until the inclemency of the weather made it impracticable to attack earlier than he did. But his final defeat of Hood was so complete, that it will be accepted as a vindication of that distinguished officer's judgment.”

The battle of Nashville did more than vindicate the judgment of Thomas ; it set an additional seal to his reputation, as a cool, determined, and far-seeing general. Without evincing that electric brilliancy which characterizes generals of the first historic class, he stands high among those solid, rock-like men who shine most in dark hours, and who earn laurels in periods when they would often be lost by more brilliant men. He was appointed major-general in the regular army, to rank as such from the 15th day of December—the date of his success at Nashville.

GENERAL HOOD.

Entirely apart from political considerations, it becomes every soldier to speak with pity and respect of his antagonist Hood. He was brave, devoted, and self-sacrificing; and if, in his own language, he was "responsible for the conception of that campaign," we believe it is equally true that he "strove hard to do his duty in its execution." He had lost the use of an arm at Gettysburg, and had lost a leg at the battle of Chickamauga. But the military critic must share the opinion of the lieutenant-general, and find him guilty of violating one of the first maxims of warfare, by "doing what his enemy wanted him to do." Such men are invaluable when controlled, but should never be placed in chief command.

It is not deemed necessary in this summary of the actions, within the vast theatre controlled by the lieutenant-general, to dwell upon the minor operations, except so far as they bear upon the strategy of the war. Among these are to be classed the merciless raids of Forrest, cutting our communications between the East and West. He was brought to his bearings at Tupelo, on the 14th of July, by A. J. Smith. He was driven from Paducah by General Hicks; and he received the surrender of Fort Pillow, to perpetrate one of the most inhuman massacres recorded in military history—the murder of helpless prisoners, white and black, after they had surrendered in good faith.

MOBILE.

We must now turn for a moment to glance at the condition of affairs at Mobile. General Canby had been placed in command of the military division west of the Pacific. In the latter part of July, Admiral Farragut projected an attack upon the forts at the entrance of Mobile Bay, and with him was sent, from Canby's department, a land force under General Gordon Granger. We have not space in which to tell

the brilliant story which has given such lustre to the name of Farragut. Fort Gaines surrendered on the 8th of August, and Fort Powell, on the island opposite, was blown up on the 9th. Fort Morgan, on the opposite side of the chief entrance, was at once invested by the land troops, and surrendered on the 23d. The captures were fourteen hundred and sixty-five prisoners, and one hundred and four guns.

PRICE INVADES MISSOURI.

Let us turn now a hurried glance to another prominent portion of the field. Near the end of August, the rebel General Price had collected at Jackson Post a force of ten thousand men, to invade Missouri, which was in command of General Rosecrans, with an adequate force to defend it. Price advanced rapidly to the attack of Pilot Knob, and forced the garrison to retreat; but such temerity and foolhardiness could not long go unpunished.

General Curtis collected such forces as he could to prevent his invasion of Kansas, while Pleasanton, with the cavalry of Rosecrans, moved rapidly in his rear. The result was not doubtful. Compelled to fight on the Big Blue River, Price was defeated with a loss of his trains and artillery, and fled ingloriously into Northern Arkansas. Although gratified with the result, Grant was not satisfied with the handling of the troops. He says in his report: "The impunity with which Price was enabled to roam over the State of Missouri, and the incalculable mischief done by him, show to how little purpose a superior force may be used. There is no reason why General Rosecrans should not have concentrated his forces and whipped Price before the latter reached Pilot Knob."

On the 24th of September, Forrest took Athens in Tennessee, and from that point proceeded to Huntsville, which he summoned twice, but it refused to surrender. He then returned to Athens, which had been reoccupied by our troops, and summoned it, but with no greater success.

TO WYTHEVILLE AND SALTVILLE.

An expedition of General Burbridge to Saltville, in Virginia, having been successful, the rebel General Breckinridge entered East Tennessee and attacked Gillem at Morristown, and captured his artillery and a number of prisoners. Just at this juncture, General Stoneman, uniting the commands of Burbridge and Gillem, near Bean's Station, proceeded to operate against Breckinridge, and also proposed to destroy the salt-works at Saltville, and the railroad into Virginia as far as possible. This expedition was eminently successful. Stoneman defeated Vaughn, of Breckinridge's command, on the 16th of December, at Marion; destroyed Wytheville and the lead-works; and pushed on to Saltville, where he broke up the salt-works. He then returned General Burbridge to Lexington, and General Gillem to Knoxville.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

FORT FISHER.

THE TROOPS LAND.—THE BOMBARDMENT AND ASSAULT.—COMMENTS.—WILMINGTON FALLS.

WE come now to the consideration of a very important movement, in which Grant was more immediately interested than in those just referred to—the combined movement of the fleet and army to capture the strong works which defended the entrance, by the Cape Fear River, to Wilmington. This city was by far the most valuable of the few seaports yet left to the enemy;—a snug harbor for blockade-runners, which carried in those articles of vital need to the Confederacy, and paid themselves liberally with the cotton which they brought out. Its strategic value was the greater because our navy could not seal it by a blockade. It was necessary to gain possession of a long strip of land north of New Inlet, and ending at Federal Point. Upon this the chief work was Fort Fisher, which presented a strong front to the sea, joining with another which looked northward. To take this, land troops were necessary, and these the lieutenant-general provided as soon as they were asked for. Admiral Porter had collected in Hampton Roads the largest flotilla ever assembled for an assault on a single point. Universal attention was attracted to it, and with that freedom of speech, which all the terrors of a military law could not curtail, journals at the North gave

full publicity to the army of the South concerning its purpose. The enemy was thus enabled to strengthen his lines of defence to their utmost. On this account, the movement was postponed until the latter part of November. When all things were in readiness, Grant was called upon for an adequate force, which the winter inaction of the armies' operating against Richmond enabled him to provide.

The lieutenant-general went in person to Hampton Roads with General Butler, from whose department the troops were to be taken, to confer with Admiral Porter. In that conference it was determined that a force of six thousand five hundred men would be sufficient; and as it was believed that Bragg had gone to Georgia, with the troops from Wilmington, to make head against Sherman, Grant and Porter were very anxious that the purpose of the expedition should be effected before he could return. The arrangements for the embarkation of the troops were confided to General Butler, but General Weitzel was designated as commander of the expedition. The following are Grant's instructions to Butler :

CITY POINT, Va., December 6, 1864.

GENERAL—The first object of the expedition under General Weitzel, is to close to the enemy the port of Wilmington. If successful in this, the second will be to capture Wilmington itself. There are reasonable grounds to hope for success, if advantage can be taken of the absence of the greater part of the enemy's forces now looking after Sherman in Georgia. The directions you have given for the numbers and equipment of the expedition are all right, except in the unimportant matter of where they embark and the amount of intrenching tools to be taken. The object of the expedition will be gained by effecting a landing on the main land between Cape Fear River and the Atlantic, north of the north entrance to the river. Should such landing be effected whilst the enemy still holds Fort Fisher and the batteries guarding the entrance to the river, then the troops should intrench themselves, and by cooperating with the navy, effect the reduction and capture of those places. These in our hands, the navy could enter the harbor, and the port of Wilmington would be sealed. Should Fort Fisher and the point of land on which it is built fall into the hands of our troops immediately on landing, then it will be worth the attempt to capture Wilmington by a forced march and surprise. If time is consumed in gaining the first object of the expedition, the second will become a matter of after consideration.

The details for execution are intrusted to you and the officer immediately in command of the troops.

Should the troops under General Weitzel fail to effect a landing at or near Fort Fisher, they will be returned to the armies operating against Richmond without delay.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

MAJOR-GENERAL B. F. BUTLER.

It may here be stated, on the authority of General Grant's report, that the instructions thus sent by courtesy to General Butler, or some of them at least, did not reach General Weitzel; nor did that officer know of their existence until General Butler published his report, after the failure of the expedition. It further appears Grant did not intend Butler to go in command, and thought, even after the expedition started, that Weitzel was in command, with full instructions, and that Butler had gone as a spectator, and principally to witness the explosion of the powder-boat, which he considered a valuable adjunct to the expedition.

Several days were still occupied in putting the powder-boat in order. Time was very valuable, and Grant became impatient. At length, on the 13th December, the transport fleet was under way, and, on the 15th, in the evening, arrived off New Inlet, near Fort Fisher; but without a proper arrangement of time with the navy, for Porter, being obliged to put into Beaufort to get ammunition for the monitors, his fleet did not arrive off Fort Fisher until the evening of the 18th. Another vexatious delay now occurred. The transports were declared to be out of coal and water; they must go back to Beaufort for these. At length, on the morning of the 24th, they reached the rendezvous. But, before the arrival of Butler, the powder-boat was taken in and exploded, with no results whatever. She had been brought around from Norfolk in tow of the *Sassacus*; her dangerous lading had been adjusted at Beaufort; she had been placed under the command of one of the coolest and most intrepid officers of the navy—Commander A. C. Rhind; had been deftly carried in in the track of a blockade-runner; had been anchored two hundred

yards from the beach, and four hundred yards from the fort, and skilfully exploded, and "nobody hurt."

THE TROOPS LAND.

On the 25th the landing of the troops commenced, above Fort Fisher, and a reconnoissance was at once pushed towards the works. The opinion of General Weitzel was adverse to an assault; and upon this, without waiting to learn the effect of the naval bombardment, and without landing in person to see the position of affairs for himself, Butler re-embarked his troops, and returned to Hampton Roads, to the utter surprise of General Grant, as well as of most of the officers of the expedition. Some of these officers volunteered the report to Grant that they were nearly in the fort when the reconnoissance was withdrawn to re-embark.

Without entering further into the controversy, we may say, that there were two men who were not inclined to abandon the project in such a light and summary manner; these were Grant and Porter; and both were stung by the exultation of the rebels at our voluntary and unnecessary retreat.

The admiral still lay off the fort, and wrote to Grant for another leader, to bring the same number of troops, with whose co-operation he was certain of success. Grant now selected General Alfred H. Terry to lead the expedition, and sent down with him the same force which Butler had taken, adding only one small brigade, and, as a precaution, a small siege-train, which, however, it was not found necessary to land. The troops were principally Ames's division, of the Twenty-fourth Corps; Terry's First division, now commanded by Hawley; and Paine's (colored) division of the Twenty-fifth. The same chief-engineer, Colonel (now General) C. B. Comstock, accompanied the expedition, the fortune of which was to sit in judgment on the former one.

Grant communicated direct to the commander of the expedition the following instructions:

CITY POINT, VA., January 3, 1865.

GENERAL - The expedition intrusted to your command has been fitted out to renew the attempt to capture Fort Fisher, N. C., and Wilmington, ultimately, if the fort falls. You will then proceed, with as little delay as possible, to the naval fleet lying off Cape Fear River, and report the arrival of yourself and command to Admiral D. D. Porter, commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron. It is exceedingly desirable that the most complete understanding should exist between yourself and the naval commander. I suggest, therefore, that you consult with Admiral Porter freely, and get from him the part to be performed by each branch of the public service, so that there may be unity of action. It would be well to have the whole programme laid down in writing. I have served with Admiral Porter, and know that you can rely on his judgment and his nerve to undertake what he proposes. I would, therefore, defer to him as much as is consistent with your own responsibilities. The first object to be attained is, to get a firm position on the spit of land on which Fort Fisher is built, from which you can operate against that fort. You want to look to the practicability of receiving your supplies, and to defending yourself against superior forces sent against you by any of the avenues left open to the enemy. If such a position can be obtained, the siege of Fort Fisher will not be abandoned until its reduction is accomplished, or another plan of campaign is ordered from these headquarters.

My own views are, that if you effect a landing, the navy ought to run a portion of their fleet into Cape Fear River, whilst the balance of it operates on the outside. Land forces cannot invest Fort Fisher, or cut it off from supplies or re-enforcements whilst the river is in possession of the enemy.

A siege-train will be loaded on vessels, and sent to Fort Monroe, in readiness to be sent to you if required. All other supplies can be drawn from Beaufort as you need them.

Keep the fleet of vessels with you until your position is assured. When you find they can be spared, order them back, or such of them as you can spare, to Fort Monroe, to report for orders.

In case of failure to effect a landing, bring your command back to Beaufort, and report to these headquarters for further instructions. You will not debark at Beaufort until so directed.

General Sheridan has been ordered to send a division of troops to Baltimore, and place them on sea-going vessels. These troops will be brought to Fort Monroe, and kept there on the vessels until you are heard from. Should you require them, they will be sent to you.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL A. H. TERRY.

This new expedition sailed from Fortress Monroe on the 6th of January, and was at Beaufort on the 8th. Owing to stress of weather, it did not rendezvous off the fort until the

evening of the 12th. The troops were landed on the 13th and 14th, and, on the 14th, a strong reconnoissance was pushed forward to within five hundred yards of Fort Fisher, along the northeastern or land front. There was entire harmony between Porter and Terry,—a fact which the admiral afterwards published to the world in a letter, speaking of the commander of the land forces in terms of unmeasured, but merited eulogium. After an arrangement between these officers, the navy moved to a new bombardment, while Terry prepared his columns of attack.

THE BOMBARDMENT AND ASSAULT.

The fleet moved up to its work in three grand divisions, called the inner, middle, and outer columns; while the iron-clads ranged in a distinct column directly under the guns of the fort. The bombardment began at a quarter before seven on the 15th, and continued until early afternoon, when the guns of the fort were silenced. Under cover of this fire, sixteen hundred sailors and marines were landed, under the command of Fleet-Captain Breese, to attack the eastern or sea front, while the storming party of land troops consisted of the brigades of Curtis, Pennypacker, and Bell. The rebel General Hoke, in our rear, towards Wilmington, with five thousand men, was held in check by Abbot's brigade, which had not been with the former expedition, and Paine's division of colored troops. The fire of the fleet was now deflected from the points of attack, and at a given signal, at half-past three o'clock, the stormers rushed to the assault. The fort was held by about two thousand five hundred men, and the northern front was filled with traverses. The rush of the sailors was so gallantly made, that for a brief space the enemy thought it the chief attack. They were soon undeceived. Terry's assaulting column, under Ames, broke down the already weakened palisades with axes, and were soon on the western part of the northern parapet; and although the enemy fought with great valor, the stormers swept in, followed by the reserves, and in a few minutes the fort was ours, with

all its garrison and equipage. The naval column, under Captain Breese, although it failed to enter the work, did effective service as a diversion, and thus aided in producing the result. Terry's loss was one hundred and ten killed, and five hundred and thirty-six wounded. The navy lost three hundred and nine in killed and wounded. All this was on the 15th. On the 16th and 17th the enemy blew up Fort Caswell at the lower entrance, and Bald Head Battery opposite was taken, and thus we were in undisputed possession of both entrances by the Cape Fear River to Wilmington.

On the 7th of January, Butler was relieved at Grant's request, and ordered to report at Lowell, Massachusetts. General Ord superseded him in command of the department.

COMMENTS.

The actions which resulted in the capture of Fort Fisher have given rise to much controversy, and a weary stretch of correspondence. When Butler was relieved, he said, in his farewell order: "I have refused to order the useless sacrifice of the lives of such soldiers, and am relieved from my command;" a Parthian shot, which, as Webster said of Haynes, failed to hit, "for want of strength in the bow." We need not dwell upon the criminations and recriminations. Porter says distinctly, in his report of the operations of the first expedition: "Two magazines had been blown up by our shells, and the fort set on fire in several places, and such a torrent of missiles was falling into it and bursting over it, that it was impossible for any thing human to stand it. * * The batteries were silenced completely." Referring to the abandonment of the project, he says: "General Weitzel in person was making observations about six hundred yards off, and the troops were in and around the works. One gallant officer, whose name I do not know, went on the parapet and brought away the rebel flag we had knocked down. A soldier went into the works and led out a horse, killing the orderly mounted on him, and taking his dispatches from the body. Another

soldier fired his musket into the bomb-proof among the rebels, and eight or ten others who had ventured near the forts were wounded by our shells."

He adds, with logical correctness: "I don't pretend to put my opinion in opposition to that of General Weitzel, who is a thorough soldier and an able engineer, and whose business it is to know more of assaulting than I do, but I can't help thinking that it was worth while to make the attempt after coming so far."

When he had determined to abandon the attempt and return to Hampton Roads, Butler wrote a letter to Porter, from which we make the following quotation:

"General Weitzel advanced his skirmish line within fifty yards of the fort while the garrison was kept in their bomb-proof by the fire of the navy, and so closely that three or four men of the picket-line ventured upon the parapet and through the sally-port of the work, capturing a horse, which they brought off, killing the orderly, who was the bearer of a dispatch from chief of artillery of General Whiting to bring a light battery within the fort, and also brought away from the parapet the flag of the fort."

To which Porter replied as follows:

"I have ordered the largest vessels to proceed off Beaufort, and fill up with ammunition, to be ready for another attack in case it is decided to proceed with this matter by making other arrangements.

"We have not commenced firing rapidly yet, and could keep any rebels inside from showing their heads until an assaulting column was within twenty yards of the works.

"I wish some more of your gallant fellows had followed the officer who took the flag from the parapet, and the brave fellow who brought the horse out from the fort. I think they would have found it an easier conquest than is supposed.

"I do not, however, pretend to place my opinion in opposition to General Weitzel, whom I know to be an accomplished soldier and engineer, and whose opinion has great weight with me."

The following letter from Grant throws still more light on the subject:

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
CITY POINT, Va., January 7, 1865.

To avoid publicity of the time of sailing and destination of the expedition against Fort Fisher, my orders to General Butler to prepare it were given verbally, and the instructions to the commanding officer of the expedition were

made by him and submitted to me. I append to the report a copy of General Butler's instructions to General Weitzel, together with copies of my dispatches and instructions to General Butler, relating to the expedition. It will be perceived that it was never contemplated that General Butler should accompany the expedition, but that Major-General Weitzel was especially named as the commander of it.

My hopes of success rested entirely on our ability to capture Fort Fisher, and I had even a hope of getting Wilmington before the enemy could get troops there to oppose us. I knew that the enemy had taken nearly the entire garrison of Wilmington and its dependencies to oppose Sherman. I am inclined to ascribe the delay which has cost us so dearly to an experiment. I refer to the explosion of gunpowder in the open air.

My dispatches to General Butler will show his report to be in error, where he states that he returned, after having effected a landing, in obedience to my instructions. On the contrary, these instructions contemplated no withdrawal or a failure after a landing was made.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

The lieutenant-general has published a report on this subject, giving the orders and facts, from which it is unnecessary to draw. We need no more perfect condemnation of the military conduct of the first expedition than that which is contained in the success of the second attempt. Words can never destroy, nor are they needed to substantiate, glaring facts. The court of inquiry upon Butler sat around Fort Fisher; Porter was the president and Terry the chief member, and the witnesses, every man, on land and fleet, that bore part in the action. And so we dismiss the case.

General Whiting, the Confederate commander, was grievously wounded in the last assault, and died a prisoner in the harbor of New York. A graduate of West Point, at the head of his class, he had talents of a high order, not untinged, however, with a consciousness of his merits to their fullest extent. He expiated his fault with his life, and we prefer to remember him as the clever, vivacious, black-haired cadet, than as the loser of his fort and his life.

WILMINGTON FALLS.

The movement upon Wilmington was at once begun. Terry's force was not large enough to storm or flank the

outer defences ; and so moving up close to the rebel works, he waited for re-enforcements under Schofield, who had been detached by the lieutenant-general from Thomas's command after the battle of Nashville. Schofield came up on the 15th of February, and assumed command. On the 16th, at night-fall, he moved Cox's division across to Smithville and up the right bank of the Cape Fear River, to take Fort Anderson in rear, while Porter enfiladed it with iron-clads. On the 18th our lines were strengthened for an assault, which the enemy saved us the trouble of making, by evacuating the works on the 19th at dawn. Cox pushed forward across Brunswick River to Eagle Island, thus flanking the peninsula defences, and, on the evening of the 21st, the enemy, burning his cotton, resin, and supplies, evacuated the city of Wilmington. Our troops entered on the morning of the 22d, having lost not more than two hundred and fifty men since the fall of Fort Fisher. Another word-sentence of terrible import was thus written : the handwriting on the wall was nearly completed.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

CONCENTRATION.

PLANS OF SHERMAN.—MARCH; THE STRATEGIC USES.—FORT STEADMAN.—SHERIDAN'S GRAND MARCH.—SHERMAN'S VISIT.—THE MOVEMENT TO THE LEFT.

WHEN Thomas had been ordered to send Schofield east, Grant also directed him to send A. J. Smith's corps and a cavalry division to Canby, for service in Northern Alabama and Mississippi.

North Carolina had now become a field of great prospective interest, and Grant constituted it a distinct military department, of which he gave Schofield the command. His orders to Schofield are here given *in extenso*.

CITY POINT, Va., January 31, 1865.

GENERAL— Your movements are intended as co-operative with Sherman's through the States of South and North Carolina. The first point to be attained is to secure Wilmington. Goldsboro' will then be your objective point, moving either from Wilmington or Newbern, or both, as you deem best. Should you not be able to reach Goldsboro', you will advance on the line or lines of railway connecting that place with the seacoast, as near to it as you can, building the road behind you. The enterprise under you has two objects: the first is to give Sherman material aid, if needed, in his march north; the second, to open a base of supplies for him on his line of march. As soon, therefore, as you can determine which of the two points, Wilmington or Newbern, you can best use for throwing supplies from, to the interior, you will commence the accumulation of twenty days' rations and forage for sixty thousand men and twenty thousand animals. You will get of these as many as you can house and protect to such point in the interior as you may be able to occupy. I believe General Palmer has received some instructions direct from General Sherman on the subject of securing supplies for his army. You can learn what steps he has taken, and be governed in your requisitions accordingly. A supply of ordnance stores will also be necessary.

Make all requisitions upon the chiefs of their respective departments in the field with me at City Point. Communicate with me by every opportunity, and should you deem it necessary at any time, send a special boat to Fortress Monroe, from which point you can communicate by telegraph.

The supplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive of those required for your own command.

The movements of the enemy may justify you, or even make it your imperative duty, to cut loose from your base, and strike for the interior to aid Sherman. In such case, you will act on your own judgment, without waiting for instructions. You will report, however, what you propose doing. The details for carrying out these instructions are necessarily left to you. I would urge, however, if I did not know that you are already fully alive to the importance of it, prompt action. Sherman may be looked for in the neighborhood of Goldsboro' any time from the 22d to the 28th of February. This limits your time very materially.

If rolling-stock is not secured in the capture of Wilmington, it can be supplied from Washington. A large force of railroad-men has already been sent to Beaufort, and other mechanics will go to Fort Fisher in a day or two. On this point I have informed you by telegraph.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

MAJOR-GENERAL J. M. SCHOFIELD.

PLANS OF SHERMAN.

When Sherman had established himself at Savannah, it became a question of immediate importance as to the next use to be made of his army. The general plan was already indicated: he was to concentrate and co-operate with Grant; but in what manner might this be best accomplished? The first mode of answering this question which suggested itself to Grant, was to order him to take transports and bring his army direct to City Point. But the Atlantic zone was almost free from rebel soldiers. Hood was so terribly beaten that his force could never seriously make head against any movement Sherman might propose. Besides, ocean transportation was scarce and miserable, and so Grant wrote countermanding his first letter, and asking for Sherman's views. With a piercing vision, backed by a brave, self-reliant soul, Sherman, ready to do whatever he was ordered, expressed a desire to move on Columbia, South Carolina, and then to Raleigh. He seemed, besides, so confident of his ability to march up with no impediment that he could not brush away, that Grant sent him

an order in general terms, on the 28th of December, directing him to carry out his plans; and in that way, to come up and join him before Richmond. Sherman was also informed that Schofield would march upon Goldsboro' to co-operate with him. Schofield had at Wilmington twenty-one thousand men, and there were eight thousand at Fort Fisher, and four thousand at Newbern, all of which were to move inland to join Sherman, should he succeed in marching up into North Carolina.

In accordance with these plans, Schofield at once pushed forward two columns upon Goldsboro', one from Wilmington and the other from Newbern, taking in the latter the division of General Innis Palmer, who had been in command there. Kinston was occupied, after a severe battle, on the 14th of February; and after a rest, Goldsboro' was entered on the 20th.

Sherman's march northward to accomplish his part of the grand programme, was magnificent in the extreme. His army, spreading over a large surface whenever it marched, left Savannah on the 1st of February, and, flanking Charleston, entered Columbia on the 17th. Thence he moved on Goldsboro', by the way of Winsboro', Cheraw, and Fayetteville, on the Cape Fear, and opened communication with Schofield by the Cape Fear River, on the 12th of March. At Averysboro' the enemy, under Hardee, endeavored to impede his advance, and Sherman, fighting the battle in person, beat him and drove him away. Again, at Bentonville, the enemy attacked our advanced corps fiercely. At first we were driven back, but by the skilful management of Slocum, who commanded the advance, the enemy could make no further impression upon our lines, and was forced to withdraw. The enemy were here commanded by General J. E. Johnston, whose first success is thus reported by General Lee:

"General J. E. Johnston reports that about five o'clock P. M. on the 19th instant, he attacked the enemy near Bentonville, routed him, and captured three guns.

"A mile in the rear he rallied on fresh troops, but was forced back slowly,

until six P. M., when, receiving more troops, he apparently assumed the offensive, which was resisted without difficulty until dark."

But such little dashes at our advance were of no value to the rebels, and of very little effect on us. The grand plan went on almost unimpeded, and Sherman joined Schofield at Goldsboro', marching in the Armies of Tennessee and Georgia on the 23d and 24th of March. There his troops—not wearied, but wanting clothing, shoes, and supplies—were halted, while these were brought up from the coast; and in the mean time, Sherman, feeling that the end was near, set out for a brief visit to City Point, where he met in conference the lieutenant-general, Mr. Lincoln, and other officers. The interview was very brief. He returned to Goldsboro' on the 30th.

We must here introduce the detailed instructions of Grant to General Thomas, indicating his cast in the great drama which was now in its last act :

CITY POINT, Va., February 14, 1865.

General Canby is preparing a movement from Mobile Bay against Mobile and the interior of Alabama. His force will consist of about twenty thousand men, besides A. J. Smith's command. The cavalry you have sent to Canby will be debarked at Vicksburg. It, with the available cavalry already in that section, will move from there eastward in co-operation. Hood's army has been terribly reduced by the severe punishment you gave it in Tennessee, by desertion consequent upon their defeat, and now by the withdrawal of many of them to oppose Sherman. (I take it a large portion of the infantry has been so withdrawn. It is so asserted in the Richmond papers; and a member of the rebel congress said, a few days since, in a speech, that one-half of it had been brought to South Carolina to oppose Sherman.) This being true, or even if it is not true, Canby's movement will attract all the attention of the enemy, and leave an advance from your standpoint easy. I think it advisable, therefore, that you prepare as much of a cavalry force as you can spare, and hold it in readiness to go south. The object would be threefold: First, to attract as much of the enemy's force as possible, to insure success to Canby; second, to destroy the enemy's line of communications and military resources; third, to destroy or capture their forces brought into the field. Tuscaloosa and Selma would probably be the points to direct the expedition against. This, however, would not be so important as the mere fact of penetrating deep into Alabama. Discretion should be left to the officer commanding the expedition to go where, according to the information he may receive, he will best secure the objects named above.

Now that your force has been so much depleted, I do not know what number

of men you can put into the field. If not more than five thousand men, however, all cavalry, I think it will be sufficient. It is not desirable that you should start this expedition until the one leaving Vicksburg has been three or four days out, or even a week. I do not know when it will start, but will inform you by telegraph as soon as I learn. If you should hear through other sources before hearing from me, you can act on the information received.

To insure success, your cavalry should go with as little wagon-train as possible, relying upon the country for supplies. I would also reduce the number of guns to a battery, or the number of batteries, and put the extra teams to the guns taken. No guns or caissons should be taken with less than eight horses.

Please inform me by telegraph, on receipt of this, what force you think you will be able to send, under these directions.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS.

Leaving General Thomas to carry out these instructions, we must now go back a brief space in the chronological order, to cast a glance at the armies in front of Petersburg and Richmond. We have spoken of winter inaction; but this phrase must be understood only in a relative sense. In the first place, the weather and temperature had much to do in forcing a rest upon the troops; and besides, as has been now seen, the time must be spent by the lieutenant-general in bringing all his armies together, in concentration upon Richmond. But the inactivity was by no means unbroken. Many cavalry movements were made, to which we need not refer; but on the 31st of January, an important demonstration was ordered to be made by the Army of the Potomac, to look again for the enemy's right flank, and threaten the Southside and Danville roads. Owing to preparations and the state of the weather, the army did not move, however, until the 5th of February. In the mean time, an unintermitted cannonade was ordered along the rebel lines, to keep their troops in place and cover the intended movement.

THE MOVEMENT TO THE LEFT.

Gregg's cavalry, followed by the Fifth Corps, under Warren, and the Second, under Humphreys, were put in motion for Hatcher's Run, with four days' rations and several batteries.

While the cannonade was still in progress, the cavalry moved down the Jerusalem road to Reams' Station. Gregg met at Rowanty Creek a cavalry force, dismounted and behind breastworks, on the opposite side. These he dislodged, with the assistance of one infantry brigade of the Fifth Corps; and thence he moved to Dinwiddie Courthouse, sending out scouting parties, one of which moved some distance unimpeded up the Boydton road. But he moved back the same night to Rowanty Creek. Humphreys, with two divisions, moved out on the Vaughan road to the crossing of Hatcher's Run, and the brigade of De Trobriand was pushed across. The Fifth Corps marched out on the Halifax road, and crossed Rowanty Creek. This was the condition of things on Sunday night. On Monday, the 6th, Gregg moved forward, finding it necessary to corduroy his way, on the Boydton and Vaughan roads. The Fifth and Second Corps were in position, the Second on the right; and the Sixth and Ninth were moved westward, ready, in reserve, to aid the movement. Warren sent Crawford's division to occupy Dabney's mill; but it was encountered fiercely by Pegram, who was also reconnoitring, and who was at first compelled to retire. The ground was miry, and the undergrowth thick and tangled; but Crawford pursued with energy, until Pegram, finding Evans' division coming to re-enforce him, halted and formed, and then, although assisted by Ayres, Crawford was compelled to fall back. The result is, that our forces retire to their intrenched position along the Vaughan road and Hatcher's Run, where the enemy's impetuous advance is checked. On Wednesday, the 8th, Crawford and Wheaton are again sent forward, but can effect nothing.

But our lines have been extended further westward, and we have a strong point of departure along the Vaughan road and the lower part of Hatcher's Run, when the last cry, "Up and at them," shall be uttered by the lieutenant-general. By the middle of February, the supply railroad from City Point was extended to the run, at the crossing of the Vaughan road, and the run held by a strong Federal force.

SHERIDAN'S GRAND MARCH.

In the long-desired and now rapidly increasing concentration of the armies upon Richmond, which should so encircle and inclose Lee as to force his final surrender, it was now the time for Sheridan to move southward. The rebels had virtually abandoned the Shenandoah Valley, and Grant determined to bring Sheridan down, to cut the westward communications with Richmond, and then either to join Sherman's force, passing Richmond on the west, to bring him to the Army of the Potomac, or to let him move back, covering the Valley. Which should be done, would depend much upon the circumstances which would be developed on Sheridan's march. Grant, however, sent him the following letter of instructions, which looks to a junction with Sherman :

CITY POINT, Va., February 20, 1865—1 P. M.

GENERAL—As soon as it is possible to travel, I think you will have no difficulty about reaching Lynchburg with a cavalry force alone. From there you could destroy the railroad and canal in every direction, so as to be of no further use to the rebellion. Sufficient cavalry should be left behind to look after Moseby's gang. From Lynchburg, if information you might get there would justify it, you could strike south, heading the streams in Virginia to the westward of Danville, and push on and join Sherman. This additional raid, with one now about starting from East Tennessee, under Stoneman, numbering four or five thousand cavalry; one from Vicksburg, numbering seven or eight thousand cavalry; one from Eastport, Mississippi, numbering ten thousand cavalry; Canby, from Mobile Bay, with about thirty-eight thousand mixed troops—these three latter pushing for Tuscaloosa, Selma, and Montgomery, and Sherman with a large army eating out the vitals of South Carolina—is all that will be wanted to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. I would advise you to overcome great obstacles to accomplish this. Charleston was evacuated on Tuesday last.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN.

In answer to Sheridan's question as to where Sherman was going, Grant could only reply, "It is doubtful, but I think he is going to Fayetteville, on his way to Goldsboro'." He further stated, that when Sheridan should reach Lynchburg,

should he take that route, he would probably find Sherman moving upon Raleigh; opinions, it may be now seen, that were correctly stated. Sheridan set out upon his march of alternatives, leaving Winchester on the 27th of February. He had two cavalry divisions of about five thousand each. By a rapid march he saved the bridge across the Middle Fork at Mount Crawford, by arriving before the enemy could destroy it, on the 1st of March; reached Staunton on the 2d, and pursued Early to his intrenchments at Waynesboro'. There, without waiting to reconnoitre, such was his momentum, he attacked at once, beat Early, took his works, sixteen hundred prisoners, eleven guns, two hundred wagons and teams, and seventeen battle-flags. The prisoners he sent back to Winchester.

The circle of the hunt was now becoming smaller, and was being rapidly reduced, as all the converging radii were shortened, to a single point. On the 3d of March, his force had reached Charlottesville, destroying the railroad and the bridge in its march. From that point, a detachment made a complete destruction of the railroad towards Richmond, including the large iron bridge across the Rivanna River; while his main body waited at Charlottesville two days for the arrival of his trains.

It was this delay, among other circumstances, which caused him to abandon the idea of going to Lynchburg, and thence to find Sherman; and determined him to complete his work of destruction, and then either join Grant or return to Winchester. At Charlottesville he divided his force into two columns. The first division moved upon Scottsville, which it reached on the morning of the 6th of March, and it marched up the James River to New Market, destroying every lock and large portions of the banks of the James River Canal. One part of this force also went to Duguidsville, to secure the bridge, but the enemy had already burnt it.

His second column proceeded down the railroad towards Lynchburg, destroying it as far as Amherst Courthouse, sixteen miles from Lynchburg; and from that point joined

the other column at New Market. At New Market, Sheridan would have crossed the river, in order to move rapidly southeast and strike the Southside road at Farmville, and destroy it towards Appomattox Courthouse; but the water was very high, and his ponton-bridge would not reach across, and as time was invaluable, he determined, instead of returning to Winchester, to strike at once for White House, on the Pamunkey, on his way to join Grant. This the lieutenant-general says, was a fortunate choice, and subsequent events have most fully demonstrated that it was so.

In pursuing this course, he marched from New Market, down the canal towards Richmond, destroying the locks and banks as he went. On the 10th he was at Columbia, and while resting there for one day, he sent scouts to Grant requesting that supplies should be dispatched to meet him at White House. This request Grant received on the 12th, and at once sent an infantry force to occupy White House, taking with them supplies to meet Sheridan on his arrival. From Columbia he made a slight detour northward, thus threatening Richmond. He crossed the Annas near Ashland, and having destroyed the railroads completely, crossed to the left bank of the Pamunkey, to protect his march, and thus reached White House on the 19th. The raid had been grand; the arrival was timely: there was work for Sheridan to do, which perhaps no other man could do as well.

MARCH; THE STRATEGIC USHER.

The month of March had already been the witness of great combinations: it was to see greater things yet. Let us look for a moment at the condition of affairs.

Interior lines were no longer valuable; our masses were almost within communicating distance, and were much larger than the forces of the enemy. Grant's projects had been prophetic, and were now almost fulfilled. Lee was almost shut up by the Armies of the Potomac and the James. Johnston could only observe Sherman, without checking him. Early

and Hampton were no match for Sheridan, who was now at White House. Canby had Dick Taylor at a disadvantage, and was now moving on Mobile. Thomas had sent two cavalry expeditions, one under Wilson into Northern Alabama, and the other under Stoneman from East Tennessee towards Lynchburg. Pope was preparing for a campaign against Kirby Smith and Price, west of the Mississippi. Hancock was at Winchester, where he could hold the Valley, and when wanted, march a new force southward upon Richmond.

In this conjuncture, it was no longer any fear that he could not capture Richmond, which troubled General Grant. That was sure, but what he feared was, that Lee, a sensible man and a skilful general, would see that the game was up, and make good his escape from Richmond, before our armies were quite ready to strike the final blow, and capture his whole force. This was indeed the danger. It was a problem of exceeding delicacy. Should Lee break away and join his army to that of Johnston, they had the mountains to retreat to, and might have still given us great trouble.

But besides this, there was another important consideration which weighed greatly with Grant. The Army of the Potomac had done the noblest, most onerous, continuous service, not always requited by the success which it deserved. It was composed chiefly of Eastern troops and Eastern commanders. On the other hand, the armies of the West had been crowned with brilliant successes. That Sherman would be able eventually to come up and join the armies operating against Richmond, there was no doubt; and then the ultimate success would have been considered due to the arrival of the Western armies. There would have arisen bitter rivalries among officers and men, between the East and West: the relative modicum of merit would have been fiercely discussed in and out of Congress. If, then, it were possible, let the Army of the Potomac finish the work they had so nobly begun. This, although a secondary view, was strongly corroborative of his purposes already formed.

On the 24th March he prepared for the grand final move-

ment, of which he was reasonably hopeful that it would bring the matter to an end. His instructions must be presented as a vital part of the history.

CITY POINT, Va., March 24, 1865.

GENERAL—On the 29th instant the armies operating against Richmond will be moved by our left, for the double purpose of turning the enemy out of his present position around Petersburg, and to insure the success of the cavalry under General Sheridan, which will start at the same time, in its efforts to reach and destroy the Southside and Danville railroads. Two corps of the Army of the Potomac will be moved at first, in two columns, taking the two roads crossing Hatcher's Run nearest where the present line held by us strikes that stream, both moving towards Dinwiddie Courthouse.

The cavalry under General Sheridan, joined by the division now under General Davies, will move at the same time, by the Weldon road and the Jerusalem plankroad, turning west from the latter before crossing the Nottoway, and west with the whole column reaching Stoney Creek. General Sheridan will then move independently under other instructions, which will be given him. All dismounted cavalry belonging to the Army of the Potomac, and the dismounted cavalry from the Middle Military Division not required for guarding property belonging to their arm of service, will report to Brigadier-General Benham, to be added to the defences of City Point. Major-General Parke will be left in command of all the army left for holding the lines about Petersburg and City Point, subject, of course, to orders from the commander of the Army of the Potomac. The Ninth Army Corps will be left intact to hold the present line of works, so long as the whole line now occupied by us is held. If, however, the troops to the left of the Ninth Corps are withdrawn, then the left of the corps may be thrown back so as to occupy the position held by the army prior to the capture of the Weldon road. All troops to the left of the Ninth Corps will be held in readiness to move at the shortest notice by such route as may be designated when the order is given.

General Ord will detach three divisions, two white and one colored, or so much of them as he can, and hold his present lines, and march for the present left of the Army of the Potomac. In the absence of further orders, or until further orders are given, the white divisions will follow the left column of the Army of the Potomac, and the colored division the right column. During the movement, Major-General Weitzel will be left in command of all the forces remaining behind from the Army of the James.

The movement of troops from the Army of the James will commence on the night of the 27th instant. General Ord will leave behind the minimum number of cavalry necessary for picket duty in the absence of the main army. A cavalry expedition from General Ord's command will also be started from Suffolk, to leave there on Saturday, the 1st of April, under Colonel Sumner, for the purpose of cutting the railroad about Hicksford. This, if accomplished, will have to be a surprise, and therefore, from three to five hundred men will

be sufficient. They should, however, be supported by all the infantry that can be spared from Norfolk and Portsmouth, as far out as to where the cavalry crosses the Blackwater. The crossing should probably be at Uniten. Should Colonel Sumner succeed in reaching the Weldon road, he will be instructed to do all the damage possible to the triangle of roads between Hicksford, Weldon, and Gaston. The railroad-bridge at Weldon being fitted up for the passage of carriages, it might be practicable to destroy any accumulation of supplies the enemy may have collected south of the Roanoke. All the troops will move with four days' rations in haversacks and eight days' in wagons. To avoid as much hauling as possible, and to give the Army of the James the same number of days' supplies with the Army of the Potomac, General Ord will direct his commissary and quartermaster to have sufficient supplies delivered at the terminus of the road to fill up in passing. Sixty rounds of ammunition per man will be taken in wagons, and as much grain as the transportation on hand will carry, after taking the specified amount of other supplies. The densely wooded country in which the army has to operate making the use of much artillery impracticable, the amount taken with the army will be reduced to six or eight guns to each division, at the option of the army commanders.

All necessary preparations for carrying these directions into operation may be commenced at once. The reserves of the Ninth Corps should be massed as much as possible. Whilst I would not now order an unconditional attack on the enemy's line by them, they should be ready, and should make the attack, if the enemy weakens his line in their front, without waiting for orders. In case they carry the line, then the whole of the Ninth Corps could follow up so as to join or co-operate with the balance of the army. To prepare for this, the Ninth Corps will have rations issued to them the same as the balance of the army. General Weitzel will keep vigilant watch upon his front, and if found at all practicable to break through at any point, he will do so. A success north of the James should be followed up with great promptness. An attack will not be feasible unless it is found that the enemy has detached largely. In that case, it may be regarded as evident that the enemy are relying upon their local reserves principally for the defence of Richmond. Preparations may be made for abandoning all the line north of the James, except inclosed works; only to be abandoned, however, after a break is made in the lines of the enemy.

By these instructions, a large part of the armies operating against Richmond is left behind. The enemy, knowing this, may, as an only chance, strip their lines to the merest skeleton, in the hope of advantage not being taken of it, whilst they hurl every thing against the moving column, and return. It cannot be impressed too strongly upon commanders of troops left in the trenches, not to allow this to occur without taking advantage of it. The very fact of the enemy coming out to attack, if he does so, might be regarded as conclusive evidence of such a weakening of his lines. I would have it particularly enjoined upon corps commanders, that in case of an attack from the enemy, those not attacked are not to wait for orders from the commanding officer of the army to which they belong, but that they will move promptly, and

notify the commander of their action. I wish also to enjoin the same action on the part of division commanders, when other parts of their corps are engaged. In like manner, I would urge the importance of following up a repulse of the enemy.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

MAJOR-GENERALS MEADE, ORD, AND SHERIDAN.

But a desperate movement of the enemy now hastened the catastrophe, which was already imminent.

FORT STEADMAN.

Two divisions under General Gordon—Gordon's own and Bushrod Johnson's—quietly massing in front of the Ninth Corps, which held the Appomattox towards the left, burst upon our intrenchments on Hare's Hill, not a mile from the river, at daybreak on the 25th of March, captured Fort Steadman by a surprise and *coup-de-main*, with Batteries Nine, Ten, and Eleven, on its flanks. The space between the contending lines was only one hundred and fifty yards. The Third Brigade of the First Division of the Ninth Corps guarded that part of the lines, while the Fourteenth New York Heavy Artillery occupied the fort, which was a square redoubt, covering about one acre, and mounting nine guns. Clearing his own abatis, and unimpeded by ours, Gordon was in a moment, and turned the guns upon the adjacent batteries, Nine, Ten, and Eleven, which were at once abandoned by our troops, and occupied by the rebels. It was a bold stroke, handsomely achieved, but his success was at an end. First checked in his progress by Fort Hascall, next on the left of Steadman, McLaughlin's brigade rallied, and, with the remainder of Willcox's division, fought valiantly to repair the fault.

The division of Hartranft, most of the men for the first time under fire, is ordered to attack; and, rushing upon Fort Steadman, pushes Gordon out into the space over which he had come, which is now also swept by the fire of adjacent batteries. Most of the enemy, cut off by this cross-fire upon their line of retreat, have no alternative but surrender; and thus Hartranft secures nearly two thousand prisoners.

The attack, which for a moment promised great results for the enemy, has not only been a failure and a loss, but it seems to have been the signal which hastened the movements already projected by Grant. Wakened into action by the firing around Fort Steadman, Meade orders all forward. Wright, whose corps lay on the left of the Ninth, rushes to the attack as a diversion, and seizes the enemy's advanced line. Humphreys, still further to the left, moves the Second Corps forward, and captures the enemy's picket-lines in his front. All efforts of the enemy to recapture them are unavailing.

President Lincoln is a spectator of the gallant recapture of Steadman. He had been promised a review: he was treated to a successful battle, which he declared to be better. But he does not lose his review. Before going into action, Crawford's division marches past, saluting; and the President and the ladies of his party behold, with mingled emotions, the steady march of the veterans who are just plunging into the battle with Wright. Although the enemy resisted our attack thenceforward until nightfall, we had gained much. Our losses were about twenty-five hundred; his not less than five thousand.

SHERMAN'S VISIT.

While Sherman's army was occupying a few days in resting and receiving supplies, in its camp at Goldsboro', that officer made a hurried visit to Grant at City Point, on the 27th of March. The lieutenant-general, the President, Generals Meade and Sheridan, and other officers, met him in conference. Sherman said he could move, as early as April 10th, upon Johnston, with twenty days' supplies. If Grant desired him to aid the movement upon Richmond, he would advance, threaten Raleigh, and strike the Danville road at a point near Burkesville, thus breaking Lee's communications, and cutting off his retreat; or he was ready to march directly to Richmond, and strengthen Grant's final attack. Grant commu-

nicated his own plans, which were to hurry matters by moving on the 29th of March. If his attack should be unsuccessful, he would mass his cavalry to destroy the communications between Lee and Johnston, so that, instead of joining their forces, they might be beaten in detail. Sherman at once returned to Goldsboro', to move against Johnston.

Grant's anxiety was now extreme, lest at the last moment Lee should escape him, and, by a happy union with Johnston, inaugurate a new, long, and difficult campaign. The great number of deserters daily coming into our lines, led him to believe that Lee was contemplating an escape.

Spending a few days in reviewing the various divisions, he sent his sick and the sutlers to City Point; waited impatiently for an attack from Lee, which he thought would be the signal for his hegira, and then moved the army out in observation and readiness to manoeuvre as a unit; sent his cavalry out to cut the rebel communications, and to remain in front ready for pursuit; and determined, if it were in human possibility, to finish up the whole matter.





E. D. C. Ord
Major General

CHAPTER XL.

THE TRUE "BEGINNING OF THE END."

FIGHT AT DINWIDDIE COURTHOUSE.—BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS.—DEFEAT OF THE REBELS.—CONSTERNATION IN RICHMOND.—ITS EVACUATION BY LEE.—PURSUIT OF THE FLEEING ARMY.—SAILOR'S CREEK.—LEE'S SURRENDER.—TERMS.—SHERMAN.—STONEMAN.—CANBY AT MOBILE.—WILSON'S COMMAND.—CONCLUSION.

IT was now the early morning of the 29th of March. In accordance with instructions, Ord had moved out with two divisions of the Twenty-fourth Corps, under Gibbon, and one of the Twenty-fifth, under Birney, and McKenzie's cavalry, on the night of the Twenty-seventh, and at dawn of the 29th they were at Hatcher's Run.

On the 28th, Sheridan had received the following instructions :

CITY POINT, Va., March 28, 1865.

GENERAL—The Fifth Army Corps will move by the Vaughan road at three A. M. to-morrow morning. The Second moves at about nine A. M., having but about three miles to march to reach the first point designated for it to take on the right of the Fifth Corps, after the latter reaching Dinwiddie Courthouse. Move your cavalry at as early an hour as you can, and without being confined to any particular road or roads. You may go out by the nearest roads in rear of the Fifth Corps, pass by its left, and passing near to or through Dinwiddie, reach the right and rear of the enemy as soon as you can. It is not the intention to attack the enemy in his intrenched position, but to force him out if possible. Should he come out and attack us, or get himself where he can be attacked, move in with your entire force in your own way, and with the full reliance that the army will engage or follow as circumstances will dictate. I shall be on the field, and will probably be able to communicate with you. Should I not do so, and you find that the enemy keeps within his main intrenched line, you may cut loose and push for the Danville road. If you find


it practicable, I would like you to cross the Southside road, between Petersburg and Burkesville, and destroy it to some extent. I would not advise much detention, however, until you reach the Danville road, which I would like you to strike as near to the Appomattox as possible. Make your destruction on that road as complete as possible. You can then pass on to the Southside road, west of Burkesville, and destroy that in like manner.

After having accomplished the destruction of the two railroads, which are now the only avenues of supply to Lee's army, you may return to this army, selecting your road further south; or you may go on into North Carolina, and join General Sherman. Should you select the latter course, get the information to me as early as possible, so that I may send orders to meet you at Goldsboro'.


U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN.

Sheridan's command, at the start, comprised five thousand seven hundred cavalry under Merritt, and three thousand three hundred under Crook; in all nine thousand. With these he moved across by way of Reams' Station and Malon's crossing of Rowanty Creek—where he built a bridge—to Dinwiddie Courthouse, on his way to cut the enemy's communication; but already fully determined, if permitted, to find the long-sought flank of the enemy, crush it, and then push on and cut off Lee's retreat.



He was at Dinwiddie Courthouse on the afternoon of the 29th at five o'clock. Custer had been left at Malon's crossing to protect the trains. Our lines were then arranged thus: Sheridan on the extreme left, and our infantry, under Warren, extended to the Quaker road, near its intersection with the



BATTLE-FIELD OF DINWIDDIE COURTHOUSE.

Boydton road ; next, on the right, was Humphreys ; next, Ord and Wright ; while Parke held the works in front of Petersburg. In this position, Grant was almost certain that the time had come for capturing Richmond, and, what was of far more importance, defeating Lee and forcing him to a surrender. To this end, he sent Sheridan the following important and significant dispatch :

GRAVELLY RUN, March 29, 1865.

GENERAL:—Our line is now unbroken from the Appomattox to Dinwiddie. We are all ready, however, to give up all from the Jerusalem plankroad to Hatcher's Run, whenever the forces can be used advantageously. After getting into line south of Hatcher's, we pushed forward to find the enemy's position. General Griffin was attacked near where the Quaker road intersects the Boydton road, but repulsed it easily, capturing about one hundred men. Humphreys reached Dabney's mill, and was pushing on when last heard from.

I now feel like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so, before going back. I do not want you, therefore, to cut loose and go after the enemy's roads at present. In the morning, push round the enemy if you can, and get on to his right rear. The movements of the enemy's cavalry may, of course, modify your action. We will act all together as one army here, until it is seen what can be done with the enemy. The signal-officer at Cobb's Hill reported, at 11:30 A. M., that a cavalry column had passed that point from Richmond towards Petersburg, taking forty minutes to pass.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN.

Grant, it will be seen, was at Gravelly Run in person, closely watching the developments of the situation. During the 30th a heavy storm of rain rendered the roads so bad that Sheridan found it very difficult to move from Dinwiddie ; nothing on wheels could get forward, except on corduroyed roads. But the cavalry can flounder on, and so he starts on the 30th for Five Forks, on the White Oak road, where he knew the enemy was in force : while Warren is directed to extend his lines across the Boydton road to the White Oak road, to cross the latter if possible, and in any event to hold it and fortify.

With an impetuosity that cannot be resisted, Sheridan seizes the Five Forks, and fights a battle there ; but the enemy making head against Warren, who has moved to obey his instructions, drives back the Fifth Corps, division after division,



BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS.

and then turns in force upon Sheridan, who is slowly driven back to Dinwiddie Courthouse. In the mean time, Humphreys drives the enemy back in his front, into his main line near Burgess's mill, while Ord and Wright, reporting the enemy weak before them, are impatient to move forward. In this conjuncture, Grant re-enforces Sheridan with the Fifth Corps—because it is the nearest—which he placed under his command; and thus strengthened, Sheridan again moves forward, while the other corps assault in their front.

As the attack on Fort Steadman had enabled our troops in their *riposte* to get very close to the enemy's lines, the task was not difficult. But we are anticipating.

In this forced movement to the rear against overpowering numbers of the enemy, General Sheridan, in the opinion of Grant, displayed great generalship. He did not retreat on the main army, "to tell the story of superior forces encountered, but he dismounted his cavalry and deployed, which forced the enemy to do the same, and thus checked his progress." When Grant was informed of this, he sent McKenzie's division of cavalry, with one division of the Fifth Corps to his assistance; and soon after, as Meade had informed him that Humphreys could hold the Boydton road, the other division of the Fifth was sent to Sheridan, and that officer assumed the command of the whole corps. This was on the 1st of April. In front of Dinwiddie, Sheridan now assaulted, and fought a successful battle, drove the enemy back, and made a second advance on Five Forks, which the enemy now held in great force. Here Sheridan executed a beautiful tactical manœuvre. While the enemy were pressed within their works, he directed General Merritt to demonstrate, as though he would turn the enemy's right flank, while the Fifth Corps was ordered up to strike their left flank vigorously. The Fifth Corps, General Sheridan thought, was moving too slowly, and for this he censured Warren; but at last it was in readiness,—Ayres' division on the left in double lines, Crawford on the right, and Griffin in reserve, behind Crawford. We quote Sheridan's words:

"I then directed General Merritt to demonstrate as though he was attempting to turn the enemy's right flank, and notified him that the Fifth Corps would strike the enemy's left flank, and ordered that the cavalry should assault the enemy's works as soon as the Fifth Corps became engaged, and that would be determined by the volleys of musketry. I then rode over to where the Fifth Corps was going into position, and found them coming up very slowly. I was exceedingly anxious to attack at once, for the sun was getting low, and we had to fight or go back. It was no place to intrench, and it would have been shameful to have gone back with no results to compensate for the loss of the brave men who had fallen during the day. In this connection, I will say that General Warren did not exert himself to get up his corps as rapidly as he might have done; and his manner gave me the impression that he wished the sun to go down before dispositions for the attack could be completed. As soon as the corps was in position, I ordered an advance in the following formation: Ayres' division on the left, in double lines; Crawford's division on the right, in double lines; and Griffin's division in reserve, behind Crawford: and the White Oak road was reached without opposition. McKenzie was ordered to swing round on the right of the infantry, and get possession of the ford at the crossing of Hatcher's Run."

The Fifth Corps advanced gallantly with a left half-wheel, and went into and beyond the enemy's works, routing him and pursuing; while Merritt, whose signal was to be the firing of the Fifth, assaulted and carried the enemy's right, putting him to flight in that quarter. In General Sheridan's flashing words:

"The enemy were driven from their strong line of works, and completely routed; the Fifth Corps doubling up their left flank in confusion, and the cavalry of General Merritt dashing on to the White Oak road, capturing their artillery and turning it upon them, and riding into their broken ranks so demoralized them, that they made no serious stand after their line was carried, but took to flight in disorder."

Between five thousand and six thousand prisoners fell into our hands, and the fugitives were driven westward, and were pursued till long after dark by Merritt's and McKenzie's cavalry, for a distance of six miles.

During this attack, Sheridan was again dissatisfied with Warren; and having already received, unsolicited, permission from the lieutenant-general, he relieved Warren of his command, and turned it over to Griffin, not the ranking officer, but selected for the purpose.

Grant, still fearful that the audacious advance of Sheridan might be overpowered, sent him during the night Miles' division of the Second Corps, which reported at daylight on the 2d. It was at once ordered to move up the White Oak road towards Petersburg, and attack the enemy at the intersection of that road with the Claiborne road. Miles was followed by two divisions of the Fifth. He attacked handsomely, and forced the enemy back; but was soon reclaimed by Humphreys, and relinquished, greatly to Sheridan's regret.

Let us look a little further to our right. A heavy bombardment had been kept up all night of April 1 along our whole line; and at four o'clock on the morning of the 2d a combined assault was made, with grand success. Wright, with the Sixth, swept every thing in his front, from his left at Hatcher's Run towards Petersburg, taking many guns and prisoners. Ord, joining him on the right, was equally successful; and then the two combined swung round by a right wheel and forward, and closed upon Petersburg to the river, tearing up the Southside Railroad.

Parke, holding in front of Petersburg, assaulted, taking the main line with its guns, but not the innermost line. Gibbon, with a part of Ord's command, captured two strong works, "the most salient and commanding points south of Petersburg." The rebel lines around the city were thus very much shortened, and if a new assault should be thought necessary, the capture would not be difficult.

When Miles made his attack under Sheridan's orders he had pushed the enemy across the run, and followed him up to Sutherland's Depot, on the Southside road; and it will be remembered that two divisions of the Fifth Corps had followed the movement. After a hard fight, in which the rebels were driven by Meade on our right and Sheridan on our left, they broke at that point in great confusion, streaming westward by the main road along the Appomattox.

The night of the 2d of April was one of consternation and terror in Richmond. The people had been lulled by the long years of security, and deceived by their leaders. No intelli-

gent man doubted the result, but the hoodwinked populace still believed that Richmond was impregnable, and would never be evacuated. Their eyes were now suddenly opened. Without warning, it was now announced, while Jeff. Davis was in church, for it was Sunday, that the army was evacuating the city, and that the "Federalists" would enter at once. Lee, who had long before seen the folly of continuing the struggle, had been overruled by Jeff. Davis; but now there was no choice. The army left that night, in frantic haste to move by the Danville road, and form a junction with Johnston. But it was too late.

Sheridan pursued vigorously on the 3d, striking at once for the Danville road, to cut him off. Meade, with the Second and Sixth corps, followed him by a forced march; Ord was dispatched to Burkesville, moving along the Southside road; the Ninth Corps stretched out, holding the main points in rear.

Although so much had been achieved, there was still to be a race with the rebels—a race for life. Lee must not escape. On the 4th of April, Sheridan struck the Danville road at Jettersville, right athwart the track of Lee, who had only reached Amelia Courthouse. The rebel army was in no condition to prolong the conflict; it could only now drift hopelessly westward, and put off for a few hours the evil day.

At Jettersville, Sheridan intrenched, and waited for Meade, who came up the next day, the 5th. On the afternoon of that day, Ord was at Burkesville; and Grant, who had reached Wilson's Station, addressed the following letter to Sherman:

WILSON'S STATION, April 5, 1865.

GENERAL—All indications now are that Lee will attempt to reach Danville with the remnant of his force. Sheridan, who was up with him last night, reports all that is left—horse, foot, and dragoons—at twenty thousand, much demoralized. We hope to reduce this number one-half. I shall push on to Burkesville, and if a stand is made at Danville, will in a few days go there. If you can possibly do so, push on from where you are, and let us see if we cannot finish the job with Lee's and Johnston's armies. Whether it will be better for you to strike for Greensboro', or nearer to Danville, you will be better able to judge when you receive this. Rebel armies now are the only strategic points to strike at.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN.

But such a junction was not to be necessary. If unmo-
lested, Lee could hardly have taken that army to Johnston.

On the 6th of April, Lee moved westward, as if towards
Danville; and Sheridan, relinquishing the command of the
Fifth Corps, and returning it to Meade, moved rapidly with
his cavalry, followed by the Sixth Corps, to strike his flank.
The Second and Fifth followed after. Ord moved to Farm-
ville, on the Lynchburg road, and sent his cavalry, with two
regiments of infantry, to destroy the bridges. This little
advance force encountered the head of Lee's army, which
struck it a staggering blow; but, with a fine soldierly vision,
General Theodore Read, who was in command, fought this
overwhelming force most heroically, detained it in his front
until Ord could come up, and fell a martyr to his zeal.
Such conduct deserves an immortal record, and has it in
Grant's report.

SAILOR'S CREEK.

On the afternoon of the 6th, Sheridan struck a force of the
enemy just south of Sailor's Creek, a small southern tributary
of the Appomattox, and a battle ensued, in which he cap-
tured sixteen guns and four hundred wagons, and kept the
enemy employed until the arrival of the Sixth Corps, which,
we have seen, was marching in his rear. A combined attack
was then made, which resulted in the capture of between six
and seven thousand prisoners, and a large number of general
officers. The disintegrating process was rapidly going on.
In this battle, the Second Corps and Twenty-fourth partici-
pated. The army was now a grand moving machine, elastic,
but exact. The corps, well in hand, were skilfully moved as
the exigencies of the field required.

On the morning of the 7th the pursuit was still continued—
the cavalry, under Sheridan, less one division, moving with
the Fifth Corps through Prince Edward's Courthouse; the
Sixth Corps, the Twenty-fourth, and one division of cavalry,
upon Farmville. The Second Corps moved by High Bridge.

The enemy were now all north of the Appomattox; but so close was the pursuit, that the Second Corps seized High Bridge before the enemy could destroy it, and crossed at their heels. The Sixth, with the cavalry division, crossed at Farmville. The hunt was nearly ended. Lee was now not only hopeless, but Grant believed that he had determined to surrender. To this end, the following correspondence ensued between them. Grant writes from Farmville:

APRIL 7, 1865.

GENERAL—The result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance, on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate States army known as the Army of Northern Virginia.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

GENERAL R. E. LEE.

Early on the morning of the 8th, before leaving, Grant received at Farmville the following:

APRIL 7, 1865.

GENERAL—I have received your note of this date. Though not entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender.

R. E. LEE, General.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT.

To this, Grant immediately replied:

APRIL 8, 1865.

GENERAL—Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same date, asking the condition, on which I will accept the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, is just received. In reply, I would say, that *peace* being my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon—namely, that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged. I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia will be received.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

GENERAL R. E. LEE.

On the morning of the 8th, as nothing was yet decided, Grant renewed the pursuit; the enemy pushing as fast as he could for Appomattox Station, and our troops moving upon him with equal footsteps. Meade's army was now north of the Appomattox, pushing the rear-guard, but never able to bring it to a decisive engagement. On the afternoon of the 8th, Sheridan strikes the railroad at Appomattox, and drives the enemy before him, capturing twenty-five guns, a hospital-train, and four trains of cars with supplies. Grant joins Meade at noon of the 8th, and receives the following letter:

APRIL 8, 1865.

GENERAL—I received, at a late hour, your note of to-day. In mine of yesterday, I did not intend to propose the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. To be frank, I do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender of this army; but as the restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, I desired to know whether your proposals would lead to that end. I cannot, therefore, meet you with a view to surrender the Army of Northern Virginia; but as far as your proposal may affect the Confederate State forces under my command, and tend to the restoration of peace, I should be pleased to meet you at 10 A. M. to-morrow on the old stage road to Richmond, between the picket-lines of the two armies.

R. E. LEE, General.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT.

To which he answers as follows:


APRIL 9, 1865.

GENERAL—Your note of yesterday is received. I have no authority to treat on the subject of peace; the meeting proposed for 10 A. M. to-day, could lead to no good. I will state, however, general, that I am equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole North entertains the same feeling. The terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. By the South laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed. Sincerely hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, I subscribe myself, etc.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

GENERAL R. E. LEE.

On the 9th, Ord comes up to Appomattox, and with him the Fifth Corps, just as the enemy is making a desperate effort to break through the cavalry, and defeat it. This is the end: the last ditch is reached. A white flag comes into the lines,



APPOMATTOX COURTHOUSE—THE SURRENDER.

asking for a suspension of hostilities in order to arrange terms for surrender. This Grant received while going to join Sheridan. It was in the following terms :

APRIL 9, 1865.

GENERAL—I received your note of this morning, on the picket-line, whither I had come to meet you, and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of yesterday, with reference to the surrender of this army. I now ask an interview in accordance with the offer contained in your letter of yesterday, for that purpose.

R. E. LEE, General.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT.

The interview took place at the residence of Mr. W. McLean, at Appomattox Courthouse. It was brief, but conclusive. Sad in the extreme to the Confederate general, who having risked every thing, had lost all.

No pen can describe the exultation of our troops.

The following view from a rebel standpoint is presented by an eye-witness from the rebel side :

“There is no passage of history in this heart-breaking war which will, for years to come, be more honorably mentioned, and gratefully remembered than the demeanor, on the 9th of April, 1865, of General Grant towards General Lee. I do not so much allude to the facility with which honorable terms were accorded to the Confederates, as to the bearing of General Grant, and the officers about him, towards General Lee. The interview was brief. Three commissioners upon either side were immediately appointed. The agreement to which these six commissioners acceded is known.

“In the mean time, immediately that General Lee was seen riding to the rear, dressed more gayly than usual, and begirt with his sword, the rumor of immediate surrender flew like wildfire through the Confederates. It might be imagined that an army, which had drawn its last regular rations on the 1st of April, and, harassed incessantly by night and day, had been marching and fighting until the morning of the 9th, would have welcomed any thing like a termination of its sufferings, let it come in what form it might. Let those who idly imagine that the finer feelings are the prerogative of what are called the ‘upper classes,’ learn from this and similar scenes to appreciate ‘common men.’ As the great Confederate captain rode back from his interview with General Grant, the news of the surrender acquired shape and consistency, and could no longer be denied. The effect on the worn and battered troops—some of whom had fought since April, 1861, and (sparse survivors of hecatombs of fallen comrades) had passed unscathed through such hurricanes of shot, as within four years no other men had ever experienced—passes mortal description.

"Whole lines of battle rushed up to their beloved old chief, and choking with emotion, broke ranks and struggled with each other to wring him once more by the hand. Men who had fought throughout the war, and knew what the agony and humiliation of that moment must be to him, strove, with a refinement of unselfishness and tenderness which he alone could fully appreciate, to lighten his burden and mitigate his pain. With tears pouring down both cheeks, General Lee at length commanded voice enough to say, 'Men, we have fought through the war together. I have done the best that I could for you.' Not an eye that looked on that scene was dry. Nor was this the emotion of sickly sentimentalists, but of rough and rugged men, familiar with hardships, danger, and death in a thousand shapes, mastered by sympathy and feeling for another which they never experienced on their own account. I know of no other passage of military history so touching, unless, in spite of the melo-dramatic coloring which French historians have loved to shed over the scene, it can be found in the *Adieu de Fontainebleau*.

"It remains for me briefly to notice the last parade of an army, whereof the exploits will be read with pride so long as the English tongue is spoken. In pursuance of an arrangement of the six commissioners, the Confederate army marched by divisions, on the morning of April the 12th, to a spot at the Appomattox Courthouse, where they stacked arms and deposited accoutrements. Upon this solemn occasion Major-General Gibbon represented the United States authorities. With the same exalted and conspicuous delicacy which he had exhibited throughout the closing scenes, General Grant was not again visible after his final interview with General Lee. About seven thousand eight hundred Confederates marched with their muskets in their hands, and were followed by about eighteen thousand unarmed stragglers, who claimed to be included in the capitulation. Each Confederate soldier was furnished with printed form of parole, which was filled up for him by his own officers, and a duplicate handed to a designated Federal officer. By the evening of the 12th the paroles were generally distributed, and the disbanded men began to scatter through the country. Hardly one of them had a farthing of money. Some of them had from fifteen hundred to two thousand miles to travel, over a country of which the scanty railroads were utterly annihilated."

The correspondence gives the exact terms.

APPOMATTOX COURTHOUSE, Va., April 9, 1865.

GENERAL—In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th instant, I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia on the following terms—to wit: Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer to be designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. The officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged; and each company or regimental commander to sign a like parole for the men of their commands. The arms,

artillery, and public property to be packed and stacked, and turned over to the officers appointed by me to receive them. This will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or baggage. This done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to his home, not to be disturbed by United States authority so long as they observe their paroles, and the laws in force where they may reside.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

GENERAL R. E. LEE.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
April 9, 1865.

GENERAL—I have received your letter of this date, containing the terms of surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as proposed by you. As they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 8th instant, they are accepted. I will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect.

R. E. LEE, General.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT.

Gibbon's command, with the Fifth Corps under Griffin, and McKenzie's cavalry, were ordered to remain at Appomattox, while the process of paroling was going on, and to take charge of the public property. Grant immediately set the remainder of the army in motion for Burkesville. The great event had been achieved. Lee, the greatest man as well as the ranking soldier in the Confederacy, had given up the cause, and his influence broke up the rebellion. Grant, after weary months, or rather a long year, of the most arduous and responsible military labor ever performed by a general, had seen the issue of all his plans, desires, and hopes in a complete success. The country again rung with his name. The few bitter and cold men who were dissatisfied with the terms he accorded to Lee, spoke only in whispers. He had not been in their pay or service, he had acted for the Union, and the cause of humanity. And it must have given his heart a glow of pleasure, that he could put one drop of comfort into the bitter cup, now drained to the dregs by an antagonist so skilful, and a rebel so brave, chivalrous, and noble as General R. E. Lee.

Let us not be misunderstood: there is no casuistry which can metamorphose treason; but the rebel chiefs will always be regarded as brave, self-sacrificing soldiers, and brilliant gen-



Map showing route of
RETREAT OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY

RICHMOND AND PETERSBURG

*and its Capture by
 U. S. Forces under Lt Genl. U. S. Grant.*

Prepared by
 Brev. Col. W. H. Paine, Engineer.
 Engraved for "Grant and His Campaigns."

Scale of Miles.



- Confederate Positions.
- Routes of March.
- Union Positions.
- Routes of March.
- Confederate Positions.
- Routes of March.

erals, by every military scholar ; and they are held in greater respect, we venture to say, by none more fully than by their chief conqueror, Lieutenant-General Ulysses S. Grant.

SHERMAN.

But little remains to be told.

Upon the receipt of Grant's letter, which we have presented in a former page, Sherman moved at once upon Johnston, who retreated rapidly before him through Raleigh, which Sherman entered on the 13th. On the 12th he had received the news of Lee's surrender. This gave Johnston a hint upon which to speak. On the 14th a correspondence was opened between Johnston and Sherman, and there was a suspension of hostilities until the memorandum of the agreement could be submitted to the President for his approval. On that very day, the humane, hard-working, honest, and honored Mr. Lincoln was killed by an assassin, and Sherman's memorandum fell into critical hands, which treated it and him with undeserved severity.

The subject is now too well known in all its bearings to need discussion here. Grant went down to Raleigh, which he reached on the 24th of April, with disapproval and new instructions, and the truce was terminated the same day. But there was to be no more fighting. On the 25th there was another meeting between Sherman and Johnston, which resulted in a surrender of the rebel army on the same terms which Grant had accorded to Lee. This surrender was received by Sherman.

We must not close without mentioning the rapid operations in other parts of the field, which now hurried events to a finality.

STONEMAN.

Stoneman started on the 20th of March, by way of Boone, in North Carolina ; struck the railroad at Wytheville, Chambersburg, and Big Lick ; and sent one column to approach Lynchburg and destroy the bridges. The main body de-

ployed between New River and Big Lick, then to Greensboro, breaking up and burning the bridges between Greensboro' and Danville, and also those between Greensboro' and the Yadkin, with many rich depots of supplies. At Salisbury he beat the rebel General Gardner, taking from him fourteen guns and one thousand three hundred and sixty-four prisoners; and after tearing up fifteen miles of railroad, with the bridges towards Charlotte, he returned to Slatersville.

Sherman desired that Stoneman should join him, but acting in accordance with the orders received from Thomas, and according to a discretion which he deemed his right, he did not.

CANBY AT MOBILE.

The movements upon Mobile will only need to be epitomized. On the 20th of March, the Sixteenth Corps, under A. J. Smith, was moved by water from Fort Gaines to Fish River; and the Thirteenth, under Gordon Granger, from Fort Morgan, joined Smith. These combined troops invested Spanish Fort, opposite Mobile, near the eastern shore of Mobile Bay. On the 27th, Steele moves from Pensacola and invests Fort Blakely, on the Tensaw River. On the 8th of April, Spanish Fort, after an attack by our troops, is evacuated. Fort Blakely is abandoned on the 9th. The enemy retire into Mobile. Alabama River is thus opened, and the northern approaches to Mobile. The city, no longer tenable, is evacuated by our troops on the 11th, and occupied by Canby's forces on the 12th.

WILSON'S COMMAND.

The cavalry expedition, which Grant had directed Thomas to send out under General Wilson, started on the 22d of March, twelve thousand five hundred strong, from Chickasaw, Alabama, and achieved a series of successes. On the 1st of April, Wilson encountered Forrest near Ebenezer Church, and beat him. On the 2d he captured Selma, a very important point, defended by Forrest with seven thousand men. There

he took three thousand prisoners and thoroughly destroyed the enemy's works and factories. On the 4th he entered Tuscaloosa, and on the 10th marched upon Montgomery, which he took on the 14th. At that point he divided his force, sending one portion to West Point, where they captured four guns and destroyed the railroad works. The other column moved on Columbus, which they took, capturing also fifteen hundred prisoners, destroyed the factories, and taking fifty-two guns. On the 20th he received the surrender of Macon from Howell Cobb ; and on the 11th of May a detachment of his force caught Jefferson Davis, while he was trying to escape in disguise.

General Dick Taylor, at Citronelle, Alabama, surrendered to Canby, May 4th, all the rebel forces east of the Mississippi, about twenty thousand in all, on terms substantially the same as those accorded by Grant to Lee.

General Edmund Kirby Smith, notwithstanding these good examples, was for a time defiant ; but Grant sent Sheridan down to Texas to bring him to terms ; and, deeming it useless to hold out any longer, Smith left his army to disband itself, while Buckner, assuming the command, surrendered the small body that remained on the 26th of May.

We cannot better finish this chapter than by quoting the eloquent and truthful tribute with which General Grant closes his masterly report.

" It has been my fortune to see the armies of both the West and East fight battles, and from what I have seen I know there is no difference in their fighting qualities. All that it was possible for men to do in battle, they have done. The Western armies commenced their battles in the Mississippi Valley, and received the final surrender of the remnant of the principal army opposed to them in North Carolina. The armies of the East commenced their battles on the river from which the Army of the Potomac derived its name, and received the final surrender of their old antagonist at Appomattox Courthouse, Va. The splendid achievements of each have nationalized our victories, removed all sectional jealousies, of which we have unfortunately experienced too much, and the cause of crimination and recrimination that might have followed, had either section failed in its duty. All have a proud record, and all sections can well congratulate themselves and each other for having done their full share in restoring the supremacy of law over every foot of territory belonging to the

United States. Let them hope for perpetual peace and harmony with that enemy whose manhood, however mistaken the cause, drew forth such herculean deeds of valor."

CONCLUSION.

We have reached the end of our task, which was to present a military biography of General Grant. He at once advised the reduction of the great armies, a work which, beginning on the day of Lee's surrender, has steadily progressed, until we have now only the needed force for a *quasi* peace establishment. Before this, however, in a vast and splendid pageant of two days' continuance, beginning on Tuesday, the 22d of May, the great armies of Meade and Sherman were reviewed by the President of the United States, the Secretary of War, and the Lieutenant-General, on Pennsylvania Avenue, amid the most enthusiastic demonstrations of a concourse gathered from all parts of the Union.

He narrowly—let us say providentially—escaped the fate of the honored and beloved President, having at first designed to be at the theatre on the night of the 14th of April, but, guided by some good angel, he set out to the North instead.

He has made tours of pleasure and inspection to the West, to Canada, to the South; and everywhere throngs press to see, and take the hand of the quiet, unpretending, sturdy man, who has saved his country, and won so glorious a fame. At West Point, the plain cadet of 1844 received in 1865 all the honors of his Alma Mater as the generalissimo of the great war.

He was made a Doctor of Laws by Harvard and a number of other institutions.

On the 7th of January, 1865, a number of the principal citizens of Philadelphia presented him with a handsome house, thoroughly furnished, in Chestnut-street, above Twentieth. To tell of his honors, and the gifts he has received, would fill a volume such as this. Among the ovations which he received, there was none, perhaps, more grateful to him than that at his old home, Galena,

Illinois, on the 28th of August, 1865. There were arches decorated with the long scroll of his victories, enthusiastic plaudits from his old friends and fellow-citizens; and over the street where he lived and the sidewalk which he had calumniated, was the motto: "General, the sidewalk is built." The fond thought which had prompted such an expression of his ambition—to be Mayor of Galena, and build the sidewalk—thus treasured by his old friends, would touch the heart of Grant, when "the applause of listening senates" would have little power to move him.

Early in December his constant friend, Mr. Washburne, of Illinois, introduced into the House of Representatives a bill to make him a *General*. It would not only be a just tribute to him, but it would make right what is now wrong in our system, and relieve us from the absurdity of a *lieutenant-general* as commander-in-chief—lieutenant to no one.

Of General Grant's talents and character it is unnecessary to add a single word. Sagacious, brave, skilful, his strongest element, subsidizing all the rest, is that tenacity of purpose, that iron will, which was the characteristic of Wellington, and which won the Waterloo of the Great Rebellion.

Closely connected with this is his moral courage. He dares to do right, without respect of persons or opinions. His reports are full of clear criticisms of his generals. Courteous and kind, he never regards private feelings where great public interests are at stake.

Joined to these qualities is a modesty which displays itself in an unostentatious demeanor, and in great reticence at all times.

He is an admirable judge of men. In this he is like the great emperor. Grant's generals have been judiciously chosen, each for his specific work—Sherman for Atlanta, Thomas for Nashville, Sheridan for the Shenandoah and Five Forks, Meade for the Army of the Potomac. And when they did well, no spice of envy ever kept him from rejoicing in their success, and awarding them the highest praise. Of Meade, whose position was sometimes a painful one, by reason of the

overshadowing presence of the general-in-chief, he says, in speaking of his appointment as major-general :

“General Meade was appointed at my solicitation, after a campaign the most protracted, and covering more severely contested battles, than any of which we have any account in history.

“I have been with General Meade during the whole campaign, and not only made the recommendation upon a conviction that this recognition of his services was fully won, but that he was eminently qualified for the command such rank would entitle him to.

“General Meade is one of our truest men and ablest officers. He has been constantly with that army confronting the strongest, best appointed, and most confident army in the South. He, therefore, has not had the same opportunity of winning laurels so distinctly marked as has fallen to the lot of other generals ; but I defy any man to name a commander who would do more than he has done with the same chances.”

Of Sherman he says, speaking of the battle of Pittsburg Landing: “To his individual efforts I am indebted for the success of that battle.” His praises of Sheridan have been recorded in former pages.

And these, be it remembered, are not the wholesale laudations with which military reports are usually filled, but just judgments, conscientiously expressed. We may say of him as did Tacitus of Agricola: “*Nec Agricola unquam per alios gesta avidus interceptit ; seu centurio, seu præfectus, incorruptum facti testem habebat.*”

An enemy to be dreaded, he was always courteous, kind, and humane to a conquered foe.

A patriot of large heart, he has done more than any other man to save his country in its day of bitter peril.

To say that he is the first soldier of the age, is but to appeal to the facts already narrated. Perhaps we accord a higher praise when we declare, without flattery, that he is the *most distinguished American of the regenerated Republic*. Let him be cherished and honored accordingly.





Mr. A. Rawlin
Br. A. Maj. Gen. U. S. A. of Staff

CHAPTER XLI.

THE LIEUTENANT-GENERAL'S MILITARY HOUSEHOLD.

GENERAL RAWLINS, CHIEF OF STAFF.—COLONEL BOWERS.—GENERAL COMSTOCK.—COLONEL BABCOCK.—COLONEL PORTER.—COLONEL HUDSON.—COLONEL BADEAU.—COLONEL PARKER.—MAJOR LEET.—CAPTAIN DUNN.—GENERAL WILLIAMS.—GENERAL WEBSTER.—COLONEL LAGOW.—COLONEL HILLYER.—GENERAL McPHERSON.—COLONEL ROWLEY.—COLONEL RIGGIN.—COLONEL IHRIE.—MAJOR PRIME.—COLONEL DUFF.—GENERAL WILSON.—GENERAL DENT.—GENERAL KENT.—GENERAL BARNARD.—COLONEL DICKEY.—GENERAL SMITH.

HOWEVER the biographer may be deterred by motives of delicacy from intruding into the domestic circle of the lieutenant-general, it is plainly a part of his duty to present to his readers the personality of those officers who surround him, and, by his own choice, constitute his military household. The world is anxious to know the nature and characters of the men by whom his will is transmitted, and the details of his plans presented daily to his armies. To satisfy this demand, we present the following brief sketches of the most noted of these officers.

GENERAL JOHN A. RAWLINS, CHIEF OF STAFF.

Major-General John A. Rawlins is the son of James D. and Looisa Rawlins. He was born February 13, 1831, in Jo-Daviess County, State of Illinois, and resided there until he entered the service, in September, 1861. His occupations, until November, 1853, were farming and burning charcoal. Three years of this time, principally from the winter seasons, were devoted to acquiring an education—two years and four months of the three years in attending the neighborhood-

school, and the remaining eight months at the Rock River Seminary, at Mount Morris, Illinois. In November, 1853, he began the study of law in the office of I. P. Stevens, Esq., of Galena, Illinois, and was admitted to the bar of that State in October, 1854. He at once commenced the practice of his profession in copartnership with his law-instructor, and continued until August, 1855, when, by mutual agreement, the copartnership was dissolved, and the business retained and carried on by him. In February, 1858, he took into copartnership in the practice David Sheean, Esq., which copartnership still existed when Rawlins entered the service.

In politics he was a Democrat, and was active in the support of the principles of that party, adhering to Mr. Douglas as their exponent; and was candidate for presidential elector from the First congressional district of that State, on the Douglas ticket, in 1860, and canvassed his district in its support, holding joint discussions in each county with the Republican candidate for presidential elector, Judge Allen C. Fuller. His party and personal friends awarded to him much credit for ability in these discussions.

Having done, in his judgment, all that one in his position could to avert the war, when it did come, he had no doubt as to the duty of every American citizen to support his country and maintain in authority its constitutionally elected Executive, even to the laying down of his life, if need be; and with all his ability and influence, he sought to make this the generally received view of others, especially of his own party. On receipt of the news of the first Bull Run disaster, he commenced, in conjunction with John E. Smith (now brevet major-general of volunteers) and J. A. Maltby (now brigadier-general of volunteers), to raise the Forty-fifth or "Lead-mine Regiment," Illinois Infantry Volunteers; when, in August, he received from General Grant, with whom he had been acquainted from the time of his settling in Galena (and for whose house in that place he was the attorney), without having sought it, the tender of a position on his staff, which he accepted. The dangerous illness of Mrs. Rawlins (who had

been long a sufferer from consumption, and was then at her father's, Mr. Hiram Smith, at Goshen, N. Y.), called him East, where he remained by her side until her decease, August 30. With this severe personal affliction resting upon him, he made arrangements for the care of the three children that she left—a son and two daughters, the eldest of whom was in his fifth year—and joined General Grant, on the 15th of September, at Cairo, Illinois, as his assistant adjutant-general, with the rank of captain, having been appointed such the 30th of the preceding month; and was with him from that time, in all his battles, and campaigns, and military operations in the field, until the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia at Appomattox Courthouse, Va., except about two months—from the 31st of July, 1864, to the 1st of October following—when he was absent for the treatment of a severe bronchial affection he had contracted in the service. He has since been with him in Washington. The relations between Grant and Rawlins, personally and officially, are, and have always been, of the most intimate, friendly, and confidential character. He was commissioned major and assistant adjutant-general, to rank from the date of the surrender of Fort Donelson; was assigned in orders as assistant adjutant-general and chief of staff, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel, November 1, 1862; was appointed a brigadier-general of volunteers, to rank from August 11, 1863; brevetted major-general of volunteers, to rank from February 24, 1865. March 3, 1865, he was appointed chief of staff to the lieutenant-general commanding, with the rank of brigadier-general in the United States Army; and he has since been brevetted major-general, United States Army, to rank from March 13, 1865.

NOTE.—In order to indicate clearly the estimation in which General Rawlins is held by General Grant, we publish the following letters, which could not be couched in stronger terms:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,
Vicksburg, Miss., July 27, 1863.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL L. THOMAS, *Adjutant-General of the Army*:

GENERAL—I would respectfully recommend, for gallant and meritorious services, and for extreme fitness for command corresponding to the increased

rank, the following promotions, to wit : Brigadier-General Greenville M. Dodge, Brigadier-General Alvin P. Hovey, Brigadier-General John E. Smith, Brigadier-General W. S. Smith, to be major-generals of volunteers ; and Colonel Charles R. Wood, Seventy-sixth Ohio ; Colonel Alexander Chambers, Sixteenth Iowa ; Lieutenant-Colonel John A. Rawlins, assistant adjutant-general ; Colonel Giles A. Smith, Eighth Missouri ; Colonel John M. Corse, Sixth Iowa ; Colonel John B. Sanborn, Fourth Minnesota ; Colonel W. Q. Gresham, Fifty-third Indiana ; Colonel M. F. Force, Twentieth Ohio ; Colonel T. Kilby Smith, Fifty-fourth Ohio, to be brigadier-generals of volunteers. These officers have all rendered valuable services in the field, and will fill the place for which they are recommended well.

Lieutenant-Colonel John A. Rawlins has been my assistant adjutant-general from the beginning of the rebellion. No officer has now a more honorable reputation than he has ; and I think I can safely say that he would make a good corps commander. This promotion I would particularly ask as a reward of merit.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

(Signed)

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.

WASHINGTON, D. C., April 4, 1864.

HON. H. WILSON, *Chairman Com. Military Affairs :*

SIR—I would most respectfully, but earnestly, ask for the confirmation of Brigadier-General John A. Rawlins by your honorable body. General Rawlins has served with me from the beginning of the rebellion. I know he has most richly earned his present position. He comes the nearest being indispensable to me of any officer in the service. But if his confirmation is dependent on his commanding troops, he shall command troops at once. There is no department commander, near where he has served, that would not most gladly give him the very largest and most responsible command his rank would entitle him to.

Believing a short letter on this subject more acceptable than a long one, I will only add, that it is my earnest desire that General Rawlins should be confirmed : that if he fails, besides the loss it will be to the service and to me personally, I shall feel, that by keeping with me a valuable officer, because he made himself valuable, I have worked him an injury.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

(Signed)

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General U. S. A.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
CITY POINT, Va., February 23, 1865.

DEAR WASHBURNE—Inclosed I send you a letter just received from Colonel Duff, late of my staff. I should be delighted if an act should pass Congress giving the commander of the army a chief of staff with the rank of a brigadier-general in the regular army. It is necessary to have such an officer, and I see no reason why the law should not give it. It would also reward an officer who has won more deserved reputation in this war than any other who has acted throughout purely as a staff-officer.

I write to you instead of Duff, knowing your present friendship for Rawlins as well as myself, and because you are in a place to help the thing along, if you think well of it.

(Signed)

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General U. S. A.

OTHER OFFICERS OF THE LIEUTENANT-GENERAL'S STAFF.

BREVET COLONEL THEODORE S. BOWERS is from Illinois. He entered the service in August, 1861, as a private in the Forty-eighth Regiment Illinois Infantry Volunteers, declining a commission, and served with it until the return of General Grant's reconnoissance in Kentucky, in January, 1862, when he was detailed as clerk at his headquarters, and was with him at Forts Henry and Donelson, and until about the 9th of March following, when he accepted the first-lieutenancy of his company, declining the captaincy, which was tendered him. He was with his company and regiment at the battle of Shiloh, during which he was again ordered on duty at General Grant's headquarters, and appointed an aid-de-camp. In November, 1862, he was made a captain and aid-de-camp, and soon after a major and judge-advocate of the Army of the Tennessee; and in September, 1863, was assigned assistant adjutant-general, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel, *vice* Colonel Rawlins, promoted, and from that time forward to the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia at Appomattox Courthouse, was General Grant's chief assistant adjutant-general in the field; and having shared with him the hardships and dangers of the war, he is retained in the same position, and continues in the able and efficient discharge of his duties at Washington. For his faithful and eminent services, his ability and fitness, he was appointed, in September, 1864, a major and assistant adjutant-general in the United States Army. He is a printer by trade, and at the breaking out of the war edited a Democratic newspaper in Southern Illinois. He is an officer of fine judgment, high sense of honor, conscientious in his duties, and possessing the full confidence of the lieutenant-general. Of this confidence no one

is more deserving, for none have labored more arduously or more loyally in his interest and the success of our arms.

BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL CYRUS B. COMSTOCK, United States Army, is from Massachusetts, and a graduate of West Point. He reported to General Grant immediately after the commencement of the investment of Vicksburg, and was assigned to duty with Major F. E. Prime, chief-engineer. Major Prime being soon after taken dangerously ill, and sent North for recovery, he succeeded to his duties, and served throughout the siege, and until September following, when, on account of dangerous illness, he, too, was compelled to go North. In November, 1863, he was assigned as assistant inspector-general, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel, *vice* Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, promoted; and upon General Grant's promotion to the lieutenant-generalcy, he was appointed senior aid on his staff, and was with him in his campaign and battles from Culpepper to the front of Petersburg and the operations on the north of the James. He accompanied the expedition under General Butler against Fort Fisher, and also the one under General Terry, being assigned in orders as chief-engineer of the latter; and for his eminent services in it was brevetted brigadier-general in the United States Army. Early in March, 1865, he was sent by General Grant to General Canby, and was with that officer in the capture of Spanish Fort, Fort Blakely, and at the fall of Mobile. Prior to his joining General Grant, he served with the Army of the Potomac throughout the Peninsula campaign, and until after the battle of Chancellorsville. He is a soldier of great moral courage and pure bravery, energetic and untiring in the discharge of his duties, and ever seeking to advance the interests of the service; a close student, and one of the ablest officers of his corps.

BREVET COLONEL ORVILLE E. BABCOCK, United States Army, is from Vermont, and a graduate of West Point. Upon General Grant's promotion to the lieutenant-generalcy, he was appointed aid-de-camp, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel, upon his staff, and served with marked and distinguished

ability in all his campaigns and battles from Culpepper to Appomattox Courthouse. He is of the corps of engineers, and served with the Army of the Potomac through the Peninsula campaign, and until the Ninth Corps, in which he was assistant inspector-general, was ordered West. He was in the sieges of Vicksburg; Jackson, Mississippi; and Knoxville, Tennessee; and at the latter place particularly, was conspicuous for his gallantry and soldierly bearing in repulsing the rebel assault on Fort Sanders. As a thoroughly practical soldier in all the details and art of war, no staff-officer of the army enjoys a more enviable reputation than Colonel Babcock. He combines with his soldierly attainments great personal popularity.

BREVET COLONEL HORACE PORTER, United States Army, is from Pennsylvania, and a graduate of West Point. He is a captain of ordnance, served in the Department of the South, participated in the siege and capture of Fort Pulaski, as chief of ordnance in the field, and as commander of heavy artillery, and was with the Army of the Potomac in the Peninsular Campaign, being the chief ordnance-officer in the field. In October, 1862, he joined the Army of the Ohio, and served with it until the battle of Stone River, when he was transferred to the Army and Department of the Cumberland as chief ordnance-officer, and was with General Rosecrans in his campaign and battles from Murfreesboro' to Chickamauga, receiving from that officer and his subordinates the highest commendation for his efficiency. Upon General Grant's being made lieutenant-general, he appointed him an aid-de-camp, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and he was with him in his battles and campaigns from Culpepper to Appomattox Courthouse, participating with General Sheridan in the battle of Five Forks. He is brave and efficient in the discharge of his duties, of soldierly instincts, and high standing in his corps.

BREVET COLONEL PETER T. HUDSON, United States Volunteers, is a Kentuckian by birth, and a resident of Iowa. He was appointed captain and aid-de-camp in 1863, and joined

General Grant for duty at Vicksburg, and was with him in the campaign and battles of Chattanooga. Having a great desire for active employment, he accompanied General W. S. Smith's cavalry expedition, that started from Memphis in February, 1864, in co-operation with General Sherman's movement from Vicksburg to Meridian, and was one of the many officers that were surprised and indignant at its disastrous termination. He was with General Grant in his campaign and battles from Culpepper to Appomattox Courthouse. In April, 1865, he was assigned as lieutenant-colonel and aid-de-camp to the lieutenant-general. He is a true type of the Western man (having spent much of his time in the Rocky Mountains and California), and thoroughly practical in his judgment.

BREVET COLONEL ADAM BADEAU, United States Volunteers, is from New York. He was appointed a captain and additional aid-de-camp, and assigned to duty with General T. W. Sherman, and was in the sieges of Fort Pulaski and Corinth, and the storming of Port Hudson, where he was severely wounded. Partially recovered from his wound, he joined General Grant in January, 1864, in pursuance of orders issued at General Grant's request, and was made military secretary, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel, on the general's promotion to the lieutenant-generalcy. He was with him from Culpepper to Appomattox Courthouse. He is brave and zealous in the discharge of his duties, but possesses, perhaps, more of a literary than military turn of mind.

BREVET COLONEL ELY S. PARKER, United States Volunteers, is from New York. He is an Indian of pure blood, and chief of the Six Nations. The historic chief Red Jacket is his great-uncle. He was appointed assistant adjutant-general of volunteers, with the rank of captain, in the spring of 1863, and reported to General John E. Smith for duty about the concluding days of the siege of Vicksburg, and served with him until the following September, when he was, by order of General Grant, assigned to duty on his staff. He was with him in the campaign and battles of Chattanooga, and was retained on his staff on his appointment to the command of the armies,

serving through all his campaigns and battles from Culpepper to Appomattox Courthouse. In September, 1864, he was appointed military secretary, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel, *vice* Colonel Rowley, resigned. He was one of the commissioners recently sent by the President to treat with the hostile Indians in the Southwest, and exercised a great influence in their deliberations. He is an accomplished soldier and gentleman, an eloquent writer and speaker, of a high order of mind, great good sense, and clear judgment.

MAJOR GEORGE K. LEET, assistant adjutant-general of volunteers, is a Pennsylvanian, but entered the service from Illinois as a private in the Chicago Mercantile Battery, and served with it in General Sherman's expedition against Vicksburg, in the battle of Arkansas Post, and the battles and siege of Vicksburg. In August following the fall of Vicksburg, he was detached from his company as clerk at General Grant's headquarters; and in October next thereafter, on General Grant's recommendation, 'was appointed' captain and assistant adjutant-general, and was with him in the campaign and battles of Chattanooga. On General Grant's appointment to the command of all the armies, he was assigned to duty in Washington, in charge of office headquarters there. He was promoted to a majority in the adjutant-general's department. As a private, he was a splendid soldier; as an officer, prompt and efficient in the performance of his duty—a courteous gentleman and man of sense. He possesses the respect and confidence of all who know him.

CAPTAIN WILLIAM MCKEE DUNN, jr., United States Volunteers, is from Indiana. He entered the service in April, 1861, in the eighteenth year of his age, as a private in the Sixth Regiment Indiana Infantry Volunteers, served his three months, and re-enlisted August 9, 1861, in the Sixty-seventh Regiment Indiana Infantry Volunteers, and served with it as a non-commissioned officer until October 19, 1861, when he was commissioned a lieutenant in the Eighty-third Regiment Indiana Infantry Volunteers from the same State, and was with it in Sherman's first assault on Vicksburg, and in the battle of Ar-

kansas Post, and until March, 1863, when he was appointed an aid-de-camp to General Sullivan. During the siege of Vicksburg he was on duty at General Grant's headquarters, where he showed such bravery and cheerfulness in the discharge of his duties, in fact ever seeking to be sent on missions of hardship and danger, that General Grant had him assigned to duty, in October, 1863, as acting aid-de-camp on his staff, where he continued to serve through all the general's battles and campaigns to the surrender of Lee at Appomattox Courthouse. For his gallantry and efficiency he was made a captain and assistant adjutant-general, to date from that surrender.

BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL SETH WILLIAMS, United States Volunteers, is from Maine, and a graduate of West Point, in the same class with General Grant. He served with distinction in the Mexican war. He was assistant adjutant-general to General McClellan in his Western Virginia campaigns, and on his being appointed to the command of all the armies, was made assistant adjutant-general of the Army of the Potomac on his staff, and soon after brigadier-general of volunteers. He continued in the same position and duties on the staff of all the successive commanders of that army through its many eventful battles and campaigns, until January 12, 1865, when he was relieved and assigned to duty on the staff of the lieutenant-general, as acting inspector-general of the armies operating against Richmond; and was with him in the spring campaign and battles that ended in the surrender of General Lee at Appomattox Courthouse. In the discharge of his duties he is ever courteous, and eminently able and efficient. He holds in strictest regard the confidential relations he necessarily bore to the several commanders of the Army of the Potomac. He speaks only of such acts of theirs as the country commends, and they would have pass into history.

OFFICERS LATE OF GENERAL GRANT'S PERSONAL STAFF.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. D. WEBSTER, United States Volunteers, was born in New Hampshire, and at the beginning of the war was a citizen of Chicago, Illinois. Commissioned a major and additional paymaster, he was assigned to duty at Cairo, Illinois, as acting chief-engineer; and soon after General Grant assumed command there, he was announced in orders as chief of staff and acting engineer. In the latter part of February, 1862, he was appointed colonel of the First Regiment Illinois Light Artillery Volunteers, and was continued on General Grant's staff as chief of staff and artillery until November, when he was appointed brigadier-general of volunteers, and relieved General McPherson in the superintendence of military railroads. In all General Grant's operations, including the battle of Belmont, to the date of his assignment as such superintendent, he bore a conspicuous part, especially in the battle of Shiloh.

COLONEL CLARK B. LAGOW was from Illinois. He entered the service in June, 1861, as a first-lieutenant in the Twenty-first Regiment Illinois Infantry Volunteers, of which General Grant was the colonel. Immediately on the general's receiving notice of his promotion to a brigadier-generalcy, he appointed him an aid-de-camp on his staff, where, and with which rank, he served through all of General Grant's battles and campaigns until after Shiloh, when he was promoted to a colonecy and additional aid-de-camp, and continued with the general through all his military operations until December following the campaign and battles of Chattanooga, when, on account of ill-health, he resigned his commission. He was very brave, and greatly devoted to the general; and was one of those heroic men who passed the Vicksburg batteries on transport steamers.

COLONEL WILLIAM S. HILLYER, United States Army, was born in Kentucky, but settled in the practice of law in Indiana, and had barely attained his majority when he was elected to the legislature of the State, in which he served one term.

Determining to discard politics and devote his energies to his profession, he moved to St. Louis, Missouri, where, by his tact and ability, he soon established himself in a most lucrative practice. In St. Louis was formed the acquaintance and friendship that still continues between him and General Grant. Fully committed to the support of his country and the Union, he was outspoken from the beginning against its enemies; and was one of those fearless loyalists of St. Louis who saved that city from the hands of the rebels. On General Grant's promotion to brigadier-general, in August, 1861, he appointed him an aid-de-camp on his staff. He was with the general in the occupancy of Paducah, the battle of Belmont, the reconnoissance in Kentucky, at Fort Henry, the siege and battle of Fort Donelson, and battle of Shiloh, where, for his eminent services, he was appointed a colonel and additional aid-de-camp, and continued with him in all his subsequent military operations to the complete investment of Vicksburg, when, owing to the urgent necessity for his personal attention to his private affairs, he resigned his commission. From June, 1862, he was provost-marshal-general. He was able in the discharge of his duties, and his decisions were characterized by humanity and justice. He is a man of very superior ability, and his views and opinions had great weight with General Grant, in whose esteem he always stood high as an officer and friend, possessing his confidence in an eminent degree.

MAJOR-GENERAL JAMES B. MCPHERSON, United States Volunteers, was from Ohio, and a graduate of West Point. He was a captain of engineers, and lieutenant-colonel under the additional aid-de-camp act, and reported to General Grant, February 1st, 1862, under orders from General Halleck, as chief-engineer of the Tennessee River expedition, and served with him in the eventful campaigns and battles that followed, until General Halleck assumed command in the field in person. He was a proficient in his profession, and combined all the requisites of an accomplished soldier and true man. On General Halleck's recommendation, he was appointed brigadier-general of volunteers, and on the evacuation of Corinth,

assigned to the command of the engineer troops and the superintendence of military railroads. He was with General Grant in the movement against Price at Iuka, and immediately after the battle of Corinth, on General Grant's recommendation, was appointed a major-general of volunteers, and relieved from railroad duty and assigned to the command of troops; a field most fitted for him, and in which he made his country's history his. General Grant was deeply affected when he received news of his death; and the country shared his grief that one who, while so young, had done so much, could not have lived to gain a greater renown.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL WILLIAM R. ROWLEY, United States Volunteers, is a New Yorker by birth, and a citizen of Galena, Illinois. At the breaking out of the war he was clerk of the Jo-Daviess County Circuit Court. In September, 1861, he entered the service as a first-lieutenant in the Forty-Fifth Illinois Infantry Volunteers, and was with it at Fort Henry and in the battle of Donelson, when he was appointed an aide-de-camp on General Grant's staff, and soon after promoted to a captaincy under the additional aide-de-camp law. He was appointed major and aide-de-camp in November, 1862, and lieutenant-colonel and military secretary on the general's appointment to lieutenant-general, and was with him in all his battles and campaigns (except the one against Vicksburg), until August, 1864, when, on account of broken health, he resigned. Owing to severe illness, he could not accompany the general on the Vicksburg campaign. Partially recovering from his illness, he was placed on duty as provost-marshal at Columbus, and rendered important service. In September, 1863, he relieved Colonel Kent as provost-marshal-general on General Grant's staff. He brought to bear, in the discharge of his duties, bravery, energy, and fine business qualifications.

COLONEL JOHN RIGGIN, jr., United States Army, was from Missouri. He served as volunteer aide-de-camp from December, 1861, until the 1st of April, 1862, participating in all General Grant's military operations to that date. He was afterwards, as a recognition of his services, appointed colonel

and additional aid-de-camp, and was with the general in all his campaigns and battles from the evacuation of Corinth until September following the fall of Vicksburg, when he resigned his commission. He is a man of most excellent business qualifications.

COLONEL GEORGE P. IHRIE, United States Army, was a citizen of California, and formerly of the old army, but not a graduate of West Point. He served as volunteer aid-de-camp in the siege of Corinth, and was appointed colonel and additional aid-de-camp in June, 1862, serving respectively as acting inspector-general and commissary of musters; and particularly distinguished himself in the defence of Trenton, Tennessee, in December, 1862, against Forrest, and assisting in saving from capture our railroad trains there. He continued with General Grant until the beginning of April, 1863.

MAJOR FREDERICK E. PRIME, United States Army, is from New York, and a graduate of West Point. He reported to General Grant in July, 1862, and was assigned to duty as chief-engineer. He laid out and constructed the interior lines of defence at Corinth, that withstood the enemy's desperate assaults on the 4th of October, 1862; was in the Tallahatchie and Vicksburg campaigns, and personally supervised all engineering operations in the siege of Vicksburg, until near its close, when he was prostrated by fever, and forced to go North for recovery. He is one of the ablest and most efficient officers of his corps. After the fall of Vicksburg, he was appointed brigadier-general of volunteers, but declined to accept it.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL WILLIAM L. DUFF, Second Regiment Illinois Light Artillery, is a Scotchman by birth, and a citizen and resident of Illinois. He entered the service immediately on the breaking out of the war, and served with his command until October, 1862, when he was assigned to duty as chief of artillery, and served as such through the Tallahatchie, Vicksburg, and Chattanooga campaigns, and until General Grant was appointed lieutenant-general. He was then assigned to duty as assistant inspector-general on his staff, and was with

him in his Richmond battles and campaigns until the expiration of his term of service, in January, 1865.

MAJOR-GENERAL JAMES H. WILSON, United States Volunteers, is from Illinois, and a graduate of West Point. He was in the siege and capture of Fort Pulaski, and with General McClellan in the battle of Antietam, and reported to General Grant in October, 1862, a first-lieutenant of topographical engineers, and was assigned to duty as chief of his corps. From his love for the advanced front, he was put on duty temporarily with General McPherson, and continued with him until we fell back from the Yocona to Holly Springs. In January, 1863, he was assigned in orders as assistant inspector-general, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel, on Major-General D. Hunter's staff; but on application of General Grant was ordered to remain with him. He accompanied the Yazoo Pass expedition as chief-engineer, and continued on engineer's duty throughout the Vicksburg campaign. The activity, industry, energy, and ability he displayed evinced his fitness for command. He was promoted to a brigadier-generalcy of volunteers in October, 1863, and continued on staff-duty through the Chattanooga campaign, accompanying General Sherman to the relief of Knoxville. In January, 1864, he was ordered to Washington, and appointed chief of the cavalry bureau, from which he was relieved at General Grant's request, and assigned to the command of a division of Sheridan's cavalry, in the Army of the Potomac. His brilliant achievements as a cavalry leader are a part of our country's history.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL FREDERICK T. DENT, United States Volunteers, is from Missouri, and a graduate of West Point. He served with distinction through the Mexican war, and in the war of the rebellion, with his regiment, the Fourth United States infantry, in the East, until General Grant was made lieutenant-general and established his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac, when he was appointed aid-de-camp, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel. He served with the general from Culpepper to Appomattox Courthouse, and during the pursuit of Lee from Petersburg, received notice of his

promotion to a brigadier-generalcy of volunteers. He is a brave and dashing officer, of great generosity and nobleness of heart.

BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL LOREN KENT, United States Volunteers, is from Illinois. He entered the service as a private in the beginning of the war, and through merit reached the lieutenant-colonelcy of the Twenty-ninth Regiment Illinois Infantry Volunteers. In June, 1863, he was assigned to duty on General Grant's staff as provost-marshal-general, *vice* Colonel Hillyer, resigned, and continued on that duty until the following September, when he was promoted to the colonelcy of his regiment, and at his own request relieved to command it. He is an officer of integrity and good sense.

BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL J. G. BARNARD, United States Volunteers, is from Massachusetts, and a graduate of West Point. He reported to General Grant at Cold Harbor, in June, 1864, and was assigned to duty as chief-engineer of the armies in the field, and served as such temporarily, subject to the orders of General Meade, until the Army of the Potomac formed a junction with the Army of the James, when he was assigned in orders as chief engineer of the armies operating against Richmond. He was with General Grant from the date of his joining him until the surrender of Lee at Appomattox Courthouse. He is of the corps of engineers, and stands high in rank and ability; and in scholarly attainments, few, if any, of his corps are his superiors. He was chief-engineer to General McClellan in the Peninsula campaign, and will, perhaps, be as long and distinctly remembered for his searching review of that general's report of his operations as for any services rendered his country in the field.

COLONEL T. LYLE DICKEY, Fourth Regiment Illinois Cavalry Volunteers, was assigned in June, 1862, chief of cavalry. He commanded the cavalry in the battles of Fort Donelson and Shiloh; and in the advance on Corinth, pushed out, and after considerable fighting with the enemy's cavalry, cut the railroad near Purdy, between Corinth and Jackson. In the Tallahatchie campaign he commanded the cavalry in person, and

was always at the front. While we lay at Oxford, he made a successful raid against the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. He was a brave and able officer, but too far advanced in years to stand the hardships of the service. He resigned in the spring of 1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. F. SMITH, United States Volunteers, is from Vermont, and a graduate of West Point, and belongs to the corps of engineers. He was General Grant's chief-engineer, during his command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, and bore a part, which is already historic, in the campaign and battles of Chattanooga. His services with the Army of the Potomac, prior to his service in the West, and in the Army of the James since, are familiar to the country. He is a very able and accomplished officer, and particularly distinguished for his strategic grasp.

In thus giving brief sketches of the officers nearest the person of the lieutenant-general, we mean no discourtesy to those who, from time to time, have served for short periods on his staff. The variety of his military commands, and the demands of special service, have caused him to avail himself of the service of hundreds, literally, at different times. But, among these, the gentlemen referred to in the foregoing pages have been so long attached to him, and identified with his campaigns, as to constitute in an especial manner his military family.

APPENDIX.

THE following correspondence will give the *rationale* of Sherman's movement, as far as it concerned that of Grant :

HEADQUARTERS THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE, OXFORD, Miss., Dec. 8, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, *Commanding Right Wing* :

You will proceed with as little delay as possible to Memphis, Tennessee, taking with you one division of your present command. On your arrival at Memphis you will assume command of all the troops there, and that portion of General Curtis's forces at present east of the Mississippi River, and organize them into brigades and divisions in your own way. As soon as possible, move with them down the river to the vicinity of Vicksburg, and with the co-operation of the gunboat fleet, under command of Flag-Officer Porter, proceed to the reduction of that place, in such manner as circumstances and your own judgment may dictate.

The amount of rations, forage, land transportation, etc., necessary to take, will be left entirely to yourself. The quartermaster at St. Louis will be instructed to send you transportation for thirty thousand men : should you still find yourself deficient, your quartermaster will be authorized to make up the deficiency from such transports as may come into the port of Memphis.

On arriving at Memphis, put yourself in communication with Admiral Foote, and arrange with him for his co-operation.

Inform me at the earliest practicable day of the time when you will embark, and such plans as may then be matured. I will hold the forces here in readiness to co-operate with you in such manner as the movements of the enemy may make necessary.

Leave the district of Memphis in the command of an efficient officer, and with a garrison of four regiments of infantry, the siege-guns, and whatever cavalry may be there.

(Signed)

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,
OXFORD, Miss., Dec. 14, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN, *Commanding, etc.* :

I have not had one word from Grierson since he left, and am getting uneasy about him. I hope General Gorman will give you no difficulty about retaining the troops that were on this side of the river, and Steele to command them. The twenty-one thousand men you have, with twelve thousand from Helena, will make a good force. The enemy are as yet on the Yalabusha. I am pushing down on them slowly, but so as to keep up the impression of a continuous move. I feel particularly anxious to have the Helena cavalry on this side of the river ; if not now, at least after you start. If Gorman will send them, instruct them where to go and how to communicate with me. My headquarters will probably be in Coffeeville one week hence. In the mean time, I will be at Springdale. It would be well if you could have two or three small boats suitable for navigating the Yazoo. It may become necessary for me to look to that base for supplies before we get through.

(Signed)

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS RIGHT WING ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE,
 OXFORD, Miss., Dec. 8, 1862.

REAR-ADMIRAL D. D. PORTER,

Commanding United States Naval Forces, Cairo, Illinois :

The movement thus far has been eminently successful. General Grant's moving down directly upon the enemy's strong lines behind the Tallahatchie, while the Helena force appeared unexpectedly on their flank, utterly confounded them, and they are now in full retreat, and we are at a loss where they will bring up. We hope they will halt and reform behind the Yalabusha, with Grenada as their centre. If so, General Grant can press their front, while I am ordered to take all the spare troops from Memphis and Helena, and proceed with all dispatch to Vicksburg.

Time now is the great object. We must not give time for new combinations. I know you will promptly co-operate. It will not be necessary to engage their Vicksburg batteries until I have broken all their inland communication. Then Vicksburg must be attacked by land and water. In this I will defer much to you.

My purpose will be to cut the road to Monroe, Louisiana, to Jackson, Mississippi, and then appear up the Yazoo, threatening the Mississippi Central road where it crosses the Big Black.

These movements will disconcert the enemy, and throw them on to Meridian, especially as General Grant presses them in front. All this should be done before the winter rains make General Grant's road impassable. I will leave for Memphis tomorrow, Tuesday night, and will reach Memphis, with one of my old divisions, Friday night. We ought to leave Memphis before the 20th, and I do earnestly desire you should meet me there at all events; even if the larger gunboats cannot proceed at once, send those of light draught down, with Captain Phelps, Gwin, Shirke, or some officer to assist me in the preliminary work. Of course, Vicksburg cannot be reduced till you arrive with the large gunboats.

General Grant's purpose is to take full advantage of the effects of the Tallahatchie success.

I am, with respect,
 (Signed) W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.

We append the following letter, which has never been published :

WASHINGTON, D. C., July 31, 1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, *Vicksburg, Mississippi :*

Your report, dated July 6th, of your campaign in Mississippi, ending in the capitulation of Vicksburg, was received last evening. Your narrative of this campaign, like the operations themselves, is brief, soldierly, and in every respect creditable and satisfactory. In boldness of plan, rapidity of execution, and brilliancy of routes, these operations will compare most favorably with those of Napoleon about Ulm. You and your army have well deserved the gratitude of your country, and it will be the boast of your children that their fathers were of the heroic army which reopened the Mississippi River.

(Signed) H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

The following is the indorsement of General Grant on the correspondence between Wright and Sheridan :

[No. 89.]

MIDDLE MILITARY DIVISION, GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN,
 April 14, 1865.

Forwards copy of dispatch to General Wright, commanding Sixth Corps, asking him to report the action of that corps at the battle of Sailors' Creek, April 6th, and forward same; also, General Wright's reply, who says he has reported to General Meade, under whose orders he is, and to whose army his corps belongs. Asks that General Wright be instructed to report to him (General Sheridan).

HEADQUARTERS ARMY UNITED STATES,
WASHINGTON, May 8, 1865.

Respectfully referred to Major-General Meade, commanding the Army of the Potomac, and attention invited to inclosed copy of dispatch, of date 6th instant, to Major-General Wright, commanding Sixth Army Corps; also, to copy of dispatch to Major-General Sheridan, of date April 6th, 1865.

This corps was not, by any order, at any time, detached from your command, but under my instructions to Major-General Sheridan, in answer to information I had just received from him, he was authorized to assume the command of this corps, when it joined him, and it is considered a matter of simple justice that its action, while under his command, be reported to him.

In your official report, you will report the whole of the operations of that corps, on the 6th of April, 1865, and General Wright will be required to make to you a report of the whole day's operations, including the battle of Sailors' Creek.

(Signed) U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

Official copy :

E. S. PARKER, brevet Colonel and Military Secretary,
Headquarters Armies of the United States, Nov. 3, 1865.

The following is General Grant's letter to General Wright, setting the controversy at rest :

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
WASHINGTON, May 6, 1865.

MAJOR-GENERAL H. G. WRIGHT, *City Point, Virginia* :

Please furnish an official report of your corps in the battle of Sailors' Creek, fought April 6th, 1865, to Major-General P. H. Sheridan. It was the intention of the lieutenant-general, that (in the absence of other orders) when you joined Sheridan, you should act under his orders, and he was so instructed.

A copy of this dispatch will be forwarded to Major-General Meade.

By command of LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT,
T. S. BOWERS, Assistant Adjutant-General.

Official copy :

E. S. PARKER, brevet Colonel and Military Secretary.

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT,
OF THE
UNITED STATES ARMIES—1864-'65.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
WASHINGTON, D. C., July 22, 1865.

SIR—I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the Armies of the United States from the date of my appointment to command the same.

From an early period in the rebellion I had been impressed with the idea that active and continuous operations of all the troops that could be brought into the field, regardless of season and weather, were necessary to a speedy termination of the war. The resources of the enemy and his numerical strength were far inferior to ours; but as an offset to this, we had a vast territory, with a population hostile to the Government, to garrison, and long lines of river and railroad communications to protect, to enable us to supply the operating armies.

The armies in the East and West acted independently and without concert, like a balky team, no two ever pulling together, enabling the enemy to use to great advantage his interior lines of communication for transporting troops from East to West, reinforcing the army most vigorously pressed, and to furlough large numbers, during seasons of inactivity on our part, to go to their homes and do the work of producing, for the support of their armies. It was a question whether our numerical strength and resources were not more than balanced by these disadvantages and the enemy's superior position.

From the first, I was firm in the conviction that no peace could be had that would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the people, both North and South, until the military power of the rebellion was entirely broken.

I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops practicable against the armed force of the enemy; preventing him from using the same force at different seasons against first one and then another of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refitting and producing necessary supplies for carrying on resistance. Second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the constitution and laws of the land.

These views have been kept constantly in mind, and orders given and campaigns made to carry them out. Whether they might have been better in conception and execution is for the people, who mourn the loss of friends fallen, and who have to pay the pecuniary cost, to say. All I can say is, that what I have done has been done conscientiously, to the best of my ability, and in what I conceived to be for the best interests of the whole country.

At the date when this report begins, the situation of the contending forces was about as follows: The Mississippi River was strongly garrisoned by Federal troops, from St. Louis, Missouri, to its mouth. The line of the Arkansas was also held, thus giving us armed possession of all west of the Mississippi, north of that stream. A few points in Southern Louisiana, not remote from the river, were held by us, together with a small garrison at and near the mouth of the Rio Grande. All the balance of the vast territory of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas was in the almost undisputed possession of the enemy, with an army of probably not less than eighty thousand effective men, that could have been brought into the field had there been sufficient opposition to

have brought them out. The let-alone policy had demoralized this force so much, that probably little more than one-half of it was ever present in garrison at any one time. But the one-half, or forty thousand men, with the bands of guerrillas scattered through Missouri, Arkansas, and along the Mississippi River, and the disloyal character of much of the population, compelled the use of a large number of troops to keep navigation open on the river, and to protect the loyal people to the west of it. To the east of the Mississippi we held substantially with the line of the Tennessee and Holston rivers, running eastward to include nearly all of the State of Tennessee. South of Chattanooga, a small foothold had been obtained in Georgia, sufficient to protect East Tennessee from incursions from the enemy's force at Dalton, Georgia. West Virginia was substantially within our lines. Virginia, with the exception of the northern border, the Potomac River, a small area about the mouth of James River, covered by the troops at Norfolk and Fort Monroe, and the territory covered by the Army of the Potomac lying along the Rapidan, was in the possession of the enemy. Along the seacoast footholds had been obtained at Plymouth, Washington, and Newbern, in North Carolina; Beaufort, Folly and Morris Islands, Hilton Head, Fort Pulaski, and Port Royal, in South Carolina; Fernandina and St. Augustine, in Florida. Key West and Pensacola were also in our possession, while all the important ports were blockaded by the navy. The accompanying map, a copy of which was sent to General Sherman and other commanders in March, 1864, shows by red lines the territory occupied by us at the beginning of the rebellion, and at the opening of the campaign of 1864, while those in blue are the lines which it was proposed to occupy.

Behind the Union lines there were many bands of guerrillas and a large population disloyal to the Government, making it necessary to guard every foot of road or river used in supplying our armies. In the South, a reign of military despotism prevailed, which made every man and boy capable of bearing arms a soldier; and those who could not bear arms in the field acted as provosts for collecting deserters and returning them. This enabled the enemy to bring almost his entire strength into the field.

The enemy had concentrated the bulk of his forces east of the Mississippi into two armies, commanded by Generals R. E. Lee and J. E. Johnston, his ablest and best generals. The army commanded by Lee occupied the south bank of the Rapidan, extending from Mine Run westward, strongly intrenched, covering and defending Richmond, the rebel capital, against the Army of the Potomac. The army under Johnston occupied a strongly intrenched position at Dalton, Georgia, covering and defending Atlanta, Georgia, a place of great importance as a railroad centre, against the armies under Major-General W. T. Sherman. In addition to these armies he had a large cavalry force under Forrest, in Northeast Mississippi; a considerable force, of all arms, in the Shenandoah Valley, and in the western part of Virginia and extreme eastern part of Tennessee; and also confronting our seacoast garrisons, and holding blockaded ports where we had no foothold upon land.

These two armies, and the cities covered and defended by them, were the main objective points of the campaign.

Major-General W. T. Sherman, who was appointed to the command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, embracing all the armies and territory east of the Mississippi River to the Alleghanies, and the Department of Arkansas, west of the Mississippi, had the immediate command of the armies operating against Johnston.

Major-General George G. Meade had the immediate command of the Army of the Potomac, from where I exercised general supervision of the movements of all our armies.

General Sherman was instructed to move against Johnston's army, to break it up, and to go into the interior of the enemy's country as far as he could, inflicting all the damage he could upon their war resources. If the enemy in his front showed signs of joining Lee, to follow him up to the full extent of his ability, while I would prevent the concentration of Lee upon him, if it was in the power of the Army of the Potomac to do so. More specific written instructions were not given, for the reason that I had talked over with him the plans of the campaign, and was satisfied that he understood them and would execute them to the fullest extent possible.

Major-General N. P. Banks, then on an expedition up Red River against Shreveport, Louisiana (which had been organized previous to my appointment to command), was notified by me on the 15th of March, of the importance it was that Shreveport should be taken at the earliest possible day, and that if he found that the taking of it would occupy from ten to fifteen days' more time than General Sherman had given his troops to be absent from their command, he would send them back at the time specified by General Sherman, even if it led to the abandonment of the main object of the Red River expedition, for this force was necessary to movements east of the Mississippi; that should his expedition prove successful, he would hold Shreveport and the

Red River with such force as he might deem necessary, and return the balance of his troops to the neighborhood of New Orleans, commencing no move for the further acquisition of territory, unless it was to make that then held by him more easily held; that it might be a part of the spring campaign to move against Mobile; that it certainly would be, if troops enough could be obtained to make it without embarrassing other movements; that New Orleans would be the point of departure for such an expedition; also, that I had directed General Steele to make a real move from Arkansas, as suggested by him (General Banks), instead of a demonstration, as Steele thought advisable.

On the 31st of March, in addition to the foregoing notification and directions, he was instructed as follows:

"1st. If successful in your expedition against Shreveport, that you turn over the defence of the Red River to General Steele and the navy.

"2d. That you abandon Texas entirely, with the exception of your hold upon the Rio Grande. This can be held with four thousand men, if they will turn their attention immediately to fortifying their positions. At least one-half of the force required for this service might be taken from the colored troops.

"3d. By properly fortifying on the Mississippi River, the force to guard it from Port Hudson to New Orleans can be reduced to ten thousand men, if not to a less number. Six thousand more would then hold all the rest of the territory necessary to hold until active operations can again be resumed west of the river. According to your last return, this would give you a force of over thirty thousand effective men with which to move against Mobile. To this I expect to add five thousand men from Missouri. If, however, you think the force here stated too small to hold the territory regarded as necessary to hold possession of, I would say concentrate at least twenty-five thousand men of your present command for operations against Mobile. With these and such additions as I can give you from elsewhere, lose no time in making a demonstration, to be followed by an attack upon Mobile. Two or more iron-clads will be ordered to report to Admiral Farragut. This gives him a strong naval fleet with which to co-operate. You can make your own arrangements with the admiral for his co-operation, and select your own line of approach. My own idea of the matter is that Pascagoula should be your base; but, from your long service in the Gulf Department, you will know best about the matter. It is intended that your movements shall be co-operative with movements elsewhere, and you cannot now start too soon. All I would now add is, that you commence the concentration of your forces at once. Preserve a profound secrecy of what you intend doing, and start at the earliest possible moment.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL N. P. BANKS."

Major-General Meade was instructed that Lee's army would be his objective point; that wherever Lee went he would go also. For his movement two plans presented themselves: One to cross the Rapidan below Lee, moving by his right flank; the other above, moving by his left. Each presented advantages over the other, with corresponding objections. By crossing above, Lee would be cut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond or going north on a raid. But if we took this route, all we did would have to be done whilst the rations we started with held out; besides, it separated us from Butler, so that he could not be directed how to co-operate. If we took the other route, Brandy Station could be used as a base of supplies until another was secured on the York or James rivers. Of these, however, it was decided to take the lower route.

The following letter of instruction was addressed to Major-General B. F. Butler:

"FORT MONROE, Va., April 2, 1864.

"GENERAL—In the spring campaign, which it is desirable shall commence at as early a day as practicable, it is proposed to have co-operative action of all the armies in the field, as far as this object can be accomplished.

"It will not be possible to unite our armies into two or three large ones to act as so many units, owing to the absolute necessity of holding on to the territory already taken from the enemy. But, generally speaking, concentration can be practically effected by armies moving to the interior of the enemy's country from the territory they have to guard. By such movement, they interpose themselves between the enemy and the country to be guarded, thereby reducing the number necessary to guard important points, or at least occupy the attention of a part of the enemy's force, if no greater object is gained. Lee's army and Richmond being the greater objects towards which our attention must be directed in the next campaign, it is desirable to unite all the force we can against them. The necessity of covering Washington with the Army of the Potomac, and of covering your department with your army, makes it impossible to unite these forces at the beginning of any move. I propose, therefore, what comes nearest this of any thing that seems practicable: The Army of the Potomac will act from its present base, Lee's army being the objective point. You will collect all the forces from your command that can be spared for garrison duty—I should say not less than twenty thousand effective men—to operate on the south side of James River, Richmond being your objective point. To the force you already have will be added about ten thousand men from South Carolina, under Major-General Gillmore, who will command them in person. Major-General W. F. Smith is ordered to report to you, to command the troops sent into the field from your own department.

"General Gillmore will be ordered to report to you at Fortress Monroe, with all the troops on transports, by the 15th instant, or as soon thereafter as practicable. Should you not receive notice by that time to move, you will make such disposition of them and your other forces as you may deem best calculated to deceive the enemy as to the real move to be made.

"When you are notified to move, take City Point with as much force as possible. Fortify, or rather intrench, at once, and concentrate all your troops for the field there as rapidly as you can. From City Point directions cannot be given at this time for your further movements.

"The fact that has already been stated—that is, that Richmond is to be your objective point, and that there is to be co-operation between your force and the Army of the Potomac—must be your guide. This indicates the necessity of your holding close to the south bank of the James River as you advance. Then, should the enemy be forced into his intrenchments in Richmond, the Army of the Potomac would follow, and by means of transports the two armies would become a unit.

"All the minor details of your advance are left entirely to your direction. If, however, you think it practicable to use your cavalry south of you, so as to cut the railroad about Hick's Ford about the time of the general advance, it would be of immense advantage.

"You will please forward for my information, at the earliest practicable day, all orders, details, and instructions you may give for the execution of this order.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL B. F. BUTLER."

On the 16th these instructions were substantially reiterated. On the 19th, in order to secure full co-operation between his army and that of General Meade, he was informed that I expected him to move from Fort Monroe the same day that General Meade moved from Culpepper. The exact time I was to telegraph him as soon as it was fixed, and that it would not be earlier than the 27th of April; that it was my intention to fight Lee between Culpepper and Richmond, if he would stand. Should he, however, fall back into Richmond, I would follow up and make a junction with his (General Butler's) army on the James River; that, could I be certain he would be able to invest Richmond on the south side, so as to have his left resting on the James, above the city, I would form the junction there; that circumstances might make this course advisable anyhow; that he should use every exertion to secure footing as far up the south side of the river as he could, and as soon as possible after the receipt of orders to move; that if he could not carry the city, he should at least detain as large a force as possible.

In co-operation with the main movements against Lee and Johnston, I was desirous of using all other troops necessarily kept in departments remote from the fields of immediate operations, and also those kept in the background for the protection of our extended lines between the loyal States and the armies operating against them.

A very considerable force, under command of Major-General Sigel, was so held for the protection of West Virginia, and the frontiers of Maryland and Pennsylvania. Whilst these troops could not be withdrawn to distant fields without exposing the North to invasion by comparatively small bodies of the enemy, they could act directly to their front, and give better protection than if lying idle in garrison. By such a movement they would either compel the enemy to detach largely for the protection of his supplies and lines of communication, or he would lose them. General Sigel was therefore directed to organize all his available force into two expeditions, to move from Beverly and Charleston, under command of Generals Ord and Crook, against the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad. Subsequently, General Ord having been relieved at his own request, General Sigel was instructed, at his own suggestion, to give up the expedition by Beverly, and to form two columns, one under General Crook, on the Kanawha, numbering about ten thousand men, and one on the Shenandoah, numbering about seven thousand men. The one on the Shenandoah to assemble between Cumberland and the Shenandoah, and the infantry and artillery advanced to Cedar Creek with such cavalry as could be made available at the moment, to threaten the enemy in the Shenandoah Valley, and advance as far as possible; while General Crook would take possession of Lewisburg with part of his force and move down the Tennessee Railroad, doing as much damage as he could, destroying the New River Bridge and salt-works, at Saltville, Va.

Owing to the weather and bad condition of the roads, operations were delayed until the 1st of May, when, every thing being in readiness and the roads favorable, orders were given for a general movement of all the armies not later than the 4th of May.

My first object being to break the military power of the rebellion, and capture the enemy's important strongholds, made me desirous that General Butler should succeed in his movement against Richmond, as that would tend more than any thing else, unless it were the capture of Lee's army, to accomplish this desired result in the East. If it failed, it was my determination, by hard fighting, either to compel Lee to retreat, or to so cripple him that he could not detach a large force to go north, and still retain enough for the defence of Richmond. It was well understood, by both Generals But-

ler and Meade, before starting on the campaign, that it was my intention to put both their armies south of the James River, in case of failure to destroy Lee without it.

Before giving General Butler his instructions, I visited him at Fort Monroe, and in conversation pointed out the apparent importance of getting possession of Petersburg, and destroying railroad communication as far south as possible. Believing, however, in the practicability of capturing Richmond unless it was re-enforced, I made that the objective point of his operations. As the Army of the Potomac was to move simultaneously with him, Lee could not detach from his army with safety, and the enemy did not have troops elsewhere to bring to the defence of the city in time to meet a rapid movement from the north of James River.

I may here state that, commanding all the armies as I did, I tried, as far as possible, to leave General Meade in independent command of the Army of the Potomac. My instructions for that army were all through him, and were general in their nature, leaving all the details and the execution to him. The campaigns that followed proved him to be the right man in the right place. His commanding always in the presence of an officer superior to him in rank, has drawn from him much of that public attention that his zeal and ability entitle him to, and which he would otherwise have received.

The movement of the Army of the Potomac commenced early on the morning of the 4th of May, under the immediate direction and orders of Major-General Meade, pursuant to instructions. Before night, the whole army was across the Rapidan (the Fifth and Sixth corps crossing at Germania Ford, and the Second Corps at United States Ford, the cavalry, under Major-General Sheridan, moving in advance), with the greater part of its trains, numbering about four thousand wagons, meeting with but slight opposition. The average distance travelled by the troops that day was about twelve miles. This I regarded as a great success, and it removed from my mind the most serious apprehensions I had entertained, that of crossing the river in the face of an active, large, well-appointed, and ably-commanded army, and how so large a train was to be carried through a hostile country, and protected. Early on the 5th, the advance corps (the Fifth, Major-General G. K. Warren commanding) met and engaged the enemy outside his intrenchments near Mine Run. The battle raged furiously all day, the whole army being brought into the fight as fast as the corps could be got upon the field, which, considering the density of the forest and narrowness of the roads, was done with commendable promptness.

General Burnside, with the Ninth Corps, was, at the time the Army of the Potomac moved, left with the bulk of his corps at the crossing of the Rappahannock River and Alexandria Railroad, holding the road back to Bull Run, with instructions not to move until he received notice that a crossing of the Rapidan was secured, but to move promptly as soon as such notice was received. This crossing he was apprized of on the afternoon of the 4th. By six o'clock of the morning of the 6th, he was leading his corps into action near the Wilderness tavern, some of his troops having marched a distance of over thirty miles, crossing both the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers. Considering that a large proportion, probably two-thirds of his command, was composed of new troops, unaccustomed to marches, and carrying the accoutrements of a soldier, this was a remarkable march.

The battle of the Wilderness was renewed by us at five o'clock on the morning of the 6th, and continued with unabated fury until darkness set in, each army holding substantially the same position that they had on the evening of the 5th. After dark, the enemy made a feeble attempt to turn our right flank, capturing several hundred prisoners, and creating considerable confusion. But the promptness of General Sedgwick, who was personally present, and commanding that part of our line, soon reformed it and restored order. On the morning of the 7th, reconnoissances showed that the enemy had fallen behind his intrenched lines, with pickets to the front, covering a part of the battle-field. From this it was evident to my mind that the two days' fighting had satisfied him of his inability to further maintain the contest in the open field, notwithstanding his advantage of position, and that he would wait an attack behind his works. I therefore determined to push on, and put my whole force between him and Richmond; and orders were at once issued for a movement by his right flank. On the night of the 7th, the march was commenced towards Spottsylvania Courthouse, the Fifth Corps moving on the most direct road. But the enemy having become apprized of our movement, and having the shorter line, was enabled to reach there first. On the 8th, General Warren met a force of the enemy, which had been sent out to oppose and delay his advance, to gain time to fortify the line taken up at Spottsylvania. This force was steadily driven back on the main force, within the recently constructed works, after considerable fighting, resulting in severe loss to both sides. On the morning of the 9th, General Sheridan started on a raid against the enemy's lines of communication with Richmond. The 9th, 10th, and 11th

were spent in manœuvring and fighting, without decisive results. Among the killed on the 9th was that able and distinguished soldier Major-General John Sedgwick, commanding the Sixth Army Corps. Major-General H. G. Wright succeeded him in command. Early on the morning of the 12th, a general attack was made on the enemy in position. The Second Corps, Major-General Hancock commanding, carried a salient of his line, capturing most of Johnston's division of Ewell's Corps and twenty pieces of artillery. But the resistance was so obstinate that the advantage gained did not prove decisive. The 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th, were consumed in manœuvring and awaiting the arrival of re-enforcements from Washington. Deeming it impracticable to make any further attack upon the enemy at Spottsylvania Courthouse, orders were issued on the 18th with a view to a movement to the North Anna, to commence at twelve o'clock on the night of the 19th. Late in the afternoon of the 19th, Ewell's Corps came out of its works on our extreme right flank; but the attack was promptly repulsed, with heavy loss. This delayed the movement to the North Anna until the night of the 21st, when it was commenced. But the enemy again having the shorter line, and being in possession of the main roads, was enabled to reach the North Anna in advance of us, and took position behind it. The Fifth Corps reached the North Anna on the afternoon of the 23d, closely followed by the Sixth Corps. The Second and Ninth Corps got up about the same time, the Second holding the railroad-bridge, and the Ninth lying between that and Jericho Ford. General Warren effected a crossing the same afternoon, and got a position without much opposition. Soon after getting into position he was violently attacked, but repulsed the enemy with great slaughter. On the 25th, General Sheridan rejoined the Army of the Potomac from the raid on which he started from Spottsylvania, having destroyed the depots at Beaver Dam and Ashland stations, four trains of cars, large supplies of rations, and many miles of railroad-track; recaptured about four hundred of our men on their way to Richmond as prisoners of war; met and defeated the enemy's cavalry at Yellow Tavern; carried the first line of works around Richmond (but finding the second line too strong to be carried by assault), recrossed to the north bank of the Chickahominy at Meadow's Bridge under heavy fire, and moved by a detour to Huxall's Landing, on the James River, where he communicated with General Butler. This raid had the effect of drawing off the whole of the enemy's cavalry force, and making it comparatively easy to guard our trains.

General Butler moved his main force up the James River, in pursuance of instructions, on the 4th of May, General Gillmore having joined with the Tenth Corps. At the same time he sent a force of one thousand eight hundred cavalry, by way of West Point, to form a junction with him wherever he might get a foothold, and a force of three thousand cavalry, under General Kautz, from Suffolk, to operate against the road south of Petersburg and Richmond. On the 5th, he occupied, without opposition, both City Point and Bermuda Hundred, his movement being a complete surprise. On the 6th, he was in position with his main army, and commenced intrenching. On the 7th, he made a reconnoissance against the Petersburg and Richmond Railroad, destroying a portion of it after some fighting. On the 9th, he telegraphed as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS NEAR BERMUDA LANDING, May 9, 1864.

"Our operations may be summed up in a few words. With one thousand seven hundred cavalry we have advanced up the Peninsula, forced the Chickahominy, and have safely brought them to our present position. These were colored cavalry, and are now holding our advance pickets towards Richmond.

"General Kautz, with three thousand cavalry from Suffolk, on the same day with our movement up James River, forced the Blackwater, burned the railroad-bridge at Stoney Creek, below Petersburg, cutting in two Beauregard's force at that point.

"We have landed here, intrenched ourselves, destroyed many miles of railroad, and got a position which, with proper supplies, we can hold out against the whole of Lee's army. I have ordered up the supplies.

"Beauregard, with a large portion of his force, was left South by the cutting of the railroads by Kautz. That portion which reached Petersburg under Hill I have whipped to-day, killing and wounding many, and taking many prisoners, after a severe and well-contested fight.

"General Grant will not be troubled with any further re-enforcements to Lee from Beauregard's force.

"BENJAMIN F. BUTLER, Major-General.

"Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War."

On the evening of the 13th and morning of the 14th, he carried a portion of the enemy's first line of defence at Drury's Bluff, or Fort Darling, with small loss. The time thus consumed from the 6th lost to us the benefit of the surprise and capture of Richmond and Petersburg, enabling, as it did, Beauregard to collect his loose forces in North and South Carolina, and bring them to the defence of those places. On the

16th, the enemy attacked General Butler in his position in front of Drury's Bluff. He was forced back, or drew back, into his intrenchments between the forks of the James and Appomattox rivers, the enemy intrenching strongly in his front, thus covering his railroads, the city, and all that was valuable to him. His army, therefore, though in a position of great security, was as completely shut off from further operations directly against Richmond as if it had been in a bottle strongly corked. It required but a comparatively small force of the enemy to hold it there.

On the 12th, General Kautz, with his cavalry, was started on a raid against the Danville Railroad, which he struck at Coalfield, Powhatan, and Chola stations, destroying them, the railroad-track, two freight-trains, and one locomotive, together with large quantities of commissary and other stores; thence, crossing to the Southside road, struck it at Wilson's, Wellsville, and Black and White stations, destroying the road and station-houses; thence he proceeded to City Point, which he reached on the 18th.

On the 19th of April, and prior to the movement of General Butler, the enemy, with a land force under General Hoke and an iron-clad ram, attacked Plymouth, N. C., commanded by General H. W. Wessels, and our gunboats there; and, after severe fighting, the place was carried by assault, and the entire garrison and armaments captured. The gunboat Smithfield was sunk, and the Miami disabled.

The army sent to operate against Richmond having hermetically sealed itself up at Bermuda Hundred, the enemy was enabled to bring the most, if not all, the re-enforcements brought from the South by Beauregard against the Army of the Potomac. In addition to this re-enforcement, a very considerable one, probably not less than fifteen thousand men, was obtained by calling in the scattered troops under Breckinridge from the western part of Virginia.

The position of Bermuda Hundred was as easy to defend as it was difficult to operate from against the enemy. I determined, therefore, to bring from it all available forces, leaving enough only to secure what had been gained; and accordingly, on the 22d, I directed that they be sent forward, under command of Major-General W. F. Smith, to join the Army of the Potomac.

On the 24th of May, the Ninth Army Corps, commanded by Major-General A. E. Burnside, was assigned to the Army of the Potomac, and from this time forward constituted a portion of Major-General Meade's command.

Finding the enemy's position on the North Anna stronger than either of his previous ones, I withdrew on the night of the 26th to the north bank of the North Anna, and moved *via* Hanover town to turn the enemy's position by his right.

Generals Torbert and Merritt's divisions of cavalry, under Sheridan, and the Sixth Corps, led the advance; crossed the Pamunkey River at Hanover town, after considerable fighting, and on the 28th the two divisions of cavalry had a severe, but successful, engagement with the enemy at Haw's shop. On the 29th and 30th we advanced, with heavy skirmishing, to the Hanover Courthouse and Cold Harbor road, and developed the enemy's position north of the Chickahominy. Late on the evening of the last day the enemy came out and attacked our left, but was repulsed with very considerable loss. An attack was immediately ordered by General Meade along his whole line, which resulted in driving the enemy from a part of his intrenched skirmish line.

On the 31st, General Wilson's division of cavalry destroyed the railroad-bridges over the South Anna River, after defeating the enemy's cavalry. General Sheridan, on the same day, reached Cold Harbor, and held it until relieved by the Sixth Corps and General Smith's command, which had just arrived, *via* White House, from General Butler's army.

On the 1st day of June an attack was made at 5 p. m. by the Sixth Corps and the troops under General Smith, the other corps being held in readiness to advance on the receipt of orders. This resulted in our carrying and holding the enemy's first line of works in front of the right of the Sixth Corps, and in front of General Smith. During the attack the enemy made repeated assaults on each of the corps not engaged in the main attack, but were repulsed with heavy loss in every instance. That night he made several assaults to regain what he had lost in the day, but failed. The 2d was spent in getting troops into position for an attack on the 3d. On the 3d of June we again assaulted the enemy's works, in the hope of driving him from his position. In this attempt our loss was heavy, while that of the enemy, I have reason to believe, was comparatively light. It was the only general attack made from the Rapidan to the James which did not inflict upon the enemy losses to compensate for our own losses. I would not be understood as saying that all previous attacks resulted in victories to our arms, or accomplished as much as I had hoped from them; but they inflicted upon the enemy severe losses, which tended, in the end, to the complete overthrow of the rebellion.

From the proximity of the enemy to his defences around Richmond, it was impossible, by any flank movement, to interpose between him and the city. I was still in a condition to either move by his left flank, and invest Richmond from the north side, or continue my move by his right flank to the south side of the James. While the former might have been better as a covering for Washington, yet a full survey of all the ground satisfied me that it would be impracticable to hold a line north and east of Richmond that would protect the Fredericksburg Railroad, a long, vulnerable line, which would exhaust much of our strength to guard, and that would have to be protected to supply the army, and would leave open to the enemy all his lines of communication on the south side of the James. My idea, from the start, had been to beat Lee's army north of Richmond, if possible. Then, after destroying his lines of communication north of the James River, to transfer the army to the south side, and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat. After the battle of the Wilderness, it was evident that the enemy deemed it of the first importance to run no risks with the army he then had. He acted purely on the defensive, behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where, in case of repulse, he could easily retire behind them. Without a greater sacrifice of life than I was willing to make, all could not be accomplished that I had designed north of Richmond. I therefore determined to continue to hold substantially the ground we then occupied, taking advantage of any favorable circumstances that might present themselves, until the cavalry could be sent to Charlottesville and Gordonsville to effectually break up the railroad connection between Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley and Lynchburg; and, when the cavalry got well off, to move the army to the south side of the James River, by the enemy's right flank, where I felt I could cut off all his sources of supply, except by the canal.

On the 7th, two divisions of cavalry, under General Sheridan, got off on the expedition against the Virginia Central Railroad, with instructions to Hunter, whom I hoped he would meet near Charlottesville, to join his forces to Sheridan's, and after the work laid out for them was thoroughly done, to join the Army of the Potomac by the route laid down in Sheridan's instructions.

On the 10th of June, General Butler sent a force of infantry, under General Gillmore, and cavalry, under General Kautz, to capture Petersburg, if possible, and destroy the railroad and common bridges across the Appomattox. The cavalry carried the works on the south side, and penetrated well towards the town, but were forced to retire. General Gillmore, finding the works which he approached very strong, and deeming an assault impracticable, returned to Bermuda Hundred without attempting one.

Attaching great importance to the possession of Petersburg, I sent back to Bermuda Hundred and City Point, General Smith's command, by water, *via* the White House, to reach there in advance of the Army of the Potomac. This was for the express purpose of securing Petersburg before the enemy, becoming aware of our intention, could re-enforce the place.

The movement from Cold Harbor commenced after dark on the evening of the 12th. One division of cavalry, under General Wilson, and the Fifth Corps, crossed the Chickahominy at Long Bridge, and moved out to White-Oak Swamp, to cover the crossings of the other corps. The advance corps reached James River, at Wilcox's Landing and Charles City Courthouse, on the night of the 13th.

During three long years the Armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia had been confronting each other. In that time they had fought more desperate battles than it probably ever before fell to the lot of two armies to fight, without materially changing the vantage ground of either. The Southern press and people, with more shrewdness than was displayed in the North, finding that they had failed to capture Washington and march on to New York, as they had boasted they would do, assumed that they only defended their capital and Southern territory. Hence, Antietam, Gettysburg, and all the other battles that had been fought, were by them set down as failures on our part, and victories for them. Their army believed this. It produced a morale which could only be overcome by desperate and continuous hard fighting. The battles of the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, North Anna, and Cold Harbor, bloody and terrible as they were on our side, were even more damaging to the enemy, and so crippled him as to make him wary ever after of taking the offensive. His losses in men were probably not so great, owing to the fact that we were, save in the Wilderness, almost invariably the attacking party; and when he did attack, it was in the open field. The details of these battles, which, for endurance and bravery on the part of the soldiery, have rarely been surpassed, are given in the report of Major-General Meade, and the subordinate reports accompanying it.

During the campaign of forty-three days, from the Rapidan to the James River, the army had to be supplied from an ever-shifting base, by wagons, over narrow roads,

through a densely wooded country, with a lack of wharves at each new base from which to conveniently discharge vessels. Too much credit cannot, therefore, be awarded to the quartermaster and commissary departments for the zeal and efficiency displayed by them. Under the general supervision of the chief quartermaster, Brigadier-General R. Ingalls, the trains were made to occupy all the available roads between the army and our water-base, and but little difficulty was experienced in protecting them.

The movement in the Kanawha and Shenandoah Valleys, under General Sigel, commenced on the first of May. General Crook, who had the immediate command of the Kanawha expedition, divided his forces into two columns, giving one, composed of cavalry, to General Averill. They crossed the mountains by separate routes. Averill struck the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, near Wytheville, on the 10th, and proceeding to New River and Christiansburg, destroyed the road, several important bridges and depots, including New River Bridge, forming a junction with Crook at Union on the 15th. General Sigel moved up the Shenandoah Valley, met the enemy at New Market on the 15th, and, after a severe engagement, was defeated with heavy loss, and retired behind Cedar Creek. Not regarding the operations of General Sigel as satisfactory, I asked his removal from command, and Major-General Hunter was appointed to supersede him. His instructions were embraced in the following dispatches to Major-General H. W. Halleck, chief of staff of the army:

* * * * * "NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA COURTHOUSE, Va., May 20, 1864. * * * * *

"The enemy are evidently relying for supplies greatly on such as are brought over the branch road running through Staunton. On the whole, therefore, I think it would be better for General Hunter to move in that direction; reach Staunton and Gordonsville or Charlottesville, if he does not meet too much opposition. If he can hold at bay a force equal to his own, he will be doing good service. * * * * *

"MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK."

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"JERICHO FORD, Va., May 25, 1864.

"If Hunter can possibly get to Charlottesville and Lynchburg, he should do so, living on the country. The railroads and canal should be destroyed beyond possibility of repairs for weeks. Completing this, he could find his way back to his original base, or from about Gordonsville join this army. * * * * *

"MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK."

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

General Hunter immediately took up the offensive, and, moving up the Shenandoah Valley, met the enemy on the 5th of June at Piedmont, and, after a battle of ten hours, routed and defeated him, capturing on the field of battle one thousand five hundred men, three pieces of artillery, and three hundred stand of small-arms. On the 8th of the same month he formed a junction with Crook and Averill at Staunton, from which place he moved direct on Lynchburg, *via* Lexington, which place he reached and invested on the 16th day of June. Up to this time he was very successful; and but for the difficulty of taking with him sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march, through a hostile country, he would, no doubt, have captured that, to the enemy an important point. The destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories was very great. To meet this movement under General Hunter, General Lee sent a force, perhaps equal to a corps, a part of which reached Lynchburg a short time before Hunter. After some skirmishing on the 17th and 18th, General Hunter, owing to a want of ammunition to give battle, retired from before the place. Unfortunately, this want of ammunition left him no choice of route for his return but by way of Kanawha. This lost to us the use of his troops for several weeks from the defence of the North.

Had General Hunter moved by way of Charlottesville, instead of Lexington, as his instructions contemplated, he would have been in a position to have covered the Shenandoah Valley against the enemy, should the force he met have seemed to endanger it. If it did not, he would have been within easy distance of the James River Canal, on the main line of communication between Lynchburg and the force sent for its defence. I have never taken exception to the operations of General Hunter, and am not now disposed to find fault with him, for I have no doubt he acted within what he conceived to be the spirit of his instructions and the interests of the service. The promptitude of his movements and his gallantry should entitle him to the commendation of his country.

To return to the Army of the Potomac: The Second Corps commenced crossing the James River on the morning of the 14th by ferry-boats at Wilcox's Landing. The laying of the ponton-bridge was completed about midnight of the 14th, and the crossing of the balance of the army was rapidly pushed forward by both bridge and ferry.

After the crossing had commenced, I proceeded by steamer to Bermuda Hundred to give the necessary orders for the immediate capture of Petersburg.

The instructions to General Butler were verbal, and were for him to send General Smith immediately, that night, with all the troops he could give him without sacrificing the position he then held. I told him that I would return at once to the Army of the Potomac, hasten its crossing, and throw it forward to Petersburg by divisions as rapidly as it could be done; that we could re-enforce our armies more rapidly there than the enemy could bring troops against us. General Smith got off as directed, and confronted the enemy's pickets near Petersburg before daylight next morning, but for some reason, that I have never been able satisfactorily to understand, did not get ready to assault his main lines until near sundown. Then, with a part of his command only, he made the assault, and carried the lines northeast of Petersburg from the Appomattox River, for a distance of over two and a half miles, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery and three hundred prisoners. This was about seven p. m. Between the line thus captured and Petersburg there were no other works, and there was no evidence that the enemy had re-enforced Petersburg with a single brigade from any source. The night was clear—the moon shining brightly—and favorable to further operations. General Hancock, with two divisions of the Second Corps, reached General Smith just after dark, and offered the service of these troops as he (Smith) might wish, waiving rank to the named commander, whom he naturally supposed knew best the position of affairs, and what to do with the troops. But instead of taking these troops, and pushing at once into Petersburg, he requested General Hancock to relieve a part of his line in the captured works, which was done before midnight.

By the time I arrived the next morning the enemy was in force. An attack was ordered to be made at six o'clock that evening by the troops under Smith and the Second and Ninth corps. It required until that time for the Ninth Corps to get up and into position. The attack was made as ordered, and the fighting continued with but little intermission until six o'clock the next morning, and resulted in our carrying the advance and some of the main works of the enemy to the right (our left) of those previously captured by General Smith, several pieces of artillery, and over four hundred prisoners.

The Fifth Corps having got up, the attacks were renewed and persisted in with great vigor on the 17th and 18th, but only resulted in forcing the enemy into an interior line, from which he could not be dislodged. The advantages of position gained by us were very great. The army then proceeded to envelop Petersburg towards the Southside Railroad, as far as possible without attacking fortifications.

On the 6th the enemy, to re-enforce Petersburg, withdrew from a part of his intrenchment in front of Bermuda Hundred, expecting, no doubt, to get troops from north of the James to take the place of those withdrawn before we could discover it. General Butler, taking the advantage of this, at once moved a force on the railroad between Petersburg and Richmond. As soon as I was apprized of the advantage thus gained, to retain it I ordered two divisions of the Sixth Corps, General Wright commanding, that were embarking at Wilcox's Landing, under orders for City Point, to report to General Butler, at Bermuda Hundred, of which General Butler was notified, and the importance of holding a position in advance of his present line urged upon him.

About two o'clock in the afternoon General Butler was forced back to the line the enemy had withdrawn from in the morning. General Wright, with his two divisions, joined General Butler on the forenoon of the 17th, the latter still holding with a strong picket-line the enemy's works. But instead of putting these divisions into the enemy's works to hold them, he permitted them to halt and rest some distance in the rear of his own line. Between four and five o'clock in the afternoon the enemy attacked and drove in his pickets and reoccupied his old line.

On the night of the 20th and morning of the 21st a lodgment was effected by General Butler, with one brigade of infantry, on the north bank of the James, at Deep Bottom, and connected the ponton-bridge with Bermuda Hundred.

On the 19th, General Sheridan, on his return from his expedition against the Virginia Central Railroad, arrived at the White House just as the enemy's cavalry was about to attack it, and compelled it to retire. The result of this expedition was, that General Sheridan met the enemy's cavalry near Trevillian Station, on the morning of the 11th of June, whom he attacked, and after an obstinate contest drove from the field in complete rout. He left his dead and nearly all his wounded in our hands, and about four hundred prisoners and several hundred horses. On the 12th he destroyed the railroad from Trevillian Station to Louisa Courthouse. This occupied until three o'clock p. m., when he advanced in the direction of Gordonsville. He found the enemy re-enforced by infantry, behind well-constructed rifle-pits, about five miles from the latter place, and too strong to successfully assault. On the extreme right, how-

ever, his reserve brigade carried the enemy's works twice, and was twice driven therefrom by infantry. Night closed the contest. Not having sufficient ammunition to continue the engagement, and his animals being without forage (the country furnishing but inferior grazing), and hearing nothing from General Hunter, he withdrew his command to the north side of the North Anna, and commenced his return march, reaching White House at the time before stated. After breaking up the depot at that place, he moved to the James River, which he reached safely after heavy fighting. He commenced crossing on the 25th, near Fort Powhatan, without further molestation, and rejoined the Army of the Potomac.

On the 22d, General Wilson, with his own division of cavalry of the Army of the Potomac, and General Kautz's division of cavalry of the Army of the James, moved against the enemy's railroads south of Richmond. Striking the Weldon Railroad at Ream's Station, destroying the depot and several miles of the road and the Southside road about fifteen miles from Petersburg, to near Nottoway Station, where he met and defeated a force of the enemy's cavalry, he reached Burkesville Station on the afternoon of the 23d, and from there destroyed the Danville Railroad to Roanoke Bridge, a distance of twenty-five miles, where he found the enemy in force, and in a position from which he could not dislodge him. He then commenced his return march, and on the 28th met the enemy's cavalry in force at the Weldon Railroad crossing of Stoney Creek, where he had a severe but not decisive engagement. Thence he made a detour from his left, with a view of reaching Ream's Station (supposing it to be in our possession). At this place he was met by the enemy's cavalry, supported by infantry, and forced to retire, with the loss of his artillery and trains. In this last encounter, General Kautz, with a part of his command, became separated, and made his way into our lines. General Wilson, with the remainder of his force, succeeded in crossing the Nottoway River and coming in safely on our left and rear. The damage to the enemy in this expedition more than compensated for the losses we sustained. It severed all connection by railroad with Richmond for several weeks.

With a view of cutting the enemy's railroad from near Richmond to the Anna Rivers, and making him wary of the situation of his army in the Shenandoah, and, in the event of failure in this, to take advantage of his necessary withdrawal of troops from Petersburg, to explode a mine that had been prepared in front of the Ninth Corps and assault the enemy's lines at that place, on the night of the 26th of July the Second Corps and two divisions of the Cavalry corps and Kautz's cavalry were crossed to the north bank of the James River and joined the force General Butler had there. On the 27th the enemy was driven from his entrenched position, with the loss of four pieces of artillery. On the 28th our lines were extended from Deep Bottom to New Market road, but in getting this position were attacked by the enemy in heavy force. The fighting lasted for several hours, resulting in considerable loss on both sides. The first object of this move having failed, by reason of the very large force thrown there by the enemy, I determined to take advantage of the diversion made by assaulting Petersburg before he could get his force back there. One division of the Second Corps was withdrawn on the night of the 28th, and moved during the night to the rear of the Eighteenth Corps, to relieve that corps in the line, that it might be foot-loose in the assault to be made. The other two divisions of the Second Corps and Sheridan's cavalry were crossed over on the night of the 29th and moved in front of Petersburg. On the morning of the 30th, between four and five o'clock, the mine was sprung, blowing up a battery and most of a regiment, and the advance of the assaulting column, formed of the Ninth Corps, immediately took possession of the crater made by the explosion, and the line for some distance to the right and left of it, and a detached line in front of it, but for some cause failed to advance promptly to the ridge beyond. Had they done this, I have every reason to believe that Petersburg would have fallen. Other troops were immediately pushed forward, but the time consumed in getting them up enabled the enemy to rally from his surprise (which had been complete), and get forces to this point for its defence. The captured line thus held being untenable, and of no advantage to us, the troops were withdrawn, but not without heavy loss. Thus terminated in disaster what promised to be the most successful assault of the campaign.

Immediately upon the enemy's ascertaining that General Hunter was retreating from Lynchburg by the way of Kanawha River, thus laying the Shenandoah Valley open for raids into Maryland and Pennsylvania, he returned northward and moved down that valley. As soon as this movement of the enemy was ascertained, General Hunter, who had reached the Kanawha River, was directed to move his troops without delay, by river and railroad, to Harper's Ferry; but owing to the difficulty of navigation by reason of low water and breaks in the railroad, great delay was experienced in getting there. It became necessary, therefore, to find other troops to check this

movement of the enemy. For this purpose the Sixth Corps was taken from the armies operating against Richmond, to which was added the Nineteenth Corps, then fortunately beginning to arrive in Hampton Roads from the Gulf Department, under orders issued immediately after the ascertainment of the result of the Red River expedition. The garrisons of Baltimore and Washington were at this time made up of heavy-artillery regiments, hundred days' men, and detachments from the invalid corps. One division under command of General Ricketts, of the Sixth Corps, was sent to Baltimore, and the remaining two divisions of the Sixth Corps, under General Wright, were subsequently sent to Washington. On the 3d of July the enemy approached Martinsburg. General Sigel, who was in command of our forces there, retreated across the Potomac at Shephardstown; and General Weber, commanding at Harper's Ferry, crossed the river, and occupied Maryland Heights. On the 6th the enemy occupied Hagerstown, moving a strong column towards Frederick City. General Wallace with Ricketts' division and his own command, the latter mostly new and undisciplined troops, pushed out from Baltimore with great promptness, and met the enemy in force on the Monocacy, near the crossing of the railroad-bridge. His force was not sufficient to insure success, but he fought the enemy nevertheless, and although it resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet it detained the enemy, and thereby served to enable General Wright to reach Washington with two divisions of the Sixth Corps, and the advance of the Nineteenth Corps, before him. From Monocacy the enemy moved on Washington, his cavalry advance reaching Rockville on the evening of the 10th. On the 12th a reconnoissance was thrown out in front of Fort Stevens, to ascertain the enemy's position and force. A severe skirmish ensued, in which we lost about two hundred and eighty in killed and wounded. The enemy's loss was probably greater. He commenced retreating during the night. Learning the exact condition of affairs at Washington, I requested by telegraph, at forty-five minutes past eleven p. m. on the 12th, the assignment of Major-General H. G. Wright to the command of all the troops that could be made available to operate in the field against the enemy, and directed that he should get outside of the trenches with all the force he could, and push Early to the last moment. General Wright commenced the pursuit on the 13th; on the 18th the enemy was overtaken at Snicker's Ferry, on the Shenandoah, when a sharp skirmish occurred; and on the 20th, General Averill encountered and defeated a portion of the rebel army at Winchester, capturing four pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners.

Learning that Early was retreating south towards Lynchburg or Richmond, I directed that the Sixth and Nineteenth corps be got back to the armies operating against Richmond, so that they might be used in a movement against Lee before the return of the troops sent by him into the Valley; and that Hunter should remain in the Shenandoah Valley, keeping between any force of the enemy and Washington, acting on the defensive as much as possible. I felt that if the enemy had any notion of returning, the fact would be developed before the Sixth and Nineteenth corps could leave Washington. Subsequently, the Nineteenth Corps was excepted from the order to return to the James.

About the 25th it became evident that the enemy was again advancing upon Maryland and Pennsylvania, and the Sixth Corps, then at Washington, was ordered back to the vicinity of Harper's Ferry. The rebel force moved down the Valley, and sent a raiding party into Pennsylvania, which, on the 30th, burned Chambersburg, and then retreated, pursued by our cavalry, towards Cumberland. They were met and defeated by General Keily, and with diminished numbers escaped into the mountains of West Virginia. From the time of the first raid the telegraph wires were frequently down between Washington and City Point, making it necessary to transmit messages a part of the way by boat. It took from twenty-four to thirty-six hours to get dispatches through and return answers back; so that often orders would be given, and then information would be received showing a different state of facts from those on which they were based, causing a confusion and apparent contradiction of orders that must have considerably embarrassed those who had to execute them, and rendered operations against the enemy less effective than they otherwise would have been. To remedy this evil, it was evident to my mind that some person should have the supreme command of all the forces in the Departments of West Virginia, Washington, Susquehanna, and the Middle Department, and I so recommended.

On the 2d of August, I ordered General Sheridan to report in person to Major-General Halleck, chief of staff, at Washington, with a view to his assignment to the command of all the forces against Early. At this time the enemy was concentrated in the neighborhood of Winchester, while our forces, under General Hunter, were concentrated on the Monocacy, at the crossing of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, leaving open to the enemy Western Maryland and Southern Pennsylvania. From where I was, I hesitated to give positive orders for the movement of our forces at

Monocacy, lest by so doing I should expose Washington. Therefore, on the 4th, I left City Point to visit Hunter's command, and determine for myself what was best to be done. On arrival there, and after consultation with General Hunter, I issued to him the following instructions:

"MONOCACY BRIDGE, Md., August 5, 1864—8 P. M.

"GENERAL—Concentrate all your available force without delay in the vicinity of Harper's Ferry, leaving only such railroad guards and garrisons for public property as may be necessary. Use, in this concentrating, the railroads, if by so doing time can be saved. From Harper's Ferry, if it is found that the enemy has moved north of the Potomac in large force, push north, following him and attacking him wherever found; follow him, if driven south of the Potomac, as long as it is safe to do so. If it is ascertained that the enemy has but a small force north of the Potomac, then push south with the main force, detaching under a competent commander a sufficient force to look after the raiders, and drive them to their homes. In detaching such a force, the brigade of cavalry now *en route* from Washington *via* Rockville may be taken into account.

"There are now on their way to join you three other brigades of the best cavalry, numbering at least five thousand men and horses. These will be instructed, in the absence of further orders, to join you by the south side of the Potomac. One brigade will probably start to-morrow. In pushing up the Shenandoah Valley, where it is expected you will have to go first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left to invite the enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted for the use of your command; such as cannot be consumed, destroy. It is not desirable that the buildings should be destroyed—they should rather be protected; but the people should be informed that, so long as an army can subsist among them, recurrences of these raids must be expected, and we are determined to stop them at all hazards.

"Bear in mind, the object is to drive the enemy south; and to do this, you want to keep him always in sight. Be guided in your course by the course he takes.

"Make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds, giving regular vouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens in the country through which you march.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL D. HUNTER."

The troops were immediately put in motion, and the advance reached Hallton that night.

General Hunter having, in our conversation, expressed a willingness to be relieved from command, I telegraphed to have General Sheridan, then at Washington, sent to Harper's Ferry by the morning train, with orders to take general command of all the troops in the field, and to call on General Hunter at Monocacy, who would turn over to him my letter of instructions. I remained at Monocacy until General Sheridan arrived, on the morning of the 6th, and, after a conference with him in relation to military affairs in that vicinity, I returned to City Point by way of Washington.

On the 7th of August, the Middle Department, and the Departments of West Virginia, Washington, and Susquehanna were constituted into the "Middle Military Division," and Major-General Sheridan was assigned to temporary command of the same.

Two divisions of cavalry, commanded by Generals Torbert and Wilson, were sent to Sheridan from the Army of the Potomac. The first reached him at Harper's Ferry about the 11th of August.

His operations during the month of August and the fore part of September were both of an offensive and defensive character, resulting in many severe skirmishes, principally by the cavalry, in which we were generally successful, but no general engagement took place. The two armies lay in such a position—the enemy on the west bank of the Opequan Creek covering Winchester, and our forces in front of Berryville—that either could bring on a battle at any time. Defeat to us would lay open to the enemy the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania for long distances before another army could be interposed to check him. Under these circumstances I hesitated about allowing the initiative to be taken. Finally, the use of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, which were both obstructed by the enemy, became so indispensably necessary to us, and the importance of relieving Pennsylvania and Maryland from continuously threatened invasion was so great, that I determined the risk should be taken. But fearing to telegraph the order for an attack without knowing more than I did of General Sheridan's feelings as to what would be the probable result, I left City Point on the 15th of September to visit him at his headquarters, to decide, after conference with him, what should be done. I met him at Charleston, and he pointed out so distinctly how each army lay; what he could do the moment he was authorized, and expressed such confidence of success, that I saw there were but two words of instructions necessary—Go in! For the conveniences of forage, the teams for supplying the army were kept at Harper's Ferry. I asked him if he could get out his teams and supplies in time to make an attack on the ensuing Tuesday morning. His reply was, that he could before daylight on Monday. He was

off promptly to time, and I may here add, that the result was such that I have never since deemed it necessary to visit General Sheridan before giving him orders.

Early on the morning of the 19th, General Sheridan attacked General Early at the crossing at the Opequan Creek, and after a most sanguinary and bloody battle, lasting until five o'clock in the evening, defeated him with heavy loss, carrying his entire position from Opequan Creek to Winchester, capturing several thousand prisoners and five pieces of artillery. The enemy rallied, and made a stand in a strong position at Fisher's Hill, where he was attacked, and again defeated with heavy loss on the 20th. Sheridan pursued him with great energy through Harrisonburg, Staunton, and the gaps of the Blue Ridge. After stripping the upper valley of most of the supplies and provisions for the rebel army, he returned to Strasburg, and took position on the north side of Cedar Creek.

Having received considerable re-enforcements, General Early again returned to the Valley, and, on the 9th of October, his cavalry encountered ours near Strasburg, where the rebels were defeated, with the loss of eleven pieces of artillery and three hundred and fifty prisoners. On the night of the 18th, the enemy crossed the mountains which separated the branches of the Shenandoah, forded the north fork, and early on the morning of the 19th, under cover of the darkness and the fog, surprised and turned our left flank, and captured the batteries which enfiladed our whole line. Our troops fell back with heavy loss and in much confusion, but were finally rallied between Middletown and Newtown. At this juncture, General Sheridan, who was at Winchester when the battle commenced, arrived on the field, arranged his lines just in time to repulse a heavy attack of the enemy, and immediately assuming the offensive, he attacked in turn with great vigor. The enemy was defeated with great slaughter, and the loss of most of his artillery and trains, and the trophies he had captured in the morning. The wreck of his army escaped during the night, and fled in the direction of Staunton and Lynchburg. Pursuit was made to Mount Jackson. Thus ended this, the enemy's last attempt to invade the North *via* the Shenandoah Valley. I was now enabled to return the Sixth Corps to the Army of the Potomac, and to send one division from Sheridan's army to the Army of the James, and another to Savannah, Georgia, to hold Sherman's new acquisitions on the seacoast, and thus enable him to move without detaching from his force for that purpose.

Reports from various sources led me to believe that the enemy had detached three divisions from Petersburg to re-enforce Early in the Shenandoah Valley. I therefore sent the Second Corps and Gregg's division of cavalry, of the Army of the Potomac, and a force of General Butler's army, on the night of the 13th of August, to threaten Richmond from the north side of the James, to prevent him from sending troops away, and, if possible, to draw back those sent. In this move we captured six pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners, detained troops that were under marching orders, and ascertained that but one division (Kershaw's), of the three reputed detached, had gone.

The enemy having withdrawn heavily from Petersburg to resist this movement, the Fifth Corps, General Warren commanding, was moved out on the 15th, and took possession of the Weldon Railroad. During the day he had considerable fighting. To regain possession of the road, the enemy made repeated and desperate assaults, but was each time repulsed with great loss. On the night of the 20th, the troops on the north side of the James were withdrawn, and Hancock and Gregg returned to the front at Petersburg. On the 25th, the Second Corps and Gregg's division of cavalry, while at Ream's Station destroying the railroad, were attacked, and after desperate fighting, a part of our line gave way, and five pieces of artillery fell into the hands of the enemy.

By the 12th of September, a branch railroad was completed from the City Point and Petersburg Railroad to the Weldon Railroad, enabling us to supply, without difficulty, in all weather, the army in front of Petersburg.

The extension of our lines across the Weldon Railroad compelled the enemy to so extend his, that it seemed he could have but few troops north of the James for the defence of Richmond. On the night of the 28th, the Tenth Corps, Major-General Birney, and the Eighteenth Corps, Major-General Ord commanding, of General Butler's army, were crossed to the north side of the James, and advanced on the morning of the 29th, carrying the very strong fortifications and intrenchments below Chapin's Farm, known as Fort Harrison, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery, and the New Market road and intrenchments. This success was followed up by a gallant assault upon Fort Gillmore, immediately in front of the Chapin Farm fortifications, in which we were repulsed with heavy loss. Kautz's cavalry was pushed forward on the road to the right of this, supported by infantry, and reached the enemy's inner line, but was unable to get further. The position captured from the enemy was so threatening to Richmond, that I determined to hold it. The enemy made several desperate at-

tempts to dislodge us, all of which were unsuccessful, and for which he paid dearly. On the morning of the 30th, General Meade sent out a reconnoissance, with a view to attacking the enemy's line, if it was found sufficiently weakened by withdrawal of troops to the north side. In this reconnoissance we captured and held the enemy's works near Poplar Spring Church. In the afternoon, troops moving to get to the left of the point gained were attacked by the enemy in heavy force, and compelled to fall back until supported by the forces holding the captured works. Our cavalry under Gregg was also attacked, but repulsed the enemy with great loss.

On the 7th of October, the enemy attacked Kautz's cavalry north of the James, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery—eight or nine pieces. This he followed up by an attack on our intrenched infantry line, but was repulsed with severe slaughter. On the 13th, a reconnoissance was sent out by General Butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some new works he was constructing, which resulted in very heavy loss to us.

On the 27th, the Army of the Potomac, leaving only sufficient men to hold its fortified line, moved by the enemy's right flank. The Second Corps, followed by two divisions of the Fifth Corps, with the cavalry in advance and covering our left flank, forced a passage of Hatcher's Run, and moved up the south side of it towards the Southside Railroad, until the Second Corps and part of the cavalry reached the Boydton plank-road where it crosses Hatcher's Run. At this point we were six miles distant from the Southside Railroad, which I had hoped by this movement to reach and hold. But finding that we had not reached the end of the enemy's fortifications, and no place presenting itself for a successful assault by which he might be doubled up and shortened, I determined to withdraw to within our fortified line. Orders were given accordingly. Immediately upon receiving a report that General Warren had connected with General Hancock, I returned to my headquarters. Soon after I left, the enemy moved out across Hatcher's Run, in the gap between Generals Hancock and Warren, which was not closed as reported, and made a desperate attack on General Hancock's right and rear. General Hancock immediately faced his corps to meet it, and after a bloody combat drove the enemy within his works, and withdrew that night to his old position.

In support of this movement, General Butler made a demonstration on the north side of the James, and attacked the enemy on the Williamsburg Road, and also on the York River Railroad. In the former he was unsuccessful; in the latter he succeeded in carrying a work which was afterwards abandoned, and his forces withdrawn to their former positions.

From this time forward the operations in front of Petersburg and Richmond, until the spring campaign of 1865, were confined to the defence and extension of our lines, and to offensive movements for crippling the enemy's lines of communication, and to prevent his detaching any considerable force to send south. By the 7th of February, our lines were extended to Hatcher's Run, and the Weldon Railroad had been destroyed to Hicksford.

General Sherman moved from Chattanooga on the 6th of May, with the Armies of the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Ohio, commanded, respectively, by Generals Thomas, McPherson, and Schofield, upon Johnston's army at Dalton; but finding the enemy's positions at Buzzard Roost, covering Dalton, too strong to be assaulted, General McPherson was sent through Snake Gap to turn it, whilst Generals Thomas and Schofield threatened it in front and on the north. This movement was successful. Johnston, finding his retreat likely to be cut off, fell back to his fortified position at Resaca, where he was attacked on the afternoon of May 15th. A heavy battle ensued. During the night the enemy retreated south. Late on the 17th, his rear-guard was overtaken near Adairsville, and heavy skirmishing followed. The next morning, however, he had again disappeared. He was vigorously pursued, and was overtaken at Cassville on the 19th, but during the ensuing night retreated across the Etowah. Whilst these operations were going on, General Jefferson C. Davis's division of Thomas's army was sent to Rome, capturing it with its forts and artillery, and its valuable mills and foundries. General Sherman, having given his army a few days' rest at this point, again put it in motion on the 23d, for Dallas, with a view of turning the difficult pass at Allatoona. On the afternoon of the 25th, the advance, under General Hooker, had a severe battle with the enemy, driving him back to New Hope Church, near Dallas. Several sharp encounters occurred at this point. The most important was on the 28th, when the enemy assaulted General McPherson at Dallas, but received a terrible and bloody repulse.

On the 4th of June, Johnston abandoned his intrenched position at New Hope Church, and retreated to the strong positions of Kenesaw, Pine, and Lost mountains. He was forced to yield the two last-named places, and concentrate his army at Kenesaw, where, on the 27th, Generals Thomas and McPherson made a determined but unsuccessful assault. On the night of the 2d of July, Sherman commenced moving

his army by the right flank, and on the morning of the 3d, found that the enemy, in consequence of this movement, had abandoned Kenesaw and retreated across the Chattahoochee.

General Sherman remained on the Chattahoochee to give his men rest and get up stores until the 17th of July, when he resumed his operations, crossed the Chattahoochee, destroyed a large portion of the railroad to Augusta, and drove the enemy back to Atlanta. At this place General Hood succeeded General Johnston in command of the rebel army, and, assuming the offensive-defensive policy, made several severe attacks upon Sherman in the vicinity of Atlanta, the most desperate and determined of which was on the 22d of July. About 1 p. m. of this day the brave, accomplished, and noble-hearted McPherson was killed. General Logan succeeded him, and commanded the Army of the Tennessee through this desperate battle, and until he was superseded by Major-General Howard, on the 26th, with the same success and ability that had characterized him in the command of a corps or division.

In all these attacks the enemy was repulsed with great loss. Finding it impossible to entirely invest the place, General Sherman, after securing his line of communications across the Chattahoochee, moved his main force round by the enemy's left flank upon the Montgomery and Macon roads, to draw the enemy from his fortifications. In this he succeeded, and, after defeating the enemy near Rough-and-Ready, Jonesboro', and Lovejoy's, forcing him to retreat to the south, on the 2d of September occupied Atlanta, the objective point of this campaign.

About the time of this move, the rebel cavalry, under Wheeler, attempted to cut his communications in the rear, but was repulsed at Dalton, and driven into East Tennessee, whence it proceeded west to McMinnville, Murfreesboro', and Franklin, and was finally driven south of the Tennessee. The damage done by this raid was repaired in a few days.

During the partial investment of Atlanta, General Rousseau joined General Sherman with a force of cavalry from Decatur, having made a successful raid upon the Atlanta and Montgomery Railroad, and its branches near Opelika. Cavalry raids were also made by Generals McCook, Garrard, and Stoneman, to cut the remaining railroad communication with Atlanta. The first two were successful—the latter, disastrous.

General Sherman's movement from Chattanooga to Atlanta was prompt, skilful, and brilliant. The history of his flank movements and battles during that memorable campaign will ever be read with an interest unsurpassed by any thing in history.

His own report, and those of his subordinate commanders, accompanying it, give the details of that most successful campaign.

He was dependent for the supply of his armies upon a single-track railroad from Nashville to the point where he was operating. This passed the entire distance through a hostile country, and every foot of it had to be protected by troops. The cavalry force of the enemy under Forrest, in Northern Mississippi, was evidently waiting for Sherman to advance far enough into the mountains of Georgia to make a retreat disastrous, to get upon his line and destroy it beyond the possibility of further use. To guard against this danger, Sherman left what he supposed to be a sufficient force to operate against Forrest in West Tennessee. He directed General Washburn, who commanded there, to send Brigadier-General S. D. Sturgis in command of this force to attack him. On the morning of the 10th of June, General Sturgis met the enemy near Guntown, Mississippi, was badly beaten, and driven back in utter rout and confusion to Memphis, a distance of about one hundred miles, hotly pursued by the enemy. By this, however, the enemy was defeated in his designs upon Sherman's line of communications. The persistency with which he followed up his success exhausted him, and made a season for rest and repairs necessary. In the mean time, Major-General A. J. Smith, with the troops of the Army of the Tennessee that had been sent by General Sherman to General Banks, arrived at Memphis on their return from Red River, where they had done most excellent service. He was directed by General Sherman to immediately take the offensive against Forrest. This he did with the promptness and effect which has characterized his whole military career. On the 14th of July, he met the enemy at Tupelo, Mississippi, and whipped him badly. The fighting continued through three days. Our loss was small compared with that of the enemy. Having accomplished the object of his expedition, General Smith returned to Memphis.

During the months of March and April this same force under Forrest annoyed us considerably. On the 24th of March it captured Union City, Kentucky, and its garrison, and on the 24th, attacked Paducah, commanded by Colonel S. G. Hicks, Fortieth Illinois Volunteers. Colonel H., having but a small force, withdrew to the forts near the river, from where he repulsed the enemy and drove him from the place.

On the 18th of April, part of this force, under the rebel General Buford, summoned the garrison of Columbus, Kentucky, to surrender, but received for reply from Colonel

Lawrence, Thirty-fourth New Jersey Volunteers, that, being placed there by his Government, with adequate force to hold his post and repel all enemies from it, surrender was out of the question.

On the morning of the same day Forrest attacked Fort Pillow, Tennessee, garrisoned by a detachment of Tennessee cavalry and the First Regiment Alabama colored troops, commanded by Major Booth. The garrison fought bravely until about three o'clock in the afternoon, when the enemy carried the works by assault; and, after our men threw down their arms, proceeded to an inhuman and merciless massacre of the garrison.

On the 14th, General Buford, having failed at Columbus, appeared before Paducah, but was again driven off.

Guerrillas and raiders, seemingly emboldened by Forrest's operations, were also very active in Kentucky. The most noted of these was Morgan. With a force of from two to three thousand cavalry, he entered the State through Pound Gap in the latter part of May. On the 11th of June, he attacked and captured Cynthiana, with its entire garrison. On the 12th, he was overtaken by General Burbridge, and completely routed, with heavy loss, and was finally driven out of the State. This notorious guerrilla was afterwards surprised and killed near Greenville, Tennessee, and his command captured and dispersed by General Gillem.

In the absence of official reports at the commencement of the Red River expedition, except so far as relates to the movements of the troops sent by General Sherman under A. J. Smith, I am unable to give the date of its starting. The troops under General Smith, comprising two divisions of the Sixteenth and a detachment of the Seventeenth Army Corps, left Vicksburg on the 10th of March, and reached the designated point on Red River one day earlier than that appointed by General Banks. The rebel forces at Fort de Russey, thinking to defeat him, left the fort on the 14th to give him battle in the open field; but, while occupying the enemy with skirmishing and demonstrations, Smith pushed forward to Fort de Russey, which had been left with a weak garrison, and captured it with its garrison—about three hundred and fifty men, eleven pieces of artillery, and many small arms. Our loss was but slight. On the 15th, he pushed forward to Alexandria, which place he reached on the 18th. On the 21st, he had an engagement with the enemy at Henderson Hill, in which he defeated him, capturing two hundred and ten prisoners and four pieces of artillery.

On the 28th, he again attacked and defeated the enemy under the rebel General Taylor, at Cane River. By the 26th, General Banks had assembled his whole army at Alexandria, and pushed forward to Grand Ecore. On the morning of April 6th he moved from Grand Ecore. On the afternoon of the 7th, his advance engaged the enemy near Pleasant Hill, and drove him from the field. On the same afternoon the enemy made a stand eight miles beyond Pleasant Hill, but was again compelled to retreat. On the 8th, at Sabine Cross Roads and Peach Hill, the enemy attacked and defeated his advance, capturing nineteen pieces of artillery and an immense amount of transportation and stores. During the night, General Banks fell back to Pleasant Hill, where another battle was fought on the 9th, and the enemy repulsed with great loss. During the night, General Banks continued his retrograde movement to Grand Ecore, and thence to Alexandria, which he reached on the 27th of April. Here a serious difficulty arose in getting Admiral Porter's fleet, which accompanied the expedition, over the rapids, the water having fallen so much since they passed up as to prevent their return. At the suggestion of Colonel (now Brigadier-General) Bailey, and under his superintendence, wing-dams were constructed, by which the channel was contracted so that the fleet passed down the rapids in safety.

The army evacuated Alexandria on the 14th of May, after considerable skirmishing with the enemy's advance, and reached Morganzia and Point Coupée near the end of the month. The disastrous termination of this expedition, and the lateness of the season, rendered impracticable the carrying out of my plan of a movement in force sufficient to insure the capture of Mobile.

On the 23d of March, Major-General Steele left Little Rock with the Seventh Army Corps, to co-operate with General Banks' expedition on Red River, and reached Arkadelphia on the 28th. On the 16th of April, after driving the enemy before him, he was joined, near Elkin's Ferry, in Washita County, by General Thayer, who had marched from Fort Smith. After several severe skirmishes, in which the enemy was defeated, General Steele reached Camden, which he occupied about the middle of April.

On learning the defeat and consequent retreat of General Banks on Red River, and the loss of one of his own trains at Mark's Mill, in Dallas County, General Steele determined to fall back to the Arkansas River. He left Camden on the 26th of April, and reached Little Rock on the 2d of May. On the 30th of April, the enemy attacked him while crossing Saline River at Jenkins' Ferry, but was repulsed with considerable loss. Our loss was about six hundred in killed, wounded, and prisoners.

Major-General Canby, who had been assigned to the command of the "Military Division of the West Mississippi," was therefore directed to send the Nineteenth Army Corps to join the armies operating against Richmond, and to limit the remainder of his command to such operations as might be necessary to hold the positions and lines of communications he then occupied.

Before starting General A. J. Smith's troops back to Sherman, General Canby sent a part of it to disperse a force of the enemy that was collecting near the Mississippi River. General Smith met and defeated this force near Lake Chicot on the 5th of June. Our loss was about forty killed and seventy wounded.

In the latter part of July, General Canby sent Major-General Gordon Granger, with such forces as he could collect, to co-operate with Admiral Farragut against the defences of Mobile Bay. On the 8th of August, Fort Gaines surrendered to the combined naval and land forces. Fort Powell was blown up and abandoned.

On the 9th, Fort Morgan was invested, and, after a severe bombardment, surrendered on the 23d. The total captures amounted to one thousand four hundred and sixty-four prisoners, and one hundred and four pieces of artillery.

About the last of August, it being reported that the rebel General Price, with a force of about ten thousand men, had reached Jacksonport, on his way to invade Missouri, General A. J. Smith's command, then *en route* from Memphis to join Sherman, was ordered to Missouri. A cavalry force was also, at the same time, sent from Memphis, under command of Colonel Winslow. This made General Rosecrans' forces superior to those of Price, and no doubt was entertained he would be able to check Price and drive him back; while the forces under General Steele, in Arkansas, would cut off his retreat. On the 26th day of September, Price attacked Pilot Knob and forced the garrison to retreat, and thence moved north to the Missouri River, and continued up that river towards Kansas. General Curtis, commanding department of Kansas, immediately collected such forces as he could to repel the invasion of Kansas, while General Rosecrans' cavalry was operating in his rear.

The enemy was brought to battle on the Big Blue and defeated, with the loss of nearly all his artillery and trains and a large number of prisoners. He made a precipitate retreat to Northern Arkansas. The impunity with which Price was enabled to roam over the State of Missouri for a long time, and the incalculable mischief done by him, shows to how little purpose a superior force may be used. There is no reason why General Rosecrans should not have concentrated his forces, and beaten and driven Price before the latter reached Pilot Knob.

September 20th, the enemy's cavalry, under Forrest, crossed the Tennessee near Waterloo, Alabama, and on the 23d attacked the garrison at Athens, consisting of six hundred men, which capitulated on the 24th. Soon after the surrender two regiments of re-enforcements arrived, and after a severe fight were compelled to surrender. Forrest destroyed the railroad westward, captured the garrison at Sulphur Branch trestle, skirmished with the garrison at Pulaski on the 27th, and on the same day cut the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad near Tullahoma and Dechard. On the morning of the 30th, one column of Forrest's command, under Buford, appeared before Huntsville, and summoned the surrender of the garrison. Receiving an answer in the negative, he remained in the vicinity of the place until next morning, when he again summoned its surrender, and received the same reply as on the night before. He withdrew in the direction of Athens, which place had been regarrisoned, and attacked it on the afternoon of the 1st of October, but without success. On the morning of the 2d he renewed his attack, but was handsomely repulsed.

Another column under Forrest appeared before Columbia on the morning of the 1st, but did not make an attack. On the morning of the 3d he moved towards Mount Pleasant. While these operations were going on, every exertion was made by General Thomas to destroy the forces under Forrest before he could recross the Tennessee, but was unable to prevent his escape to Corinth, Mississippi.

In September, an expedition under General Burbridge was sent to destroy the salt-works at Saltville, Virginia. He met the enemy on the 2d of October, about three miles and a half from Saltville, and drove him into his strongly intrenched position around the salt-works, from which he was unable to dislodge him. During the night he withdrew his command and returned to Kentucky.

General Sherman, immediately after the fall of Atlanta, put his armies in camp in and about the place, and made all preparations for refitting and supplying them for future service. The great length of road from Atlanta to the Cumberland River, however, which had to be guarded, allowed the troops but little rest.

During this time Jefferson Davis made a speech in Macon, Georgia, which was reported in the papers of the South, and soon became known to the whole country, disclosing the plans of the enemy, thus enabling General Sherman to fully meet them. He exhibited the weakness of supposing that an army that had been beaten and

fearfully decimated in a vain attempt at the defensive, could successfully undertake the offensive against the army that had so often defeated it.

In execution of this plan, Hood, with his army, was soon reported to the southwest of Atlanta. Moving far to Sherman's right, he succeeded in reaching the railroad about Big Shanty, and moved north on it.

General Sherman, leaving a force to hold Atlanta, with the remainder of his army fell upon him and drove him to Gadston, Alabama. Seeing the constant annoyance he would have with the roads to his rear if he attempted to hold Atlanta, General Sherman proposed the abandonment and destruction of that place, with all the railroads leading to it, and telegraphed me as follows :

"CENTREVILLE, Ga., October 10—noon.

"Dispatch about Wilson just received. Hood is now crossing Coosa River, twelve miles below Rome, bound west. If he passes the Mobile and Ohio road, had I not better execute the plan of my letter sent by Colonel Porter, and leave General Thomas, with the troops now in Tennessee, to defend the State? He will have an ample force when the re-enforcements ordered reach Nashville.

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT."

For a full understanding of the plan referred to in this dispatch, I quote from the letter sent by Colonel Porter: "I will therefore give my opinion, that your army and Canby's should be re-enforced to the maximum; that after you get Wilmington, you strike for Savannah and the river; that Canby be instructed to hold the Mississippi River, and send a force to get Columbus, Georgia, either by the way of the Alabama or the Appalachicola, and that I keep Hood employed and put my army in final order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston, to be ready as soon as Wilmington is sealed as to commerce, and the city of Savannah is in our possession." This was in reply to a letter of mine of date September 12th, in answer to a dispatch of his containing substantially the same proposition, and in which I informed him of a proposed movement against Wilmington, and of the situation in Virginia, etc.

"CITY POINT, Va., October 11, 1864—11 A. M.

"Your dispatch of October 10th received. Does it not look as if Hood was going to attempt the invasion of Middle Tennessee, using the Mobile and Ohio and Memphis and Charleston roads to supply his base on the Tennessee River, about Florence or Decatur? If he does this, he ought to be met and prevented from getting north of the Tennessee River. If you were to cut loose, I do not believe you would meet Hood's army, but would be bushwhacked by all the old men and little boys, and such railroad-guards as are still left at home. Hood would probably strike for Nashville, thinking that by going north he could inflict greater damage upon us than we could upon the rebels by going south. If there is any way of getting at Hood's army, I would prefer that; but, I must trust to your own judgment. I find I shall not be able to send a force from here to act with you on Savannah. Your movements, therefore, will be independent of mine; at least until the fall of Richmond takes place. I am afraid Thomas, with such lines of road as he has to protect, could not prevent Hood from going north. With Wilson turned loose, with all your cavalry, you will find the rebels put much more on the defensive than heretofore.

"MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN."

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

KINGSTON, Ga., October 11—11 A. M.

"Hood moved his army from Palmetto Station across by Dallas and Cedartown, and is now on the Coosa River, south of Rome. He threw one corps on my road at Acworth, and I was forced to follow. I hold Atlanta with the Twentieth Corps, and have strong detachments along my line. This reduces my active force to a comparatively small army. We cannot remain here on the defensive. With the twenty-five thousand men, and the bold cavalry he has, he can constantly break my roads. I would infinitely prefer to make a wreck of the road, and of the country from Chattanooga to Atlanta, including the latter city—send back all my wounded and worthless, and with my effective army, move through Georgia, smashing things, to the sea. Hood may turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I believe he will be forced to follow me. Instead of my being on the defensive, I would be on the offensive; instead of guessing at what he means to do, he would have to guess at my plans. The difference in war is full twenty-five per cent. I can make Savannah, Charleston, or the mouth of the Chattahoochee.

"Answer quick, as I know we will not have the telegraph long.

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT."

CITY POINT, Va., October 11, 1864—11:30 P. M.

"Your dispatch of to-day received. If you are satisfied the trip to the seacoast can be made, holding the line of the Tennessee River firmly, you may make it, destroying all the railroad south of Dalton or Chattanooga, as you think best.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN,"

It was the original design to hold Atlanta, and by getting through to the coast, with a garrison left on the southern railroads, leading east and west, through Georgia, to effectually sever the east from the west. In other words, cut the would-be Confederacy in two again, as it had been cut once by our gaining possession of the Mississippi River. General Sherman's plan virtually effected this object.

General Sherman commenced at once his preparations for his proposed movement, keeping his army in position in the mean time to watch Hood. Becoming satisfied that Hood had moved westward from Gadsden across Sand Mountain, General Sherman sent the Fourth Corps, Major-General Stanley commanding, and the Twenty-third Corps, Major-General Schofield commanding, back to Chattanooga to report to Major-General Thomas, at Nashville, whom he had placed in command of all the troops of his military division, save the four army corps and cavalry division he designed to move with through Georgia. With the troops thus left at his disposal, there was little doubt that General Thomas could hold the line of the Tennessee, or, in the event Hood should force it, would be able to concentrate and beat him in battle. It was therefore readily consented to that Sherman should start for the seacoast.

Having concentrated his troops at Atlanta by the 14th of November, he commenced his march, threatening both Augusta and Macon. His coming-out point could not be definitely fixed. Having to gather his subsistence as he marched through the country, it was not impossible that a force inferior to his own might compel him to head for such point as he could reach, instead of such as he might prefer. The blindness of the enemy, however, in ignoring his movement, and sending Hood's army, the only considerable force he had west of Richmond and east of the Mississippi River, northward on an offensive campaign, left the whole country open, and Sherman's route to his own choice.

How that campaign was conducted, how little opposition was met with, the condition of the country through which the armies passed, the capture of Fort McAllister, on the Savannah River, and the occupation of Savannah on the 21st of December, are all clearly set forth in General Sherman's admirable report.

Soon after General Sherman commenced his march from Atlanta, two expeditions, one from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and one from Vicksburg, Mississippi, were started by General Canby to cut the enemy's line of communication with Mobile and detain troops in that field. General Foster, commanding Department of the South, also sent an expedition, *via* Broad River, to destroy the railroad between Charleston and Savannah. The expedition from Vicksburg, under command of brevet Brigadier-General E. D. Osband (colonel Third United States colored cavalry), captured, on the 27th of November, and destroyed the Mississippi Central railroad-bridge and trestle-work over Big Black River, near Canton, thirty miles of the road, and two locomotives, besides large amounts of stores. The expedition from Baton Rouge was without favorable results. The expedition from the Department of the South, under the immediate command of Brigadier-General John P. Hatch, consisting of about five thousand men of all arms, including a brigade from the navy, proceeded up Broad River and debarked at Boyd's Neck on the 29th of November, from where it moved to strike the railroad at Grahamsville. At Honey Hill, about three miles from Grahamsville, the enemy was found and attacked in a strongly fortified position, which resulted, after severe fighting, in our repulse with a loss of seven hundred and forty-six in killed, wounded, and missing. During the night, General Hatch withdrew. On the 6th of December, General Foster obtained a position covering the Charleston and Savannah Railroad, between the Coosawhatchie and Talifinny rivers.

Hood, instead of following Sherman, continued his move northward, which seemed to me to be leading to his certain doom. At all events, had I had the power to command both armies, I should not have changed the orders under which he seemed to be acting. On the 26th of October, the advance of Hood's army attacked the garrison at Decatur, Alabama, but failing to carry the place, withdrew towards Courtland, and succeeded, in the face of our cavalry, in effecting a lodgment on the north side of the Tennessee River, near Florence. On the 28th, Forrest reached the Tennessee, at Fort Hieman, and captured a gunboat and three transports. On the 2d of November he planted batteries above and below Johnsonville, on the opposite side of the river, isolating three gunboats and eight transports. On the 4th the enemy opened his batteries upon the place, and was replied to from the gunboats and the garrison. The gunboats becoming disabled were set on fire, as also were the transports, to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. About a million and a half dollars' worth of stores and property on the levee and in storehouses was consumed by fire. On the 5th the enemy disappeared and crossed to the north side of the Tennessee River, above Johnsonville, moving towards Clifton, and subsequently joined Hood. On the night of the 5th, General Schofield, with the advance of the Twenty-third Corps, reached Johnsonville, but finding the enemy gone, was ordered to Pulaski, and put

in command of all the troops there, with instructions to watch the movements of Hood and retard his advance, but not to risk a general engagement until the arrival of General A. J. Smith's command from Missouri, and until General Wilson could get his cavalry remounted.

On the 19th, General Hood continued his advance. General Thomas, retarding him as much as possible, fell back towards Nashville for the purpose of concentrating his command and gaining time for the arrival of re-enforcements. The enemy coming up with our main force, commanded by General Schofield, at Franklin, on the 20th, assaulted our works repeatedly during the afternoon until late at night, but were in every instance repulsed. His loss in this battle was one thousand seven hundred and fifty killed, seven hundred and two prisoners, and three thousand eight hundred wounded. Among his losses were six general officers killed, six wounded, and one captured. Our entire loss was two thousand three hundred. This was the first serious opposition the enemy met with, and I am satisfied was the fatal blow to all his expectations. During the night, General Schofield fell back towards Nashville. This left the field to the enemy—not lost by battle, but voluntarily abandoned—so that General Thomas's whole force might be brought together. The enemy followed up and commenced the establishment of his line in front of Nashville on the 2d of December.

As soon as it was ascertained that Hood was crossing the Tennessee River, and that Price was going out of Missouri, General Rosecrans was ordered to send to General Thomas the troops of General A. J. Smith's command, and such other troops as he could spare. The advance of this re-enforcement reached Nashville on the 30th of November.

On the morning of the 15th December, General Thomas attacked Hood in position, and, in a battle lasting two days, defeated and drove him from the field in the utmost confusion, leaving in our hands most of his artillery and many thousand prisoners, including four general officers.

Before the battle of Nashville I grew very impatient over, as it appeared to me, the unnecessary delay. This impatience was increased upon learning that the enemy had sent a force of cavalry across the Cumberland into Kentucky. I feared Hood would cross his whole army and give us great trouble there. After urging upon General Thomas the necessity of immediately assuming the offensive, I started West to superintend matters there in person. Reaching Washington City, I received General Thomas's dispatch announcing his attack upon the enemy, and the result as far as the battle had progressed. I was delighted. All fears and apprehensions were dispelled. I am not yet satisfied but that General Thomas, immediately upon the appearance of Hood before Nashville, and before he had time to fortify, should have moved out with his whole force and given him battle, instead of waiting to remount his cavalry, which delayed him until the inelucency of the weather made it impracticable to attack earlier than he did. But his final defeat of Hood was so complete, that it will be accepted as a vindication of that distinguished officer's judgment.

After Hood's defeat at Nashville he retreated, closely pursued by cavalry and infantry, to the Tennessee River, being forced to abandon many pieces of artillery and most of his transportation. On the 28th of December our advanced forces ascertained that he had made good his escape to the south side of the river.

About this time, the rains having set in heavily in Tennessee and North Alabama, making it difficult to move army transportation and artillery, General Thomas stopped the pursuit by his main force at the Tennessee River. A small force of cavalry, under Colonel W. J. Palmer, Fifteenth Pennsylvania Volunteers, continued to follow Hood for some distance, capturing considerable transportation and the enemy's ponton-bridge. The details of these operations will be found clearly set forth in General Thomas's report.

A cavalry expedition, under brevet Major-General Grierson, started from Memphis on the 21st of December. On the 25th he surprised and captured Forrest's dismounted camp at Verona, Mississippi, on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, destroyed the railroad, sixteen cars loaded with wagons and pontons for Hood's army, four thousand new English carbines, and large amounts of public stores. On the morning of the 28th he attacked and captured a force of the enemy at Egypt, and destroyed a train of fourteen cars; thence turning to the southwest, he struck the Mississippi Central Railroad at Winona, destroyed the factories and large amounts of stores at Bankston, and the machine-shops and public property at Grenada, arriving at Vicksburg January 5th.

During these operations in Middle Tennessee, the enemy, with a force under General Breckinridge, entered East Tennessee. On the 13th of November he attacked General Gillem, near Morristown, capturing his artillery and several hundred prisoners. Gillem, with what was left of his command, retreated to Knoxville. Following

up his success, Breckinridge moved to near Knoxville, but withdrew on the 18th, followed by General Ammen. Under the directions of General Thomas, General Stoneman concentrated the commands of Generals Burbridge and Gillem near Bean's Station, to operate against Breckinridge, and destroy or drive him into Virginia—destroy the salt-works at Saltville, and the railroad into Virginia as far as he could go without endangering his command. On the 12th of December he commenced his movement, capturing and dispersing the enemy's forces wherever he met them. On the 16th he struck the enemy, under Vauqn, at Marion, completely routing and pursuing him to Wytheville, capturing all his artillery, trains, and one hundred and ninety-eight prisoners; and destroyed Wytheville, with its stores and supplies, and the extensive lead-works near there. Returning to Marion, he met a force under Breckinridge, consisting, among other troops, of the garrison of Saltville, that had started in pursuit. He at once made arrangements to attack it the next morning; but morning found Breckinridge gone. He then moved directly to Saltville, and destroyed the extensive salt-works at that place, a large amount of stores, and captured eight pieces of artillery. Having thus successfully executed his instructions, he returned General Burbridge to Lexington and General Gillem to Knoxville.

Wilmington, North Carolina, was the most important seacoast port left to the enemy through which to get supplies from abroad, and send cotton and other products out by blockade-runners, besides being a place of great strategic value. The navy had been making strenuous exertions to seal the harbor of Wilmington, but with only partial effect. The nature of the outlet of Cape Fear River was such, that it required watching for so great a distance that, without possession of the land north of New Inlet, or Fort Fisher, it was impossible for the navy to entirely close the harbor against the entrance of blockade-runners.

To secure the possession of this land required the co-operation of a land force, which I agreed to furnish. I immediately commenced the assemblage in Hampton Roads, under Admiral D. D. Porter, of the most formidable armada ever collected for concentration upon one given point. This necessarily attracted the attention of the enemy, as well as that of the loyal North; and through the imprudence of the public press, and very likely of officers of both branches of service, the exact object of the expedition became a subject of common discussion in the newspapers both North and South. The enemy, thus warned, prepared to meet it. This caused a postponement of the expedition until the latter part of November, when, being again called upon by Hon. G. V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, I agreed to furnish the men required at once, and went myself, in company with Major-General Butler, to Hampton Roads, where we had a conference with Admiral Porter as to the force required and the time of starting. A force of six thousand five hundred men was regarded as sufficient. The time of starting was not definitely arranged, but it was thought all would be ready by the 6th of December, if not before. Learning, on the 30th of November, that Bragg had gone to Georgia, taking with him most of the forces about Wilmington, I deemed it of the utmost importance that the expedition should reach its destination before the return of Bragg, and directed General Butler to make all arrangements for the departure of Major-General Weitzel, who had been designated to command the land forces, so that the navy might not be detained one moment.

On the 6th of December, the following instructions were given:

"CITY POINT, Va., December 6, 1864.

"GENERAL—The first object of the expedition under General Weitzel is to close to the enemy the port of Wilmington. If successful in this, the second will be to capture Wilmington itself. There are reasonable grounds to hope for success, if advantage can be taken of the absence of the greater part of the enemy's forces now looking after Sherman in Georgia. The directions you have given for the numbers and equipment of the expedition are all right, except in the unimportant matter of where they embark and the amount of intrenching tools to be taken. The object of the expedition will be gained by effecting a landing on the main land between Cape Fear River and the Atlantic, north of the north entrance to the river. Should such landing be effected whilst the enemy still holds Fort Fisher and the batteries guarding the entrance to the river, then the troops should intrench themselves, and, by co-operating with the navy, effect the reduction and capture of those places. These in our hands, the navy could enter the harbor, and the port of Wilmington would be sealed. Should Fort Fisher and the point of land on which it is built fall into the hands of our troops immediately on landing, then it will be worth the attempt to capture Wilmington by a forced march and surprise. If time is consumed in gaining the first object of the expedition, the second will become a matter of after-consideration.

"The details for execution are intrusted to you and the officer immediately in command of the troops.

"Should the troops under General Weitzel fail to effect a landing at or near Fort Fisher, they will be returned to the armies operating against Richmond without delay.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL B. F. BUTLER."

General Butler commanding the army from which the troops were taken for this enterprise, and the territory within which they were to operate, military courtesy required that all orders and instructions should go through him. They were so sent; but General Weitzel has since officially informed me that he never received the foregoing instructions, nor was he aware of their existence, until he read General Butler's published official report of the Fort Fisher failure, with my indorsement and papers accompanying it. I had no idea of General Butler's accompanying the expedition until the evening before it got off from Bermuda Hundred, and then did not dream but that General Weitzel had received all the instructions, and would be in command. I rather formed the idea that General Butler was actuated by a desire to witness the effect of the explosion of the powder-boat. The expedition was detained several days at Hampton Roads, awaiting the loading of the powder-boat.

The importance of getting the Wilmington expedition off without any delay, with or without the powder-boat, had been urged upon General Butler, and he advised to so notify Admiral Porter.

The expedition finally got off on the 13th of December, and arrived at the place of rendezvous, off New Inlet, near Fort Fisher, on the evening of the 15th. Admiral Porter arrived on the evening of the 18th, having put in at Beaufort to get ammunition for the monitors. The sea becoming rough, making it difficult to land troops, and the supply of water and coal being about exhausted, the transport fleet put back to Beaufort to replenish; this, with the state of the weather, delayed the return to the place of rendezvous until the 25th. The powder-boat was exploded on the morning of the 24th, before the return of General Butler from Beaufort; but it would seem, from the notice taken of it in the Southern newspapers, that the enemy were never enlightened as to the object of the explosion until they were informed by the Northern press.

On the 25th a landing was effected without opposition, and a reconnoissance, under brevet Brigadier-General Curtis, pushed up towards the fort. But before receiving a full report of the result of this reconnoissance, General Butler, in direct violation of the instructions given, ordered the re-embarkation of the troops and the return of the expedition. The re-embarkation was accomplished by the morning of the 27th.

On the return of the expedition, officers and men—among them brevet Major-General (then brevet Brigadier-General) M. R. Curtis, First-Lieutenant G. W. Ross, — regiment Vermont Volunteers, First-Lieutenant George W. Walling, and Second-Lieutenant George Simpson, One Hundred and Forty-second New York Volunteers—voluntarily reported to me that when recalled they were nearly into the fort, and, in their opinion, it could have been effected without much loss.

Soon after the return of the expedition, I received a dispatch from the Secretary of the Navy, and a letter from Admiral Porter, informing me that the fleet was still off Fort Fisher, and expressing the conviction that, under a proper leader, the place could be taken. The natural supposition with me was, that when the troops abandoned the expedition, the navy would do so also. Finding it had not, however, I answered on the 30th of December, advising Admiral Porter to hold on, and that I would send a force and make another attempt to take the place. This time I selected brevet Major-General (now Major-General) A. H. Terry to command the expedition. The troops composing it consisted of the same that composed the former, with the addition of a small brigade, numbering about one thousand five hundred, and a small siege-train. The latter it was never found necessary to land. I communicated direct to the commander of the expedition the following instructions:

"CITY POINT, Va., January 3, 1865.

"GENERAL—The expedition intrusted to your command has been fitted out to renew the attempt to capture Fort Fisher, N. C., and Wilmington ultimately, if the fort falls. You will then proceed with as little delay as possible to the naval fleet lying off Cape Fear River, and report the arrival of yourself and command to Admiral D. D. Porter, commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron.

"It is exceedingly desirable that the most complete understanding should exist between yourself and the naval commander. I suggest, therefore, that you consult with Admiral Porter freely, and get from him the part to be performed by each branch of the public service, so that there may be unity of action. It would be well to have the whole programme laid down in writing. I have served with Admiral Porter, and know that you can rely on his judgment and his nerve to undertake what he proposes. I would, therefore, defer to him as much as is consistent with your own responsibilities. The first object to be attained is to get a firm position on the spit of land on which Fort Fisher is built, from which you can operate against that fort. You want to look to the practicability of receiving your supplies, and to defending yourself against superior forces sent against you by any of the avenues left open to the enemy. If such a position can be obtained, the siege of Fort Fisher will not be abandoned until its reduction is accomplished, or another plan of campaign is ordered from these headquarters.

"My own views are, that, if you effect a landing, the navy ought to run a portion of their fleet

into Cape Fear River, while the balance of it operates on the outside. Land forces cannot invest Fort Fisher, or cut it off from supplies or re-enforcements, while the river is in possession of the enemy.

"A siege-train will be loaded on vessels and sent to Fort Monroe, in readiness to be sent to you if required. All other supplies can be drawn from Beaufort as you need them.

"Keep the fleet-vessels with you until your position is assured. When you find they can be spared, order them back, or such of them as you can spare, to Fort Monroe, to report for orders.

"In case of failure to effect a landing, bring your command back to Beaufort, and report to these headquarters for further instructions. You will not debark at Beaufort until so directed.

"General Sheridan has been ordered to send a division of troops to Baltimore, and place them on sea-going vessels. These troops will be brought to Fort Monroe and kept there on the vessels until you are heard from. Should you require them, they will be sent to you.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"BEEVET MAJOR-GENERAL A. H. TERRY."

Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Comstock, aid-de-camp (now brevet brigadier-general), who accompanied the former expedition, was assigned, in orders, as chief-engineer to this.

It will be seen that these instructions did not differ materially from those given for the first expedition; and that in neither instance was there an order to assault Fort Fisher. This was a matter left entirely to the discretion of the commanding officer.

The expedition sailed from Fort Monroe on the morning of the 6th, arriving at the rendezvous, off Beaufort, on the 8th, where, owing to the difficulties of the weather, it lay until the morning of the 12th, when it got under way and reached its destination that evening. Under cover of the fleet, the disembarkation of the troops commenced on the morning of the 13th, and by three o'clock P. M. was completed without loss. On the 14th a reconnoissance was pushed to within five hundred yards of Fort Fisher, and a small advance work taken possession of and turned into a defensive line against any attempt that might be made from the fort. This reconnoissance disclosed the fact that the front of the work had been seriously injured by the navy fire. In the afternoon of the 15th the fort was assaulted, and after most desperate fighting was captured, with its entire garrison and armament. Thus was secured, by the combined efforts of the navy and army, one of the most important successes of the war. Our loss was: killed, one hundred and ten; wounded, five hundred and thirty-six. On the 16th and 17th the enemy abandoned and blew up Fort Caswell and the works on Smith's Island, which were immediately occupied by us. This gave us entire control of the mouth of the Cape Fear River.

At my request, Major-General B. F. Butler was relieved, and Major-General E. O. C. Ord assigned to the Department of Virginia and North Carolina.

The defence of the line of the Tennessee no longer requiring the force which had beaten and nearly destroyed the only army threatening it, I determined to find other fields of operation for General Thomas's surplus troops—fields from which they would co-operate with other movements. General Thomas was therefore directed to collect all troops, not essential to hold his communications at Eastport, in readiness for orders. On the 7th of January, General Thomas was directed, if he was assured of the departure of Hood south from Corinth, to send General Schofield with his corps east with as little delay as possible. This direction was promptly complied with, and the advance of the corps reached Washington on the 23d of the same month, whence it was sent to Fort Fisher and Newbern. On the 26th he was directed to send General A. J. Smith's command and a division of cavalry to report to General Canby. By the 7th of February the whole force was *en route* for its destination.

The State of North Carolina was constituted into a military department, and General Schofield assigned to command, and placed under the orders of Major-General Sherman. The following instructions were given him:

"CITY POINT, Va., January 31, 1865.

"GENERAL—* * * Your movements are intended as co-operative with Sherman through the States of South and North Carolina. The first point to be attained is to secure Wilmington. Goldsboro' will then be your objective point, moving either from Wilmington or Newbern, or both, as you deem best. Should you not be able to reach Goldsboro', you will advance on the line or lines of railway connecting that place with the seacoast—as near to it as you can, building the road behind you. The enterprise under you has two objects: the first is to give General Sherman material aid, if needed, in his march north; the second, to open a base of supplies for him on his line of march. As soon, therefore, as you can determine which of the two points, Wilmington or Newbern, you can best use for throwing supplies from to the interior, you will commence the accumulation of twenty days' rations and forage for sixty thousand men and twenty thousand animals. You will get of these as many as you can house and protect to such point in the interior as you may be able to occupy. I believe General Palmer has received some instructions direct from General Sherman on the subject of securing supplies for his army. You can learn what steps he has taken, and be governed in your requisitions accordingly. A supply of ordnance stores will also be necessary.

"Make all requisitions upon the chiefs of their respective departments in the field with me at City Point. Communicate with me by every opportunity; and should you deem it necessary at any time, send a special boat to Fortress Monroe, from which point you can communicate by telegraph.

"The supplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive of those required for your own command.

"The movements of the enemy may justify, or even make it your imperative duty, to cut loose from your base, and strike for the interior to aid Sherman. In such case you will act on your own judgment, without waiting for instructions. You will report, however, what you purpose doing. The details for carrying out these instructions are necessarily left to you. I would urge, however, if I did not know that you are already fully alive to the importance of it, prompt action. Sherman may be looked for in the neighborhood of Goldsboro' any time from the 22d to the 23th of February; this limits your time very materially.

"If rolling-stock is not secured in the capture of Wilmington, it can be supplied from Washington. A large force of railroad-men have already been sent to Beaufort, and other mechanics will go to Fort Fisher in a day or two. On this point I have informed you by telegraph.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL J. M. SCHOFIELD."

Previous to giving these instructions I had visited Fort Fisher, accompanied by General Schofield, for the purpose of seeing for myself the condition of things, and personally conferring with General Terry and Admiral Porter as to what was best to be done.

Anticipating the arrival of General Sherman at Savannah—his army entirely foot-loose, Hood being then before Nashville, Tennessee, the Southern railroads destroyed, so that it would take several months to re-establish a through-line from west to east, and regarding the capture of Lee's army as the most important operation towards closing the rebellion—I sent orders to General Sherman on the 6th of December, that after establishing a base on the seacoast, with necessary garrison, to include all his artillery and cavalry, to come by water to City Point with the balance of his command.

On the 18th of December, having received information of the defeat and utter rout of Hood's army by General Thomas, and that, owing to the great difficulty of procuring ocean transportation, it would take over two months to transport Sherman's army, and doubting whether he might not contribute as much towards the desired result by operating from where he was, I wrote to him to that effect, and asked him for his views as to what would be best to do. A few days after this I received a communication from General Sherman, of date 16th December, acknowledging the receipt of my order of the 6th, and informing me of his preparations to carry it into effect as soon as he could get transportation. Also that he had expected, upon reducing Savannah, instantly to march to Columbia, South Carolina, thence to Raleigh, and thence to report to me; but that this would consume about six weeks' time after the fall of Savannah, whereas by sea he could probably reach me by the middle of January. The confidence he manifested in this letter of being able to march up and join me pleased me, and, without waiting for a reply to my letter of the 18th, I directed him, on the 28th of December, to make preparations to start, as he proposed, without delay, to break up the railroads in North and South Carolina, and join the armies operating against Richmond as soon as he could.

On the 21st of January I informed General Sherman that I had ordered the Twenty-third Corps, Major-General Schofield commanding, east; that it numbered about twenty-one thousand men; that we had at Fort Fisher, about eight thousand men; at Newbern about four thousand; that if Wilmington was captured, General Schofield would go there; if not, he would be sent to Newbern; that, in either event, all the surplus force at both points would move to the interior towards Goldsboro', in co-operation with his movement; that from either point railroad communication could be run out; and that all these troops would be subject to his orders as he came into communication with them.

In obedience to his instructions, General Schofield proceeded to reduce Wilmington, North Carolina, in co-operation with the navy under Admiral Porter, moving his forces up both sides of the Cape Fear River. Fort Anderson, the enemy's main defence on the west bank of the river, was occupied on the morning of the 19th, the enemy having evacuated it after our appearance before it.

After fighting on 20th and 21st, our troops entered Wilmington on the morning of the 22d, the enemy having retreated towards Goldsboro' during the night. Preparations were at once made for a movement on Goldsboro' in two columns—one from Wilmington, and the other from Newbern—and to repair the railroad leading there from each place, as well as to supply General Sherman by Cape Fear River, towards Fayetteville, if it became necessary. The column from Newbern was attacked on the 8th of March at Wise's Forks, and driven back with the loss of several hundred prisoners. On the 11th the enemy renewed his attack upon our intrenched position,

but was repulsed with severe loss, and fell back during the night. On the 14th the Neuse River was crossed and Kinston occupied, and on the 21st Goldsboro' was entered. The column from Wilmington reached Cox's Bridge, on the Neuse River, ten miles above Goldsboro', on the 22d.

By the 1st of February, General Sherman's whole army was in motion from Savannah. He captured Columbia, South Carolina, on the 17th; thence moved on Goldsboro', North Carolina, *via* Fayetteville, reaching the latter place on the 12th of March, opening up communication with General Schofield by way of Cape Fear River. On the 15th he resumed his march on Goldsboro'. He met a force of the enemy at Averbysboro', and after a severe fight defeated and compelled it to retreat. Our loss in the engagement was about six hundred. The enemy's loss was much greater. On the 18th the combined forces of the enemy, under General Johnston, attacked his advance at Bentonville, capturing three guns and driving it back upon the main body. General Slocum, who was in the advance, ascertaining that the whole of Johnston's army was in the front, arranged his troops on the defensive, intrenched himself and awaited re-enforcements, which were pushed forward. On the night of the 21st the enemy retreated to Smithfield, leaving his dead and wounded in our hands. From there Sherman continued to Goldsboro', which place had been occupied by General Schofield on the 21st (crossing the Neuse River ten miles above there, at Cox's Bridge, where General Terry had got possession and thrown a ponton-bridge on the 22d), thus forming a junction with the columns from Newbern and Wilmington.

Among the important fruits of this campaign was the fall of Charleston, South Carolina. It was evacuated by the enemy on the night of the 17th of February, and occupied by our forces on the 18th.

On the morning of the 31st of January, General Thomas was directed to send a cavalry expedition, under General Stoneman, from East Tennessee, to penetrate South Carolina well down towards Columbia, to destroy the railroads and military resources of the country, and return, if he was able, to East Tennessee by way of Salisbury, North Carolina, releasing our prisoners there, if possible. Of the feasibility of this latter, however, General Stoneman was to judge. Sherman's movements, I had no doubt, would attract the attention of all the force the enemy could collect, and facilitate the execution of this. General Stoneman was so late in making his start on this expedition (and Sherman having passed out of the State of South Carolina), on the 27th of February I directed General Thomas to change his course, and ordered him to repeat his raid of last fall, destroying the railroad towards Lynchburg as far as he could. This would keep him between our garrisons in East Tennessee and the enemy. I regarded it not impossible that in the event of the enemy being driven from Richmond, he might fall back to Lynchburg and attempt a raid north through East Tennessee. On the 14th of February the following communication was sent to General Thomas:

"CITY POINT, Va., February 14, 1865.

"General Canby is preparing a movement from Mobile Bay against Mobile and the interior of Alabama. His force will consist of about twenty thousand men, besides A. J. Smith's command. The cavalry you have sent to Canby will be debarked at Vicksburg. It, with the available cavalry already in that section, will move from there eastward, in co-operation. Hood's army has been terribly reduced by the severe punishment you gave it in Tennessee, by desertion consequent upon their defeat, and now by the withdrawal of many of them to oppose Sherman. (I take it a large portion of the infantry has been so withdrawn. It is so asserted in the Richmond papers, and a member of the rebel Congress said a few days since in a speech, that one-half of it had been brought to South Carolina to oppose Sherman.) This being true, or even if it is not true, Canby's movement will attract all the attention of the enemy, and leave the advance from your standpoint easy. I think it advisable, therefore, that you prepare as much of a cavalry force as you can spare, and hold it in readiness to go south. The object would be threefold: first, to attract as much of the enemy's force as possible, to insure success to Canby; second, to destroy the enemy's line of communications and military resources; third, to destroy or capture their forces brought into the field. Tuscaloosa and Selma would probably be the points to direct the expedition against. This, however, would not be so important as the mere fact of penetrating deep into Alabama. Discretion should be left to the officer commanding the expedition to go where, according to the information he may receive, he will best secure the objects named above.

"Now that your force has been so much depleted, I do not know what number of men you can put into the field. If not more than five thousand men, however, all cavalry, I think it will be sufficient. It is not desirable that you should start this expedition until the one leaving Vicksburg has been three or four days out, or even a week. I do not know when it will start, but will inform you by telegraph as soon as I learn. If you should hear through other sources before hearing from me, you can act on the information received.

"To insure success, your cavalry should go with as little wagon-train as possible, relying upon the country for supplies. I would also reduce the number of guns to a battery, or the number of batteries, and put the extra teams to the guns taken. No guns or caissons should be taken with less than eight horses.

"Please inform me by telegraph, on receipt of this, what force you think you will be able to send under these directions.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL G. H. THOMAS."

On the 15th, he was directed to start the expedition as soon after the 20th as he could get it off.

I deemed it of the utmost importance, before a general movement of the armies operating against Richmond, that all communications with the city, north of James River, should be cut off. The enemy having withdrawn the bulk of his force from the Shenandoah Valley and sent it south, or replaced troops sent from Richmond, and desiring to re-enforce Sherman, if practicable, whose cavalry was greatly inferior in numbers to that of the enemy, I determined to make a move from the Shenandoah, which, if successful, would accomplish the first at least, and possibly the latter of these objects. I therefore telegraphed General Sheridan as follows:

"CITY POINT, Va., February 20, 1865—1 P. M.

"GENERAL—As soon as it is possible to travel, I think you will have no difficulty about reaching Lynchburg with a cavalry force alone. From there you could destroy the railroad and canal in every direction, so as to be of no further use to the rebellion. Sufficient cavalry should be left behind to look after Moseby's gang. From Lynchburg, if information you might get there would justify it, you could strike south, heading the streams in Virginia to the westward of Danville, and push on and join General Sherman. This additional raid, with one now about starting from East Tennessee under Stoneman, numbering four or five thousand cavalry, one from Vicksburg, numbering seven or eight thousand cavalry, one from Eastport, Mississippi, ten thousand cavalry, Cauby from Mobile Bay, with about thirty-eight thousand mixed troops, these three latter pushing for Tuscaloosa, Selma, and Montgomery, and Sherman with a large army eating out the vitals of South Carolina, is all that will be wanted to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. I would advise you to overcome great obstacles to accomplish this. Charleston was evacuated on Tuesday last.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."

On the 25th I received a dispatch from General Sheridan, inquiring where Sherman was aiming for, and if I could give him definite information as to the points he might be expected to move on, this side of Charlotte, North Carolina. In answer, the following telegram was sent him:

"CITY POINT, Va., February 25, 1865.

"GENERAL—Sherman's movements will depend on the amount of opposition he meets with from the enemy. If strongly opposed, he may possibly have to fall back to Georgetown, S. C., and fit out for a new start. I think, however, all danger for the necessity of going to that point has passed. I believe he has passed Charlotte. He may take Fayetteville on his way to Goldsboro'. If you reach Lynchburg, you will have to be guided in your after movements by the information you obtain. Before you could possibly reach Sherman, I think you would find him moving from Goldsboro' towards Raleigh, or engaging the enemy strongly posted at one or the other of these places, with railway communications opened from his army to Wilmington or Newbern.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."

General Sheridan moved from Winchester on the 27th of February, with two divisions of cavalry, numbering about five thousand each. On the 1st of March he secured the bridge, which the enemy attempted to destroy, across the middle fork of the Shenandoah, at Mount Crawford, and entered Staunton on the 2d, the enemy having retreated to Waynesboro'. Thence he pushed on to Waynesboro', where he found the enemy in force in an entrenched position, under General Early. Without stopping to make a reconnoissance, an immediate attack was made, the position was carried, and sixteen hundred prisoners, eleven pieces of artillery, with horses and caissons complete, two hundred wagons and teams loaded with subsistence, and seventeen battle-flags, were captured. The prisoners, under an escort of fifteen hundred men, were sent back to Winchester. Thence he marched on Charlottesville, destroying effectually the railroad and bridges as he went, which he reached on the 3d. Here he remained two days, destroying the railroad towards Richmond and Lynchburg, including the large iron bridges over the north and south forks of the Rivanna River and awaiting the arrival of his trains. This necessary delay caused him to abandon the idea of capturing Lynchburg. On the morning of the 6th, dividing his force into two columns, he sent one to Scottsville, whence it marched up the James River Canal to New Market, destroying every lock, and in many places the bank of the canal. From here a force was pushed out from this column to Duquitsville, to obtain possession of the bridge across the James River at that place, but failed. The enemy burned it on our approach. The enemy also burned the bridge across the river at Hardwickville. The other column moved down the railroad

towards Lynchburg, destroying it as far as Amherst Courthouse, sixteen miles from Lynchburg; thence across the country, uniting with the column at New Market. The river being very high, his pontoons would not reach across it; and the enemy having destroyed the bridges by which he had hoped to cross the river and get on the Southside Railroad about Farnville, and destroy it to Appomattox Courthouse, the only thing left for him was to return to Winchester or strike a base at the White House. Fortunately, he chose the latter. From New Market he took up his line of march, following the canal towards Richmond, destroying every lock upon it and cutting the banks wherever practicable, to a point eight miles east of Goochland, concentrating the whole force at Columbia on the 10th. Here he rested one day, and sent through by scouts information of his whereabouts and purposes, and a request for supplies to meet him at White House, which reached me on the night of the 12th. An infantry force was immediately sent to get possession of White House, and supplies were forwarded. Moving from Columbia in a direction to threaten Richmond, to near Ashland Station, he crossed the Annas, and after having destroyed all the bridges and many miles of the railroad, proceeded down the north bank of the Pamunkey to White House, which place he reached on the 19th.

Previous to this the following communication was sent to General Thomas :

"CITY POINT, Va., March 7, 1865—9:30 A. M.

"GENERAL—I think it will be advisable now for you to repair the railroad in East Tennessee, and throw a good force up to Bull's Gap and fortify there. Supplies at Knoxville could always be got forward as required. With Bull's Gap fortified, you can occupy as outposts about all of East Tennessee, and be prepared, if it should be required of you in the spring, to make a campaign towards Lynchburg, or into North Carolina. I do not think Stoneman should break the road until he gets into Virginia, unless it should be to cut off rolling-stock that may be caught west of that.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL G. H. THOMAS."

Thus it will be seen that in March, 1865, General Canby was moving an adequate force against Mobile and the army defending it under General Dick Taylor; Thomas was pushing out two large and well-appointed cavalry expeditions—one from Middle Tennessee under brevet Major-General Wilson against the enemy's vital points in Alabama, the other from East Tennessee, under Major-General Stoneman, towards Lynchburg—and assembling the remainder of his available forces, preparatory to offensive operations from East Tennessee; General Sheridan's cavalry was at White House; the Armies of the Potomac and James were confronting the enemy, under Lee, in his defences of Richmond and Petersburg; General Sherman with his armies, re-enforced by that of General Schofield, was at Goldsboro'; General Pope was making preparations for a spring campaign against the enemy under Kirby Smith and Price, west of the Mississippi; and General Hancock was concentrating a force in the vicinity of Winchester, Virginia, to guard against invasion or to operate offensively, as might prove necessary.

After the long march by General Sheridan's cavalry over winter roads, it was necessary to rest and refit at White House. At this time the greatest source of uneasiness to me was the fear that the enemy would leave his strong lines about Petersburg and Richmond for the purpose of uniting with Johnston, before he was driven from them by battle, or I was prepared to make an effectual pursuit. On the 24th of March, General Sheridan moved from White House, crossed the James River at Jones' Landing, and formed a junction with the Army of the Potomac in front of Petersburg on the 27th. During this move, General Ord sent forces to cover the crossings of the Chickahominy.

On the 24th of March the following instructions for a general movement of the armies operating against Richmond were issued :

"CITY POINT, Va., March 24, 1865.

"GENERAL—On the 29th instant the armies operating against Richmond will be moved by our left, for the double purpose of turning the enemy out of his present position around Petersburg, and to insure the success of the cavalry under General Sheridan, which will start at the same time, in its efforts to reach and destroy the Southside and Danville Railroads. Two corps of the Army of the Potomac will be moved at first in two columns, taking the two roads crossing Hatcher's Run, nearest where the present line held by us strikes that stream, both moving towards Dinwiddie Courthouse.

The cavalry under General Sheridan, joined by the division now under General Davies, will move at the same time by the Weldon road and the Jerusalem plankroad, turning west from the latter before crossing the Nottoway, and west with the whole column before reaching Stoney Creek. General Sheridan will then move independently, under other instructions which will be given him. All dismounted cavalry belonging to the Army of the Potomac, and the dismounted cavalry from the middle military division not required for guarding property belonging to their arm of service, will report to Brigadier-General Benham, to be added to the defences of City Point.

Major-General Parke will be left in command of all the army left for holding the lines about Petersburg and City Point, subject of course to orders from the commander of the Army of the Potomac. The Ninth Army Corps will be left intact, to hold the present line of works so long as the whole line now occupied by us is held. If, however, the troops to the left of the Ninth Corps are withdrawn, then the left of the corps may be thrown back so as to occupy the position held by the army prior to the capture of the Weldon road. All troops to the left of the Ninth Corps will be held in readiness to move at the shortest notice by such route as may be designated when the order is given.

"General Ord will detach three divisions, two white and one colored, or so much of them as he can, and hold his present lines, and march for the present left of the Army of the Potomac. In the absence of further orders, or until further orders are given, the white divisions will follow the left column of the Army of the Potomac, and the colored division the right column. During the movement Major-General Weitzel will be left in command of all the forces remaining behind from the Army of the James.

"The movement of troops from the Army of the James will commence on the night of the 27th instant. General Ord will leave behind the minimum number of cavalry necessary for picket-duty, in the absence of the main army. A cavalry expedition, from General Ord's command, will also be started from Suffolk, to leave there on Saturday, the 1st of April, under Colonel Sumner, for the purpose of cutting the railroad about Hicksford. This, if accomplished, will have to be a surprise, and therefore from three to five hundred men will be sufficient. They should, however, be supported by all the infantry that can be spared from Norfolk and Portsmouth, as far out as to where the cavalry crosses the Blackwater. The crossing should probably be at Uniten. Should Colonel Sumner succeed in reaching the Weldon road, he will be instructed to do all the damage possible to the triangle of roads between Hicksford, Weldon, and Gaston. The railroad-bridge at Weldon being fitted up for the passage of carriages, it might be practicable to destroy any accumulation of supplies the enemy may have collected south of the Roanoke. All the troops will move with four days' rations in haversacks and eight days' in wagons. To avoid as much hauling as possible, and to give the Army of the James the same number of days' supply with the Army of the Potomac, General Ord will direct his commissary and quartermaster to have sufficient supplies delivered at the terminus of the road to fill up in passing. Sixty rounds of ammunition per man will be taken in wagons, and as much grain as the transportation on hand will carry, after taking the specified amount of other supplies. The densely wooded country in which the army has to operate making the use of much artillery impracticable, the amount taken with the army will be reduced to six or eight guns to each division, at the option of the army commanders.

"All necessary preparations for carrying these directions into operation may be commenced at once. The reserves of the Ninth Corps should be massed as much as possible. Whilst I would not now order an unconditional attack on the enemy's line by them, they should be ready, and should make the attack if the enemy weakens his line in their front, without waiting for orders. In case they carry the line, then the whole of the Ninth Corps could follow up so as to join or co-operate with the balance of the army. To prepare for this, the Ninth Corps will have rations issued to them, same as the balance of the army. General Weitzel will keep vigilant watch upon his front, and if found at all practicable to break through at any point, he will do so. A success north of the James should be followed up with great promptness. An attack will not be feasible unless it is found that the enemy has detached largely. In that case it may be regarded as evident that the enemy are relying upon their local reserves principally for the defence of Richmond. Preparations may be made for abandoning all the line north of the James, except inclosed works—only to be abandoned, however, after a break is made in the lines of the enemy.

"By these instructions a large part of the armies operating against Richmond is left behind. The enemy, knowing this, may, as an only chance, strip their lines to the merest skeleton, in the hope of advantage not being taken of it, whilst they hurl every thing against the moving column, and return. It cannot be impressed too strongly upon commanders of troops left in the trenches not to allow this to occur without taking advantage of it. The very fact of the enemy coming out to attack, if he does so, might be regarded as almost conclusive evidence of such a weakening of his lines. I would have it particularly enjoined upon corps commanders that, in case of an attack from the enemy, those not attacked are not to wait for orders from the commanding officer of the army to which they belong, but that they will move promptly, and notify the commander of their action. I would also enjoin the same action on the part of division commanders when other parts of their corps are engaged. In like manner, I would urge the importance of following up a repulse of the enemy.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERALS MEADE, ORD, and SHERIDAN."

Early on the morning of the 25th the enemy assaulted our lines in front of the Ninth Corps (which held from the Appomattox River towards our left), and carried Fort Steadman, and a part of the line to the right and left of it, established themselves and turned the guns of the fort against us; but our troops on either flank held their ground until the reserves were brought up, when the enemy was driven back with a heavy loss in killed and wounded, and one thousand nine hundred prisoners. Our loss was sixty-eight killed, three hundred and thirty-seven wounded, and five hundred and six missing. General Meade at once ordered the other corps to advance and feel the enemy in their respective fronts. Pushing forward, they captured and held the enemy's strongly entrenched picket-line in front of the Second and Sixth corps, and eight hundred and thirty-four prisoners. The enemy made desperate attempts to retake this line, but without success. Our loss in front of these was fifty-two killed, eight hundred and sixty four wounded, and two hundred and seven missing. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded was far greater.

General Sherman having got his troops all quietly in camp about Goldsboro', and his preparations for furnishing supplies to them perfected, visited me at City Point on the 27th of March, and stated that he would be ready to move, as he had previously written me, by the 10th of April, fully equipped and rationed for twenty days, if it should become necessary to bring his command to bear against Lee's army, in co-operation with our forces in front of Richmond and Petersburg. General Sherman proposed in this movement to threaten Raleigh, and then, by turning suddenly to the right, reach the Roanoke at Gaston or thereabouts, whence he could move on to the Richmond and Danville Railroad, striking it in the vicinity of Burkesville, or join the armies operating against Richmond, as might be deemed best. This plan he was directed to carry into execution, if he received no further directions in the mean time. I explained to him the movement I had ordered to commence on the 29th of March. That if it should not prove as entirely successful as I hoped, I would cut the cavalry loose to destroy the Danville and Southside railroads, and thus deprive the enemy of further supplies, and also prevent the rapid concentration of Lee's and Johnston's armies.

I had spent days of anxiety lest each morning should bring the report that the enemy had retreated the night before. I was firmly convinced that Sherman's crossing the Roanoke would be the signal for Lee to leave. With Johnston and him combined, a long, tedious, and expensive campaign, consuming most of the summer, might become necessary. By moving out I would put the army in better condition for pursuit, and would at least, by the destruction of the Danville road, retard the concentration of the two armies of Lee and Johnston, and cause the enemy to abandon much material that he might otherwise save. I therefore determined not to delay the movement ordered.

On the night of the 27th, Major-General Ord, with two divisions of the Twenty-fourth Corps, Major-General Gibbon commanding, and one division of the Twenty-fifth Corps, Brigadier-General Birney commanding, and McKenzie's cavalry, took up his line of march in pursuance of the foregoing instructions, and reached the position assigned him near Hatcher's Run on the morning of the 29th. On the 28th the following instructions were given to General Sheridan :

"CITY POINT, Va., March 28, 1865.

"GENERAL—The Fifth Army Corps will move by the Vaughn road at three A. M. to-morrow morning. The Second moves at about nine A. M., having but about three miles to march to reach the point designated for it to take on the right of the Fifth Corps, after the latter reaching Dinwiddie Courthouse. Move your cavalry at as early an hour as you can, and without being confined to any particular road or roads. You may go out by the nearest roads in rear of the Fifth Corps, pass by its left, and, passing near to or through Dinwiddie, reach the right and rear of the enemy as soon as you can. It is not the intention to attack the enemy in his intrenched position, but to force him out, if possible. Should he come out and attack us, or get himself where he can be attacked, move in with your entire force in your own way, and with the full reliance that the army will engage or follow, as circumstances will dictate. I shall be on the field, and will probably be able to communicate with you. Should I not do so, and you find that the enemy keeps within his main intrenched line, you may cut loose and push for the Danville road. If you find it practicable, I would like you to cross the Southside road, between Petersburg and Burkesville, and destroy it to some extent. I would not advise much detention, however, until you reach the Danville road, which I would like you to strike as near to the Appomattox as possible. Make your destruction on that road as complete as possible. You can then pass on to the Southside road, west of Burkesville, and destroy that in like manner.

"After having accomplished the destruction of the two railroads, which are now the only avenues of supply to Lee's army, you may return to this army, selecting your road further south, or you may go on into North Carolina and join General Sherman. Should you select the latter course, get the information to me as early as possible, so that I may send orders to meet you at Goldsboro'.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."

On the morning of the 29th the movement commenced. At night the cavalry was at Dinwiddie Courthouse, and the left of our infantry line extended to the Quaker road, near its intersection with the Boydton plankroad. The position of the troops, from left to right, was as follows: Sheridan, Warren, Humphreys, Ord, Wright, Parke.

Every thing looked favorable to the defeat of the enemy and the capture of Petersburg and Richmond, if the proper effort was made. I therefore addressed the following communication to General Sheridan, having previously informed him verbally not to cut loose for the raid contemplated in his orders until he received notice from me to do so :

"GRAVELLY CREEK, March 29, 1865.

"GENERAL—Our line is now unbroken from the Appomattox to Dinwiddie. We are all ready however, to give up all, from the Jerusalem plankroad to Hatcher's Run, whenever the forces can be used advantageously. After getting into line south of Hatcher's, we pushed forward to find

the enemy's position. General Griffin was attacked near where the Quaker road intersects the Boydton road, but repulsed it easily, capturing about one hundred men. Humphreys reached Dabney's mill, and was pushing on when last heard from.

"I now feel like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so, before going back. I do not want you, therefore, to cut loose and go after the enemy's roads at present. In the morning push around the enemy, if you can, and get on to his right rear. The movements of the enemy's cavalry may, of course, modify your action. We will act all together as one army here, until it is seen what can be done with the enemy. The signal-officer at Cobb's Hill reported, at half-past eleven A. M., that a cavalry column had passed that point from Richmond towards Petersburg, taking forty minutes to pass.

"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

From the night of the 29th to the morning of the 31st the rain fell in such torrents as to make it impossible to move a wheeled vehicle, except as corduroy roads were laid in front of them. During the 30th, Sheridan advanced from Dinwiddie Courthouse towards Five Forks, where he found the enemy in force. General Warren advanced and extended his line across the Boydton plankroad to near the White Oak road, with a view of getting across the latter; but, finding the enemy strong in his front and extending beyond his left, was directed to hold on where he was and fortify. General Humphreys drove the enemy from his front into his main line on the Hatcher, near Burgess's mills. Generals Ord, Wright, and Parke made examination in their fronts to determine the feasibility of an assault on the enemy's lines. The two latter reported favorably. The enemy confronting us, as he did, at every point from Richmond to our extreme left, I conceived his lines must be weakly held, and could be penetrated if my estimate of his forces was correct. I determined, therefore, to extend my line no further, but to re-enforce General Sheridan with a corps of infantry, and thus enable him to cut loose and turn the enemy's right flank, and with the other corps assault the enemy's lines. The result of the offensive effort of the enemy the week before, when he assaulted Fort Steadman, particularly favored this. The enemy's intrenched picket-line captured by us at that time threw the lines occupied by the belligerents so close together at some points that it was but a moment's run from one to the other. Preparations were at once made to relieve General Humphreys' corps, to report to General Sheridan; but the condition of the roads prevented immediate movement. On the morning of the 31st, General Warren reported favorably to getting possession of the White Oak road, and was directed to do so. To accomplish this, he moved with one division, instead of his whole corps, which was attacked by the enemy in superior force and driven back on the second division before it had time to form, and it, in turn, forced back upon the third division, when the enemy was checked. A division of the Second Corps was immediately sent to his support, the enemy driven back with heavy loss, and possession of the White Oak road gained. Sheridan advanced, and with a portion of his cavalry got possession of the Five Forks; but the enemy, after the affair with the Fifth Corps, re-enforced the rebel cavalry, defending that point with infantry, and forced him back towards Dinwiddie Courthouse. Here General Sheridan displayed great generalship. Instead of retreating with his whole command on the main army, to tell the story of superior forces encountered, he deployed his cavalry on foot, leaving only mounted men enough to take charge of the horses. This compelled the enemy to deploy over a vast extent of woods and broken country, and made his progress slow. At this juncture he dispatched to me what had taken place, and that he was dropping back slowly on Dinwiddie Courthouse. General McKenzie's cavalry and one division of the Fifth Corps were immediately ordered to his assistance. Soon after, receiving a report from General Meade that Humphreys could hold our position on the Boydton road, and that the other two divisions of the Fifth Corps could go to Sheridan, they were so ordered at once. Thus the operations of the day necessitated the sending of Warren, because of his accessibility, instead of Humphreys, as was intended, and precipitated intended movements. On the morning of the 1st of April, General Sheridan, re-enforced by General Warren, drove the enemy back on Five Forks, where, late in the evening, he assaulted and carried his strongly fortified position, capturing all his artillery and between five and six thousand prisoners.

About the close of this battle, brevet Major-General Charles Griffin relieved Major-General Warren in command of the Fifth Corps. The report of this reached me after nightfall. Some apprehensions filled my mind lest the enemy might desert his lines during the night, and by falling upon General Sheridan before assistance could reach him, drive him from his position and open the way for retreat. To guard against this, General Miles' division of Humphreys' corps was sent to re-enforce him, and a bombardment was commenced and kept up until four o'clock in the morning (April 2), when an assault was ordered on the enemy's lines. General Wright penetrated the lines with his whole corps, sweeping every thing before him, and to his left towards Hatcher's Run, capturing many guns and several thousand prisoners. He was

closely followed by two divisions of General Ord's command, until he met the other division of General Ord's that had succeeded in forcing the enemy's lines near Hatcher's Run. Generals Wright and Ord immediately swung to the right, and closed all of the enemy on that side of them in Petersburg, while General Humphreys pushed forward with two divisions and joined General Wright on the left. General Parke succeeded in carrying the enemy's main line, capturing guns and prisoners, but was unable to carry his inner line. General Sheridan, being advised of the condition of affairs, returned General Miles to his proper command. On reaching the enemy's lines immediately surrounding Petersburg, a portion of General Gibbon's corps, by a most gallant charge, captured two strong inclosed works—the most salient and commanding south of Petersburg—thus materially shortening the line of investment necessary for taking in the city. The enemy south of Hatcher's Run retreated westward to Sutherland's Station, where they were overtaken by Miles' division. A severe engagement ensued, and lasted until both his right and left flanks were threatened by the approach of General Sheridan, who was moving from Ford's Station towards Petersburg, and a division sent by General Meade from the front of Petersburg, when he broke in the utmost confusion, leaving in our hands his guns and many prisoners. This force retreated by the main road along the Appomattox River. During the night of the 2d the enemy evacuated Petersburg and Richmond, and retreated towards Danville. On the morning of the 3d pursuit was commenced. General Sheridan pushed for the Danville road, keeping near the Appomattox, followed by General Meade with the Second and Sixth corps, while General Ord moved for Burkesville along the Southside road; the Ninth Corps stretched along that road behind him. On the 4th, General Sheridan struck the Danville road near Jetersville, where he learned that Lee was at Amelia Courthouse. He immediately intrenched himself and awaited the arrival of General Meade, who reached there the next day. General Ord reached Burkesville on the evening of the 5th.

On the morning of the 5th, I addressed Major-General Sherman the following communication :

" WILSON'S STATION, April 5, 1865.

" GENERAL—All indications now are that Lee will attempt to reach Danville with the remnant of his force. Sheridan, who was up with him last night, reports all that is left, horse, foot, and dragoons, at twenty thousand, much demoralized. We hope to reduce this number one-half. I shall push on to Burkesville, and, if a stand is made at Danville, will in a very few days go there. If you can possibly do so, push on from where you are, and let us see if we cannot finish the job with Lee's and Johnston's armies. Whether it will be better for you to strike for Greensboro', or nearer to Danville, you will be better able to judge when you receive this. Rebel armies now are the only strategic points to strike at.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

" MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN."

On the morning of the 6th, it was found that General Lee was moving west of Jetersville, towards Danville. General Sheridan moved with his cavalry (the Fifth Corps having been returned to General Meade on his reaching Jetersville) to strike his flank, followed by the Sixth Corps, while the Second and Fifth corps pressed hard after, forcing him to abandon several hundred wagons and several pieces of artillery. General Ord advanced from Burkesville towards Farmville, sending two regiments of infantry and a squadron of cavalry, under brevet Brigadier-General Theodore Read, to reach and destroy the bridges. This advance met the head of Lee's column near Farmville, which it heroically attacked and detained until General Read was killed and his small force overpowered. This caused a delay in the enemy's movements, and enabled General Ord to get well up with the remainder of his force, on meeting which, the enemy immediately intrenched himself. In the afternoon, General Sheridan struck the enemy south of Sailors' Creek, captured sixteen pieces of artillery and about four hundred wagons, and detained him until the Sixth Corps got up, when a general attack of infantry and cavalry was made, which resulted in the capture of six or seven thousand prisoners, among whom were many general officers. The movements of the Second Corps and General Ord's command contributed greatly to the day's success.

On the morning of the 7th, the pursuit was renewed, the cavalry, except one division, and the Fifth Corps moving by Prince Edward's Courthouse; the Sixth Corps, General Ord's command, and one division of cavalry, on Farmville; and the Second Corps by the High Bridge road. It was soon found that the enemy had crossed to the north side of the Appomattox; but so close was the pursuit, that the Second Corps got possession of the common bridge at High Bridge before the enemy could destroy it, and immediately crossed over. The Sixth Corps and a division of cavalry crossed at Farmville to its support.

Feeling now that General Lee's chance of escape was utterly hopeless, I addressed him the following communication from Farmville :

"GENERAL—The result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of Northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate States army known as the Army of Northern Virginia.

"APRIL 7, 1865.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"GENERAL R. E. LEE."

Early on the morning of the 8th, before leaving, I received at Farmville the following:

"APRIL 7, 1865.

"GENERAL—I have received your note of this date. Though not entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia. I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender.

"R. E. LEE, General.

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."

To this I immediately replied:

"APRIL 8, 1865.

"GENERAL—Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same date, asking the condition on which I will accept the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, is just received. In reply, I would say, that *peace* being my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon—namely, That the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged. I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia will be received.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"GENERAL R. E. LEE."

Early on the morning of the 8th the pursuit was resumed. General Meade followed north of the Appomattox, and General Sheridan, with all the cavalry, pushed straight for Appomattox Station, followed by General Ord's command and the Fifth Corps. During the day General Meade's advance had considerable fighting with the enemy's rear-guard, but was unable to bring on a general engagement. Late in the evening General Sheridan struck the railroad at Appomattox Station, drove the enemy from there, and captured twenty-five pieces of artillery, a hospital-train, and four trains of cars loaded with supplies for Lee's army. During this day I accompanied General Meade's column, and about midnight received the following communication from General Lee:

"APRIL 8, 1865.

"GENERAL—I received, at a late hour, your note of to-day. In mine of yesterday I did not intend to propose the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. To be frank, I do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender of this army; but as the restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, I desire to know whether your proposals would lead to that end. I cannot, therefore, meet you with a view to surrender the Army of Northern Virginia; but as far as your proposal may affect the Confederate States forces under my command, and tend to the restoration of peace, I should be pleased to meet you at 10 A.M. to-morrow on the old stage-road to Richmond, between the picket-lines of the two armies.

R. E. LEE, General.

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."

Early on the morning of the 9th I returned him an answer as follows, and immediately started to join the column south of the Appomattox:

"APRIL 9, 1865

"GENERAL—Your note of yesterday is received. I have no authority to treat on the subject of peace; the meeting proposed for A. M. to-day could lead to no good. I will state, however, general, that I am equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole North entertains the same feeling. The terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. By the South laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed. Seriously hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, I subscribe myself, etc.,

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"GENERAL R. E. LEE."

On the morning of the 9th, General Ord's command and the Fifth Corps reached Appomattox Station just as the enemy was making a desperate effort to break through our cavalry. The infantry was at once thrown in. Soon after a white flag was received, requesting a suspension of hostilities pending negotiations for a surrender.

Before reaching General Sheridan's headquarters, I received the following from General Lee:

" APRIL 9, 1865.

"GENERAL.—I received your note of this morning on the picket-line, whither I had come to meet you, and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army. I now ask an interview, in accordance with the offer contained in your letter of yesterday, for that purpose.

R. E. LEE, General

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."

The interview was held at Appomattox Courthouse, the result of which is set forth in the following correspondence :

" APPOMATTOX COURTHOUSE, Virginia, April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL.—In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th instant, I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia on the following terms, to wit: Rolls of the officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer to be designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. The officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged; and each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the men of their commands. The arms, artillery, and public property to be packed and stacked, and turned over to the officers appointed by me to receive them. This will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or baggage. This done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by United States authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they may reside.

" U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"GENERAL R. E. LEE."

" HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL.—I received your letter of this date containing the terms of the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as proposed by you. As they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 8th instant, they are accepted. I will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect.

R. E. LEE, General.

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."

The command of Major-General Gibbon, the Fifth Army Corps under Griffin, and McKenzie's cavalry, were designated to remain at Appomattox Courthouse until the paroling of the surrendered army was completed, and to take charge of the public property. The remainder of the army immediately returned to the vicinity of Burkesville.

General Lee's great influence throughout the whole South caused his example to be followed, and to-day the result is that the armies lately under his leadership are at their homes, desiring peace and quiet, and their arms are in the hands of our ordnance officers.

On the receipt of my letter of the 5th, General Sherman moved directly against General Johnston, who retreated rapidly on and through Raleigh, which place General Sherman occupied on the morning of the 13th. The day preceding, news of the surrender of General Lee reached him at Smithfield.

On the 14th a correspondence was opened between General Sherman and General Johnston, which resulted on the 18th in an agreement for the suspension of hostilities, and a memorandum or basis for peace, subject to the approval of the President. This agreement was disapproved by the President on the 21st, which disapproval, together with your instructions, was communicated to General Sherman by me in person on the morning of the 24th, at Raleigh, North Carolina, in obedience to your orders. Notice was at once given by him to General Johnston for the termination of the truce that had been entered into. On the 25th another meeting between them was agreed upon, to take place on the 26th, which terminated in the surrender and disbandment of Johnston's army upon substantially the same terms as were given to General Lee.

The expedition under General Stoneman from East Tennessee got off on the 20th of March, moving by way of Boone, North Carolina, and struck the railroad at Wytheville, Chambersburg, and Big Lick. The force striking it at Big Lick pushed on to within a few miles of Lynchburg, destroying the important bridges, while with the main force he effectually destroyed it between New River and Big Lick, and then turned for Greensboro' on the North Carolina Railroad; struck that road and destroyed the bridges between Danville and Greensboro', and between Greensboro' and the Yadkin, together with the depots of supplies along it, and captured four hundred prisoners. At Salisbury he attacked and defeated a force of the enemy under General Gardiner, capturing fourteen pieces of artillery and one thousand three hundred and sixty-four prisoners, and destroyed large amounts of army stores. At this place he destroyed fifteen miles of railroad and the bridges towards Charlotte. Thence he moved to Slatersville.

General Canby, who had been directed in January to make preparations for a movement from Mobile Bay against Mobile and the interior of Alabama, commenced his movement on the 20th of March. The Sixteenth Corps, Major-General A. J. Smith commanding, moved from Fort Gaines by water to Fish River; the Thirteenth Corps, under Major-General Gordon Granger, moved from Fort Morgan and joined the Sixteenth Corps on Fish River, both moving thence on Spanish Fort and investing it on the 27th; while Major-General Steele's command moved from Pensacola, cut the railroad leading from Tensas to Montgomery, effected a junction with them, and partially invested Fort Blakely. After a severe bombardment of Spanish Fort, a part of its line was carried on the 8th of April. During the night the enemy evacuated the fort. Fort Blakely was carried by assault on the 9th, and many prisoners captured; our loss was considerable. These successes practically opened to us the Alabama River, and enabled us to approach Mobile from the north. On the night of the 11th the city was evacuated, and was taken possession of by our forces on the morning of the 12th.

The expedition under command of Brevet Major-General Wilson, consisting of twelve thousand five hundred mounted men, was delayed by rains until March 22d, when it moved from Chickasaw, Alabama. On the 1st of April, General Wilson encountered the enemy in force under Forrest near Ebenezer Church, drove him in confusion, captured three hundred prisoners and three guns, and destroyed the central bridge over the Cahawba River. On the 2d he attacked and captured the fortified city of Selma, defended by Forrest with seven thousand men and thirty-two guns, destroyed the arsenal, armory, naval foundry, machine-shops, vast quantities of stores, and captured three thousand prisoners. On the 4th he captured and destroyed Tuscaloosa. On the 10th he crossed the Alabama River, and after sending information of his operations to General Canby, marched on Montgomery, which place he occupied on the 14th, the enemy having abandoned it. At this place many stores and five steamboats fell into our hands. Thence a force marched direct on Columbus, and another on West Point, both of which places were assaulted and captured on the 16th. At the former place we got one thousand five hundred prisoners and fifty-two field-guns, destroyed two gunboats, the navy yard, foundries, arsenal, many factories, and much other public property. At the latter place we got three hundred prisoners, four guns, and destroyed nineteen locomotives and three hundred cars. On the 20th he took possession of Macon, Georgia, with sixty field-guns, one thousand two hundred militia, and five generals, surrendered by General Howell Cobb. General Wilson, hearing that Jeff. Davis was trying to make his escape, sent forces in pursuit and succeeded in capturing him on the morning of May 11th.

On the 4th day of May, General Dick Taylor surrendered to General Canby all the remaining rebel forces east of the Mississippi.

A force sufficient to insure an easy triumph over the enemy under Kirby Smith, west of the Mississippi, was immediately put in motion for Texas, and Major-General Sheridan designated for its immediate command; but on the 26th day of May, and before they reached their destination, General Kirby Smith surrendered his entire command to Major-General Canby. This surrender did not take place, however, until after the capture of the rebel President and Vice-President; and the bad faith was exhibited of first disbanding most of his army and permitting an indiscriminate plunder of public property.

Owing to the report that many of those lately in arms against the Government had taken refuge upon the soil of Mexico, carrying with them arms rightfully belonging to the United States, which had been surrendered to us by agreement—among them some of the leaders who had surrendered in person—and the disturbed condition of affairs on the Rio Grande, the orders for troops to proceed to Texas were not changed.

There have been severe combats, raids, expeditions, and movements to defeat the designs and purposes of the enemy, most of them reflecting great credit on our arms, and which contributed greatly to our final triumph, that I have not mentioned. Many of these will be found clearly set forth in the reports herewith submitted; some in the telegrams and brief dispatches announcing them, and others, I regret to say, have not as yet been officially reported.

For information touching our Indian difficulties, I would respectfully refer to the reports of the commanders of departments in which they have occurred.

It has been my fortune to see the armies of both the West and the East fight battles, and from what I have seen I know there is no difference in their fighting qualities. All that it was possible for men to do in battle they have done. The Western armies commenced their battles in the Mississippi Valley, and received the final surrender of the remnant of the principal army opposed to them in North Carolina. The armies of the East commenced their battles on the river from which the Army of the Potomac derived its name, and received the final surrender of their old

antagonist at Appomattox Courthouse, Virginia. The splendid achievements of each have nationalized our victories, removed all sectional jealousies (of which we have unfortunately experienced too much), and the cause of crimination and recrimination that might have followed had either section failed in its duty. All have a proud record, and all sections can well congratulate themselves and each other for having done their full share in restoring the supremacy of law over every foot of territory belonging to the United States. Let them hope for perpetual peace and harmony with that enemy, whose manhood, however mistaken the cause, drew forth such heroic deeds of valor.

I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, November 18, 1865.

[Official copy].

E. D. TOWNSEND,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

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
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